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1 What is Economics? 
Economics studies the allocation of scarce resources among people – examining 
what goods and services wind up in the hands of which people.  Why scarce 
resources?  Absent scarcity, there is no significant allocation issue.  All practical, 
and many impractical, means of allocating scarce resources are studied by 
economists.  Markets are an important means of allocating resources, so 
economists study markets.  Markets include stock markets like the New York 
Stock Exchange, commodities markets like the Chicago Mercantile, but also 
farmer’s markets, auction markets like Christie’s or Sotheby’s (made famous in 
movies by people scratching their noses and inadvertently purchasing a Ming 
vase) or eBay, or more ephemeral markets, such as the market for music CDs in 
your neighborhood.  In addition, goods and services (which are scarce 
resources) are allocated by governments, using taxation as a means of acquiring 
the items.  Governments may be controlled by a political process, and the study 
of allocation by the politics, which is known as political economy, is a significant 
branch of economics.  Goods are allocated by certain means, like theft, deemed 
illegal by the government, and such allocation methods nevertheless fall within 
the domain of economic analysis; the market for marijuana remains vibrant 
despite interdiction by the governments of most nations.  Other allocation 
methods include gifts and charity, lotteries and gambling, and cooperative 
societies and clubs, all of which are studied by economists. 
 
Some markets involve a physical marketplace.  Traders on the New York Stock 
Exchange get together in a trading pit.  Traders on eBay come together in an 
electronic marketplace.  Other markets, which are more familiar to most of us, 
involve physical stores that may or may not be next door to each other, and 
customers who search among the stores, purchasing when the customer finds an 
appropriate item at an acceptable price.  When we buy bananas, we don’t 
typically go to a banana market and purchase from one of a dozen or more 
banana sellers, but instead go to a grocery store.  Nevertheless, in buying 
bananas, the grocery stores compete in a market for our banana patronage, 
attempting to attract customers to their stores and inducing them to purchase 
bananas. 
 
Price – exchange of goods and services for money – is an important allocation 
means, but price is hardly the only factor even in market exchanges.  Other 
terms, such as convenience, credit terms, reliability, and trustworthiness are also 
valuable to the participants in a transaction.  In some markets such as 36 inch 
Sony WEGA televisions, one ounce bags of Cheetos, or Ford Autolite spark 
plugs, the products offered by distinct sellers are identical, and for such products, 
price is usually the primary factor considered by buyers, although delivery and 
other aspects of the transaction may still matter.  For other products, like 
restaurant meals, camcorders by different manufacturers, or air travel on distinct 
airlines, the products differ to some degree, and thus the qualities of the product 
are factors in the decision to purchase.  Nevertheless, different products may be 
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considered to be in a single market if the products are reasonable substitutes, 
and we can consider a “quality-adjusted” price for these different goods. 
 
Economic analysis is used in many situations.  When British Petroleum sets the 
price for its Alaskan crude oil, it uses an estimated demand model, both for 
gasoline consumers and also for the refineries to which BP sells.  The demand 
for oil by refineries is governed by a complex economic model used by the 
refineries and BP estimates the demand by refineries by estimating the economic 
model used by refineries.  Economic analysis was used by experts in the antitrust 
suit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice both to understand Microsoft’s 
incentive to foreclose (eliminate from the market) rival Netscape and consumer 
behavior in the face of alleged foreclosure.  Stock market analysts use economic 
models to forecast the profits of companies in order to predict the price of their 
stocks.  When the government forecasts the budget deficit or considers a change 
in environmental regulations, it uses a variety of economic models.  This book 
presents the building blocks of the models in common use by an army of 
economists thousands of times per day. 
1.1.1 Normative and Positive Theories 
Economic analysis is used for two main purposes.  The first is a scientific 
understanding of how allocations of goods and services – scarce resources – are 
actually determined.  This is a positive analysis, analogous to the study of 
electromagnetism or molecular biology, and involves only the attempt to 
understand the world around us.   The development of this positive theory, 
however, suggests other uses for economics.  Economic analysis suggests how 
distinct changes in laws, rules and other government interventions in markets will 
affect people, and in some cases, one can draw a conclusion that a rule change 
is, on balance, socially beneficial.  Such analyses combine positive analysis – 
predicting the effects of changes in rules – with value judgments, and are known 
as normative analyses.  For example, a gasoline tax used to build highways 
harms gasoline buyers (who pay higher prices), but helps drivers (who face fewer 
potholes and less congestion).  Since drivers and gasoline buyers are generally 
the same people, a normative analysis may suggest that everyone will benefit.  
This type of outcome, where everyone is made better off by a change, is 
relatively uncontroversial. 
 
In contrast, cost-benefit analysis weighs the gains and losses to different 
individuals and suggests carrying out changes that provide greater benefits than 
harm.  For example, a property tax used to build a local park creates a benefit to 
those who use the park, but harms those who own property (although, by 
increasing property values, even non-users obtain some benefits).  Since some 
of the taxpayers won’t use the park, it won’t be the case that everyone benefits 
on balance.  Cost-benefit analysis weighs the costs against the benefits.  In the 
case of the park, the costs are readily monetized (turned into dollars), because 
the costs to the tax-payers are just the amount of the tax.  In contrast, the 
benefits are much more challenging to estimate.  Conceptually, the benefits are 
the amount the park users would be willing to pay to use the park if the park 
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charged admission.  However, if the park doesn’t charge admission, we would 
have to estimate willingness-to-pay.  In principle, the park provides greater 
benefits than costs if the benefits to the users exceed the losses to the 
taxpayers.  However, the park also involves transfers from one group to another. 
 
Welfare analysis provides another approach to evaluating government 
intervention into markets.  Welfare analysis posits social preferences and goals, 
like helping the poor. Generally a welfare analysis involves performing a cost-
benefit analysis taking account not just of the overall gains and losses, but also 
weighting those gains and losses by their effects on other social goals.  For 
example, a property tax used to subsidize the opera might provide more value 
than costs, but the bulk of property taxes are paid by lower and middle income 
people, while the majority of opera-goers are rich.  Thus, the opera subsidy 
represents a transfer from relatively low income people to richer people, which is 
not consistent with societal goals of equalization.  In contrast, elimination of sales 
taxes on basic food items like milk and bread generally has a relatively greater 
benefit to the poor, who spend a much larger percentage of their income on food, 
than to the rich.  Thus, such schemes may be considered desirable not so much 
for their overall effects but for their redistribution effects.  Economics is helpful 
not just in providing methods for determining the overall effects of taxes and 
programs, but also the incidence of these taxes and programs, that is, who pays, 
and who benefits.  What economics can’t do, however, is say who ought to 
benefit.  That is a matter for society at large to decide. 
1.1.2 Opportunity Cost 
Economists use the idea of cost in a slightly quirky way that makes sense once 
you think about it, and we use the term opportunity cost to remind you 
occasionally of our idiosyncratic notion of cost.  For an economist, the cost of 
something is not just the cash payment, but all of the value given up in the 
process of acquiring the thing.  For example, the cost of a university education 
involves tuition, and text book purchases, and also the wages that would have 
been earned during the time at university, but were not.  Indeed, the value of the 
time spent in acquiring the education – how much enjoyment was lost – is part of 
the cost of education.  However, some “costs” are not opportunity costs.  Room 
and board would not generally be a cost because, after all, you are going to be 
living and eating whether you are in university or not.  Room and board are part 
of the cost of an education only insofar as they are more expensive than they 
would be otherwise.  Similarly, the expenditures on things you would have 
otherwise done – hang-gliding lessons, a trip to Europe – represent savings.  
However, the value of these activities has been lost while you are busy reading 
this book. 
 
The concept of opportunity cost can be summarized by a definition: 
 
 The opportunity cost is the value of the best foregone alternative. 
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This definition captures the idea that the cost of something is not just its 
monetary cost but also the value of what you didn’t get.  The opportunity cost of 
spending $17 on a CD is what you would have done with the $17 instead, and 
perhaps the value of the time spent shopping.  The opportunity cost of a puppy 
includes not just the purchase price of the puppy, but also the food, veterinary 
bills, carpet cleaning, and the value of the time spent dealing with the puppy.  A 
puppy is a good example, because often the purchase price is a negligible 
portion of the total cost of ownership.  Yet people acquire puppies all the time, in 
spite of their high cost of ownership.  Why?  The economic view of the world is 
that people acquire puppies because the value they expect to get exceeds the 
opportunity cost.  That is, they acquire a puppy when the value of a puppy is 
higher than the value of what is foregone by the acquisition of a puppy. 
 
Even though opportunity costs include lots of non-monetary costs, we will often 
monetize opportunity costs, translating the costs into dollar terms for comparison 
purposes.  Monetizing opportunity costs is clearly valuable, because it gives a 
means of comparison.  What is the opportunity cost of 30 days in jail?  It used to 
be that judges occasionally sentenced convicted defendants to “thirty days or 
thirty dollars,” letting the defendant choose the sentence.  Conceptually, we can 
use the same idea to find out the value of 30 days in jail.  Suppose you would 
choose to pay a fine of $750 to avoid the thirty days in jail, but wouldn’t pay 
$1,000 and instead would choose time in the slammer.  Then the value of the 
thirty day sentence is somewhere between $750 and $1000.  In principle, there 
exists a price where at that price you pay the fine, and at a penny more you go to 
jail.  That price – at which you are just indifferent to the choice – is the monetized 
or dollar cost of the jail sentence. 
 
The same idea as choosing the jail sentence or the fine justifies monetizing 
opportunity costs in other contexts.  For example, a gamble has a certainty 
equivalent, which is the amount of money that makes one indifferent to choosing 
the gamble versus the certain amount.  Indeed, companies buy and sell risk, and 
much of the field of risk management involves buying or selling risky items to 
reduce overall risk.  In the process, risk is valued, and riskier stocks and assets 
must sell for a lower price (or, equivalently, earn a higher average return).  This 
differential is known as a risk premium, and it represents a monetization of the 
risk portion of a risky gamble. 
 
Home buyers considering various available houses are presented with a variety 
of options, such as one or two story, building materials like brick or wood, roofing 
materials, flooring materials like wood or carpet, presence or absence of 
swimming pools, views, proximity to parks, and so on.  The approach taken to 
valuing these items is known as hedonic pricing, and corresponds to valuing 
each item separately – what does a pool add to value on average? – and then 
summing the value of the components.  The same approach is used to value old 
cars, making adjustments to a base value for the presence of options like leather 
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interior, CD changer, and so on.  Again, such a valuation approach converts a 
bundle of disparate attributes into a monetary value. 
 
The conversion of costs into dollars is occasionally controversial, and nowhere is 
it more controversial than in valuing human life.  How much is your life worth?  
Can it be converted into dollars?  A certain amount of insight into this question 
can be gleaned by thinking about risks.  Wearing seatbelts and buying optional 
safety equipment reduce the risk of death by a small but measurable amount.  
Suppose a $400 airbag option reduces the overall risk of death by 0.01%.  If you 
are indifferent to buying the option, you have implicitly valued the probability of 
death at $400 per 0.01%, or $40,000 per 1%, or around $4,000,000 per life.  Of 
course, you may feel quite differently about a 0.01% chance of death than a risk 
ten thousand times greater, which would be a certainty.  But such an approach 
provides one means of estimating the value of the risk of death – an examination 
what people will, and will not, pay to reduce that risk. 
 
Opportunity cost – the value of the best foregone alternative – is a basic building 
block of economic analysis.  The conversion of costs into dollar terms, while 
sometimes controversial, provides a convenient means of comparing costs. 
1.1.3 Economic Reasoning and Analysis 
What this country needs is some one-armed economists. 
-Harry S Truman 
 
Economic reasoning is rather easy to satirize.  One might want to know, for 
instance, what the effect of a policy change – a government program to educate 
unemployed workers, an increase in military spending, or an enhanced 
environmental regulation – will be on people and their ability to purchase the 
goods and services they desire.  Unfortunately, a single change may have 
multiple effects.  As an absurd and tortured example, government collection and 
storage of helium for (allegedly) military purposes reduces the cost of children’s 
birthday balloons, causing substitution away from party hats and hired clowns.  
The reduction in alternatives for clowns reduces clowns’ wages and thus reduces 
the costs of running a circus.  This cost reduction increases the number of 
circuses, thereby forcing zoos to lower admission fees to compete with circuses.  
Thus, were the government to stop subsidizing the manufacture of helium, the 
admission fee of zoos would likely rise, even though zoos use no helium.  This 
example is superficially reasonable, although the effects are miniscule. 
 
To make any sense at all of the effects of a change in economic conditions, it is 
helpful to divide up the effect into pieces.  Thus, we will often look at the effects 
of a change “other things equal,” that is, assuming nothing else changed.  This 
isolates the effect of the change.  In some cases, however, a single change can 
lead to multiple effects; even so, we will still focus on each effect individually.  A 
gobbledygook way of saying “other things equal” is to use Latin and say “ceteris 
paribus.”  Part of your job as a student is to learn economic jargon, and that is an 
example.  Fortunately, there isn’t too much jargon. 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 1-6
 
We will make a number of assumptions that you may not find very easy to 
believe.  Not all of the assumptions are required for the analysis, and instead 
merely simplify the analysis.  Some, however, are required but deserve an 
explanation.  There is a frequent assumption that the people we will talk about 
seem exceedingly selfish relative to most people we know.  We model the 
choices that people make, assuming that they make the choice that is best for 
them.  Such people – the people in the models as opposed to real people – are 
known occasionally as “homo economicus.”  Real people are indubitably more 
altruistic than homo economicus, because they couldn’t be less: homo 
economicus is entirely selfish.  (The technical term is acting in one’s self-
interest.)  That doesn’t necessarily invalidate the conclusions drawn from the 
theory, however, for at least four reasons: 
• People often make decisions as families or households rather than 
individuals, and it may be sensible to consider the household as the 
“consumer.”  That households are fairly selfish is more plausible perhaps 
than individuals being selfish. 
• Economics is pretty much silent on why consumers want things.  You may 
want to make a lot of money so that you can build a hospital or endow a 
library, which would be altruistic things to do.  Such motives are broadly 
consistent with self-interested behavior.   
• Corporations are often required to serve their shareholders by maximizing 
the share value, inducing self-interested behavior on the part of the 
corporation.  Even if corporations had no legal responsibility to act in the 
financial interest of their shareholders, capital markets may force them to 
act in the self-interest of the shareholders in order to raise capital.  That is, 
people choosing investments that generate a high return will tend to force 
corporations to seek a high return.   
• There are many good, and some not-so-good, consequences of people 
acting in their own self-interest, which may be another reason to focus on 
self-interested behavior.   
Thus, while there are limits to the applicability of the theory of self-interested 
behavior, it is a reasonable methodology for attempting a science of human 
behavior. 
 
Self-interested behavior will often be described as “maximizing behavior,” where 
consumers maximize the value they obtain from their purchases, and firms 
maximize their profits.  One objection to the economic methodology is that 
people rarely carry out the calculations necessary to literally maximize anything.  
However, that is not a sensible objection to the methodology.  People don’t carry 
out the physics calculations to throw a baseball or thread a needle, either, and 
yet they accomplish these tasks.  Economists often consider that people act “as 
if” they maximize an objective, even though no calculations are carried out.  
Some corporations in fact use elaborate computer programs to minimize costs or 
maximize their profits, and the entire field of operations research is used to 
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create and implement such maximization programs.  Thus, while individuals don’t 
carry out the calculations, some companies do. 
 
A good example of economic reasoning is the sunk cost fallacy.  Once one has 
made a significant non-recoverable investment, there is a psychological tendency 
to invest more even when the return on the subsequent investment isn’t 
worthwhile.  France and Britain continued to invest in the Concorde (a supersonic 
aircraft no longer in production) long after it became clear that the project would 
generate little return.  If you watch a movie to the end, long after you become 
convinced that it stinks, you have exhibited the sunk cost fallacy.  The fallacy is 
the result of an attempt to make an investment that has gone bad turn out to be 
good, even when it probably won’t.  The popular phrase associated with the sunk 
cost fallacy is “throwing good money after bad.”  The fallacy of sunk costs arises 
because of a psychological tendency to try to make an investment pay off when 
something happens to render it obsolete.  It is a mistake in many circumstances. 
 
The fallacy of sunk costs is often thought to be an advantage of casinos.  People 
who lose a bit of money gambling hope to recover their losses by gambling more, 
with the sunk “investment” in gambling inducing an attempt to make the 
investment pay off.  The nature of most casino gambling is that the house wins 
on average, which means the average gambler (and even the most skilled slot 
machine or craps player) loses on average.  Thus, for most, trying to win back 
losses is to lose more on average. 
 
The way economics is performed is by a proliferation of mathematical models, 
and this proliferation is reflected in this book.  Economists reason with models.  
Models help by removing extraneous details from a problem or issue, letting one 
analyze what remains more readily.  In some cases the models are relatively 
simple, like supply and demand.  In other cases, the models are relatively 
complex (e.g. the over-fishing model of Section  6.3.6).  In all cases, the models 
are the simplest model that lets us understand the question or phenomenon at 
hand.  The purpose of the model is to illuminate connections between ideas.  A 
typical implication of a model is “when A increases, B falls.”  This “comparative 
static” prediction lets us see how A affects B, and why, at least in the context of 
the model.  The real world is always much more complex than the models we 
use to understand the world.  That doesn’t make the model useless, indeed, 
exactly the opposite.  By stripping out extraneous detail, the model represents a 
lens to isolate and understand aspects of the real world. 
 
Finally, one last introductory warning before we get started.  A parody of 
economists talking is to add the word marginal before every word.  Marginal is 
just economist’s jargon for “the derivative of.”  For example, marginal cost is the 
derivative of cost; marginal value is the derivative of value.  Because introductory 
economics is usually taught to students who have not yet studied calculus or 
can’t be trusted to remember even the most basic elements of it, economists 
tend to avoid using derivatives and instead talk about the value of the next unit 
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purchased, or the cost of the next unit, and describe that as the marginal value or 
cost.  This book uses the term marginal frequently because one of the purposes 
of the book is to introduce the necessary jargon so that you can read more 
advanced texts or take more advanced classes.  For an economics student not to 
know the word marginal would be akin to a physics student not knowing the word 
mass.  The book minimizes jargon where possible, but part of the job of a 
principles student is to learn the jargon, and there is no getting around that. 
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2 Supply and Demand 
Supply and demand are the most fundamental tools of economic analysis.  Most 
applications of economic reasoning involve supply and demand in one form or 
another.  When prices for home heating oil rise in the winter, usually the reason 
is that the weather is colder than normal and as a result, demand is higher than 
usual.  Similarly, a break in an oil pipeline creates a short-lived gasoline 
shortage, as occurred in the Midwest in the year 2000, which is a reduction in 
supply.  The price of DRAM, or dynamic random access memory, used in 
personal computers falls when new manufacturing facilities begin production, 
increasing the supply of memory. 
 
This chapter sets out the basics of supply and demand, introduces equilibrium 
analysis, and considers some of the factors than influence supply and demand 
and the effects of those factors.  In addition, quantification is introduced in the 
form of elasticities.  Dynamics are not considered, however, until Chapter 3, 
which focuses on production, and Chapter 4 introduces a more fundamental 
analysis of demand, including a variety of topics such as risk.  In essence, this is 
the economics “quickstart” guide, and we will look more deeply in the subsequent 
chapters. 
2.1 Supply and Demand 
2.1.1 Demand and Consumer Surplus 
Eating a French fry makes most people a little bit happier, and we are willing to 
give up something of value – a small amount of money, a little bit of time – to eat 
one.  What we are willing to give up measures the value – our personal value – 
of the French fry.  That value, expressed in dollars, is the willingness to pay for 
French fries.  That is, if you are willing to give up three cents for a single French 
fry, your willingness to pay is three cents.  If you pay a penny for the French fry, 
you’ve obtained a net of two cents in value.  Those two cents – the difference 
between your willingness to pay and the amount you do pay – is known as 
consumer surplus.  Consumer surplus is the value to a consumer of consumption 
of a good, minus the price paid. 
 
The value of items – French fries, eyeglasses, violins – is not necessarily close to 
what one has to pay for them.  For people with bad vision, eyeglasses might be 
worth ten thousand dollars or more, in the sense that if eyeglasses and contacts 
cost $10,000 at all stores, that is what one would be willing to pay for vision 
correction.  That one doesn’t have to pay nearly that amount means that the 
consumer surplus associated with eyeglasses is enormous.  Similarly, an order 
of French fries might be worth $3 to a consumer, but because French fries are 
available for around $1, the consumer obtains a surplus of $2 in the purchase. 
 
How much is a second order of French fries worth?  For most of us, that first 
order is worth more than the second one.  If a second order is worth $2, we 
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would still gain from buying it.  Eating a third order of fries is worth less still, and 
at some point we’re unable or unwilling to eat any more fries even when they are 
free, which implies that at some point the value of additional French fries is zero. 
We will measure consumption generally as units per period of time, e.g. French 
fries consumed per month. 
 
Many, but not all, goods have this feature of diminishing marginal value – the 
value of the last unit consumed declines as the number consumed rises.  If we 
consume a quantity q, it implies the marginal value v(q) falls as the number of 
units rise.1  An example is illustrated in Figure  2-1. Here the value is a straight 
line, declining in the number of units. 
 
 
Figure  2-1: The Demand Curve 
Demand need not be a straight line, and indeed could be any downward-sloping 
curve.  Contrary to the usual convention, demand gives the quantity chosen for 
any given price off the horizontal axis, that is, given the value p on the vertical 
axis, the corresponding value q0 on the horizontal axis is the quantity the 
consumer will purchase. 
 
It is often important to distinguish the demand curve itself – the entire relationship 
between price and quantity demanded – from the quantity demanded.  Typically, 
“demand” refers to the entire curve, while “quantity demanded” is a point on the 
curve. 
                                            
1 When diminishing marginal value fails, which sometimes is said to occur with beer consumption, 
constructing demand takes some additional effort, which isn’t of a great deal of consequence.  
Buyers will still choose to buy a quantity where marginal value is decreasing. 
q
value 
v(q) 
q0 
v(q0), p 
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Given a price p, a consumer will buy those units with v(q)>p, since those units 
are worth more than they cost.  Similarly, a consumer should not buy units for 
which v(q)<p.  Thus, the quantity q0 that solves the equation v(q0)=p gives the 
quantity of units the consumer will buy.  This value is also illustrated in Figure 
 2-1.2  Another way of summarizing this insight is that the marginal value curve is 
the inverse of demand function, where the demand function gives the quantity 
demanded for any given price.  Formally, if x(p) is the quantity a consumer buys 
given a price of p, then .))(( ppxv =  
 
But what is the marginal value curve?  Suppose the total value of consumption of 
the product, in dollar value, is given by u(q).  That is, a consumer who pays u(q) 
for the quantity q is just indifferent to getting nothing and paying nothing.  For 
each quantity, there should exist one and only one price that exactly makes the 
consumer indifferent between purchasing it and getting nothing at all, because if 
the consumer is just willing to pay u(q), any greater amount is more than the 
consumer should be willing to pay. 
 
The consumer facing a price p gets a net value or consumer surplus of CS = u(q) 
– pq from consuming q units.  In order to obtain the maximal benefit, the 
consumer would then choose the level of q to maximize u(q) – pq.  When the 
function CS is maximized, its derivative is zero, which implies that, at the quantity 
that maximizes the consumer’s net value 
 
.)()(0 pqupqqu
dq
d −′=−=  
 
 
Thus we see that ),()( quqv ′=  that is, the marginal value of the good is the 
derivative of the total value. 
 
Consumer surplus is the value of the consumption minus the amount paid, and 
represents the net value of the purchase to the consumer.  Formally, it is u(q)-pq.  
A graphical form of the consumer surplus is generated by the following identity. 
 
( ) ( ) .)()()()(max
00
00
00 ∫∫ −=−′=−=−=
qq
q
dxpxvdxpxupqqupqquCS  
                                            
2 We will treat units as continuous, even though in reality they are discrete units.  The reason for 
treating them as continuous is only to simplify the mathematics; with discrete units, the consumer 
buys those units with value exceeding the price, and doesn’t buy those with value less than the 
price, just as before.  However, since the value function isn’t continuous, much less differentiable, 
it would be an accident for marginal value to equal price.  It isn’t particularly arduous to handle 
discreteness of the products, but it doesn’t lead to any significant insight either, so we won’t 
consider it here. 
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This expression shows that consumer surplus can be represented as the area 
below the demand curve and above the price, as is illustrated in Figure  2-2.  The 
consumer surplus represents the consumer’s gains from trade, the value of 
consumption to the consumer net of the price paid. 
 
 
Figure  2-2: Consumer Surplus 
 
The consumer surplus can also be expressed using the demand curve, by 
integrating from the price up.  In this case, if x(p) is the demand, we have 
 
∫
∞
=
p
dyyxCS )( . 
 
When you buy your first car, you experience an increase in demand for gasoline 
because gasoline is pretty useful for cars and not so much for other things.  An 
imminent hurricane increases the demand for plywood (to protect windows), 
batteries, candles, and bottled water.  An increase in demand is represented by a 
movement of the entire curve to the northeast (up and to the right), which 
represents an increase in the marginal value v (movement up) for any given unit, 
or an increase in the number of units demanded for any given price (movement 
to the right).  Figure  2-3 illustrates a shift in demand. 
 
Similarly, the reverse movement represents a decrease in demand.  The beauty 
of the connection between demand and marginal value is that an increase in 
demand could in principle have meant either more units demanded at a given 
q 
value 
q0 
v(q0) )()( quqv ′=
Consumer 
Surplus 
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price, or a higher willingness to pay for each unit, but those are in fact the same 
concept – both create a movement up and to the right. 
 
For many goods, an increase in income increases the demand for the good.  
Porsche automobiles, yachts, and Beverly Hills homes are mostly purchased by 
people with high incomes.  Few billionaires ride the bus.  Economists aptly 
named goods whose demand doesn’t increase with income inferior goods, with 
the idea that people substitute to better quality, more expensive goods as their 
incomes rise.  When demand for a good increases with income, the good is 
called normal.  It would have been better to call such goods superior, but it is too 
late to change such a widely accepted convention. 
 
 
Figure  2-3: An Increase in Demand 
 
Another factor that influences demand is the price of related goods.  The 
dramatic fall in the price of computers over the past twenty years has significantly 
increased the demand for printers, monitors and internet access.  Such goods 
are examples of complements.  Formally, for a given good X, a complement is a 
good whose consumption increases the value of X.  Thus, the use of computers 
increases the value of peripheral devices like printers and monitors.  The 
consumption of coffee increases the demand for cream for many people.  
Spaghetti and tomato sauce, national parks and hiking boots, air travel and hotel 
rooms, tables and chairs, movies and popcorn, bathing suits and sun tan lotion, 
candy and dentistry are all examples of complements for most people – 
consumption of one increases the value of the other.  The complementarity 
relationship is symmetric – if consumption of X increases the value of Y, then 
q 
value 
v(q) 
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consumption of Y must increase the value of X.3  There are many complementary 
goods and changes in the prices of complementary goods have predictable 
effects on the demand of their complements.  Such predictable effects represent 
the heart of economic analysis. 
 
The opposite case of a complement is a substitute.  Colas and root beer are 
substitutes, and a fall in the price of root beer (resulting in an increase in the 
consumption of root beer) will tend to decrease the demand for colas.  Pasta and 
ramen, computers and typewriters, movies (in theaters) and sporting events, 
restaurants and dining at home, spring break in Florida versus spring break in 
Mexico, marijuana and beer, economics courses and psychology courses, driving 
and bicycling are all examples of substitutes for most people.  An increase in the 
price of a substitute increases the demand for a good, and conversely, a 
decrease in the price of a substitute decreases demand for a good.  Thus, 
increased enforcement of the drug laws, which tend to increase the price of 
marijuana, lead to an increase in the demand for beer. 
 
Much of demand is merely idiosyncratic to the individual – some people like 
plaids, some like solid colors.  People like what they like.  Often people are 
influenced by others – tattoos are increasingly common not because the price 
has fallen but because of an increased acceptance of body art.  Popular clothing 
styles change, not because of income and prices but for other reasons.  While 
there has been a modest attempt to link clothing style popularity to economic 
factors,4 by and large there is no coherent theory determining fads and fashions 
beyond the observation that change is inevitable.  As a result, this course, and 
economics more generally, will accept preferences for what they are without 
questioning why people like what they like.  While it may be interesting to 
understand the increasing social acceptance of tattoos, it is beyond the scope of 
this text and indeed beyond most, but not all, economic analyses.  We will, 
however, account for some of the effects of the increasing acceptance of tattoos 
through changes in the number of firms offering tattooing, changes in the variety 
of products offered, and so on. 
 
2.1.1.1 (Exercise) A reservation price is the maximum willingness to pay for a 
good that most people buy one unit of, like cars or computers.  Graph the 
demand curve for a consumer with a reservation price of $30 for a unit of 
a good.  
 
                                            
3 The basis for this insight can be seen by denoting the total value in dollars of consuming goods 
x and y as u(x, y).  Then the demand for x is given by the partial .x
u ∂∂   The statement that y is a 
complement is the statement that the demand for x rises as y increases, that is, .02 >∂∂∂ yxu   
But then with a continuous second derivative, 02 >∂∂∂ xyu , which means the demand for y, yu ∂∂ , 
increases with x. 
4 Skirts are allegedly shorter during economic booms and lengthen during recessions. 
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2.1.1.2 (Exercise) Suppose the demand curve is given by x(p) = 1 – p.  The 
consumer’s expenditure is px(p) = p(1 – p).  Graph the expenditure.  
What price maximizes the consumer’s expenditure? 
 
2.1.1.3 (Exercise) For demand x(p) = 1 – p, compute the consumer surplus 
function as a function of p. 
 
2.1.1.4 (Exercise) For demand x(p) = p–ε, for ε > 1, find the consumer surplus 
as a function of p.  (Hint: recall that the consumer surplus can be 
expressed as ∫
∞
=
p
dyyxCS )( .) 
2.1.2 Supply 
The supply curve gives the number of units, represented on the horizontal axis, 
as a function of the price on the vertical axis, which will be supplied for sale to the 
market.  An example is illustrated in Figure  2-4.  Generally supply is upward-
sloping, because if it is a good deal for a seller to sell 50 units of a product at a 
price of $10, then it remains a good deal to supply those same 50 at a price of 
$11.  The seller might choose to sell more than 50, but if the first 50 weren’t 
worth keeping at a price of $10, that remains true at $11.5 
 
The seller who has a cost c(q) for selling q units obtains a profit, at price p per 
unit, of pq – c(q).  The quantity which maximizes profit for the seller is the 
quantity q* satisfying 
 
 *).()(0 qcpqcpq
dq
d ′−=−=  
 
 
 
                                            
5 This is a good point to remind the reader that the economists’ familiar assumption of “other 
things equal” is still in effect.  If the increased price is an indication that prices might rise still 
further, or a consequence of some other change that affects the sellers’ value of items, then of 
course the higher price might not justify sale of the items.  We hold other things equal to focus on 
the effects of price alone, and then will consider other changes separately.  The pure effect of an 
increased price should be to increase the quantity offered, while the effect of increased 
expectations may be to decrease the quantity offered. 
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Figure  2-4: The Supply Curve 
 
 
Thus, price equals marginal cost is a characteristic of profit maximization; the 
seller sells all the units whose cost is less than price, and doesn’t sell the units 
whose cost exceeds price.  In constructing the demand curve, we saw that the 
demand curve was the inverse of the marginal value.  There is an analogous 
property of supply: the supply curve is the inverse function of marginal cost.  
Graphed with the quantity supplied on the horizontal axis and price on the 
vertical axis, the supply curve is the marginal cost curve, with marginal cost on 
the vertical axis. 
 
Exactly in parallel to consumer surplus with demand, profit is given by the 
difference of the price and marginal cost 
 
Profit ( ) .)(*)(*)(max
*
0
∫ ′−=−=−=
q
q
dxxcpqcpqqcpq  
 
This area is shaded in Figure  2-5. 
 
q 
p 
q0 
p 
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Figure  2-5: Supplier Profits 
 
The relationship of demand and marginal value exactly parallels the relationship 
of supply and marginal cost, for a somewhat hidden reason.  Supply is just 
negative demand, that is, a supplier is just the possessor of a good who doesn’t 
keep it but instead offers it to the market for sale.  For example, when the price of 
housing goes up, one of the ways people demand less is by offering to rent a 
room in their house, that is, by supplying some of their housing to the market.  
Similarly, the marginal cost of supplying a good already produced is the loss of 
not having the good, that is, the marginal value of the good.  Thus, with 
exchange, it is possible to provide the theory of supply and demand entirely as a 
theory of net demand, where sellers are negative demanders.  There is some 
mathematical economy in this approach, and it fits certain circumstances better 
than separating supply and demand.  For example, when the price of electricity 
rose very high in the western United States in 2003, several aluminum smelters 
resold electricity they had purchased in long-term contracts, that is, demanders 
became suppliers. 
 
However, the “net demand” approach obscures the likely outcomes in instances 
where the sellers are mostly different people, or companies, than the buyers.  
Moreover, while there is a theory of complements and substitutes for supply that 
is exactly parallel to the equivalent theory for demand, the nature of these 
complements and substitutes tends to be different.  For these reasons, and also 
for the purpose of being consistent with common economic usage, we will 
distinguish supply and demand. 
 
An increase in supply refers to either more units available at a given price, or a 
lower price for the supply of the same number of units.  Thus, an increase in 
supply is graphically represented by a curve that is lower or to the right, or both, 
q 
p 
q0 
p 
Profit 
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that is, to the south-east.  This is illustrated in Figure  2-6.  A decrease in supply is 
the reverse case, a shift to the northwest. 
 
 
Figure  2-6: An Increase in Supply 
 
Anything that increases costs of production will tend to increase marginal cost 
and thus reduce the supply.  For example, as wages rise, the supply of goods 
and services is reduced, because wages are the input price of labor.  Labor 
accounts for about two-thirds of all input costs, and thus wage increases create 
supply reductions (a higher price is necessary to provide the same quantity) for 
most goods and services.  Costs of materials of course increase the price of 
goods using those materials.  For example, the most important input into the 
manufacture of gasoline is crude oil, and an increase of $1 in the price of a 42 
gallon barrel of oil increases the price of gasoline about two cents – almost one-
for-one by volume.  Another significant input in many industries is capital, and as 
we will see, interest is cost of capital.  Thus, increases in interest rates increase 
the cost of production, and thus tend to decrease the supply of goods. 
 
Parallel to complements in demand, a complement in supply to a good X is a 
good Y such that an increase in the price of Y increases the supply of X.  
Complements in supply are usually goods that are jointly produced.  In producing 
lumber (sawn boards), a large quantity of wood chips and sawdust are also 
produced as a by-product.  These wood chips and saw dust are useful in the 
manufacture of paper.  An increase in the price of lumber tends to increase the 
quantity of trees sawn into boards, thereby increasing the supply of wood chips.  
Thus, lumber and wood chips are complements in supply. 
 
It turns out that copper and gold are often found in the same kinds of rock – the 
conditions that give rise to gold compounds also give rise to copper compounds.  
Thus, an increase in the price of gold tends to increase the number of people 
q 
p 
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prospecting for gold, and in the process increases not just the quantity of gold 
supplied to the market, but also the quantity of copper.  Thus, copper and gold 
are complements in supply. 
 
The classic supply-complement is beef and leather – an increase in the price of 
beef increases the slaughter of cows, thereby increasing the supply of leather. 
 
The opposite of a complement in supply is a substitute in supply.  Military and 
civilian aircraft are substitutes in supply – an increase in the price of military 
aircraft will tend to divert resources used in the manufacture of aircraft toward 
military aircraft and away from civilian aircraft, thus reducing the supply of civilian 
aircraft.  Wheat and corn are also substitutes in supply.  An increase in the price 
of wheat will lead farmers whose land is reasonably well-suited to producing 
either wheat or corn to substitute wheat for corn, increasing the quantity of wheat 
and decreasing the quantity of corn.  Agricultural goods grown on the same type 
of land usually are substitutes.  Similarly, cars and trucks, tables and desks, 
sweaters and sweatshirts, horror movies and romantic comedies are examples of 
substitutes in supply. 
 
Complements and substitutes are important because they are common and have 
predictable effects on demand and supply.  Changes in one market spill over to 
the other market, through the mechanism of complements or substitutes. 
 
2.1.2.1 (Exercise) A typist charges $30/hr and types 15 pages per hour.  Graph 
the supply of typed pages. 
 
2.1.2.2 (Exercise) An owner of an oil well has two technologies for extracting 
oil.  With one technology, the oil can be pumped out and transported for 
$5,000 per day, and 1,000 barrels per day are produced.  With the other 
technology, which involves injecting natural gas into the well, the owner 
spends $10,000 per day and $5 per barrel produced, but 2,000 barrels 
per day are produced.  What is the supply?  Graph it. 
 
(Hint: Compute the profits, as a function of the price, for each of the technologies.  
At what price would the producer switch from one technology to the other?  At 
what price would the producer shut down and spend nothing?) 
 
2.1.2.3 (Exercise) An entrepreneur has a factory the produces Lα widgets, 
where α<1, when L hours of labor is used.  The cost of labor (wage and 
benefits) is w per hour.  If the entrepreneur maximizes profit, what is the 
supply curve for widgets? 
 
Hint: The entrepreneur’s profit, as a function of the price, is pLα  – wL.  The 
entrepreneur chooses the amount of labor to maximize profit.  Find the amount of 
labor that maximizes, which is a function of p, w and α.  The supply is the amount 
of output produced, which is Lα.  
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2.1.2.4 (Exercise) In the above exercise, suppose now that more than 40 hours 
entails a higher cost of labor (overtime pay).  Let w be $20/hr for under 
40 hours, and $30/hr for each hour over 40 hours, and α = ½.  Find the 
supply curve. 
 
Hint: Let L(w, p) be the labor demand when the wage is w (no overtime pay) and 
the price is p.  Now show that, if L(20,p) < 40, the entrepreneur uses L(20,p) 
hours.  This is shown by verifying that profits are higher at L(20,p) than at 
L(30,p).  If L(30,p) > 40, the entrepreneur uses L(30,p) hours.  Finally, if L(20,p) > 
40 > L(30,p), the entrepreneur uses 40 hours.  Labor translates into supply via 
Lα. 
 
2.1.2.5 (Exercise) In the previous exercise, for what range of prices does 
employment equal 40 hours?  Graph the labor demanded by the 
entrepreneur. 
 
Hint: The answer involves 10 . 
 
2.1.2.6 (Exercise) Suppose marginal cost, as a function of the quantity q 
produced, is mq.  Find the producer’s profit as a function of the price p. 
2.2 The Market 
Individuals with their own supply or demand trade in a market, which is where 
prices are determined.  Markets can be specific or virtual locations – the farmer’s 
market, the New York Stock Exchange, eBay – or may be an informal or more 
amorphous market, such as the market for restaurant meals in Billings, Montana 
or the market for roof repair in Schenectady, New York. 
2.2.1 Market Demand and Supply 
Individual demand gives the quantity purchased for each price.  Analogously, the 
market demand gives the quantity purchased by all the market participants – the 
sum of the individual demands – for each price.  This is sometimes called a 
“horizontal sum” because the summation is over the quantities for each price.  An 
example is illustrated in Figure  2-7.  For a given price p, the quantity q1 
demanded by one consumer, and the quantity q2 demanded by a second 
consumer are illustrated.  The sum of these quantities represents the market 
demand, if the market has just those two-participants.  Since the consumer with 
subscript 2 has a positive quantity demanded for high prices, while the consumer 
with subscript 1 does not, the market demand coincides with consumer 2’s 
demand when the price is sufficiently high.  As the price falls, consumer 1 begins 
purchasing, and the market quantity demanded is larger than either individual 
participant’s quantity, and is the sum of the two quantities. 
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Example:  If the demand of buyer 1 is given by q = max {0, 10 – p}, and the 
demand of buyer 2 is given by q = max {0, 20 – 4p}, what is market demand for 
the two-participants? 
 
Solution: First, note that buyer 1 buys zero at a price 10 or higher, while buyer 2 
buys zero at a price of 5 or higher.  For a price above 10, market demand is zero.  
For a price between 5 and 10, market demand is buyer 1’s demand, or 10 – p.  
Finally, for a price between zero and 5, the market quantity demanded is 10 – p + 
20 – 4p = 30 – 5p. 
 
 
Figure  2-7: Market Demand 
 
Market supply is similarly constructed – the market supply is the horizontal 
(quantity) sum of all the individual supply curves. 
 
Example:  If the supply of firm 1 is given by q = 2p, and the supply of firm 2 is 
given by q = max {0, 5p – 10}, what is market supply for the two-participants? 
 
Solution: First, note that firm 1 is in the market at any price, but firm 2 is in the 
market only if price exceeds 2.  Thus, for a price between zero and 2, market 
supply is firm 1’s supply, or 2p.  For p>2, market supply is 5p – 10 + 2p = 7p – 
10. 
 
2.2.1.1 (Exercise) Is the consumer surplus for market demand the sum of the 
consumer surpluses for the individual demands?  Why or why not?  
Illustrate your conclusion with a figure like Figure  2-7. 
 
p 
q1 q2 q1+ q2
Market Demand 
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2.2.1.2 (Exercise) Suppose the supply of firm i is αi p, when the price is p, 
where i takes on the values 1, 2, 3, … n.  What is the market supply of 
these n firms? 
 
2.2.1.3 (Exercise) Suppose consumers in a small town choose between two 
restaurants, A and B.  Each consumer has a value vA for A and a value 
vB for B, each of which is a uniform random draw from the [0,1] interval.  
Consumers buy whichever product offers the higher consumer surplus.  
The price of B is 0.2.  In the square associated with the possible value 
types, identify which consumers buy from firm A.  Find the demand 
(which is the area of the set of consumers who buy from A in the picture 
below).  Hint: Consumers have three choices: Buy nothing (value 0), buy 
from A (value vA – pA) and buy from B, (value vB – pB = vB – 0.2).  Draw 
the lines illustrating which choice has the highest value for the consumer. 
 
 
2.2.2 Equilibrium 
Economists use the term equilibrium in the same way as the word is used in 
physics, to represent a steady state in which opposing forces are balanced, so 
that the current state of the system tends to persist.  In the context of supply and 
demand, equilibrium refers to a condition where the pressure for higher prices is 
exactly balanced by a pressure for lower prices, and thus that the current state of 
exchange between buyers and sellers can be expected to persist. 
 
When the price is such that the quantity supplied of a good or service exceeds 
the quantity demanded, some sellers are unable to sell because fewer units are 
purchased than are offered.  This condition is called a surplus.  The sellers who 
fail to sell have an incentive to offer their good at a slightly lower price – a penny 
less – in order to succeed in selling.  Such price cuts put downward pressure on 
Value of A 
Value 
of B 
Price 
of B 
Price 
of A 
Buy Nothing 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 2-23
prices, and prices tend to fall.  The fall in prices generally reduces the quantity 
supplied and increases the quantity demanded, eliminating the surplus.  That is, 
a surplus encourages price cutting, which reduces the surplus, a process that 
ends only when the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded. 
 
Similarly, when the price is low enough that the quantity demanded exceeds the 
quantity supplied, a shortage exists.  In this case, some buyers fail to purchase, 
and these buyers have an incentive to accept a slightly higher price in order to be 
able to trade.  Sellers are obviously happy to get the higher price as well, which 
tends to put upward pressure on prices, and prices rise.  The increase in price 
tends to reduce the quantity demanded and increase the quantity supplied, 
thereby eliminating the shortage.  Again, the process stops when the quantity 
supplied equals the quantity demanded. 
 
 
Figure  2-8: Equilibration 
 
This logic, which is illustrated in Figure  2-8, justifies the conclusion that the only 
equilibrium price is the price in which the quantity supplied equals the quantity 
demanded.  Any other price will tend to rise in a shortage, or fall in a surplus, 
until supply and demand are balanced.  In Figure  2-8, a surplus arises at any 
price above the equilibrium price p*, because the quantity supplied qs is larger 
than the quantity demanded qd.  The effect of the surplus – leading to sellers with 
excess inventory – induces price cutting which is illustrated with three arrows 
pointing down. 
 
Similarly, when the price is below p*, the quantity supplied qs is less than the 
quantity demanded qd.  This causes some buyers to fail to find goods, leading to 
p 
q
Demand
Supply
q*
p* 
Surplus: qd < qs
Shortage: qs < qd
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higher asking prices and higher bid prices by buyers.  The tendency for the price 
to rise is illustrated with the arrows pointing up.  The only price which doesn’t 
lead to price changes is p*, the equilibrium price in which the quantity supplied 
equals the quantity demanded. 
 
The logic of equilibrium in supply and demand is played out daily in markets all 
over the world, from stock, bond and commodity markets with traders yelling to 
buy or sell, to Barcelona fish markets where an auctioneer helps the market find 
a price, to Istanbul gold markets, to Los Angeles real estate markets. 
 
2.2.2.1 (Exercise) If demand is given by qd(p) = a – bp, and supply is given by 
qs(p) = cp, solve for the equilibrium price and quantity.  Find the 
consumer surplus and producer profits. 
 
2.2.2.2 (Exercise) If demand is given by qd(p) = ap-ε, and supply is given by 
qs(p) = bpη, where all parameters are positive numbers, solve for the 
equilibrium price and quantity. 
2.2.3 Efficiency of Equilibrium 
The equilibrium of supply and demand balances the quantity demanded and the 
quantity supplied, so that there is no excess of either.  Would it be desirable, 
from a social perspective, to force more trade, or to restrain trade below this 
level? 
 
There are circumstances where the equilibrium level of trade has harmful 
consequences, and such circumstances are considered in Chapter  6.  However, 
provided that the only people affected by a transaction are the buyer and seller, 
the equilibrium of supply and demand maximizes the total gains from trade. 
 
This proposition is quite easy to see.  To maximize the gains from trade, clearly 
the highest value buyers must get the goods.  Otherwise, if there is a potential 
buyer that doesn’t get the good with higher value than one who does, the gains 
from trade rise just by diverting the good to the higher value buyer.  Similarly, the 
lowest cost sellers must supply those goods; otherwise we can increase the 
gains from trade by replacing a higher cost seller with a lower cost seller.  Thus, 
the only question is how many goods should be traded to maximize the gains 
from trade, since it will involve the lowest cost sellers selling to the highest value 
buyers.  Adding a trade increases the total gains from trade when that trade 
involves a buyer with value higher than the seller’s cost.  Thus, the gains from 
trade are maximized by the set of transactions to the left of the equilibrium, with 
the high value buyers buying from the low cost sellers. 
 
In the economist’s language, the equilibrium is efficient, in that it maximizes the 
gains from trade, under the assumption that the only people affected by any 
given transaction are the buyers and seller. 
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2.3 Changes in Supply and Demand 
2.3.1 Changes in Demand 
What are the effects of an increase in demand?  As the population of California 
has grown, the demand for housing has risen.  This has pushed the price of 
housing up, and also spurred additional development, increasing the quantity of 
housing supplied as well.  We see this illustrated in Figure  2-9, which represents 
an increase in the demand.  In this figure, supply and demand have been 
abbreviated S and D.  Demand starts at D1 and is increased to D2.  Supply 
remains the same.  The equilibrium price increases from p1* to p2*, and the 
quantity rises from q1* to q2*. 
 
 
Figure  2-9: An Increase in Demand 
 
A decrease in demand – such as occurred for typewriters with the advent of 
computers, or buggy whips as cars replaced horses as the major method of 
transportation – has the reverse effect of an increase, and implies a fall in both 
the price and the quantity traded.  Examples of decreases in demand include 
products replaced by other products – VHS tapes were replaced by DVDs, vinyl 
records replaced by CDs, cassette tapes replaced by CDs, floppy disks (oddly 
named because the 1.44 MB “floppy,” a physically hard product, replaced the 
720KB, 5 ¼ inch soft floppy disk) replaced by CDs and flash memory drives, and 
so on.  Even personal computers experienced a fall in demand as the market 
was saturated in the year 2001. 
2.3.2 Changes in Supply 
An increase in supply comes about from a fall in the marginal cost – recall that 
the supply curve is just the marginal cost of production.  Consequently, an 
p 
q
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S
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increased supply is represented by a curve that is lower and to the right on the 
supply/demand graph, which is an endless source of confusion for many 
students.  The reasoning – lower costs and greater supply are the same thing – 
is too easily forgotten.  The effects of an increase in supply are illustrated in 
Figure  2-10.  The supply curve goes from S1 to S2, which represents a lower 
marginal cost.  In this case, the quantity traded rises from q1* to q2* and price 
falls from p1* to p2*. 
 
 
Figure  2-10: An Increase in Supply 
 
Computer equipment provides an endless source of examples for increases in 
supply.  Consider Dynamic Random Access Memory, or DRAM.  DRAMs are the 
chips in computers and many other devices that store information on a temporary 
basis.6  Their cost has fallen dramatically, which is illustrated in Figure  2-11.7  
Note that the prices in this figure reflect a logarithmic scale, so that a fixed 
percentage decrease is illustrated by a straight line.  Prices of DRAMs fell to 
close to 1/1000th of their 1990 level by 2004.  The means by which these prices 
have fallen are themselves quite interesting.  The main reasons are shrinking the 
size of the chip (a “die shrink”), so that more chips fit on each silicon disk, and 
increasing the size of the disk itself, so that more chips fit on a disk.  The 
combination of these two, each of which required the solutions to thousands of 
engineering and chemistry problems, has led to dramatic reductions in marginal 
                                            
6 Information that will be stored on a longer term basis is generally embedded in flash memory or 
on a hard disk.  Neither of these products lose their information when power is turned off, unlike 
DRAM. 
7 Used with permission of computer storage expert Dr. Edward Grochowski. 
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costs and consequent increases in supply.  The effect has been that prices fell 
dramatically and quantities traded rose dramatically. 
 
 
Figure  2-11: Price of Storage 
 
An important source of supply and demand changes are changes in the markets 
of complements.  A decrease in the price of a demand-complement increases the 
demand for a product, and similarly, an increase in the price of a demand-
substitute increases demand for a product.  This gives two mechanisms to trace 
through effects from external markets to a particular market via the linkage of 
demand substitutes or complements.  For example, when the price of gasoline 
falls, the demand for automobiles (a complement) overall should increase.  As 
the price of automobiles rises, the demand for bicycles (a substitute in some 
circumstances) should rise.  When the price of computers falls, the demand for 
operating systems (a complement) should rise.  This gives an operating system 
seller like Microsoft an incentive to encourage technical progress in the computer 
market, in order to make the operating system more valuable. 
 
An increase in the price of a supply-substitute reduces the supply of a good (by 
making the alternative good more attractive to suppliers), and similarly, a 
decrease in the price of a supply complement reduces the supply of a good.  By 
making the by-product less valuable, the returns to investing in a good are 
reduced.  Thus, an increase in the price of DVD-R discs (used for recording 
DVDs) discourages investment in the manufacture of CD-Rs, which are a 
substitute in supply, leading to a decrease in the supply of CD-Rs.  This tends to 
increase the price of CD-Rs, other things equal.  Similarly, an increase in the 
price of oil increases exploration for oil, tending to increase the supply of natural 
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gas, which is a complement in supply.  However, since natural gas is also a 
demand substitute for oil (both are used for heating homes), an increase in the 
price of oil also tends to increase the demand for natural gas.  Thus, an increase 
in the price of oil increases both the demand and the supply of natural gas.  Both 
changes increase the quantity traded, but the increase in demand tends to 
increase the price, while the increase in supply tends to decrease the price.  
Without knowing more, it is impossible to determine whether the net effect is an 
increase or decrease in the price. 
 
2.3.2.1 (Exercise) Video games and music CDs are substitutes in demand.  
What is the effect of an increase in supply of video games on the price 
and quantity traded of music CDs?  Illustrate your answer with diagrams 
for both markets. 
 
2.3.2.2 (Exercise) Electricity is a major input into the production of aluminum, 
and aluminum is a substitute in supply for steel.  What is the effect of an 
increase in price of electricity on the steel market? 
 
2.3.2.3 (Exercise) Concerns about terrorism reduced demand for air travel, and 
induced consumers to travel by car more often.  What should happen to 
the price of Hawaiian hotel rooms? 
 
When the price of gasoline goes up, people curtail their driving to some extent, 
but don’t immediately scrap their SUVs and rush out and buy more fuel-efficient 
automobiles or electric cars.  Similarly, when the price of electricity rises, people 
don’t replace their air conditioners and refrigerators with the most modern, 
energy-saving models right away.  There are three significant issues raised by 
this kind of example.  First, such changes may be transitory or permanent, and 
people reasonably react differently to temporary changes than to permanent 
changes.  The effect of uncertainty is a very important topic and will be 
considered in section  5.2.6, but only in a rudimentary way for this introductory 
text.  Second, energy is a modest portion of the cost of owning and operating an 
automobile or refrigerator, so it doesn’t make sense to scrap a large capital 
investment over a small permanent increase in cost.  Thus people rationally 
continue operating “obsolete” devices until their useful life is over, even when 
they wouldn’t buy a new replacement of that device, an effect with the 
gobbledygook name of hysteresis.  Third, A permanent increase in energy prices 
leads people to buy more fuel efficient cars, and to replace the old gas guzzlers 
more quickly.  That is, the effects of a change are larger over a larger time 
interval, which economists tend to call the long run. 
 
A striking example of such delay arose when oil quadrupled in price in 1973-4, 
caused by a reduction in sales by the cartel of oil-producing nations, OPEC, 
which stands for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.  The 
increased price of oil (and consequent increase in gasoline prices) caused 
people to drive less and to lower their thermostats in the winter, thus reducing the 
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quantity of oil demanded.  Over time, however, they bought more fuel efficient 
cars and insulated their homes more effectively, significantly reducing the 
quantity demanded still further.  At the same time, the increased prices for oil 
attracted new investment into oil production in Alaska, the North Sea between 
Britain and Norway, Mexico and other areas.  Both of these effects (long-run 
substitution away from energy, and long-run supply expansion) caused the price 
to fall over the longer term, undoing the supply reduction created by OPEC.  In 
1981, OPEC further reduced output, sending prices still higher, but again, 
additional investment in production, combined with energy-saving investment, 
reduced prices until they fell back to 1973 levels (adjusted for inflation) in 1986.  
Prices continued to fall until 1990, when they were at all-time low levels and 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent the first Iraqi war sent them higher 
again. 
 
Short-run and long-run effects represent a theme of economics, with the major 
conclusion of the theme that substitution doesn’t occur instantaneously, which 
leads to predictable patterns of prices and quantities over time. 
 
It turns out that direct estimates of demand and supply are less useful as 
quantifications than notions of percentage changes, which have the advantage of 
being unit-free.  This observation gives rise to the concept of elasticity, the next 
topic. 
2.4 Elasticities 
2.4.1 Elasticity of Demand 
Let x(p) represent the quantity purchased when the price is p, so that the function 
x represents demand.  How responsive is demand to price changes?  One might 
be tempted to use the derivative x′  to measure the responsiveness of demand, 
since it measures directly how much the quantity demanded changes in 
response to a small change in price. However, this measure has two problems.  
First, it is sensitive to a change in units.  If I measure the quantity of candy in 
kilograms rather than pounds, the derivative of demand for candy with respect to 
price changes even when demand itself has remained the same.  Second, if I 
change price units, converting from one currency to another, again the derivative 
of demand will change.  So the derivative is unsatisfactory as a measure of 
responsiveness because it depends on units of measure.  A common way of 
establishing a unit-free measure is to use percentages, and that suggests 
considering the responsiveness of demand in percentage terms to a small 
percentage change in price.  This is the notion of elasticity of demand.8  The 
elasticity of demand is the percentage decrease in quantity that results from a 
small percentage increase in price.  Formally, the elasticity of demand, which is 
                                            
8 The concept of elasticity was invented by Alfred Marshall, 1842-1924, in 1881 while sitting on 
his roof. 
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generally denoted with the Greek letter epsilon ε (chosen to mnemonically 
suggest elasticity) is 
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The minus sign is included to make the elasticity a positive number, since 
demand is decreasing.  First, let’s verify that the elasticity is in fact unit free.  A 
change in the measurement of x cancels because the proportionality factor 
appears in both the numerator and denominator.  Similarly, if we change the 
units of measurement of price to replace the price p with r=ap, x(p) is replaced 
with x(r/a).  Thus, the elasticity is 
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which is independent of a, and therefore not affected by the change in units. 
 
How does a consumer’s expenditure, also known as (individual) total revenue, 
react to a change in price?  The consumer buys x(p) at a price of p, and thus 
expenditure is TR = px(p).  Thus 
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Therefore, 
 
.1
1
ε−=
TR
p
TR
dp
d
 
 
In words, the percentage change of total revenue resulting from a one percent 
change in price is one minus the elasticity of demand.  Thus, a one percent 
increase in price will increase total revenue when the elasticity of demand is less 
than one, which is defined as an inelastic demand.  A price increase will 
decrease total revenue when the elasticity of demand is greater than one, which 
is defined as an elastic demand.  The case of elasticity equal to one is called 
unitary elasticity, and total revenue is unchanged by a small price change.  
Moreover, that percentage increase in price will increase revenue by 
approximately 1-ε percent.  Because it is often possible to estimate the elasticity 
of demand, the formulae can be readily used in practice. 
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Table  2-1 provides estimates on demand elasticities for a variety of products. 
 
Table  2-1: Various Demand Elasticities9 
Product ε 
Salt  0.1  
Matches  0.1  
Toothpicks  0.1  
Airline travel, short-run  0.1  
Residential natural gas, short-run  0.1  
Gasoline, short-run  0.2  
Automobiles, long-run  0.2  
Coffee  0.25  
Legal services, short-run  0.4  
Tobacco products, short-run  0.45  
Residential natural gas, long-run  0.5  
Fish (cod) consumed at home  0.5  
Physician services  0.6  
Taxi, short-run  0.6  
Gasoline, long-run  0.7  
Movies  0.9  
Shellfish, consumed at home  0.9  
Tires, short-run  0.9  
Oysters, consumed at home  1.1  
Private education  1.1  
Housing, owner occupied, long-run 1.2  
Tires, long-run  1.2  
Radio and television receivers  1.2  
Automobiles, short-run  1.2-1.5
Restaurant meals  2.3  
Airline travel, long-run  2.4  
Fresh green peas  2.8  
Foreign travel, long-run  4.0  
Chevrolet automobiles  4.0  
Fresh tomatoes  4.6  
  
                                            
9 From http://www.mackinac.org/archives/1997/s1997-04.pdf; cited sources: Economics: Private 
and Public Choice, James D. Gwartney and Richard L. Stroup, eighth edition 1997, seventh 
edition 1995; Hendrick S. Houthakker and Lester D. Taylor, Consumer Demand in the United 
States, 1929-1970 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966,1970); Douglas R. Bohi, 
Analyzing Demand Behavior (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Hsaing-tai 
Cheng and Oral Capps, Jr., "Demand for Fish" American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
August 1988; and U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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Figure  2-12: Elasticities for Linear Demand 
 
When demand is linear, x(p)=a-bp, the elasticity of demand has the form 
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pb
a
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This case is illustrated in Figure  2-12. 
 
If demand takes the form x(p)=ap-ε,  then demand has constant elasticity, and the 
elasticity is equal to ε. 
 
2.4.1.1 (Exercise) Suppose a consumer has a constant elasticity of demand ε, 
and demand is elastic (ε > 1).  Show that expenditure increases as price 
decreases. 
 
2.4.1.2 (Exercise) Suppose a consumer has a constant elasticity of demand ε, 
and demand is inelastic (ε < 1).  What price makes expenditure the 
greatest? 
 
2.4.1.3 (Exercise) For a consumer with constant elasticity of demand ε > 1, 
compute the consumer surplus. 
2.4.2 Elasticity of Supply 
The elasticity of supply is analogous to the elasticity of demand, in that it is a 
unit-free measure of the responsiveness of supply to a price change, and is 
defined as the percentage increase in quantity supplied resulting from a small 
percentage increase in price.  Formally, if s(p) gives the quantity supplied for 
q
price 
a
a/b 
ε=1 
ε=0
ε=∞ 
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each price p, the elasticity of supply, denoted η (the Greek letter “eta”, chosen 
because epsilon was already taken) is 
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Again similar to demand, if supply takes the form s(p)=apη,  then supply has 
constant elasticity, and the elasticity is equal to η.  A special case of this form is 
linear supply, which occurs when the elasticity equals one. 
 
2.4.2.1 (Exercise) For a producer with constant elasticity of supply, compute 
the producer profits. 
2.5 Comparative Statics 
When something changes – the price of a complement, the demand for a good – 
what happens to the equilibrium?  Such questions are answered by comparative 
statics, which are the changes in equilibrium variables when other things change.  
The use of the term “static” suggests that such changes are considered without 
respect to dynamic adjustment, but instead just focus on the changes in the 
equilibrium level.  Elasticities will help us quantify these changes 
2.5.1 Supply and Demand Changes 
How much do the price and quantity traded change in response to a change in 
demand?  We begin by considering the constant elasticity case, which will let us 
draw conclusions for small changes in more general demand functions.  We will 
denote the demand function by qd(p)=ap-ε  and supply function by qs(p)=bpη.  The 
equilibrium price p* is given by the quantity supplied equal to the quantity 
demanded, or the solution to the equation: 
 
*).(*)( pqpq sd =  
 
Substituting the constant elasticity formulae, 
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The quantity traded, q*, can be obtained from either supply or demand and the 
price: 
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There is one sense in which this gives an answer to the question of what 
happens when demand increases.  An increase in demand, holding the elasticity 
constant, corresponds to an increase in the parameter a.  Suppose we increase 
a by a fixed percentage, replacing a by a(1+∆).  Then price goes up by the 
multiplicative factor ( ) ηε +∆+ 11  and the change in price, as a proportion of the 
price, is 
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Similarly, quantity rises by 
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These formulae are problematic for two reasons.  First, they are specific to the 
case of constant elasticity.  Second, they are moderately complicated.  Both of 
these issues can be addressed by considering small changes, that is, a small 
value of ∆.  We make use of a trick to simplify the formula.  The trick is that, for 
small ∆, 
 
( ) .11 ∆+≈∆+ rr  
 
The squiggly equals sign ≈ should be read “approximately equal to.”10  Applying 
this insight, we have that: 
 
                                            
10 The more precise meaning of  ≈  is that, as ∆ gets small, the size of the error of the formula is 
small even relative to ∆.  That is, ( ) .11 ∆+≈∆+ rr  means ( ) ( ) .011
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For a small percentage increase ∆ in demand, quantity rises by 
approximately ηεη +∆  percent and price rises by approximately 
ηε +∆  percent. 
 
The beauty of this claim is that it holds even when demand and supply do not 
have constant elasticities, because the effect considered is local, and locally, the 
elasticity is approximately constant if the demand is “smooth.” 
 
 
2.5.1.1 (Exercise) Show that for a small percentage increase ∆ in supply, 
quantity rises by approximately ηεε +∆  percent and price falls by 
approximately ηε +∆  percent. 
 
2.5.1.2 (Exercise)  If demand is perfectly inelastic, what is the effect of a 
decrease in supply?  Apply the formula and then graph the solution. 
2.6 Trade 
Supply and demand offers one approach to understanding trade, and it 
represents the most important and powerful concept in the toolbox of 
economists.   However, for some issues, especially those of international trade, 
another related tool is very useful: the production possibilities frontier.  Analysis 
using the production possibilities frontier was made famous by the “guns and 
butter” discussions of World War II.  From an economic perspective, there is a 
tradeoff between guns and butter – if a society wants more guns, it must give up 
something, and one thing to give up is butter.  That getting more guns might 
entail less butter often seems mysterious, because butter, after all, is made with 
cows, and indirectly with land and hay.  But the manufacture of butter also 
involves steel containers, tractors to turn the soil, transportation equipment, and 
labor, all of which either can be directly used (steel, labor) or require inputs that 
could be used (tractors, transportation) to manufacture guns.  From a production 
standpoint, more guns entail less butter (or other things). 
2.6.1 Production Possibilities Frontier 
Formally, the set of production possibilities is the collection of “feasible outputs” 
of an individual, group or society or country.  You could spend your time cleaning 
your apartment, or you could study.  The more of your time you devote to 
studying, the higher your grades will be, but the dirtier your apartment will be.  
This is illustrated, for a hypothetical student, in Figure  2-13. 
 
The production possibilities set embodies the feasible alternatives.  If you spend 
all your time studying, you would obtain a 4.0 (perfect) grade point average 
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(GPA).  Spending an hour cleaning reduces the GPA, but not by much; the 
second hour reduces by a bit more, and so on. 
 
The boundary of the production possibilities set is known as the production 
possibilities frontier.  This is the most important part of the production possibilities 
set, because at any point strictly inside the production possibilities set, it is 
possible to have more of everything, and usually we would choose to have 
more.11  The slope of the production possibilities frontier reflects opportunity cost, 
because it describes what must be given up in order to acquire more of a good.  
Thus, to get a cleaner apartment, more time, or capital, or both, must be spent on 
cleaning, which reduces the amount of other goods and services that can be had.  
For the two-good case in Figure  2-13, diverting time to cleaning reduces 
studying, which lowers the GPA.  The slope dictates how much lost GPA there is 
for each unit of cleaning. 
 
 
Figure  2-13: The Production Possibilities Frontier 
 
One important feature of production possibilities frontiers is illustrated in the 
Figure  2-13: they are concave toward the origin.  While this feature need not be 
universally true, it is a common feature, and there is a reason for it that we can 
see in the application.  If you are only going to spend an hour studying, you 
spend that hour doing the most important studying that can be done in an hour, 
                                            
11 To be clear, we are considering an example with two goods, cleanliness and GPA.  Generally 
there are lots of activities, like sleeping, eating, teeth-brushing, and the production possibilities 
frontier encompasses all of these goods.  Spending all your time sleeping, studying and cleaning 
would still represent a point on a three-dimensional frontier. 
Grades 
Cleanliness
4.0 
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and thus get a lot of grades for the hour’s work.  The second hour of studying 
produces less value than the first, and the third hour less than the second.  This 
is the principle of diminishing marginal returns.  Diminishing marginal returns are 
like picking apples.  If you are only going to pick apples for a few minutes, you 
don’t need a ladder because the fruit is low on the tree; the more time spent, the 
fewer apples per hour you will pick. 
 
Consider two people, Ann and Bob, getting ready for a party.  One is cutting up 
vegetables, the other is making hors d’oeuvres.   Ann can cut up two ounces of 
vegetables per minute, or make one hors d’oeuvre in a minute.  Bob, somewhat 
inept with a knife, can cut up one ounce of vegetables per minute, or make two 
hors d’oeuvres per minute.  Ann’s and Bob’s production possibilities frontiers are 
illustrated in the Figure  2-14, given that they have an hour to work. 
 
Since Ann can produce two ounces of chopped vegetables in a minute, if she 
spends her entire hour on vegetables, she can produce 120 ounces.  Similarly, if 
she devotes all her time to hors d’oeuvres, she produces 60 of them.  The 
constant translation between the two means that her production possibilities 
frontier is a straight line, which is illustrated in the left side of Figure  2-14.  Bob’s 
is the reverse – he produces 60 ounces of vegetables, or 120 hors d’oeuvres, or 
something on the line in between. 
 
 
Figure  2-14: Two Production Possibilities Frontiers 
 
For Ann, the opportunity cost of an ounce of vegetables is half of one hors 
d’oeuvre – to get one extra ounce of vegetable, she must spend 30 extra 
seconds on vegetables.  Similarly, the cost of one hors d’oeuvres for Ann is two 
ounces of vegetables.  Bob’s costs are the inverse of Ann – an ounce of 
vegetables costs him two hors d’oeuvres. 
 
What can Bob and Ann accomplish together?  The important insight is that they 
should use the low cost person in the manufacture of each good, when possible.  
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This means that if fewer than 120 ounces of vegetables will be made, Ann makes 
them all.  Similarly, if fewer than 120 hors d’oeuvres are made, Bob makes them 
all.  This gives a joint production possibilities frontier illustrated in the Figure  2-15.  
Together, they can make 180 of one and none of the other.  If Bob makes only 
hors d’oeuvres, and Ann makes only chopped vegetables, they will have 120 of 
each.  With fewer than 120 ounces of vegetables, the opportunity cost of 
vegetables is Ann’s, and is thus half an hors d’oeuvre, but if more than 120 are 
needed, then the opportunity cost jumps to two. 
 
Now change the hypothetical slightly – suppose that Bob and Ann are putting on 
separate dinner parties, each of which will feature chopped vegetables and hors 
d’oeuvres in equal portions.  By herself, Ann can only produce 40 ounces of 
vegetables and 40 hors d’oeuvres if she must produce equal portions.  She 
accomplishes this by spending 20 minutes on vegetables and 40 minutes on hors 
d’oeuvres.  Similarly, Bob can produce 40 of each, but using the reverse 
allocation of time. 
 
 
Figure  2-15: Joint PPF 
 
By working together, they can collectively have more of both goods.  Ann 
specializes in producing vegetables, and Bob specializes in producing hors 
d’oeuvres.  This yields 120 units of each, which they can split equally, to have 60 
of each.  By specializing in the activity in which they have lower cost, Bob and 
Ann can jointly produce more of each good. 
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Moreover, Bob and Ann can accomplish this by trading.  At a “one for one” price, 
Bob can produce 120 hors d’oeuvres, and trade 60 of them for 60 ounces of 
vegetables.  This is better than producing the vegetables himself, which netted 
him only 40 of each.  Similarly, Ann produces 120 ounces of vegetables, and 
trades 60 of them for 60 hors d’oeuvres.  This trading makes them both better off. 
 
The gains from specialization are potentially enormous.  The grandfather of 
economics, Adam Smith, writes about specialization in the manufacture of pins: 
 
“…One man draws out the wire; another straights it; a third cuts it; a 
fourth points it; a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to 
make the head requires two or three distinct operations ; to put it on 
is a peculiar business; to whiten the pins is another ; it is even a 
trade by itself to put them into the paper ; and the important 
business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about 
eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all 
performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will 
sometimes perform two or three of them.”12  
 
Smith goes on to say that skilled individuals could produce at most twenty pins 
per day acting alone, but that with specialization, ten people can produce 48,000 
pins per day, 240 times as many pins. 
 
2.6.1.1 (Exercise) The Manning Company has two factories, one that makes 
roof trusses, and one that makes cabinets.  With m workers, the roof 
factory produces m  trusses per day.  With n workers, the cabinet plant 
produces n5 .  The Manning Company has 400 workers to use in the 
two factories.  Graph the production possibilities frontier.  (Hint: Let T be 
the number of trusses produced.  How many workers are used making 
trusses?) 
 
2.6.1.2 (Exercise) Alarm & Tint, Inc., has 10 workers working a total of 400 
hours per week.  Tinting takes 2 hours per car.  Alarm installation is 
complicated, however, and performing A alarm installations requires A2 
hours of labor.  Graph Alarm & Tint’s production possibilities frontier for a 
week. 
2.6.2 Comparative and Absolute Advantage 
Ann produces chopped vegetables because her opportunity cost of producing 
vegetables, at ½ of one hors d’oeuvre, is lower than Bob’s.  A lower opportunity 
cost is said to create a comparative advantage.  That is, Ann gives up less to 
produce chopped vegetables than Bob, so in comparison to hors d’oeuvres, she 
has an advantage in the production of vegetables.  Since the cost of one good is 
                                            
12 Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” originally 
published 1776, released by the Gutenberg project, 2002. 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 2-40
the amount of another good foregone, a comparative advantage in one good 
implies a comparative disadvantage in another.  If you are better at producing 
butter, you are necessarily worse at something else, and in particular the thing 
you give up less of to get more butter. 
 
To illustrate this point, let’s consider another party planner.  Charlie can produce 
one hors d’oeuvre, or one ounce of chopped vegetables, per minute.  His 
production is strictly less than Ann’s, that is, his production possibilities frontier 
lies inside of Ann’s.  However, he has a comparative advantage over Ann in the 
production of hors d’oeuvres, because he gives up only one ounce of vegetables 
to produce a hors d’oeuvres, while Ann must give up two ounces of vegetables.  
Thus, Ann and Charlie can still benefit from trade if Bob isn’t around. 
 
2.6.2.1 (Exercise) Graph the joint production possibilities frontier for Ann and 
Charlie, and show that collectively they can produce 80 of each if they 
need the same number of each product.  Hint:  First show that Ann will 
produce some of both goods, by showing that if Ann specializes, there 
are too many ounces of vegetables.  Then show, if Ann devotes x 
minutes to hors d’oeuvres, that 
 
  60 + x = 2(60 – x). 
 
When one production possibilities frontier lies outside another, the larger is said 
to have an absolute advantage – more total things are possible.  In this case, 
Ann has an absolute advantage over Charlie – she can, by herself, have more – 
but not over Bob.  Bob has an absolute advantage over Charlie, too, but again, 
not over Ann. 
 
Diminishing marginal returns implies that the more of a good that a person 
produces, the higher is the cost (in terms of the good given up).  That is to say, 
diminishing marginal returns means that supply curves slope upward; the 
marginal cost of producing more is increasing in the amount produced. 
 
Trade permits specialization in activities in which one has a comparative 
advantage.  Moreover, whenever opportunity costs differ, potential gains from 
trade exist.  If person 1 has an opportunity cost of c1 of producing good X (in 
terms of Y, that is, for each unit of X that person 1 produces, person 1 gives up 
c1 units of Y), and person 2 has an opportunity cost of c2, then there are gains 
from trade whenever c1 is not equal to c2 and neither party has specialized.13  
Suppose c1 < c2.  Then by having person 1 increase the production of X by ∆, c1 
∆ less of the good Y is produced.  Let person 2 reduce the production of X by ∆, 
so that the production of X is the same.  Then there is c2 ∆ units of Y made 
available, for a net increase of (c2-c1) ∆.  The net changes are summarized in 
Table  2-2. 
                                            
13 If a party specialized in one product, it is a useful convention to say that the marginal cost of 
that product is now infinite, since no more can be produced. 
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Table  2-2: Construction of the Gains From Trade 
 1 2 Net Change
Change in X +∆ -∆ 0 
Change in Y -c1 ∆ c2 ∆ (c2-c1) ∆ 
 
Whenever opportunity costs differ, there are gains from re-allocating production 
from one producer to another, gains which are created by having the low cost 
producers produce more, in exchange for greater production of the other good by 
the other producer, who is the low cost producer of this other good.  An important 
aspect of this re-allocation is that it permits production of more of all goods.  This 
means there is little ambiguity about whether it is a good thing to re-allocate 
production – it just means we have more of everything we want.14 
 
How can we guide the reallocation of production to produce more goods and 
services?  It turns out that under some circumstances, the price system does a 
superb job of creating efficient production.  The price system posits a price for 
each good or service, and anyone can sell at the common price.  The insight is 
that such a price induces efficient production.  To see this, suppose we have a 
price p which is the number of units of Y one has to give to get a unit of X.  
(Usually prices are in currency, but we can think of them as denominated in 
goods, too.)  If I have a cost c of producing X, which is the number of units of Y 
that I lose to obtain a unit of X, I will find it worthwhile to sell X if p > c, because 
the sale of a unit of X, nets me p – c units of Y, which I can either consume or 
resell for something else I want.  Similarly, if c > p, I would rather buy X 
(producing Y to pay for it).  Either way, only producers with costs less than p will 
produce X, and those with costs greater than p will purchase X, paying for it with 
Y, which they can produce more cheaply than its price.  (The price of Y is 1/p – 
that is the amount of X one must give to get a unit of Y.) 
 
Thus, a price system, with appropriate prices, will guide the allocation of 
production to insure the low cost producers are the ones who produce, in the 
sense that there is no way of re-allocating production to obtain more goods and 
services. 
 
2.6.2.2 (Exercise) Using Manning’s production possibilities frontier in  2.6.1.1 
(Exercise), compute the marginal cost of trusses in terms of cabinets. 
 
                                            
14 If you are worried that more production means more pollution or other bad things, rest assured.  
Pollution is a bad, so we enter the negative of pollution (or environmental cleanliness) as one of 
the goods we would like to have more of.  The reallocation dictated by differences in marginal 
costs produces more of all goods.  Now with this said, we don’t have any reason at this point to 
believe that the reallocation will benefit everyone. 
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2.6.2.3 (Exercise) Using Alarm & Tint’s production possibilities frontier in 
 2.6.1.2 (Exercise), compute the marginal cost of alarms in terms of 
window tints. 
2.6.3 Factors and Production 
Production possibilities frontiers provide the basis for a rudimentary theory of 
international trade.  To understand the theory, it is first necessary to consider that 
there are fixed and mobile factors.  Factors of production are jargon for inputs to 
the production process.  Labor is generally considered a fixed factor, because 
most countries don’t have borders wide open to immigration, although of course 
some labor moves across international borders.  Temperature, weather, and land 
are also fixed – Canada is a high-cost citrus grower because of its weather.  
There are other endowments that could be exported, but are expensive to export 
because of transportation costs, including water and coal.  Hydropower – 
electricity generated from the movement of water – is cheap and abundant in the 
Pacific Northwest, and as a result, a lot of aluminum is smelted there, because 
aluminum smelting requires lots of electricity.  Electricity can be transported, but 
only with losses (higher costs), which gives other regions a disadvantage in the 
smelting of aluminum.  Capital is generally considered a mobile factor, because 
plants can be built anywhere, although investment is easier in some 
environments than in others.  For example, reliable electricity and other inputs 
are necessary for most factories.  Moreover, comparative advantage may arise 
from the presence of a functioning legal system, the enforcement of contracts, 
and the absence of bribery, because enforcement of contracts increases the 
return on investment by increasing the probability the economic return to 
investment isn’t taken by others. 
 
Fixed factors of production give particular regions a comparative advantage in 
the production of some kinds of goods, and not in others.  Europe, the United 
States and Japan have a relative abundance of highly skilled labor, and have a 
comparative advantage in goods requiring high skills, like computers, 
automobiles and electronics.  Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong 
have increased the available labor skills, and now manufacture more complicated 
goods like VCRs, computer parts and the like. Mexico has a relative abundance 
of middle-level skills, and a large number of assembly plants operate there, as 
well as clothing and shoe manufacturers.  Lower skilled Chinese workers 
manufacture the majority of the world’s toys.  The skill levels of China are rising 
rapidly. 
 
The basic model of international trade was first described by David Ricardo 
(1772-1823), and suggests that nations, responding to price incentives, will 
specialize in the production of goods in which they have a comparative 
advantage, and purchase the goods in which they have a comparative 
disadvantage.  In Ricardo’s description, England has a comparative advantage of 
manufacturing cloth, and Portugal in producing wine, leading to gains from trade 
from specialization. 
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The Ricardian theory suggests that the United States, Canada, Australia and 
Argentina should export agricultural goods, especially grains that require a large 
land area for the value generated (they do).  It suggests that complex technical 
goods should be produced in developed nations (they are) and that simpler 
products and natural resources should be exported by the lesser developed 
nations (they are).  It also suggests that there should be more trade between 
developed and underdeveloped nations than between developed and other 
developed nations.  The theory falters on this prediction – the vast majority of 
trade is between developed nations.  There is no consensus for the reasons for 
this, and politics plays a role – the North American Free Trade Act vastly 
increased the volume of trade between the United States and Mexico, for 
example, suggesting that trade barriers may account for some of the lack of trade 
between the developed and the underdeveloped world.  Trade barriers don’t 
account for the volume of trade between similar nations, which the theory 
suggests should be unnecessary.  Developed nations sell each other mustard 
and tires and cell phones, exchanging distinct varieties of goods they all produce. 
2.6.4 International Trade 
The Ricardian theory emphasizes that the relative abundance of particular 
factors of production determines comparative advantage in output, but there is 
more to the theory.  When the United States exports a computer to Mexico, 
American labor, in the form of a physical product, has been sold abroad.  When 
the United States exports soybeans to Japan, American land (or at least the use 
of American land for a time) has been exported to Japan.  Similarly, when the 
United States buys car parts from Mexico, Mexican labor has been sold to the 
United States, and similarly when the Americans buy Japanese televisions, 
Japanese labor has been purchased.  The goods that are traded internationally 
embody the factors of production of the producing nations, and it is useful to think 
of international trade as directly trading the inputs through the incorporation of 
inputs into products. 
 
If the set of traded goods is broad enough, the value of factors of production 
should be equalized through trade.  The United States has a lot of land, relative 
to Japan, but by selling agricultural goods to Japan, it is as if Japan had more 
land, by way of access to US land.  Similarly, by buying automobiles from Japan, 
it is as if a portion of the Japanese factories were present in the United States.  
With inexpensive transportation, the trade equalizes the values of factories in the 
United States and Japan, and also equalizes the value of agricultural land.  One 
can reasonably think that soybeans are soybeans, wherever they are produced, 
and that trade in soybeans at a common price forces the costs of the factors 
involved in producing soybeans to be equalized across the producing nations.  
The purchase of soybeans by Japanese drives up the value of American land, 
and drives down the value of Japanese land by giving an alternative to its output, 
leading toward equalization of the value of the land across the nations. 
 
This prediction, known as factor price equalization, of modern international trade 
theory was first developed by Paul Samuelson (1915 – ) and generalized by Eli 
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Heckscher (1879 – 1952) and Bertil Ohlin (1899 – 1979).  It has powerful 
predictions, including the equalization of wages of equally skilled people after 
free trade between the United States and Mexico.  Thus, free trade in physical 
goods should equalize the price of haircuts, and land, and economic consulting, 
in Mexico City and New York.  Equalization of wages is a direct consequence of 
factor price equalization because labor is a factor of production.  If economic 
consulting is cheap in Mexico, trade in goods embodying economic consulting – 
boring reports, perhaps – will bid up the wages in the low wage area, and reduce 
the quantity in the high wage area. 
 
An even stronger prediction of the theory is that the price of water in New Mexico 
should be the same as in Minnesota.  If water is cheaper in Minnesota, trade in 
goods that heavily use water – e.g. paper – will tend to bid up the value of 
Minnesota water, while reducing the premium on scarce New Mexico water. 
 
It is fair to say that if factor price equalization works fully in practice, it works very, 
very slowly.  Differences in taxes, tariffs and other distortions make it a challenge 
to test the theory across nations.  On the other hand, within the United States, 
where we have full factor mobility and product mobility, we still have different 
factor prices – electricity is cheaper in the Pacific Northwest.  Nevertheless, 
nations with a relative abundance of capital and skilled labor export goods that 
use these intensively, nations with a relative abundance of land export land-
intensive goods like food, nations with a relative abundance of natural resources 
export these resources, and nations with an abundance of low-skilled labor 
export goods that make intensive use of this labor.  The reduction of trade 
barriers between such nations works like Ann and Bob’s joint production of party 
platters: by specializing in the goods in which they have a comparative 
advantage, there is more for all. 
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3 The US Economy 
An important aspect of economics is economic statistics, and an army of 
economists collect and analyze these statistics.  This chapter presents an 
overview of the economic activity of the United States.  How much do you need 
to know about these statistics?  It would be ridiculous to memorize them.  At the 
same time, it would be undesirable to be ignorant of how we are changing, and 
how we are not.15 
3.1.1 Basic Demographics 
There are about three hundred million people in the United States, up from 76 
million in 1900.   
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Figure  3-1: US Resident Population 
 
During the last century, the US population has become primarily an urban 
population, growing from 40% to 80% urban.  The population is primarily white, 
with 12-13% African-American and 4% classified as other, primarily Hispanic.  
These proportions are relatively stable over the century, with the white population 
falling from 89% to 83%.  The census is thought to understate minority 
populations because of greater difficulties in contacting minorities.  The census 
does not attempt to classify people but instead accepts people’s description of 
their own race. 
 
                                            
15 I apologize to those using the book in foreign countries; this chapter is about the US not 
because it is more important but because I know it better.  Encourage your professor to write a 
chapter on your country!  All of the statistics in this chapter come from Fedstats, 
http://www.fedstats.gov/, from FRED, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/, and from the NBER, 
http://www.nber.org/. 
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Figure  3-2: US Urban and White Population 
 
The United States population has been aging significantly, with the proportion of 
seniors (over 65 years old) tripling over the past century, and the proportion of 
young people dropping by over a third.  Indeed, the proportion of children 
between zero and five years old has dropped from 12.1% of the population to 
under 7%. 
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Figure  3-3: Population Proportions by Age Group 
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The baby boom – a dramatic increase in births for the years 1946-1964, is visible 
in the Figure  3-3 as the population in the 0-24 age group begins increasing in 
1950, peaking in 1970 and then declining significantly as the baby boom moves 
into the 25-44 year old bracket.  There is a slight “echo” of the baby boom, most 
readily seen by looking at the 0-5 age bracket, as in Figure  3-4. 
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Figure  3-4:  Proportion of Population under Age Five 
 
The aging of the American population is a consequence of greater life 
expectancy.  When social security was created in 1935, the average American 
male lived to be slightly less than sixty years old.   The social security benefits, 
which didn’t start until age 65, thus were not being paid to a substantial portion of 
the population. 
 
Figure  3-5 shows life expectancy at birth, thus including infant mortality.  The 
significant drop in life expectancy in 1918 – to nearly 30 years old for non-whites 
– is primarily a consequence of the great influenza, which killed about 2.5% of 
the people who contracted it and killed more Americans in 1918 than did World 
War I. The Great Depression (1932-39) also reduced life expectancy.  The 
steady increase in life expectancy is also visible, with white females now living 
eighty years on average. 
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Figure  3-5: US Life Expectancy at Birth 
 
It is said that the United States is a country of immigrants, and a large fraction of 
the population had ancestors that came from elsewhere.  Immigration into this 
United States, however, has been increasing after a long decline, and the 
fraction of the population that were born in foreign countries is about 11% -- one 
in nine. 
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Figure  3-6: US Immigrant Population, in Percent, by Continent of Origin 
 
The majority of immigrants during this century came from Europe, but 
immigration from Europe has been declining for most of the century, while 
immigration from Asia and Latin America has grown substantially.  Figure  3-7 
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aggregates the total country of origin data over the century, to identify the major 
sources of immigrants. 
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Figure  3-7: National Origin of Immigrants, 1900-2000 
 
One hears a lot about divorce rates in the United States, with statements like 
“fifty percent of all marriages end in divorce.”  Although it has grown, the divorced 
population is actually a small fraction of the population in the United States. 
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Figure  3-8: Male Marital Status (Percentages) 
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Figure  3-9: Female Marital Status (Percent) 
 
Marriage rates have fallen, but primarily because the “never married” category 
has grown.  Some of the “never married” probably represent unmarried couples, 
since the proportion of children from unmarried women has risen fairly 
dramatically.  Even so, marriage rates are greater than they were a century ago.  
However, a century ago there were more unrecorded and common-law 
marriages than probably there are today. 
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Figure  3-10: Percent of Births to Unwed Mothers 
 
While we are on the subject, however, the much discussed crisis in teen-age 
pregnancy doesn’t appear like such a crisis when viewed in terms of the 
proportion of all births that involve a teenage mother. 
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Figure  3-11: Percent of Births to Women Age 19 or less 
 
3.1.2 Education 
Why are the western nations rich, and many other nations poor?  What creates 
the wealth of the developed nations?  Modern economic analysis attributes much 
of the growth of the United States and other developed nations to its educated 
workforce, and not to natural resources.  Japan, with a relative scarcity of natural 
resources but a highly educated workforce, is substantially richer than Brazil, with 
its abundance of natural resources. 
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Figure  3-12: Educational Attainment in Years (Percent of Population) 
 
Just less than 85% of the US population completes 12 years of schooling, not 
counting kindergarten.  Not all of these students graduate from high school, but 
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they spent twelve years in school.  The proportion that completes only five or 
fewer years of elementary school has dropped from about a quarter of the 
population to a steady 1.6%.  At least four years of university now represents a 
bit more than a quarter of the population, which is a dramatic increase.  Slightly 
fewer women (25% versus 28%) complete four years of university, although 
women are more likely to complete four years of high school. 
 
Graduation rates are somewhat below the number of years completed, so that 
slightly less than three-quarters of the US population actually obtain their high 
school degree.  Of those obtaining a high school degree, nearly half obtain a 
university or college degree. 
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Figure  3-13: Graduation Rates 
 
There are several interesting things to see in Figure  3-13.  First, high school 
completion dropped significantly during World War II (1940-45) but rebounded 
after.  Second, after World War II, college graduation spiked, as many US 
soldiers were sent to university by the government under a program called the 
“GI Bill.”16 
 
As the numbers of high school students rose, the portion of high school 
graduates going to university fell, meaning a larger segment of the population 
became high school educated.  This increase represents the creation of the US 
middle class; previously, high school completion and university were in large part 
a sign of wealth.  The creation of a large segment of the population who 
graduated from high school, but didn’t attend university, led to a population with 
                                            
16 The etymology of GI, as slang for US soldiers, is disputed, with candidates including 
“Government Issue,” “General Infantry” and “Galvanized Iron,” the latter a reference to trash cans 
that looked like German World War I artillery. 
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substantial skills and abilities, but no inherited wealth, who became the middle 
class. 
 
High school completion has been declining for thirty years.  This is surprising 
given the high rate of financial return to education in the United States.  Much of 
the reduction in completion can be attributed to an increase in General Education 
Development, or GED, certification, which is a program that grants diplomas 
(often erroneously thought to be a “General Equivalent Degree”) after 
successfully passing examinations in five subject areas.  Unfortunately, those 
people who obtain GED certification are not as successful as high school 
graduates, even marginal graduates, and indeed the GED certification does not 
seem to help students succeed, in comparison with high school graduation.17 
3.1.3 Households and Consumption 
There are approximately one hundred million households in the United States.  
The number of residents per household has consistently shrunk during this 
century, from over four to under three. 
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Figure  3-14: Household Occupancy 
The shrinking size of households reflects a reduction not just in birthrates but 
also an increase in the number of people living alone.  More women live alone 
than men, even though four times as many families with a single adult member 
are headed by women.  This discrepancy – many more women both living on 
their own and living with children and partner, even though there are about the 
same number of men and women born – is accounted for by the greater female 
longevity already noted above. 
 
                                            
17 In performing this kind of analysis, economists are very concerned with adjusting for the type of 
person.  Smarter people are more likely to graduate from high school, but one doesn’t 
automatically become smart by attending high school.  Thus, care has been taken to hold 
constant innate abilities, measured by various measures like IQ scores and performance on tests, 
so that the comparison is between similar individuals, some of whom persevere to finish school, 
some of who don’t.  Indeed, some studies use identical twins. 
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Figure  3-15: Proportion of Households by Type 
 
Where do we live?  About 60% of households live in single family detached 
homes, meaning houses that stand alone.  Another 5% or so live in single family 
attached houses, such as “row houses.”    Slightly over 7½ % live in mobile 
homes or trailers, and the remainder live in multi-unit housing, including 
apartments and duplexes.  Two-thirds of American families own their own 
homes, up from 43% in 1940.  Slightly less than half a percent of the population 
is incarcerated in state and federal prisons.  This represents a four-fold increase 
over 1925-1975. 
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Figure  3-16: Percentage of Incarcerated Residents 
 
Ten percent of households do not have an automobile, and 97.6% have a 
telephone.  So-called “land line” telephones may start to fall as apartment 
dwellers, especially students, begin to rely exclusively on cell phones.  Just 
under 99% of households have complete plumbing facilities (running water, bath 
or shower, flush toilet), up from 54.7% in 1940. 
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How much income do these households make?  What is the distribution of 
income?  One way of assessing the distribution is to use quintiles to measure 
dispersion.  A quintile (or fifth) is a group of size 20%.  Thus the top income 
quintile represents the top 20% of income earners, the next represents those 
ranking 60%-80%, and so on.  Figure  3-17 shows the earnings of the top, middle 
and bottom quintiles. 
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Figure  3-17: Income Shares for Three Quintiles 
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Figure  3-18: Family Income 
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The earnings of the top quintile fell slightly until the late 1960s, when it began to 
rise.  All other quintiles lost income share to the top quintile starting in the middle 
1980s.  Figures like these suggest that families are getting poorer, except for an 
elite few.  However, in fact families are getting richer, just not as fast as the top 
quintile. 
 
Figure  3-18 shows the income, adjusted for inflation to be in 2001 dollars, for 
families at various points in the income spectrum.  For example, the 60% line 
indicates families for whom 40% of the families have higher income, and 60% 
have lower income.  Incomes of all groups has risen, although the richer families 
have seen their incomes rise faster than poorer families.  That is readily seen 
when percentage changes are plotted in Figure  3-19. 
 
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
19
50
19
53
19
56
19
59
19
62
19
65
19
68
19
71
19
74
19
77
19
80
19
83
19
86
19
89
19
92
19
95
19
98
20
01
20%
40%
60%
80%
95%
 
Figure  3-19: Family Income, Cumulative Percentage Change 
 
Real income gains in percentage terms have been larger for richer groups, even 
though the poor have also seen substantially increased incomes. 
 
If the poor have fared less well than the rich in percentage terms, how have 
African-Americans fared?  After World War II, African-Americans families earned 
about 50% of white family income.  This has risen gradually, noticeably in the 
1960s after the 1964 Civil Rights Act that is credited with integrating workplaces 
throughout the southern United States.  African-American family income lagged 
white income growth through the 1980s, but has been rising again. 
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Figure  3-20: Black Family Income as a Percentage of White Income 
 
These income measures attempt to actually measure purchasing power, and 
thus adjust for inflation.  How much will $1 buy?  This is a complicated question, 
because changes in prices aren’t uniform – some goods get relatively cheaper, 
while others become more expensive, and the overall cost of living is a challenge 
to calculate.  The price index typically used is the consumer price index (CPI), 
which adjusts for what it costs to buy a “standard” bundle of food, clothing, 
housing, electricity and other items.  Figure  3-21 shows the CPI over most of 
past century, where 1982 is set as the reference year. 
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Figure  3-21: Consumer Price Index (1982 = 100) 
 
3.1.3.1 (Exercise) Have prices actually risen?  Economists generally agree that 
the meaning of “prices have risen” is that you would prefer past prices to 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 3-58
current prices.  What makes this challenging is that the set of available 
products change over time.  Cars have gone up significantly in price, but 
are also more reliable.  Would you be better off with your current income 
in 1913 than today?  You would be very rich with current average income 
in 1913, but not have access to modern medicine, television, electronics, 
refrigeration, highways, and many other technologies.  If you made 
$40,000 annually in 1913, how would you live and what would you buy?  
(Do some research.) 
 
3.1.3.2 (Exercise) Compare a $40,000 income in 1980 to the present.  What 
differences are there in available products?  In the quality of products?  
How rich does $40,000 make you in each time period?  In which period 
would you choose to live, and why? 
 
There have been three major inflations in the past century.  Both World War I and 
World War II, with a large portion of the goods and services diverted to military 
use, saw significant inflations.  In addition, there was a substantial inflation during 
the 1970s, after the Vietnam War in the 1960s.  The price level fell during the 
Great Depression (1929-39).  Falling price levels create investment problems, 
because inflation adjusted interest rates, which must adjust for a deflation, are 
forced to be high, since unadjusted interest rates cannot be negative. 
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Figure  3-22: CPI Percent Changes 
 
The cost of food has fallen quite dramatically over the past century.  Figure  3-23 
shows that the percentage of pre-tax household income spent on food has fallen 
from 25% to about 10%.  This fall is a reflection of greater incomes, and of the 
fact that the real cost of food has fallen. 
 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 3-59
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
19
29
19
34
19
39
19
44
19
49
19
54
19
59
19
64
19
69
19
74
19
79
19
84
19
89
19
94
19
99
Food
Eating Out
 
Figure  3-23: Food Expenditure as Percent of Income, and Proportion Spent Out 
 
Moreover, a much greater fraction of expenditures on food are spent away from 
home, a fraction that has risen from under 15% to 40%. 
 
How do we spend our income?  The major categories are food, clothing, housing, 
medical, household operation, transportation, and recreation.  The percentage of 
disposable income spent on these categories are shown, for the years 1929, 
1965 and 2001, in Figure  3-24. 
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Figure  3-24: After Tax Income Shares 
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Food has shrunk substantially, but we enjoy more recreation, and spend a lot 
more staying healthy.  (Food is larger than in Figure  3-23 because these figures 
use after tax disposable income, rather than pre-tax income.)  This is in part a 
consequence of our aging population, but also of the increased technology 
available. 
3.1.4 Production 
We learned something about where we live and what we buy.  Were do we get 
our income?  Primarily we earn by providing goods and services.  Nationally, we 
produce about eleven trillion dollars worth of goods and services.  Broadly 
speaking, we spend that eleven trillion on personal consumption of goods and 
services, savings, and government.  This, by the way, is often expressed as Y = 
C + I + G, which states that income (Y) is spent on consumption (C), investment 
(which comes from savings) and government.  One can consume imports as 
well, so the short-term constraint looks like Y + M = C + I + G + X, where M is 
imports and X is exports. 
 
How much does the United States produce?  Economists measure output with 
the gross domestic product (GDP), which is the value of traded goods and 
services produced within the borders of the United States.  GDP measures what 
is produced within the United States, and thus excludes output of Japanese 
factories owned by Americans, but includes the output of US factories owned by 
Japanese. 
 
Importantly, GDP excludes non-traded goods and services.  Thus, unpaid 
housework is not included.  If you clean your own home, and your neighbor 
cleans his or her home, the cleaning does not contribute to GDP.  On the other 
hand, if you and neighbor pay each other to clean each other’s homes, GDP 
goes up by the payments, even though the actual production of goods and 
services remains unchanged.  Thus, GDP does not measure our total output as a 
nation, because it neglects unpaid services.  Why does it neglect unpaid 
services?  Primarily, because we can’t readily measure them.  Data on 
transactions is generated by tax information and reporting requirements imposed 
on businesses.   For the same reason, GDP neglects illegal activities as well, 
such as illegal drug sales and pirated music sales.  Thus, GDP is not a perfect 
measure of the production of our society.  It is just the best measure we have. 
 
Figure  3-25 shows the growth in GDP, and its components of personal 
consumption, government expenditures, and investment.  The figures are 
expressed in constant 1996 dollars, that is, adjusted for inflation.  The figure for 
government includes the government’s purchases of goods and services – 
weapons, highways, rockets, pencils – but does not include transfer payments 
like social security and welfare programs.  Transfer payments are excluded from 
this calculation because the actual dollars are spent by the recipient, not by the 
government.  The cost of making the transfer payments (e.g. printing and mailing 
the checks), however, is included in the cost of government. 
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Figure  3-25: Output, Consumption, Investment and Government 
 
It is often visually challenging to draw useful information from graphs like Figure 
 3-25, because economic activity is growing at a constant percentage.  
Consequently, economists often use a logarithmic scale, rather than a dollar 
scale.  A logarithmic scale has the useful property that a straight line gives 
constant percentage growth.  Consider a variable X that takes on values xt at 
time t.  Define %∆x to be the percentage change: 
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Thus, if the percentage change is constant over time, log(xt) will be a straight line 
over time.  Moreover, for small percentage changes: 
 ( ) xx ∆≈∆+ %%1log  
 
so that the slope is approximately the growth rate.18  Figure  3-26 shows these 
statistics with a logarithmic scale. 
                                            
18 The meaning of ≈ throughout this book is ‘to the first order.’ Here that means ( ) 0
%
%%1loglim
0%
=∆
∆−∆+
→∆ x
xx
x
.  Moreover, in this case the errors of the approximation are modest up 
to about 25% changes. 
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Figure  3-26: Major GDP Components in Log Scale 
 
Immediately noticeable is the approximately constant growth rate from 1950 to 
the present, because a straight line with a log scale represents a constant growth 
rate.  In addition, government has grown much more slowly (although recall that 
transfer payments, another aspect of government, aren’t shown).  A third feature 
is the volatility of investment – it shows much greater changes than output and 
consumption.  Indeed, during the great depression (1929-39), income fell 
somewhat, consumption fell less, government was approximately flat, and 
investment plunged to 10% of its former level. 
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Figure  3-27: Per Capita Income and Consumption 
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Some of the growth in the American economy has arisen because there are 
more of us.  Double the number of people, and consume twice as many goods, 
and individually we aren’t better off.  How much are we producing per capita, and 
how much are we consuming? 
 
US output of goods and services, and consumption, have grown substantially 
over the past 75 years.  In addition, consumption has been a steady percentage 
of income.  This is more clearly visible when income shares are plotted in Figure 
 3-28. 
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Figure  3-28: Consumption, Investment and Government (% GDP) 
 
Consumption was a very high portion of income during the Great Depression 
(1929-39), because income itself fell.  Little investment took place.  The wartime 
economy of World War II reduced consumption to below 50% of output, with 
government spending a similar fraction as home consumers.  Otherwise, 
consumption has been a relatively stable 60-70% of income, rising modestly 
during the past twenty years, as the share of government shrank, and net imports 
grew.  Net imports rose to 4% of GDP in 2001.  
 
The most basic output of our economic system is food, and the US economy 
does a remarkable job producing food.  The US has about 941 million acres 
under cultivation to produce food and meat, which represents 41½ % of the 
surface area of the United States.  Land use for agriculture peaked in 1952, at 
1,206 million acres, and has been dwindling ever since, especially in the 
northeast where farms are being returned to forest through disuse.  Figure  3-29 
shows the output of agricultural products in the United States, adjusting to 1982 
prices.   
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Figure  3-29: US Agricultural Output, 1982 constant dollars 
 
The growth in output is more pronounced when viewed per worker involved in 
agriculture. 
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Figure  3-30: Agricultural Output, Total and Per Worker (1982 $, Log Scale) 
 
Where do we work?  Economists divide production into goods and services.  
Goods are historically divided into mining, construction and manufacturing.  
Mining includes production of raw materials of all kinds, including metals, oil, 
bauxite and gypsum.  Construction involves production of housing and business 
space.  Manufacturing involves the production of everything from computers to 
those little chef’s hats that are placed on turkey legs.  Figure  3-31 describes the 
major sectors of the US economy.  Because the data come from firms, 
agriculture is excluded, although goods and services provided to farms would be 
included. 
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Figure  3-31: Major Non-Agricultural Sectors of US Economy, percent of GDP 
 
Mining has diminished as a major factor in the US economy, a consequence of 
the growth of other sectors, and the reduction in the prices for raw materials.  
Contrary to many popular predictions, the prices of raw materials have fallen 
even as output and population have grown.  We will see later in this book that the 
fall in prices of raw materials – ostensibly in fixed supply given the limited 
capacity of the earth – means that people expect a relative future abundance, 
either because of technological improvements in their use or because of large as 
yet undiscovered pools of the resources.  An example of technological 
improvements is the substitution of fiber optic cable for copper wires.  An 
enormous amount of copper has been recovered from telephone lines, and we 
can have more telephone lines and use less copper than was used in the past. 
 
Manufacturing has become less important, for several reasons.  Many 
manufactured goods cost less, pulling down the overall value.  In addition, we 
import more manufactured goods than in the past.  We produce more services.  
T& PU stands for transportation and public utilities, and includes electricity and 
telephone services and transportation including rail and air travel.  This sector 
has shrunk as a portion of the entire economy, although the components have 
grown in absolute terms.  We take more airplane trips than we have historically. 
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Figure  3-32: Air Travel Per Capita 
 
Electricity production has risen dramatically. 
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Figure  3-33: Electricity Production (M kwh) 
 
However, energy use more generally has not grown as much, just doubling over 
the post-war period. 
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Figure  3-34: Energy Use (Quadrillion BTUs) 
 
The number of automobiles per capita in the United States peaked in the early 
1980s, which looks like a reduction in transportation since then.  However, we 
still drive more than ever, suggesting the change is actually an increase in the 
reliability of automobiles. 
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Figure  3-35: Cars Per Thousand Population and Miles Driven Per Capita 
 
The cost of selling goods – wholesale and retail costs – remains relatively stable, 
as does “FIRE,” which stands for finance, insurance, and real estate costs.  
Other services, ranging from restaurants to computer tutoring, have grown 
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substantially.  This is the so-called “service economy” that used to be in the news 
frequently, but is less so these days. 
 
A bit more than 60% of the population works.  The larger numbers in recent 
years are partially a reflection of the baby boom’s entry into working years, 
reducing the proportion of elderly and children in American society.  However, it 
is partially a reflection of an increased propensity for households to have two 
income earners. 
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Figure  3-36: Percentage of Population Employed (Military & Prisoners Excluded) 
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Figure  3-37: Labor Force Participation Rates, All Women and Married Women 
 
Female participation in the labor force has risen quite dramatically in the United 
States.  Figure  3-37 shows female labor force participation.  Overall participation 
rates have roughly tripled during the century, and significantly exceed the rates 
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prevailing during World War II, when many women went back to work.  In 
addition, participation of married women has now risen above those of unmarried 
women.  Participation rates of single women are even higher, currently at 68% 
they are higher than the overall average participation rate of all residents.  The 
difference is primarily elderly women, who are disproportionately more likely to 
be widowed rather than married or single, and who are less likely to be working. 
 
Another sector of the economy which has been much in the news is national 
defense.  How much do we spend on the military?  In this century, the large 
expenditure occurred during World War II, when about 50% of GDP was spent by 
the government, and 37% of GDP went to the armed forces.  During the Korean 
War, we spent about 15% of GDP on military goods, and less than 10% of GDP 
during the Vietnam war.  The military buildup during Ronald Reagan’s presidency 
(1980-1988) increased our military expenditures from about 5½% to 6½% of 
GDP – a large percentage change in military expenditures, but a small diversion 
of GDP.  The fall of the Soviet Union led the United States to reduce military 
expenditures, in what was called the “peace dividend,” but again the effects were 
modest. 
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Figure  3-38: Defense as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Historically, defense represents the largest expenditure by the federal 
government.  However, as we see, defense has become a much smaller part of 
the economy overall.  However, the federal government plays many other roles in 
the modern US economy. 
3.1.5 Government 
With a budget over two trillion dollars, the federal government represents just 
under 20% of the US economy.  It is one of the largest organizations in the world; 
only nations are larger organizations, and only a handful of nations are larger. 
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The size of the federal government, as a percentage of GDP, is shown in Figure 
 3-39.  Federal expenditures boomed during World War II (1940-45), but shrank 
back to nearly pre-war levels shortly afterward, with much of the difference 
attributable to veterans’ benefits and continuing international involvement.  
Federal expenditures, as a percentage of GDP, continue to grow until Ronald 
Reagan’s presidency in 1980, when they begin to shrink slightly after an initial 
growth.  Figure  3-39 also shows federal revenues, and the deficit – the difference 
between expenditures and revenues, is apparent, especially for World War II and 
1970-1998. 
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Figure  3-39: Federal Expenditures and Revenues (Percent of GDP) 
 
Much has been written about the federal government’s “abdication” of various 
services, which are pushed onto state and local government.  Usually this 
behavior is attributed to the Reagan presidency (1980-88).  There is some 
evidence of this behavior in the post-war data, but the effect is very modest and 
long term.  Most of the growth in state and local government occurred between 
1947 and 1970, well before the Reagan presidency; state and local government 
has been stable since then.  Moreover, the expenditure of the federal 
government, which shows ups and downs, has also been fairly stable.  In any 
event, such effects are modest overall. 
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Figure  3-40: Federal, State & Local and Total Government Receipts (% GDP) 
 
Figure  3-40 sets out the taxation at both the federal and state and local (merged 
to be regional) level.  Figure  3-41 shows expenditures of the same entities.  Both 
figures are stated as a percentage of GDP.  State and local taxation and 
expenditures doubled over the postwar period.  The two figures are very similar. 
The federal government’s expenditures have varied more significantly than its 
revenues. 
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Figure  3-41: Federal, Regional and Total Expenditures as a Percent of GDP 
 
A peculiarity of the US federal government is a penchant for “off-budget” 
expenditures.  Originally, such off-budget items involved corporations like Intelsat 
(which commercialized satellite technology) and RCA (the Radio Corporation of 
America, which commercialized radio) and other semi-autonomous and self-
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sustaining operations.  Over time, however, off-budget items became a way of 
hiding the growth of government, through a process that became known as 
“smoke and mirrors.” 
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Figure  3-42: Federal Expenditures, On and Off Budget, Percent of GDP 
 
During the 1980s, the public became aware of off-budget items.  Political 
awareness made off-budget items cease to work as a device for evading 
balanced-budget requirements, and few new ones were created, although they 
continue to be debated.  Sporadically there are attempts to push social security 
off-budget. 
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Figure  3-43: Federal and Regional Government Employment (000s) 
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Federal employees includes two major categories, uniformed military personnel 
and the executive branch.  State and Local government is much larger and has 
tripled in size since 1962.  The biggest growth areas involve public school 
teachers, police, corrections (prisons) and hospitals.  About 850,000 of the 
federal employees work for the postal service. 
 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
19
40
19
44
19
48
19
52
19
56
19
60
19
64
19
68
19
72
19
76
19
80
19
84
19
88
19
92
19
96
20
00
Defense
Transfers
To Regional
Other Grants
Interest
Other
 
Figure  3-44: Major Expenditures of the Federal Government 
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Figure  3-45: Major Transfer Payments (% of Federal Budget) 
 
Transfers to individuals represent almost 50% of federal expenditures.  These 
transfers are direct payments to individuals, in the form of a check.  Such 
transfers include social security, Medicare, Medicaid, unemployment insurance, 
and veteran’s benefits.  Transfers to state and local governments are listed as 
regional.  “Other grants” also involve sending checks, usually with strings 
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attached.  The growth in social security during the 1950s and 1960s is primarily a 
consequence of increasing benefit levels.  The growth in Medicare and Medicaid 
payments over the period 1970-90, in contrast, is primarily a consequence of 
increased costs of existing programs rather than increases in benefit levels.  
 
A question you may ask, quite reasonably, is whether the social security program 
can survive to the time when you retire.  A common misunderstanding about 
social security is that it is an investment program – that the taxes individuals paid 
in are invested and returned at retirement.  As Figure  3-46 makes clear, for most 
of its existence the social security program has paid out approximately what it 
took in.   
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Figure  3-46: Social Security Revenue and Expenditure, $ millions 
The social security administration has been ostensibly investing money and has 
a current value of approximately 1.5 trillion dollars, which is a bit less than four 
times the current annual expenditure on social security.  Unfortunately, this 
money is “invested” in the federal government, and thus is an obligation of the 
federal government, as opposed to an investment in the stock market.  
Consequently, from the perspective of someone hoping to retire in, say, 2050, 
this investment isn’t much comfort, since the investment won’t make it easier for 
the federal government to make the social security payments.  The good news is 
that the government can print money.  The bad news is that when it prints a lot of 
it, and the obligations of the social security administration are in the tens of 
trillions of dollars, it isn’t worth very much. 
 
The federal government runs deficits, spending more than it earned.  In most of 
the past 75 years we see from Figure  3-39 that the government runs a deficit, 
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bringing in less than it spends.  Interest has been as high as 15% of the cost of 
the federal government (see Figure  3-44).  How large is the debt, and how 
serious is it?  Figure  3-47 gives the size of the federal debt, in absolute dollars 
and as a percent of GDP.  The debt was increased dramatically during World 
War II (1940-45), but over the following 25 years, little was added to it, so that as 
a portion of growing GDP, the debt fell. 
 
Starting in the late 1970s, the US began accumulating debt faster than we were 
growing, and the debt began to rise.  That trend wasn’t stabilized until the 1990s, 
and then only because the economy grew at an extraordinary rate by historical 
standards.  The expenditures following the 2001 airplane attacks, combined with 
a recession in the economy, have sent the debt rising again. 
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Figure  3-47: Federal Debt, Total and Percent of GDP 
 
 
The national debt isn’t out of control.  At current 4% interest rates on federal 
borrowing, we spend about 2½ % of GDP on interest servicing the federal debt.  
The right evaluation of the debt is as a percentage of GDP; viewed as a 
percentage, the size of the debt is of moderate size – serious but not critical.  
The serious side of the debt is the coming retirement of the baby boom 
generation, which is likely to put additional pressure on the government. 
 
An important distinction in many economic activities is the distinction between a 
stock and a flow.  Your bank account represents a stock of money, the 
expenditures and income a flow.  The national debt is a stock; the deficit is the 
addition to the debt and is a flow.  If you think about a lake with incoming water 
and evaporation, the amount of water in the lake is the stock of water, the 
incoming stream minus evaporation the flow.  
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Table  3-1: Expenditures on Agencies as Percent of Non-Transfer Expenditures 
Department or Agency 1977 1990 2002 
Legislative 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Judiciary 0.2 0.3 0.6 
Agriculture 2.1 2.2 2.7 
Commerce 3.2 0.7 0.7 
Education 3.9 3.8 6.7 
Energy 3.1 3.2 2.9 
Health 3.7 4.6 8.3 
Defense 43.8 59.2 46.9 
Homeland Security - - 4.1 
Housing & Urban Dev. 13.4 2.9 4.3 
Interior 1.6 1.3 1.4 
Justice 1.0 1.7 2.7 
Labor 6.1 1.7 1.7 
State 0.6 0.9 1.3 
Transportation 2.2 2.6 2.1 
Treasury 1.7 1.6 1.4 
Veterans 2.3 2.6 3.3 
Corps of Engineers 1.0 0.6 0.6 
Environmental P.A. 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Fed Emergency M.A. 0.2 0.4 0.0 
GSA 0.2 0.5 0.0 
Intl Assistance 2.8 2.7 1.9 
NASA 1.6 2.5 2.0 
NSF 0.3 0.4 0.7 
 
 
 
Table  3-1 gives the expenditures on various agencies, as a percentage of the 
“discretionary” expenditures, where discretionary is a euphemism for 
expenditures that aren’t transfers.  Transfers, which are also known as 
entitlements, include social security, Medicare, aid to families with dependent 
children, unemployment insurance and veteran’s benefits.  In contrast, Table  3-1 
gives the expenditures by the “Alphabet Soup” of federal agencies.   
 
The National Science Foundation (NSF) provides funds for basic research.  The 
general idea of government-funded research is that it is useful for ideas to be in 
the public domain, and moreover that some research isn’t commercially viable, 
but is valuable nevertheless.  Studying asteroids and meteors produces little if 
any revenue, but could, perhaps, save humanity one day in the event that we can 
deflect a large incoming asteroid.  (Scientists appear pessimistic about actually 
deflecting an asteroid.)  Similarly, research into nuclear weapons might be 
commercially viable but as a society, we don’t want firms selling nuclear 
weapons to the highest bidder.  In addition to the NSF, the National Institutes of 
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Health, also a government agency, fund a great deal of research.  How much 
does the government spend on R&D?  Figure  3-48 shows the history of R&D 
expenditures.  The 1960s “space race” competition between the US and the 
Soviet Union led to the greatest federal expenditure on research and 
development, and it topped 2% of GDP.  There was a modest increase during 
the Reagan presidency (1980-88) in defense R&D, which promptly returned to 
earlier levels. 
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Figure  3-48: Federal Spending on R&D, as a Percent of GDP 
 
Where does the government get the money to buy all these things?  As we see in 
Figure  3-49, the federal income tax currently produces just under 50% of federal 
revenue.  Social Security and Medicare taxes produce the next largest portion, 
with around 30-35% of revenue.  The rest comes from corporate profits taxes 
(about 10%), excise taxes like those imposed on cigarettes, liquor and cigarettes 
(under 5%) and other taxes like tariffs, fees, sales of property like radio spectrum 
and oil leases, and fines.  The major change since World War II is the dramatic 
increase in social security, a consequence of the federal government’s attempt to 
insure the future viability of the program, in the face of severely adverse 
demographics in the form of the retirement of the baby boom generation. 
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Figure  3-49: Sources of Federal Government Revenue 
 
An important aspect of tax collection is that the income taxes, like the federal 
income tax as well as Social Security and Medicare taxes, are very inexpensive 
to collect, relative to sales taxes and excise taxes.  Income taxes are 
straightforward to collect even relative to corporate income taxes.  Quite 
reasonably, corporations can deduct expenses and the costs of doing business 
and are taxed on their profits, not on revenues.  What is an allowable deduction, 
and what is not, make corporate profits complicated to administer.  Moreover, 
from an economic perspective, corporate taxes are paid by consumers, in the 
form of higher prices for goods, at least when industries are competitive. 
3.1.6 Trade 
The United States is a major trading nation.  Figure  3-50 presents total US 
imports and exports, including foreign investment and earnings (for example, 
earnings from US owned foreign assets).  As is clear from this figure, the net 
trade surplus ended in the 1970s, and the US now runs substantial trade deficits, 
around 4% of GDP.  In addition, trade is of increasing important in the economy. 
 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 3-79
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
16.00%
18.00%
20.00%
19
60
19
64
19
68
19
72
19
76
19
80
19
84
19
88
19
92
19
96
20
00
Exports
Imports
 
Figure  3-50: Total Imports and Exports as a Proportion of GDP 
 
Figure  3-50 includes investment and earnings.  When we think of trade, we tend 
to think of goods traded – American soybeans, movies and computers sold 
abroad, and automobiles, toys, shoes and wine purchased from foreign 
countries.  Figure  3-51 shows the total trade in goods and services, as a 
percentage of US GDP.  These figures are surprisingly similar, which shows that 
investment and earnings from investment are roughly balanced – the US invests 
abroad to a similar extent as foreigners invest in the US. 
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Figure  3-51: US Trade in Goods and Services 
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Figure  3-52 shows the earnings on US assets abroad, and the payments from 
US-based assets owned by foreigners.  These accounts are roughly in balance, 
while the US used to earn about 1% of GDP from its ownership of foreign assets. 
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Figure  3-52: Income and Payments as a Percent of GDP 
 
Who does the US trade with?  Table  3-2 details the top fifteen trading partners., 
and the share of trade.  The US and Canada remain the top trading countries of 
all pairs of countries.  Trade with Mexico has grown substantially since the 
enactment of the 1994 North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), which extended 
the earlier US – Canada agreement to include Mexico and Mexico is the US’s 
second largest trading partner.  Together, the top fifteen account for three-
quarters of US foreign trade. 
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Table  3-2: Top US Trading Partners and Trade Volumes ($B) 
Rank Country Exports  Year-to-Date 
Imports 
Year-to-Date Total Percent 
 All Countries 533.6 946.6 1,480.2 100.0% 
 Top 15 Countries 400.7 715.4 1,116.2 75.4% 
1 Canada 123.1 167.8 290.9 19.7% 
2 Mexico 71.8 101.3 173.1 11.7% 
3 China 22.7 121.5 144.2 9.7% 
4 Japan 36.0 85.1 121.0 8.2% 
5 Germany 20.4 50.3 70.8 4.8% 
6 United Kingdom 23.9 30.3 54.2 3.7% 
7 Korea, South 17.5 29.6 47.1 3.2% 
8 Taiwan 14.0 22.6 36.5 2.5% 
9 France 13.4 20.0 33.4 2.3% 
10 Italy  6.9 18.6 25.5 1.7% 
11 Malaysia  7.2 18.0 25.2 1.7% 
12 Ireland  5.2 19.3 24.5 1.7% 
13 Singapore 13.6 10.1 23.7 1.6% 
14 Netherlands 15.7 7.9 23.6 1.6% 
15 Brazil 9.3 13.2 22.5 1.5% 
 
3.1.7 Fluctuations 
The US economy has recessions, a term which refers to a drop in gross 
domestic output.  Recessions are officially called by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, which keeps statistics on the economy and engages in 
various kinds of economic research.  Generally a recession is called whenever 
output drops for half of a year. 
 
Figure  3-53 shows the overall industrial production of the United States since 
World War II.  Drops in output are clearly noticeable.  The official recessions are 
also marked.  There are three booms that lasted about a decade; these are the 
longest booms in US history and much longer than booms ordinarily lasted.  Prior 
to World War II, a normal boom lasted 2½ years and the longest was four years.  
Recessions have historically lasted a 1½ to two years, a pattern that continues.  
Indeed, the average recession since World War II has been shorter than the 
average recession prior to that time. 
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Figure  3-53: Postwar Industrial Production and Recessions 
 
These fluctuations in output are known as the business cycle, which is not an 
exactly periodic cycle but instead a random cycle. 
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Figure  3-54: Percentage of the Population Employed 
An important aspect of the business cycle is that many economic variables move 
together, or covary.  Some economic variables vary less with the business cycle 
than others.  Investment varies very strongly with the business cycle, while 
overall employment varies weakly.  Interest rates, inflation, stock prices, 
unemployment and many other variables also vary systematically over the 
business cycle.  Recessions are clearly visible in the percentage of the 
population employed, illustrated in Figure  3-54.  
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 3-83
 
Some economic variables are much more variable than others.  For example, 
investment, durable goods purchases, and utilization of production capacity vary 
more dramatically over the business cycle than consumption and employment.  
Figure  3-55 shows the percentage of industrial capacity utilized to produce 
manufactured goods.  This series is more volatile than production itself, and 
responds more strongly to economic conditions. 
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Figure  3-55: Industrial Factory Capacity Utilitzation (Source: FRED) 
 
Most of the field of macroeconomics is devoted to understanding the 
determinants of growth and of fluctuations, but further consideration of this 
important topic is beyond the scope of a microeconomics text.   
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4 Producer Theory 
The most basic theory of the firm views the firm as a means of transforming 
things into other, more valuable things, which is known as production.  Thus, 
smelting of copper or gold removes impurities and makes the resulting product 
more valuable.  Silicon valley transforms silicon, which is the primary ingredient 
of sand, along with a thousand other chemicals and metals, into computer chips 
used in everything from computers to toasters.  Cooking transforms raw food, 
adding flavor and killing bacteria.  Moving things to locations where they have 
higher value is a form of production.  Moving stone to the location of a house 
where the stone can be installed in the exterior, or bringing the King Tut museum 
exhibit temporarily to Chicago, or a basketball team to the playoffs, are all 
examples of production.  In this simplistic view, a firm is comprised of a 
technology or set of technologies for transforming things and then chooses the 
transformation to maximize the net profits.  This “firm as a production function” 
view of the firm is adequate for some purposes, especially when products or 
services are relatively standardized and technologies widely available, but fares 
poorly when the internal organization of the firm matters a great deal.  
Nevertheless, the “firm as a production function” model is a natural starting point 
in the investigation of competition. 
4.1 The Competitive Firm 
4.1.1 Types of Firms 
There are four major types of firms created in law, although these broad types 
have many subtypes.  At the smallest end is the proprietorship, in which a firm is 
owned by a single individual (the proprietor) or perhaps a family, and operated by 
a relatively small number of people.  The family farm, many restaurants, 
convenience stores, and laundromats are operated this way.  Debts accrued by 
the proprietorship are the personal responsibility of the proprietor.  Professionals 
like attorneys and accountants are often organized as partnerships.  Partnerships 
share profits according to a formula (some equally by partner, some assigning 
shares or points to partners so that ‘rainmakers’ who generate more of the 
business obtain a larger share of the profits) and usually all are liable for losses 
incurred by the partnership.  Thus, if a partner in a law firm steals a client’s 
money and disappears, the other partners are generally responsible for the loss.  
In contrast, a corporation is, by a legal fiction, a person, which means a 
corporation itself can incur debt and the responsibility for repayment of that debt 
is with the corporation, not with the officers or owners of the corporation.  When 
the energy trader company Enron collapsed, the shareholders in Enron lost their 
investment in the stock, but were not responsible for the remaining debts of the 
corporation.  Moreover, executives of the company are also not financially 
responsible for debts of the corporation, provided the executives act legally and 
carry out their responsibilities appropriately.  If a meteor strikes a manufacturing 
facility and bankrupts the corporation, the executives are not personally 
responsible for the debts the corporation fails to pay.  On the other hand, 
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breaking the law is not permitted, and executives at Archer Daniels Midland, the 
large agriculture firm, who colluded in the fixing of the price of lysine went to jail 
and were personally fined.  The corporation was fined as well. 
 
Corporations shield company executives and shareholders from liability, and are 
said to offer “limited liability.”  So why would anyone in their right mind organize a 
firm as a proprietorship or a partnership?  Corporations cost money to organize, 
about $1,000 per year at the time of this writing, and are taxed, which is why 
many small businesses are organized as proprietorships: it is cheaper.  
Moreover, it may not be possible for a corporation owned by a family to borrow 
money to open a restaurant: potential lenders fear not being repaid in the event 
of bankruptcy, so insist on some personal liability on the part of the owners.  So 
why are professional groups organized as partnerships and not corporations?  
The short answer is that a large variety of hybrid organizational forms exist.  The 
distinctions have been blurred and organizations like “Chapter S Corporations” 
and “Limited Liability Partnerships” offer the advantages of partnerships 
(including avoidance of taxation) and corporations.  The disadvantages to these 
forms is primarily larger legal fees, and limitations on the nature of ownership and 
rules specific to individual states. 
 
It is usually the case that proprietorships are smaller than partnerships, and 
partnerships smaller than corporations, although there are some very large 
partnerships (e.g. the big four accounting firms) and some tiny corporations.  The 
fourth kind can be of any size, for its distinction is not how it is organized 
internally but what it does with the revenue.  The non-profit firm is prohibited from 
distributing a profit to its owners.  Religious operations, academic associations, 
environmental groups, most zoos, industry associations, lobbying groups, many 
hospitals, credit unions (a type of bank), labor unions, private universities and 
charities are all organized as non-profit corporations.  The major advantage of 
non-profit firms is that the government doesn’t tax them.  In exchange for 
avoiding taxes, non-profits must be engaged in government-approved activities, 
meaning generally that the non-profit operates for the benefit of some segment of 
society.  So why can’t you establish your own non-profit, that operates for the 
benefit of you, and avoid taxes?  Generally you alone aren’t enough of a socially 
worthy purpose to meet the requirements to form a non-profit.19  Moreover, you 
can’t establish a non-profit for a worthy goal and not serve that goal but just pay 
yourself all the money the corporation raises, because non-profits are prohibited 
from overpaying their managers, since overpaying the manager means not 
serving the worthy corporate goal as well as possible.  Finally, commercial 
activities of non-profits are taxable.  Thus, when the non-profit zoo sells stuffed 
animals in the gift-shop, generally the zoo collects sales tax and is potentially 
subject to corporate taxes. 
 
                                            
19 Certainly some of the non-profit religious organizations created by televangelists suggest that 
the non-profit established for the benefit of a single individual isn’t far-fetched. 
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The modern corporation is a surprisingly recent invention.  Prior to World War I, 
companies were generally organized in a pyramid structure, with a president at 
the top, and vice-presidents who reported to him, etc.  In a pyramid structure, 
there is a well-defined chain of command, and no one is ever below two distinct 
managers of the same level.  The problem with a pyramid structure is that two 
retail stores that want to coordinate have to contact their managers, and possibly 
their managers’ managers, and so on up the pyramid until a common manager is 
reached.  There are circumstances where such rigid decision-making is unwieldy, 
and the larger the operation of a corporation, the more unwieldy it gets. 
 
Four companies – Sears, DuPont, General Motors and Standard Oil of New 
Jersey (Exxon) – found that the pyramid structure didn’t work well for them.  
Sears found that its separate businesses of retail stores and mail order required 
a mix of shared inputs (purchased goods) but distinct marketing and 
warehousing of these goods.  Consequently, retail stores and mail order needed 
to be separate business units, but purchasing had to answer to both of them.  
Similarly, DuPont’s military business (e.g. explosives) and consumer chemicals 
were very different operations serving very different kinds of customers, yet often 
selling the same things, so again the inputs needed to be centrally produced and 
to coordinate with two separate corporate divisions.  General Motors’ many car 
divisions employ ‘friendly rivalry,’ in which technology and parts are shared 
across the divisions but the divisions compete in marketing their cars to 
consumers.  Again, technology can’t be under just one division, but instead is 
common to all.  Finally, Standard Oil of New Jersey was attempting to create a 
company that managed oil products from oil exploration all the way through 
pumping gasoline into automobile gas tanks.  With such varied operations all 
over the globe, Standard Oil of New Jersey required extensive coordination and 
found that the old business model needed to be replaced.  These four companies 
independently invented the modern corporation, which is organized into separate 
business units.  These business units run as semi-autonomous companies 
themselves, with one business unit purchasing, at a negotiated price, inputs from 
another unit, and selling outputs to a third.  The study of the internal organization 
of firms and its ramifications for competitiveness is fascinating, but beyond the 
scope of this book.20 
4.1.2 Production Functions 
The firm transforms inputs into outputs.  For example, a bakery takes inputs like 
flour, water, yeast, labor, and heat and makes loaves of bread.  An earth-moving 
company takes capital equipment, ranging from shovels to bulldozers, and labor 
and digs holes.  A computer manufacturer buys parts, generally “off-the-shelf” 
like disk-drives and memory, along with cases and keyboards and other parts 
that may be manufactured specially for the computer manufacturer, and uses 
                                            
20 If you want to know more about organization theory, I happily recommend Competitive 
Solutions: The Strategist’s Toolkit, by R. Preston McAfee, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002. 
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labor to produce computers.  Starbucks takes coffee beans, water, some capital 
equipment, and labor and produces brewed coffee. 
 
Many if not all firms produce several outputs.  However, we can view a firm 
producing multiple outputs as using several distinct production processes, and 
thus it is useful to start by looking at a firm that produces only one output.  
Generally, we can describe this firm as buying an amount x1 of the first input, x2 
of the second input, and so on (we’ll use xn to denote the last input) and 
producing an amount y of the output, that is, the production function is 
 
 y = f(x1, x2, … , xn). 
 
Mostly we will focus on two inputs in this section, but carrying out the analysis for 
more than two inputs is straightforward. 
 
Example: The Cobb-Douglas production function is the product of the x’s raised 
to powers, and comes in the form: 
 
 nan
aa
n xxxaxxxf ...),...,,( 21 21021 =  
 
The constants a1 through an are positive numbers, generally individually less than 
one.  For example, with two goods, capital K and labor L, Cobb-Douglas can be 
expressed as a0KaLb.  We will use this example frequently.  It is illustrated, for a0 
= 1, a=1/3 and b=2/3, in Figure  4-1. 
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Figure  4-1: Cobb-Douglas Isoquants 
 
Figure  4-1 shows three isoquants for the Cobb-Douglas production function.  An 
isoquant, meaning “equal quantity,” illustrates the input mixes that produce a 
given output level.  In this case, given a=1/3 and b=2/3, we can solve y = KaLb for 
K to obtain K = y3 L-2.  Thus, K = L-2 gives the combinations of inputs yielding an 
output of 1, and that is what the dark, solid line represents.  The middle, grey 
dashed line represents an output of 2, and  finally the dotted light-grey line 
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represents an output of 3.  Isoquants are familiar contour plots used, for 
example, to show the height of terrain or temperature on a map.  Temperature 
isoquants are, not surprisingly, called isotherms. 
 
Isoquants provide a natural way of looking at production functions and are a bit 
more useful to examine than 3-D plots like the one provided in Figure  4-2. 
 
 
 
Figure  4-2: The Production Function 
 
The fixed-proportions production function comes in the form 
 
 }...,,,{),...,,( 221121 nnn xaxaxaMinxxxf =  
 
 
Figure  4-3: Fixed Proportions 
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The fixed proportions production function has the property that adding an input 
beyond a necessary level does no good.  For example, the productive value of 
having more than one shovel per worker is pretty low, so that shovels and 
diggers are reasonably modeled as producing holes using a fixed proportions 
production function.  Moreover, without a shovel or other digging implement like a 
backhoe, a bare-handed worker produces so little digging as to be nearly 
useless, so extra workers beyond the number of shovels have little effect.  
Ultimately, the size of the holes is pretty much determined by Min {number of 
shovels, number of diggers}.  The Figure  4-3 illustrates the isoquants for fixed 
proportions.  As we will see, fixed proportions makes the inputs “perfect 
complements.” 
 
Two inputs K and L are perfect substitutes in a production function f if they enter 
as a sum, that is, f(K, L, x3, … , xn) = g(K + cL, x3, … , xn), for a constant c.  With 
an appropriate scaling of the units of one of the variables, all that matters is the 
sum of the two variables, not the individual values.  In this case, the isoquants 
are straight lines that are parallel to each other, as illustrated in the Figure  4-4. 
 
 
Figure  4-4: Perfect Substitutes 
 
The marginal product of an input is just the derivative of the production function 
with respect to that input.21  An important aspect of marginal products is that they 
are affected by the level of other inputs.  For example, in the Cobb-Douglas case 
with two inputs22 and for constant A. 
 
                                            
21 This is a partial derivative, since it holds the other inputs fixed.  Partial derivatives are denoted 
with the symbol ∂. 
22 The symbol α is the Greek letter “alpha.”  The symbol β is the Greek letter “beta.”  These are 
the first two letters of the Greek alphabet, and the word alphabet itself originates from these two 
letters. 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 4-90
,),( βαLAKLKf =  
 
the marginal product of capital is 
 
.),( 1 βαα LAKLK
K
f −=∂
∂  
 
If α and β are between zero and one (the usual case), then the marginal product 
of capital increases in the amount of labor, and decreases in the amount of 
capital.  For example, an extra computer is very productive in a situation with lots 
of workers and few computers, but not so productive in a situation where there 
are lots of computers and few people to operate them. 
 
The value of the marginal product of an input is just the marginal product times 
the price of the output.  If the value of the marginal product of an input exceeds 
the cost of that input, it is profitable to use more of the input.   
 
Some inputs are more readily changed than others.  It can take five years or 
more to order and obtain new passenger aircraft, four years to build an electricity 
generation facility or a pulp and paper mill.  Very skilled labor – experienced 
engineers, animators, patent attorneys – is often hard to find and challenging to 
hire.  It usually takes three to five years to hire even a small number of academic 
economists.  On the other hand, it is possible to buy shovels, telephones, and 
computers and to hire a variety of temporary workers quite rapidly, in a matter of 
a day or so.  Moreover, additional hours of work can be obtained by an existing 
labor force simply by hiring them “overtime,” at least on a temporary basis.  The 
amount of water or electricity a production facility uses can be varied second by 
second.  If you run a restaurant, you can use more water tonight to wash dishes 
if you need it.  If you start in the morning, you can probably get a few additional 
workers by that evening by paying overtime to those who aren’t scheduled to 
work.  It will probably take a few days or more to hire additional waiters and 
waitresses, and perhaps more than a few days to find a skilled chef.  You can 
obtain more ingredients, generally the same day, and more plates and silverware 
pretty quickly.  You can lease more space, but it will probably take more than a 
month to actually occupy a larger space, what with finding the space for rent, 
renting it, remodeling it and obtaining the necessary permits. 
 
That some inputs or factors can be varied quickly, others only slowly, leads to the 
notions of the long run and short run.  In the short run, only some inputs can be 
adjusted, while in the long run, all inputs can be adjusted.  Traditionally, 
economists viewed labor as quickly adjustable, and capital equipment as more 
difficult to adjust.  That is certainly right for airlines – obtaining new aircraft is a 
very slow process – and for large complex factories, and for relatively low-skilled 
and hence substitutable labor.  On the other hand, obtaining workers with 
unusual skills is a slower process than obtaining warehouse or office space.  
Generally speaking, the long-run inputs are those that are expensive to adjust 
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quickly, while the short-run factors can be adjusted in a relatively short time 
frame.  What factors belong in which category is dependent on the context or 
application under consideration. 
 
4.1.2.1 (Exercise) For the Cobb-Douglas production function, suppose there 
are two inputs K and L, and the sum of the exponents is one.  Show that 
if each input is paid the value of the marginal product per unit of the 
input, the entire output is just exhausted.  That is, for this production 
function, show 
 
    ),( LKf
L
fL
K
fK =∂
∂+∂
∂ . 
4.1.3 Profit Maximization 
Consider an entrepreneur that would like to maximize profit, perhaps by running 
a delivery service.  The entrepreneur uses two inputs, capital K (e.g. trucks) and 
labor L (e.g. drivers), and rents the capital at cost r per dollar of capital.  The 
wage rate for drivers is w.  The production function is F(K, L), that is, given inputs 
K and L, the output is F(K, L).  Suppose p is the price of the output.  This gives a 
profit of:23 
 
.),( wLrKLKpF −−=π  
 
First, consider the case of a fixed level of K.  The entrepreneur chooses L to 
maximize profit.  The value L* of L that maximizes the function π must satisfy: 
 
.*),(0 wLK
L
Fp
L
−∂
∂=∂
∂= π  
 
This expression is known as a first order condition, because it says the first 
derivative of the function is zero.24  The first order condition shows that we add 
workers to the production process until reaching a worker who just pays his 
salary, in that the value of the marginal product for that worker is equal to the 
cost of the worker. 
 
 
                                            
23 Economists often use the Greek letter π to stand for profit.  There is little risk of confusion 
because economics doesn’t use the ratio of the circumference to the diameter of a circle very 
often.  On the other hand, the other two named constants, Euler’s e and i, the square root of -1, 
appear fairly frequently in economic analysis. 
24 It is possible that L=0 is the best that entrepreneur can do.  In this case, the derivative of profit 
with respect to L is not necessarily zero.  The first order condition instead would be: 
Either 
L∂
∂= π0 , or L=0 and 
L∂
∂≥ π0 .  The latter pair of conditions reflects the logic that either the 
derivative is zero and we are at a maximum, or L = 0, in which case a small increase in L must 
not cause π to increase. 
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Figure  4-5: Profit-Maximizing Labor Input 
 
In addition, a second characteristic of a maximum is that the second derivative is 
negative (or non-positive).  This arises because, at a maximum, the slope goes 
from positive (since the function is increasing up to the maximum), to zero (at the 
maximum), to a negative number (because the function is falling as the variable 
rises past the maximum).  This means that the derivative is falling, that is, the 
second derivative is negative.  This logic is illustrated in the Figure  4-5. 
 
The second property is known as the second order condition, because it is a 
condition on the second derivative.25  It is expressed as: 
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This is enough of a mathematical treatment to establish comparative statics on 
the demand for labor.  Here, we treat the choice L* as a function of another 
parameter – the price p, the wage w, or the level of capital K.  For example, to 
find the effect of the wage on the labor demanded by the entrepreneur, we can 
write: 
 
.))(*,(0 wwLK
L
Fp −∂
∂=  
 
                                            
25 The orders refer to considering small but positive terms ∆, which are sent to zero to reach 
derivatives.  The value ∆2, the “second order term” goes to zero faster than ∆, the first order term. 
L* 
L
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This expression recognizes that the choice L* that the entrepreneur makes 
satisfies the first order condition, and results in a value that depends on w.  But 
how does it depend on w?  We can differentiate this expression to obtain: 
 
,1)(*))(*,(
)(
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2
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∂= wLwLK
L
F
p  
 
or 
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wLK
L
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wL  
 
The second order condition lets the derivative be signed.  This form of argument 
assumes that the choice L* is differentiable, which is not necessarily true. 
 
Digression: In fact, there is a revealed preference form of argument that 
makes the point without calculus and makes it substantially more 
generally.  Suppose w1 < w2 are two wage levels, and that the 
entrepreneur chooses L1 when the wage is w1 and L2 when the wage is 
w2.  Then profit maximization requires that these choices are optimal. In 
particular, when the wage is w1, the entrepreneur earns higher profit with 
L1 than with L2: 
 
212111 ),(),( LwrKLKpfLwrKLKpf −−≥−− . 
 
When the wage is w2, the entrepreneur earns higher profit with L2 than 
with L1. 
 
.),(),( 121222 LwrKLKpfLwrKLKpf −−≥−−  
 
The sum of the left hand sides of these two expressions is at least as 
large as the sum of the right hand side of the two expressions: 
 
≥−−+−− 222111 ),(),( LwrKLKpfLwrKLKpf
 212121 ),(),( LwrKLKpfLwrKLKpf −−+−−  
 
A large number of terms cancel, to yield 
 
21122211 LwLwLwLw −−≥−− . 
 
This expression can be re-arranged to yield 
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This shows that the higher labor choice must be associated with the lower 
wage.  This kind of argument, sometimes known as a “revealed 
preference” kind of argument because choices by consumers were the 
first place the type of argument was applied, can be very powerful and 
general, because issues of differentiability are avoided.  However, we will 
use the more standard differentiability type argument, because such 
arguments are usually more readily constructed. 
 
The effect of an increase in the capital level K on the choice by the entrepreneur 
can be calculated by considering L* as a function of the capital level K. 
 
.))(*,(0 wKLK
L
Fp −∂
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Differentiating this expression with respect to K, we obtain 
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We know the denominator of this expression is not positive, thanks to the second 
order condition, so the unknown part is the numerator.  We then obtain the 
conclusion that: 
 
An increase in capital increases the labor demanded by the entrepreneur if 
0))(*,(
2
>∂∂
∂ KLK
LK
F , and decreases the labor demanded if .0))(*,(
2
<∂∂
∂ KLK
LK
F  
 
This conclusion looks like gobbledygook but is actually quite intuitive.  Note that 
0))(*,(
2
>∂∂
∂ KLK
LK
F  means that an increase in capital increases the derivative of 
output with respect to labor, that is, an increase in capital increases the marginal 
product of labor.  But this is the definition of a complement!  That is, 
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0))(*,(
2
>∂∂
∂ KLK
LK
F  means that labor and capital are complements in production 
– an increase in capital increases the marginal productivity of labor.  Thus an 
increase in capital will increase the demand for labor when labor and capital are 
complements, and will decrease the demand for labor when labor and capital are 
substitutes. 
 
This is an important conclusion because different kinds of capital may be 
complements or substitutes for labor.  Are computers complements or substitutes 
for labor?  Some economists consider that computers are complements to highly 
skilled workers, increasing the marginal value of the most skilled, but substitute 
for lower skilled workers.  In academia, the ratio of secretaries to professors has 
fallen dramatically since the 1970s as more and more professors use machines 
to perform secretarial functions.  Computers are thought to have increased the 
marginal product of professors and reduced the marginal product of secretaries, 
so the number of professors rose and the number of secretaries fell. 
 
The revealed preference version of the effect of an increase in capital is to 
posit two capital levels, K1 and K2, with associated profit-maximizing choices 
L1 and L2.  The choices require, for profit maximization, that 
 
21211111 ),(),( wLrKLKpFwLrKLKpF −−≥−−  
 
and 
 
.),(),( 12122222 wLrKLKpFwLrKLKpF −−≥−−  
 
Again, adding the left-hand-sides together produces a result at least as large 
as the sum of the right hand sides: 
 
≥−−+−− 22221111 ),(),( wLrKLKpFwLrKLKpF   
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Eliminating redundant terms yields 
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or, 
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or, 
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and finally, 
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Thus, if K2 > K1 and 0),(
2
>∂∂
∂ LK
LK
F  for all K and L, then L2 ≥ L1, that is, with 
complementary inputs, an increase in one input increases the optimal choice 
of the second input.  In contrast, with substitutes, an increase in one input 
decreases the other input.  While we still used differentiability of the 
production function to carry out the revealed preference argument, we did 
not need to establish that the choice L* was differentiable to perform the 
analysis. 
 
Example: Labor Demand with the Cobb-Douglas production function.  The Cobb-
Douglas production function has the form ,),( βαLAKLKF =  for constants A, α 
and β, all positive.  It is necessary for β<1 for the solution to be finite and well-
defined.  The demand for labor satisfies 
 
,*))(*,(0 1 wLAKpwKLK
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or 
 
                                            
26 Here we use the standard convention that ....... ∫∫ −=
a
b
b
a
dxdx  
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When α+β=1, L is linear in capital.  Cobb-Douglas production is necessarily 
complementary, that is, an increase in capital increases labor demanded by the 
entrepreneur. 
 
4.1.3.1 (Exercise) For the fixed proportions production function Min {K, L}, find 
labor demand (capital fixed at K). 
4.1.4 The Shadow Value 
When capital K can’t be adjusted in the short run, it creates a constraint on the 
profit available on the entrepreneur – the desire to change K reduces the profit 
available to the entrepreneur.  There is no direct value of capital, because capital 
is fixed.  That doesn’t mean we can’t examine its value, however, and the value 
of capital is called a shadow value because it refers to the value associated with 
a constraint.  Shadow value is well-established jargon. 
 
What is the shadow-value of capital?  Let’s return to the constrained, short-run 
optimization problem.  The profit of the entrepreneur is: 
 
.),( wLrKLKpF −−=π  
 
The entrepreneur chooses the value L* to maximize profit, but is stuck in the 
short run with the level of capital inherited from a past decision.  The shadow 
value of capital is the value of capital to profit, given the optimal decision L*.  
Because  
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the shadow value of capital is 
 
rLK
K
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p
K
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Note that this could be negative; the entrepreneur might like to sell some capital 
but can’t, perhaps because it is installed in the factory. 
 
Any constraint has a shadow value.  The term refers to the value of relaxing a 
constraint.  The shadow value is zero when the constraint doesn’t bind; for 
example, the shadow value of capital is zero when it is set at the profit-
maximizing level.  Technology binds the firm; the shadow value of a superior 
technology is the increase in profit associated with it.  For example, parameterize 
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the production technology by a parameter a, so that aF(K, L) is produced. The 
shadow value of a given level of a is, in the short run, 
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∂= ππ  
 
A term is vanishing in the process of establishing the shadow value.  The desired 
value L* varies with the other parameters like K and a, but the effect of these 
parameters on L* doesn’t appear in the expression for the shadow value of the 
parameter because 
L∂
∂= π0  at L*. 
4.1.5 Input Demand 
Over a long period of time, an entrepreneur can adjust both the capital and the 
labor used at the plant.  This lets the entrepreneur maximize profit with respect to 
both variables K and L.  We’ll use a double star, **, to denote variables in their 
long-run solution.  The approach to maximizing profit over two variables is to 
maximize it separately over each variable, thereby obtaining 
 
,*)**,*(0 wLK
L
Fp −∂
∂=  
 
and 
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We see for both capital and labor, the value of the marginal product is equal to 
purchase price of the input. 
 
It is more of a challenge to carry out comparative statics exercises with two 
variables, and the general method won’t be developed here.27  However, we can 
illustrate one example as follows. 
 
Example: The Cobb-Douglas production function implies choices of capital and 
labor satisfying two first order conditions, one each for labor and capital.28 
 
,*****)**,*(0 1 wLAKpwLK
L
Fp −=−∂
∂= −βαβ  
                                            
27 If you want to know more, the approach is to arrange the two equations as a vector with x = (K, 
L), z=(r/p, w/p), so that ,*)*( zxF0 −′=  and then differentiate to obtain 
( ) ,*)*(** 1dzxFdx −′′=  which can then be solved for each comparative static. 
 
28  It is necessary for α+β<1 for the solution to be finite and well-defined. 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 4-99
 
.*****)**,*(0 1 rLAKpwLK
K
Fp −=−∂
∂= − βαα  
 
To solve this expression, first rewrite to obtain 
 
1**** −= βαβ LAKpw  and βαα **** 1 LAKpr −= , then divide the first by the 
second to yield 
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While these expressions appear complicated, in fact the dependence on the 
output price p, and the input prices r and w are quite straightforward. 
 
How do equilibrium values of capital and labor respond to a change in input 
prices or output price for the Cobb-Douglas production function?  It is useful to 
cast these changes in percentage terms.  It is straightforward to demonstrate that 
both capital and labor respond to a small percentage change in any of these 
variables with a constant percentage change. 
 
4.1.5.1 (Exercise) For the Cobb-Douglas production function ,),( βαLAKLKF =  
show 
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An important insight of profit maximization is that it implies minimization of costs 
of yielding the chosen output, that is, profit-maximization entails efficient 
production.  The logic is straightforward.  The profit of an entrepreneur is revenue 
minus costs, and the revenue is price times output.  For the chosen output, then, 
the entrepreneur earns the revenue associated with the output, which is fixed 
since we are considering only the chosen output, minus the costs of producing 
that output.  Thus, for the given output, maximizing profits is equivalent to 
maximizing a constant (revenue) minus costs.  Since maximizing –C is 
equivalent to minimizing C, the profit-maximizing entrepreneur minimizes costs.  
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 4-100
This is important because profit-maximization implies not being wasteful in this 
regard: a profit-maximizing entrepreneur produces at least cost. 
 
 
Figure  4-6: Tangency and Isoquants 
 
There are circumstances where the cost-minimization feature of profit 
maximization can be used, and this is especially true when a graphical approach 
is taken.  The graphical approach to profit-maximization is illustrated in Figure 
 4-6.  The curve represents an isoquant, which holds constant the output.  The 
straight lines represent “isocost” lines, which hold constant the expenditure on 
inputs.  Isocost lines solve the problem 
 
rK + wL = constant 
 
and thus have slope .
r
w
dL
dK −=   Isocost lines are necessarily parallel – they have 
the same slope.  Moreover, the cost associated with an isocost line rises the 
further northeast we go in the graph, or the further away from the origin. 
 
What point on an isoquant minimizes total cost?  The answer is the point 
associated with the lowest (most southwest) isocost that intersects the isoquant.  
This point will be tangent to the isoquant and is denoted by a star.  At any lower 
cost, it isn’t possible to produce the desired quantity.  At any higher cost, it is 
possible to lower cost and still produce the quantity. 
 
L 
K 
q 
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That cost minimization requires a tangency between the isoquant and the isocost 
has a useful interpretation.  The slope of the isocost is minus the ratio of input 
prices.  The slope of the isoquant measures the substitutability of the inputs in 
producing the output.  Economists call this slope the marginal rate of technical 
substitution, which is the amount of one input needed to make up for a decrease 
in another input and hold output constant.  Thus, one feature of cost minimization 
is that the input price ratio equals the marginal rate of technical substitution. 
4.1.6 Myriad Costs 
How much does it cost to produce a given quantity q?  We already have a 
detailed answer to this question, but now need to focus less on the details and 
more on the “big picture.”  First, let’s focus on the short run, and suppose L is 
adjustable in the short run, but K is not.  Then the short-run total cost of 
producing q, given the capital level, is 
 
SRTC(q|K) = wLrK
L
+min , over all L satisfying F(K,L)≥q. 
 
In words, the short-run total cost of the quantity q given the existing level K is the 
minimum cost, where L gets to vary (which is denoted by “min over L”), where 
the L considered is large enough to produce q.  The vertical line | is used to 
indicate a condition or conditional requirement; here |K indicates that K is fixed.  
The minimum lets L vary but not K.  Finally, there is a constraint F(K,L) ≥ q, 
which indicates that one has to be able to produce q with the mix of inputs 
because we are considering the short-run cost of q. 
 
The short-run total cost of q given K has a simple form.  First, since we are 
minimizing cost, the constraint F(K,L) ≥ q will be satisfied with equality, F(K,L) = 
q.  This equation determines L, since K is fixed, that is, qKqLKF S =)),(,(  gives 
the short-run value of L, LS(q,K).  Finally, the cost is then rK + wL = rK + 
wLS(q,K). 
 
The short-run marginal cost given K is just the derivative of total cost with respect 
to q.  To establish the short-run marginal cost, note that the equation F(K,L) = q 
gives 
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The tall vertical line, subscripted with F=q, is used to denote the constraint F(K,L) 
= q that is being differentiated.  Thus, the short-run marginal cost is 
 
SRMC(q|K) = .
)),(,(
)()(
KqLK
L
F
w
dq
dLwwLrK
dq
dqCSRT
SqF ∂
∂==+=′ =
 
 
There are two other short-run costs that will be needed to complete the analysis.  
First, there is the notion of the short-run average cost of production, which we 
obtain by dividing the total cost by the quantity: 
 
q
KqSRTCKqSRAC )|()|( = . 
 
Finally, we need one more short-run cost: the short-run average variable cost.  
The variable cost eliminates the fixed costs of operation, which in this case are 
rK.  That is, 
 
.
)|()|0()|()|(
q
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q
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The short-run average variable cost is the average cost ignoring the investment 
in capital equipment. 
 
The short-run average cost could also be called the short-run average total cost, 
since it is the average of the total cost per unit of output, but “average total” is a 
bit of an oxymoron.29  Consequently, when total, fixed or variable is not specified, 
the convention is to mean total.  Note that the marginal variable cost is the same 
as the marginal total costs, because the difference between variable cost and 
total cost is a constant – the cost of zero production, also known as the fixed cost 
of production. 
 
At this point, we have identified four distinct costs, all relevant to the short run.  
These are the total cost, the marginal cost, the average cost, and the average 
variable cost.  In addition, all of these can be considered in the long run as well.  
There are three differences in the long run.  First, the long run lets all inputs vary, 
so the long-run total cost is 
 
LRTC(q) = wLrK
KL
+
,
min , over all L and K combinations satisfying F(K,L) ≥ q. 
 
                                            
29 An oxymoron is a word or phrase which is self-contradictory, like “jumbo shrimp,” “stationary 
orbit,” “virtual reality,” “modern tradition,” or “pretty ugly.”  Oxymoron comes from the Greek oxy, 
meaning sharp, and moros, meaning dull.  Thus oxymoron is itself an oxymoron, so an oxymoron 
is self-descriptive.  Another word which is self-descriptive is “pentasyllabic.” 
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Second, since all inputs can vary, the long-run cost isn’t conditioned on K.  
Finally, the long-run average variable cost is the same as the long-run average 
total cost.  Because in the long run a firm could use no inputs and thus incur no 
costs, the cost of producing zero is zero.  Therefore, in the long run, all costs are 
variable, and the long-run average variable cost is the long-run average total 
cost. 
 
4.1.6.1 (Exercise)  For the Cobb-Douglas production function ,),( βαLAKLKF =  
with α+β<1, with K fixed in the short run but not in the long run, and cost 
r of capital and w for labor, show 
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Note that the easiest way to find the long-run total cost is to minimize the short-
run total cost over K.  Since this is a function of one variable, it is straightforward 
to identify the K that minimizes cost, and then plug that K into the expression for 
total cost. 
 
One might want to distinguish the very short run, from the short run, from the 
medium run, from the long run, from the very long run.  But a better approach is 
to view adjustment as a continuous process, with a gradual easing of the 
constraints.  Faster adjustment costs more.  Continuous adjustment is a more 
advanced topic, requiring an Euler equation approach. 
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4.1.7 Dynamic Firm Behavior 
In this section, we consider a firm or entrepreneur that can’t affect the price of 
output or the prices of inputs, that is, a competitive firm.  How does such a 
competitive firm respond to price changes?  When the price of the output rises, 
the firm earns profits 
 
),|( Kqcpq −=π  
 
where c(q|K) is the total cost of producing given that the firm currently has capital 
K.  Assuming the firm produces at all, the firm maximizes profits by choosing the 
quantity qs satisfying )|(0 Kqcp s′−= , that is, choosing the quantity where price 
equals marginal cost.  However, this is a good strategy only if producing a 
positive quantity is desirable, that is, if ),,0()|( KcKqcpq ss −≥−  which can be 
rewritten as 
s
s
q
KcKqc
p
),0()|( −≥ .  The right-hand-side of this inequality is the 
average variable cost of production, and thus the inequality requires that a firm 
will produce at all provided price exceeds the average variable cost.  Thus, the 
profit-maximizing firm produces the quantity qs where price equals marginal cost, 
provided price is as large as minimum average variable cost.  If price falls below 
minimum average variable cost, the firm shuts down. 
 
The behavior of the competitive firm is illustrated in Figure  4-7.  The thick line 
represents the choice of the firm as a function of the price, which is on the 
vertical axis.  Thus, if the price is below the minimum average variable cost 
(AVC), the firm shuts down.  When price is above the minimum average variable 
cost, the marginal cost gives the quantity supplied by the firm.  Thus, the choice 
of the firm is composed of two distinct segments – the marginal cost, where the 
firm produces when the output where price equals marginal cost, and shutdown, 
where the firm makes a higher profit, or loses less money, by producing zero. 
 
Figure  4-7 also illustrates the average total cost, which doesn’t affect the short 
term behavior of the firm but does affect the long term behavior, because when 
price is below average total cost, the firm is not making a profit, but instead would 
prefer to exit over the long term.  That is, when the price is between the minimum 
average variable cost and the minimum average total cost, it is better to produce 
than to shut down, but the return on capital was below the cost of capital.  With a 
price in this intermediate area, a firm would produce, but would not replace the 
capital, and thus would shut down in the long-term if the price is expected to 
persist.  As a consequence, minimum average total cost is the long-run “shut 
down” point for the competitive firm.  (Shutdown may refer to reducing capital 
rather that literally setting capital to zero.)  Similarly, in the long term, the firm 
produces the quantity where the price equals the long-run marginal cost. 
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Figure  4-7: Short-Run Supply 
 
Figure  4-7 illustrates one other fact: the minimum of average cost occurs at the 
point that marginal cost equals average cost.  To see this, let C(q) be total cost, 
so that average cost is C(q)/q.  Then the minimum of average cost occurs at the 
point satisfying: 
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But this can be rearranged to imply 
q
qC
qC
)(
)( =′ , that is, marginal cost equals 
average cost at the minimum of average cost. 
 
The long-run marginal cost has a complicated relationship to short-run marginal 
cost.  The problem in characterizing the relationship between long-run and short-
run marginal costs is that some costs are marginal in the long run that are fixed 
in the short run, tending to make long-run marginal costs larger than short-run 
marginal costs.  However, in the long run, the assets can be configured optimally, 
while some assets are fixed in the short run, and this optimal configuration tend 
to make long run costs lower. 
 
Instead, it is more useful to compare the long-run average total costs and short-
run average total costs.  The advantage is that capital costs are included in short-
run average total costs.  The result is a picture like Figure  4-8. 
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McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 4-106
 
Figure  4-8: Average and Marginal Costs 
 
In Figure  4-8, the short run is unchanged – there is a short-run average cost, 
short-run average variable cost, and short-run marginal cost.  The long-run 
average total cost has been added, in such a way that the minimum average total 
cost occurs at the same point as the minimum short-run average cost, which 
equals the short-run marginal cost.  This is the lowest long-run average cost, and 
has the nice property that long-run average cost equals short-run average total 
cost equals short-run marginal cost.  However, for a different output by the firm, 
there would necessarily be a different plant size, and the three-way equality is 
broken.  Such a point is illustrated in Figure  4-9. 
 
In Figure  4-9, the quantity produced is larger than the quantity that minimizes 
long-run average total cost.  Consequently, as is visible in the picture, the 
quantity where short-run average cost equals long-run average cost does not 
minimize short-run average cost.  What this means is that a factory designed to 
minimize the cost of producing a particular quantity won’t necessarily minimize 
short-run average cost.  Essentially, because the long-run average total cost is 
increasing, larger plant sizes are getting increasingly more expensive, and it is 
cheaper to use a somewhat “too small” plant and more labor than the plant size 
with the minimum short-run average total cost.  However, this situation wouldn’t 
likely persist indefinitely, because, as we shall see, competition tend to force 
price to the minimum long-run average total cost, and at that point, we have the 
three-way equality between long-run average total cost, short-run average total 
cost, and short-run marginal cost. 
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Figure  4-9: Increased Plant Size 
 
4.1.7.1 (Exercise) Suppose a company has total cost given by  
K
qrK
2
2
+ , where 
capital K is fixed in the short run.  What is short-run average total cost 
and marginal cost?  Plot these curves.  For a given quantity q0, what 
level of capital minimizes total cost?  What is the minimum average total 
cost of q0? 
 
4.1.8 Economies of Scale and Scope 
An economy of scale – that larger scale lowers cost – arises when an increase in 
output reduces average costs.  We met economies of scale, and their opposite, 
diseconomies of scale, in the previous section, with an example where long-run 
average total cost initially fell, then rose, as quantity was increased. 
 
What makes for an economy of scale?  Larger volumes of productions permit the 
manufacture of more specialized equipment.  If I am producing a million identical 
automotive tail lights, I can spend $50,000 on an automated plastic stamping 
machine and only affect my costs by five cents each.  In contrast, if I am 
producing 50,000 units, the stamping machine increases my costs by a dollar 
each, and is much less economical. 
 
Indeed, it is somewhat more of a puzzle as to what produces a diseconomy of 
scale.  An important source of diseconomies are managerial in nature – 
organizing a large, complex enterprise is a challenge, and larger organizations 
tend to devote a larger percentage of their revenues to management of the 
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operation.  A bookstore can be run by a couple of individuals who rarely if ever 
engage in management activities, where a giant chain of bookstores needs 
finance, human resource, risk management and other “overhead” type expenses 
just in order to function.  Informal operation of small enterprises is replaced by 
formal procedural rules in large organizations.  This idea of managerial 
diseconomies of scale is reflected in the aphorism that “A platypus is a duck 
designed by a committee.” 
 
In his influential 1975 book The Mythical Man-Month, IBM software manager 
Fred Books describes a particularly severe diseconomy of scale.  Adding 
software engineers to a project increases the number of conversations necessary 
between pairs of individuals.  If there are n engineers, there are ½ n (n – 1) pairs, 
so that communication costs rise at the square of the project size.  This is pithily 
summarized in Brooks’ Law: "Adding manpower to a late software project makes 
it later." 
 
Another related source of diseconomies of scale involves system slack.  In 
essence, it is easier to hide incompetence and laziness in a large organization 
than in a small one.  There are a lot of familiar examples of this insight, starting 
with the Peter Principle, which states that people rise in organizations to the point 
of their own incompetence, which means eventually people cease to do the jobs 
that they do well.30  That slack grows as an organization grows implies an 
diseconomy of scale. 
 
Generally, for many types of products, economies of scale from production 
technology tend to reduce average cost, up to a point where the operation 
becomes difficult to manage, at which point diseconomies tend to prevent the 
firm from economically getting larger.  Under this view, improvements in 
information technologies over the past twenty years have permitted firms to get 
larger and larger.  While that seems logical, in fact firms aren’t getting that much 
larger than they used to be, and the share of output produced by the top 
thousand firms has been relatively steady.  That is, the growth in the largest firms 
just mirrors world output growth. 
 
Related to an economy of scale is an economy of scope.  An economy of scope 
is a reduction in cost associated with producing several distinct goods.  For 
example, Boeing, which produces both commercial and military jets, can 
amortize some of its R&D costs over both types of aircraft, thereby reducing the 
average costs of each.  Scope economies work like scale economies, except 
they account for advantages of producing multiple products, where scale 
economies involve an advantage of multiple units of the same product. 
 
Economies of scale can operate at the level of the individual firm but can also 
operate at an industry level.  Suppose there is an economy of scale in the 
production of an input.  For example, there is an economy of scale in the 
                                            
30 Laurence Johnston Peter (1919–1990). 
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production of disc drives for personal computers.  That means an increase in the 
production of PCs will tend to lower the price of disc drives, reducing the cost of 
PCs, which is a scale economy.  In this case, it doesn’t matter to the scale 
economy whether one firm or many firms are responsible for the increased 
production, and this is known as an external economy of scale or an industry 
economy of scale, because the scale economy operates at the level of the 
industry rather than in the individual firm.  Thus, the long-run average cost of 
individual firms may be flat, while the long-run average cost of the industry slopes 
downward. 
 
Even in the presence of an external economy of scale, there may be 
diseconomies of scale at the level of the firm.  In such a situation, the size of any 
individual firm is limited by the diseconomy of scale, but nonetheless the average 
cost of production is decreasing in the total output of the industry, through the 
entry of additional firms.  Generally there is an external diseconomy of scale if a 
larger industry drives up input prices, for example increasing land costs.  
Increasing the production of soybeans significantly requires using land that isn’t 
so well suited for them, tending to increase the average cost of production.  Such 
a diseconomy is an external diseconomy rather than operating at the individual 
farmer level.  Second, there is an external economy if an increase in output 
permits the creation of more specialized techniques and a greater effort in R&D 
to lower costs.  Thus, if an increase in output increases the development of 
specialized machine tools and other production inputs, an external economy will 
be present. 
 
An economy of scale arises when total average cost falls as the number of units 
produced rises.  How does this relate to production functions?  We let 
y=f(x1,x2,…,xn) be the output when the n inputs x1, x2,…,xn are used.  A rescaling 
of the inputs involves increasing the inputs by a fixed percentage, e.g. multiplying 
them all by the constant λ (the Greek letter lambda), where λ>1.  What does this 
do to output?  If output goes up by more than λ, we have an economy of scale 
(also known as increasing returns to scale):  scaling up production increases 
output proportionately more.  If output goes up by less than λ, we have a 
diseconomy of scale or decreasing returns to scale.  And finally, if output rises by 
exactly λ, we have constant returns to scale.  How does this relate to average 
cost?  Formally, we have an economy of scale if 
 
),,,(),,,( 2121 nn xxxfxxxf KK λλλλ >  if λ>1. 
 
This corresponds to decreasing average cost.  Let w1 be the price of input 1, w2 
the price of input 2, and so on.  Then the average cost of producing 
y=f(x1,x2,…,xn) is 
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What happens to average cost as we scale up production by λ>1?  Call this 
AVC(λ). 
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Thus, average cost falls if there is an economy of scale and rises if there is a 
diseconomy of scale. 
 
Another insight about the returns to scale concerns the value of the marginal 
product of inputs.  Note that, if there are constant returns to scale: 
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The value 
1x
f
∂
∂  is the marginal product of input x1, and similarly 
2x
f
∂
∂  is the 
marginal product of input 2, and so on.  Consequently, if the production function 
exhibits constant returns to scale, it is possible to divide up output in such a way 
that each input receives the value of the marginal product.  That is, we can give 
1
1 x
fx ∂
∂  to the suppliers of input 1, 
2
2 x
fx ∂
∂  to the suppliers of input 2, and so on, 
and this exactly uses up the all the output.  This is known as “paying the marginal 
product,” because each supplier is paid the marginal product associated with the 
input. 
 
If there is a diseconomy of scale, then paying the marginal product is feasible, 
but there is generally something left over, too.  If there are increasing returns to 
scale (an economy of scale), then it is not possible to pay all the inputs their 
marginal product, that is, ).,,,( 21
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4.1.8.1 (Exercise) Given the Cobb-Douglas production function 
na
n
aa
n xxxxxxf ...),...,,( 21 2121 = , show there is constant returns to scale if 
121 =++ naaa K , increasing returns to scale if 121 >++ naaa K , and 
decreasing returns to scale if 121 <++ naaa K . 
4.1.8.2 (Exercise) Suppose a company has total cost given by 
K
qrK
2
2
+  where 
capital K can be adjusted in the long run.  Does this company have an 
economy of scale, diseconomy of scale, or constant returns to scale in 
the long run? 
 
4.1.8.3 (Exercise) A production function f is homogeneous of degree r if 
),,,(),,,( 2121 n
r
n xxxfxxxf KK λλλλ = .  Consider a firm with a production 
function that is homogeneous of degree r.  Suppose further that the firm 
pays the value of marginal product for all its inputs.  Show that the 
portion of revenue left over is 1 – r. 
4.2 Perfect Competition Dynamics 
The previous section developed a detailed analysis of how a competitive firm 
responds to price and input cost changes.  In this section, we consider how a 
competitive market responds to demand or cost changes. 
4.2.1 Long-run Equilibrium 
The basic picture of a long-run equilibrium is presented in Figure  4-10.  There are 
three curves, all of which are already familiar.  First, there is demand, considered 
in the first chapter.  Here demand is taken to be the “per period” demand.  
Second, there is the short-run supply, which reflects two components – a shut 
down point at minimum average variable cost, and quantity such that price 
equals short-run marginal cost above that level.  The short-run supply, however, 
is the market supply level, which means it sums up the individual firm effects.  
Finally, there is the long-run average total cost at the industry level, thus 
reflecting any external diseconomy or economy of scale.  As drawn in Figure 
 4-10, there is no long-run scale effect.  The long-run average total cost is also the 
long-run industry supply.31 
 
                                            
31 This may seem confusing, because supply is generally the marginal cost, not the average cost.  
However, because a firm will quit producing in the long term if price falls below its minimum 
average cost, the long-term supply is just the minimum average cost of the individual firms, 
because this is the marginal cost of the industry. 
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Figure  4-10: Long-Run Equilibrium 
 
As drawn, the industry is in equilibrium, with price equal to P0, which is the long-
run average total cost, and also equating short-run supply and demand.  That is, 
at the price of P0, and industry output of Q0, no firm wishes to shut down, no firm 
can make positive profits from entering, there is no excess output, and no 
consumer is rationed.  Thus, no market participant has an incentive to change 
their behavior, so the market is in both long-run and short-run equilibrium. 
4.2.2 Dynamics with Constant Costs 
Now consider an increase in demand.  Demand might increase because of 
population growth, or because a new use for an existing product is developed, or 
because of income growth, or because the product becomes more useful.  For 
example, the widespread adoption of the Atkins diet increased demand for high 
protein products like beef jerky and eggs.  Suppose that the change is expected 
to be permanent.  This is important because the decision of a firm to enter is 
based more on expectations of future demand than on present demand. 
 
Figure  4-11 reproduces the equilibrium figure, but with the curves “grayed out” to 
indicate a starting position, and a darker new demand curve, labeled D1. 
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Figure  4-11: A Shift in Demand 
 
The initial effect of the increased demand is that the price is bid up, because 
there is excess demand at the old price P0.  This is reflected by a change in both 
price and quantity to P1 and Q1, to the intersection of the short-run supply SRS 
and the new demand curve.  This is a short-run equilibrium, and persists 
temporarily because, in the short run, the cost of additional supply is higher. 
 
At the new, short-run equilibrium, price exceeds the long-run supply cost.  This 
higher price attracts new investment in the industry.  It takes some time for this 
new investment to increase the quantity supplied, but over time the new 
investment leads to increased output, and a fall in the price, as illustrated in 
Figure  4-12. 
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Figure  4-12: Return to Long-Run Equilibrium 
 
As new investment is attracted into the industry, the short-run supply shifts to the 
right, because with the new investment, more is produced at any given price 
level.  This is illustrated with the darker short-run supply, SRS2.  The increase in 
price causes the price to fall back to its initial level, and the quantity to increase 
still further to Q2. 
 
It is tempting to think that the effect of a decrease in demand just retraces the 
steps of an increase in demand, but that isn’t correct.  In both cases, the first 
effect is the intersection of the new demand with the old short-run supply.  Only 
then does the short-run supply adjust to equilibrate the demand with the long-run 
supply.  That is, the initial effect is a short-run equilibrium, followed by adjustment 
of the short-run supply to bring the system into long-run equilibrium.  Moreover, a 
small decrease in demand can have a qualitatively different effect in the short-run 
than a large decrease in demand, depending on whether the decrease is large 
enough to induce immediate exit of firms.  This is illustrated in Figure  4-13. 
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Figure  4-13: A Decrease in Demand 
 
In Figure  4-13, we start at the long-run equilibrium where LRS and D0 and SRS0 
all intersect.  If demand falls to D1, the price falls to the intersection of the new 
demand and the old short-run supply, along SRS0.  At that point, exit of firms 
reduces the short-run supply and the price rises, following along the new demand 
D1. 
 
 
Figure  4-14: A Big Decrease in Demand 
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If, however, the decrease in demand is large enough to push the industry to 
minimum average variable cost, there is immediate exit.  In Figure  4-14, the fall 
in demand from D0 to D1 is sufficient to push the price to minimum average 
variable cost, which is the shutdown point of suppliers.  Enough suppliers have to 
shutdown to keep the price at this level, which induces a shift in of the short-run 
supply, to SRS1.  Then there is additional shutdown, shifting the short-run supply 
in still further, but driving up the price (along the demand curve) until the long-
term equilibrium is reached. 
 
Consider an increase in the price of an input into production.  For example, an 
increase in the price of crude oil increases the cost of manufacturing gasoline.  
This tends to decrease (shift up) both the long-run supply and the short-run 
supply, by the amount of the cost increase.  The effect is illustrated in Figure 
 4-15.  The increased costs reduce both the short-run supply (prices have to be 
higher to in order to produce the same quantity) and the long-run supply.  The 
short-run supply shifts upward to SRS1, and the long-run supply to LRS2.  The 
short-run effect is to move to the intersection of the short-run supply and 
demand, which is at the price P1 and the quantity Q1.  This price is below the 
long-run average cost, which is the long-run supply, so over time some firms 
don’t replace their capital and there is disinvestment in the industry.  This 
disinvestment causes the short-run supply to be reduced (move left) to SRS2. 
 
 
 
Figure  4-15: A Decrease in Supply 
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The case of a change in supply is more challenging because both the long-run 
supply and the short-run supply are shifted.  But the logic – start at a long-run 
equilibrium, then look for the intersection of current demand and short-run 
supply, then look for the intersection of current demand and long-run supply – is 
the same whether demand or supply has shifted. 
4.2.3 General Long-run Dynamics 
The previous section made two simplifying assumptions that won’t hold in all 
applications of the theory.  First, it assumed constant returns to scale, so that 
long-run supply is horizontal.  A perfectly elastic long-run supply means that price 
always eventually returns to the same point.  Second, the theory didn’t 
distinguish long-run from short-run demand.  But with many products, consumers 
will adjust more over the long-term than immediately.  As energy prices rise, 
consumers buy more energy-efficient cars and appliances, reducing demand.  
But this effect takes time to be seen, as we don’t immediately scrap our cars in 
response to a change in the price of gasoline.  The short-run effect is to drive 
less in response to an increase in the price, while the long-run effect is to choose 
the appropriate car for the price of gasoline. 
 
 
Figure  4-16: Equilibrium with External Scale Economy 
 
To illustrate the general analysis, we start with a long-run equilibrium.  Figure 
 4-16 reflects a long-run economy of scale, because the long-run supply slopes 
downward, so that larger volumes imply lower cost.  The system is in long-run 
equilibrium because the short-run supply and demand intersection occurs at the 
same price and quantity as the long-run supply and demand intersection.  Both 
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short-run supply and short-run demand are less elastic than their long-run 
counterparts, reflecting greater substitution possibilities in the long-run. 
 
Now consider a decrease in demand, decreasing both short-run and long-run 
demand.  This is illustrated in Figure  4-17.  To reduce the proliferation of curves, 
we color the old demand curves very faintly, and mark the initial long-run 
equilibrium with a zero inside a small rectangle.32  The intersection of short-run 
supply and short-run demand is marked with the number 1.  Both long-run supply 
and long-run demand are more elastic than their short-run counterparts, which 
has an interesting effect.  The short-run demand tends to shift down over time, 
because the price associated with the short-run equilibrium is above the long-run 
demand price for the short-run equilibrium quantity.  However, the price 
associated with the short-run equilibrium is below the long-run supply price at 
that quantity.  The effect is that buyers see the price as too high, and are 
reducing their demand, while sellers see the price as too low, and so are 
reducing their supply.  Both short-run supply and short-run demand fall, until a 
long-run equilibrium is achieved. 
 
 
Figure  4-17: Decrease in Demand 
 
                                            
32 The short-run demand and long-run demand have been shifted down by the same amount, that 
is, both reflect an equal reduction in value.  This kind of shift might arise if, for instance, a 
substitute had become cheaper, but the equal reduction is not essential to the theory.  In addition, 
the fact of equal reductions often isn’t apparent from the diagram, because of the different slopes 
– to most observers, it appears that short-run demand fell less than long-run demand.  This isn’t 
correct, however, and one can see this because the intersection of the new short-run demand 
and long-run demand occurs directly below the intersection of the old curves, implying both fell by 
equal amounts. 
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In this case, the long-run equilibrium involves higher prices, at the point labeled 
2, because of the economy of scale in supply.  This economy of scale means that 
the reduction in demand causes prices to rise over the long run.  The short-run 
supply and demand eventually adjust to bring the system into long-run 
equilibrium, as Figure  4-18 illustrates.  The new long-run equilibrium has short-
run demand and supply curves associated with it, and the system is in long-run 
equilibrium because the short-run demand and supply, which determine the 
current state of the system, intersect at the same point as the long-run demand 
and supply, which determine where the system is heading. 
 
Figure  4-18: Long Run After a Decrease in Demand 
 
There are four basic permutations of the dynamic analysis – demand increase or 
decrease, and a supply increase or decrease.  Generally, it is possible for long-
run supply to slope down – this is the case of an economy of scale – and for 
long-run demand to slope up.33  This gives sixteen variations of the basic 
analysis.  In all sixteen cases, the procedure is the same.  Start with a long-run 
equilibrium, shift both the short-run and long-run levels of either demand or 
                                            
33 The demand situation analogous to an economy of scale in supply is a network externality, in 
which the addition of more users of a product increases the value of the product.  Telephones are 
a clear example – suppose you were the only person with a phone – but other products like 
computer operating systems and almost anything involving adoption of a standard represent 
examples of network externalities.  When the slope of long-run demand is greater than the slope 
of long-run supply, the system will tend to be inefficient, because an increase in production 
produces higher average value and lower average cost.  This usually means there is another 
equilibrium at a greater level of production. 
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supply.  The first stage is the intersection of the short-run curves.  The system 
will then go to the intersection of the long-run curves. 
 
An interesting example of competitive dynamics concepts is the computer 
memory market, which was discussed above.  Most of the costs of manufacturing 
computer memory are fixed costs.  The modern DRAM plant costs several billion 
dollars; the cost of other inputs – chemicals, energy, labor, silicon wafers – are 
modest in comparison.  Consequently, the short-run supply is vertical until prices 
are very, very low; at any realistic price, it is optimal to run these plants 100% of 
the time.34  The nature of the technology has let manufacturers cut the costs of 
memory by about 30% per year over the past forty years, demonstrating that 
there is a strong economy of scale in production.  These two features – vertical 
short-run supply, strong economies of scale – are illustrated in the Figure  4-19.  
The system is started at the point labeled with the number 0, with a relatively 
high price, and technology which has made costs lower that this price.  
Responding to the profitability of DRAM, short-run supply shifts out (new plants 
are built and die-shrinks permits increasing output from existing plants).  The 
increased output causes prices to fall, relatively dramatically because short-run 
demand is inelastic, and the system moves to the point labeled 1.  The fall in 
profitability causes DRAM investment to slow, which lets demand catch up, 
boosting prices to the point labeled 2.  (One should probably think of Figure  4-19 
as being in a logarithmic scale.) 
 
 
Figure  4-19: DRAM Market 
                                            
34 The plants are expensive in part because they are so clean, because a single speck of dust 
falling on a chip ruins the chip.  The Infineon DRAM plant in Virginia stopped operations only 
when a snow-storm prevented workers and materials from reaching the plant. 
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The point labeled with the number 2 looks qualitatively similar to the point labeled 
1.  The prices have followed a “saw-tooth” pattern, and the reason is due to the 
relatively slow adjustment of demand compared to supply, as well as the 
inelasticity of short-run demand, which creates great price swings as short-run 
supply shifts out.  Supply can be increased quickly, and is increased “in lumps” 
because a die-shrink (making the chips smaller so that more fit on a given silicon 
wafer) tends to increase industry production by a large factor.  This process can 
be repeated starting at the point labeled 2.  The system is marching inexorably 
toward a long-run equilibrium in which electronic memory is very, very cheap 
even by 2004 standards and used in applications that haven’t yet been 
considered, but the process of getting there is a wild ride, indeed.  The saw-tooth 
pattern is illustrated in Figure  4-20, which shows DRAM industry revenues in 
billions of dollars from 1992 to 2003, and projections of 2004 and 2005.35 
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Figure  4-20: DRAM Revenue Cycle 
4.2.3.1 (Exercise) Land close to the center of a city is in fixed supply, but it can 
be used more intensively by using taller buildings.  When the population 
of a city increases, illustrate the long- and short-run effects on the 
housing markets using a graph. 
 
4.2.3.2 (Exercise) Emus can be raised on a wide variety of ranch land, so that 
there are constant returns to scale in the production of emus in the long 
run.  In the short run, however, the population of emus is limited by the 
number of breeding pairs of emus and the supply is essentially vertical.  
Illustrate the long- and short-run effects of an increase in demand for 
emus.  (In the late 1980s, there was a speculative bubble in emus, with 
prices reaching $80,000 per breeding pair, in contrast to $2,000 or so 
today.) 
 
                                            
35 Two distinct data sources were used, which is why there are two entries for each of 1998 and 
1999. 
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4.2.3.3 (Exercise) There are long-run economies of scale in the manufacture of 
computers and their components.  There was a shift in demand away 
from desktop computers and toward notebook computers around the 
year 2001.  What are the short- and long-run effects?  Illustrate your 
answer with two diagrams, one for the notebook market and one for the 
desktop market.  Account for the fact that the two products are 
substitutes, so that if the price of notebook computers rises, some 
consumers shift to desktops.  (To answer this question, start with a time 
0 and a market in long-run equilibrium.  Shift demand for notebooks out 
and demand for desktops in.  What happens in the short run?  What 
happens in the long run to the prices of each?  What does that price 
effect do to demand for each?) 
4.3 Investment 
The distinction between the short-run supply and the long-run supply is governed 
by the time that investment takes.  Some of the difference between the short-run 
demand and the long-run demand arises because we don’t scrap capital goods – 
cars, fridges, and air conditioners – in response to price changes.  In both cases, 
investment is an important component of the responsiveness of supply and 
demand.  In this section, we take a first look at investment.  We will take a 
second look at investment from a somewhat different perspective later when we 
consider basic finance tools near the end of the book.  Investment goods require 
expenditures today to produce future value, so we begin the analysis by 
examining the value of future payments. 
4.3.1 Present value 
The promise of $1 in the future is not worth $1 today.  There are a variety of 
reasons why a promise of future payments is not worth the face value today, 
some of which involve risk that the money may not be paid.  Let’s set aside such 
risk for the moment; we’ll consider risk separately later.  Even when the future 
payment is perceived to occur with negligible risk, nevertheless most people 
prefer $1 today to $1 payable a year hence.  One way of expressing this is that 
the present value – the value today – of a future payment of a dollar is less than 
a dollar.  From a present value perspective, future payments are discounted. 
 
From the individual perspective, one reason that you should value a future 
payment less than a current payment is due to arbitrage.36  Suppose you are 
going to need $10,000 one year from now, to put a down-payment on a house.  
One way of producing $10,000 is to buy a government bond that pays $10,000 a 
year from now.  What will that bond cost you?  At current interest rates, a secure 
                                            
36 Arbitrage is the process buying and selling in such a way to make a profit.  For example, if 
wheat is selling for $3 per bushel in New York, but $2.50 per bushel in Chicago, one can buy in 
Chicago and sell in New York and profit by $0.50 per bushel, minus any transaction and 
transportation cost.  Such arbitrage tends to force prices to differ by no more than transaction 
costs.  When these transaction costs are small, as with gold, prices will be about the same 
worldwide. 
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bond37 will cost around $9700.  This means that no one should willing to pay 
$10,000 for a future payment of $10,000, because instead one can have the 
future $10,000, by buying the bond, and have $300 left over to spend on 
cappuccinos or economics textbooks.  In other words, if you will pay $10,000 for 
a secure promise to repay the $10,000 a year hence, then I can make a 
successful business selling you the secure promise for $10,000, and pocketing 
$300. 
 
This arbitrage consideration also suggests how to value future payments: 
discount them by the relevant interest rate. 
 
Example (Auto loan): You are buying a $20,000 car, and you are offered the 
choice to pay it all today in cash, or to pay $21,000 in one year.  Should you pay 
cash (assuming you have that much in cash) or take the loan?  The loan is at a 
5% annual interest rate, because the repayment is 5% higher than the loan 
amount.  This is a good deal for you if your alternative is to borrow money at a 
higher interest rate, e.g. on (most) credit cards.  It is also a good deal if you have 
savings that pay more than 5% -- if buying the car with cash entails cashing in a 
certificate of deposit that pays more than 5%, then you would be losing the 
difference.  If, on the other hand, you are currently saving money that pays less 
than 5% interest, paying off the car is a better deal. 
 
The formula for present value is to discount by the amount of interest.  Let’s 
denote the interest rate for the next year as r1, the second year’s rate as r2, and 
so on.  In this notation, a $1 invested would pay $1+r1 next year, or $(1+r1)×(1+r2) 
after 2 years, or $(1+r1)×(1+r2)×(1+r3) after 3 years.  That is, ri is the interest rate 
that determines the value, at the end of year i, of $1 invested at the start of year i.  
Then, if we obtain a stream of payments A0 immediately, A1 at the end of year 1, 
A2 at the end of year 2, and so on, the present value of that stream is 
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Example (Consolidated annuities or Consols):  What is the value of $1 paid at the 
end of each year forever, with a fixed interest rate r?  Suppose the value is v.  
Then38 
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37 Economists tend to consider US federal government securities secure, because the probability 
of such a default is very, very low. 
38 This development uses the formula, for -1<a<1, that ...1
1
1 2 +++=− aaa  which is readily 
verified. 
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At a 5% interest rate, $1 million per year paid forever is worth $20 million today.  
Bonds that pay a fixed amount every year forever are known as consols; no 
current government issues consols. 
 
 Example (Mortgages): Again, fix an interest rate r, but this time let r be the 
monthly interest rate.  A mortgage implies a fixed payment per month for a large 
number of months (e.g. 360 for a 30 year mortgage).  What is the present value 
of these payments over n months?  A simple way to compute this is to use the 
consol value, because 
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Thus, at a monthly interest rate of ½%, paying $1 per month for 360 months 
produces a present value M of  79.166.
)005.1(
11
005.
1
360
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −   Thus, to borrow 
$100,000, one would have to pay $599.55
79.166
000,100$ =  per month. 
 
Example (Simple and Compound Interest): In the days before calculators, it was 
a challenge to actually solve interest rate formulas, so certain simplifications 
were made.  One of these was “simple” interest, which means that daily or 
monthly rates are translated into annual rates by incorrect formulas.  For 
example, with an annual rate of 5%, the simple interest daily rate is 
%07692.
365
%5 = .  That this is incorrect can be seen from the calculation that 
%051267.1
365
05.1
365
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +   Simple interest increases the annual rate, so it 
benefits lenders and harms borrowers.  (Consequently, banks advertise the 
accurate annual rate on savings accounts – when consumers like the number to 
be larger – and not on mortgages, although banks are required by law to disclose 
– but not to advertise widely – actual annual interest on mortgages.) 
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Obligatory Lottery Example: You win the lottery, and the paper reports you’ve 
won $20 million.  You’re going to be paid $20 million, but is it worth $20 million?  
In fact, you get $1 million per year for 20 years.  However, in contrast to our 
formula, you get the first million right off the bat, so the value is 
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Table 3.1 computes the present value of our $20 million dollar lottery, listing the 
results in thousands of dollars, at various interest rates.  At ten percent interest, 
the value of the lottery is less than half the “number of dollars” paid, and even at 
5%, the value of the stream of payments is 65% of the face value. 
 
r 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 10% 
PV (000s) $15,324 $14,134 $13,085 $12,158 $11,336 $9,365
 
The lottery example shows that interest rates have a dramatic impact on the 
value of payments made in the distant future.  Present value analysis is the 
number one tool used in MBA programs, where it is known as Net Present Value 
or NPV analysis.  It is accurate to say that the majority of corporate investment 
decisions are guided by an NPV analysis. 
 
Example (Bond prices): A standard treasury bill has a fixed future value.  For 
example it may pay $10,000 in one year.  It is sold at a discount off the face 
value, so that a one-year $10,000 bond might sell for $9,615.39, producing a 4% 
interest rate.  To compute the effective interest rate r, the formula relating the 
future value FV, the number of years n, and the price is 
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We can see from either formula that treasury bill prices move inversely to interest 
rates – an increase in interest rates reduces treasury prices.  Bonds are a bit 
more complicated.  Bonds pay a fixed interest rate set at the time of issue during 
the life of the bond, generally collected semi-annually, and the face value is paid 
at the end of the term.  These bonds were often sold on long terms, as much as 
30 years.  Thus, a three-year $10,000 bond at 5% with semi-annual payments 
would pay $250 at the end of each half year for three years, and pay $10,000 at 
the end of the three years.  The net present value, with an annual interest rate r, 
is 
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The net present value will be the price of the bond.  Initially, the price of the bond 
should be the face value, since the interest rate is set as a market rate.  The U.S. 
Treasury quit issuing such bonds in 2001, replacing them with bonds in which the 
face value is paid and then interest paid semi-annually. 
 
4.3.1.1 (Exercise) At a 7% annual interest rate, what is the present value of 
$100 paid at the end of one year, and $200 paid at the end of the second 
year? 
 
4.3.1.2 (Exercise) Compute the NPV of the 3 year, $10,000 bond, with $250 
payments semi-annually, that was described above, at an interest rate of 
4%. 
 
4.3.1.3 (Exercise) You can finance your $20,000 car with a straight 5% loan 
paid monthly over 5 years, or get one year interest free, but then pay 7% 
over the following four years.  Which is a better deal?  (Hint: In both 
cases, figure out the fixed monthly payments that produce a net present 
value equal to $20,000.) 
 
4.3.1.4 (Exercise) You win the lottery.  At what interest rate should you accept 
$7 million today over twenty annual payments of $500,000?  
4.3.2 Investment 
A simple investment project involves spending an investment, I, and then reaping 
a return over time.  If you dig a mine, drill an oil well, build an apartment building 
or a factory, or buy a share of stock, you spend money now, in the hopes of 
earning money subsequently.  We will set aside the very important risk issue until 
the next subsection, and ask how to make the decision to invest. 
 
The NPV approach involves assigning a rate of return r that is reasonable for, 
and specific to, the project and then computing the present value of the expected 
stream of payments.  Since the investment is initially expended, it is counted as 
negative revenue.  This gives an expression that looks like: 
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where R1 represents first year revenues, R2 represents second year revenues, 
etc.39  The investment is then made when NPV is positive – since this would add 
to the net value of the firm. 
 
Carrying out an NPV analysis essentially requires two things.  First, investment 
and revenues must be estimated.  This is a challenge, especially for new 
products where there is no direct way of estimating demand, or with uncertain 
outcomes like oil wells or technological research.40  Second, an appropriate rate 
of return must be identified.  The rate of return is a problem, mostly because of 
risk associated with the payoffs to the investment, but also because of the 
incentives of project managers to inflate the payoffs and minimize the costs to 
make the project look more attractive to upper management.  In addition, most 
investment undertaken by corporations is financed not with borrowing but with 
retained earnings, that is, with profits from previous activities.  Thus a company 
that undertakes one investment can’t carry out some other investment, and the 
interest rate has to account for the internal corporate value of funds.  As a result 
of these factors, interest rates of 15%-20% are common for evaluating the NPV 
of projects of major corporations. 
 
Example (Silver Mine): A company is considering whether to develop a silver 
mine in Mexico.  The company estimates that developing the mine (building 
roads and opening a large hole in the ground) would require $4 million per year 
for four years and no revenues would accrue during this time.  Starting in year 5 
the expenses fall to $2 million per year, and $6 million in net revenue is earned 
off the mined silver for each of the subsequent 40 years.  If the company values 
funds at 18%, should it develop the mine? 
 
The earnings from the mine are calculated in the following table.  First, the NPV 
of the investment phase during years 0, 1, 2, and 3 is 
 
.697.12
)18.1(
4
)18.1(
4
18.1
44
32
−=−+−+−+−=NPV  
 
A dollar earned in each of years 4 through 43 have a present value of 
 
                                            
39 The most common approach is to treat revenues within a year as if they are received at the 
midpoint, and then discount appropriately for that mid-year point.  The present discussion 
oversimplifies in this regard. 
40 The building of the famed Sydney Opera House, which looks like billowing sails over Sydney 
harbor, was estimated to cost $7 million and actually cost $105 million.  A portion of the cost 
overrun was due to the fact that the original design neglected to install air conditioning.  When 
this oversight was discovered, it was too late to install a standard unit, which would interfere with 
the excellent acoustics, so instead an ice hockey floor was installed as a means of cooling the 
building. 
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The mine is just profitable at 18%, in spite of the fact that its $4 million payments 
are made in four years, after which point $4 million dollar revenues are earned 
for forty years.  The problem in the economics of mining is that 18% makes those 
future revenues have quite modest present values. 
 
Year Earnings ($M) / yr PV ($M)
0-3 -4 -12.697
4-43 4 13.377
Net  0.810
 
There are other approaches to deciding whether to take an investment.  In 
particular, the Internal Rate of Return approach solves the equation NPV=0 for 
the interest rate, and then the project is undertaken if the rate of return is 
sufficiently high.  This approach is flawed because the equation may have more 
than one solution, or no solutions and it is not transparent what the right thing to 
do should be in these events.  Indeed, the IRR approach gets the profit-
maximizing answer only if it agrees with NPV.  A second approach is the 
payback period, which asks how many years a project must be run before 
profitability is reached.  The problem with the payback period is deciding between 
projects – if I can only do one of two projects, the one with the higher NPV makes 
the most money for the company.  The one with the faster payback may make a 
quite small amount of money very quickly; it isn’t apparent that this is a good 
choice.  When a company is in risk of bankruptcy, a short payback period might 
be valuable, although this would ordinarily be handled by employing a higher 
interest rate in an NPV analysis.  NPV does a good job when the question is 
whether to undertake a project or not, and it does better than other approaches 
to investment decisions.  For this reason, NPV has become the most common 
approach to investment decisions.  Indeed, NPV analysis is more common than 
all other approaches combined.  NPV does a poor job, however, when the 
question is whether to undertake a project, or delay the project.  That is, NPV 
answers “yes or no” to investment, but when the choice is “yes or wait,” NPV 
requires amendment. 
 
4.3.2.1 (Exercise) Suppose that, without a university education, you’ll earn 
$25,000 per year.  A university education costs $20,000 per year, and 
you forgo the $25,000/year you would have earned for four years.  
However, you earn $50,000 per year for the following forty years.  At 7%, 
what is the NPV of the university education? 
 
4.3.2.2 (Exercise) Now that you’ve decided to go to university based on the 
previous answer, suppose that you can attend East State U, paying 
$3,000 per year for four years and earning $40,000 when you graduate, 
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or North Private U, paying $22,000 per year for the four years and 
earning $50,000 when you graduate.  Which is the better deal at 7%? 
4.3.3 Investment Under Uncertainty 
Risk has a cost, and people, and corporations, buy insurance against financial 
risk.41  The standard approach to investment under uncertainty is to compute an 
NPV, with the revenues composed of expected values, and the interest rate used 
adjusted to compensate for the risk. 
 
For example, consider a project like oil exploration.  The risks are enormous.  
Half of all underwater tracts in the Gulf Coast near Louisiana and Texas that are 
leased are never drilled, because later information makes them a bad bet.  Half 
of all the tracts that are drilled are dry.  So right off the bat, three-quarters of the 
tracts that are sold produce zero or negative revenue, and positive costs.  To see 
how the economics of such a risky investment might be developed, suppose that 
the relevant rate of return for such investments is 18%.  Suppose further the tract 
can be leased for $500,00 and the initial exploration costs $1 million.  If the tract 
has oil (with a 25% probability), it produces $1 million per year for twenty years, 
and then runs dry.  This gives an expected revenue of $250,000 per year.  To 
compute the expected net present value, we first compute the returns: 
 
Table  4-1: Oil Tract Return 
 Expected revenue  EPV 
0 -$1M -$1.5M 
1-20 $0.25M $1.338M
Net  -$0.162 
 
At 18%, the investment is a loss – the risk is too great given the average returns. 
 
A very important consideration for investment under uncertainty is the choice of 
interest rate.  The most important thing to understand is that the interest rate is 
specific to the project, and not to the investor.  This is perhaps the most 
important insight of corporate finance generally: the interest rate should adjust for 
the risk associated with the project and not the investor.  For example, suppose 
hamburger retailer McDonald’s is considering investing in a cattle ranch in Peru.  
McDonald’s is overall a very low-risk firm, but this particular project is quite risky, 
because of local conditions.  McDonald’s still needs to adjust for the market value 
of the risk it is undertaking, and that value is a function of the project risk, not the 
risk of McDonald’s other investments. 
 
This basic insight of corporate finance – the appropriate interest rate is 
determined by the project, not the investor – is counter-intuitive to most of us 
                                            
41 For example, NBC spent $6 million in buying an insurance policy against US nonparticipation in 
the 1980 Moscow summer Olympic games, and the US didn’t participate (because of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan), and NBC was paid $94 million from the policy. 
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because it doesn’t apply to our personal circumstances.  For individuals, the cost 
of borrowing money is mostly a function of their own personal circumstances, 
and thus the decision of whether to pay cash for a car or borrow the money is not 
so much a function of the car being purchased but of the wealth of the borrower.  
Even so, personal investors borrow money at distinct interest rates.  Mortgage 
rates on houses are lower than interest rates on automobiles, and interest rates 
on automobiles lower than on credit cards.  This is because the “project” of 
buying a house has less risk associated for it: the percentage loss to the lender 
in event of borrower default is lower on a house than on a car.  Credit cards carry 
the highest interest rates because they are unsecured by any asset. 
 
One way of understanding why the interest rate is project-specific but not 
investor-specific is to think about undertaking the project by creating a separate 
firm to make the investment.  The creation of subsidiary units is a common 
strategy, in fact.  This subsidiary firm created to operate a project has a value 
equal to the NPV of the project using the interest rate specific to the subsidiary, 
which is the interest rate for the project, independent of the parent.  For the 
parent company, owning such a firm is a good thing if the firm has positive value, 
and not otherwise.42 
 
Investments in oil are subject to another kind of uncertainty: price risk.  Prices of 
oil fluctuate and aren’t constant.  Moreover, oil pumped and sold today is not 
available for the future.  Should you develop and pump the oil you have today, or 
should you hold out and sell in the future?  This question, known as the option 
value of investment, is generally somewhat challenging and arcane, but a simple 
example provides a useful insight. 
 
To develop this example, let’s set aside some extraneous issues first.  Consider 
a very simple investment, in which either C is invested or not.43  If C is invested, 
a value V is generated.  The cost C is a constant; it could correspond to drilling or 
exploration costs, or in the case of a stock option, the strike price of the option, 
which is the amount one pays to obtain the share of stock.  The value V, in 
contrast, varies from time to time in a random fashion.  To simplify the analysis, 
we assume that V is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], so that the 
probability of V falling in an interval [a, b] is b-a if 0≤a≤b≤1.  The option only has 
value if C<1, which we assume for the rest of this section. 
 
The first thing to note is that the optimal rule to make the investment is cutoff 
value, that is, to set a level V0 and exercise the option if, and only if, V≥V0.  This 
is because, if you are willing to exercise the option and generate value V, you 
should be willing to exercise the option and obtain even more value.  The NPV 
                                            
42 It may seem that synergies between parent and subsidiary are being neglected here, but 
synergies should be accounted for at the time they produce value, i.e. as part of the stream of 
revenues of the subsidiary. 
43 This theory is developed in striking generality by Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck, Investment 
Under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press, 1994. 
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rule simply says V0 = C, that is, invest whenever it is profitable.  The purpose of 
the example developed below is to provide some insight into how far wrong the 
NPV rule will be when option values are potentially significant. 
 
Now consider the value of option to invest, given that the investment rule V≥V0 is 
followed. Call this option value J(V0).  If the realized value V exceeds V0, one 
obtains V-C.  Otherwise, one delays the investment, producing a discounted level 
of the same value.  This logic says 
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This expression for J(V0) arises as follows.  First, the hypothesized distribution of 
V is uniform on [0,1].  Consequently, the value of V will exceed V0 with probability 
1- V0.  In this event, the expected value of V is the midpoint of the interval [V0, 1], 
which is ½(V0+1).  The value ½(V0+1) - C is the average payoff from the strategy 
of investing whenever V≥ V0, which is obtained with probability 1- V0.  Second, 
with probability V0, the value falls below the cutoff level V0.  in this case, no 
investment is made, and instead, we wait until the next period.  The expected 
profits of the next period are J(V0) and these profits are discounted in the 
standard way. 
 
The expression for J is straightforward to solve: 
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Rudimentary calculus shows 
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First, note that 0)( >′ CJ  and 0)1( <′J , which together imply the existence of a 
maximum at a value V0 between C and 1, satisfying 0)( 0 =′ VJ .  Second, the 
solution occurs at 
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The positive root of the quadratic has V0>1, which entails never investing, and 
hence is not a maximum.  The profit-maximizing investment strategy is to invest 
whenever the value exceeds V0 given by the negative root in the formula.  There 
are a couple of notable features about this solution.  First, at r=0, V0 = 1.  This is 
because r=0 corresponds to no discounting, so there is no loss in holding out for 
the highest possible value.  Second, as r→∞, V0 → C.  As r→∞, the future is 
valueless, so it is worth investing if the return is anything over costs.  These are 
not surprising findings, quite the opposite – they should hold in any reasonable 
formulation of such an investment strategy.  Moreover, they show that the NPV 
rule, which requires V0 = C, is correct only if the future is valueless. 
 
How does this solution behave?  The solution is plotted as a function of r, for 
C=0, 0.25 and 0.5, in Figure  4-21. 
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Figure  4-21: Investment Strike Price Given r 
 
The horizontal axis represents interest rates, so this picture shows very high 
interest rates by current standards, up to 200%.  Even so, V0 remains 
substantially above C.  That is, even when the future has very little value 
because two-thirds of the value is destroyed by discounting each period, the 
optimal strategy deviates significantly from the NPV strategy.  Figure  4-22 shows 
a close-up of that picture for a more reasonable range of interest rates, for 
interest rates of zero to ten percent. 
 
Figure  4-22 shows the cutoff values of investment for three values of C, the cost 
of the investment.  These three values are 0 (lowest curve), 0.25 (the middle 
dashed curve), and 0.5, the highest, dotted line.  Consider the lowest curve, with 
C=0.  The NPV of this project is always positive – there are no costs and 
revenues are positive.  Nevertheless, because the investment can only be made 
once, it pays to hold out for a higher level of payoff, indeed, for 65% or more of 
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the maximum payoff.  The economics at an interest rate of 10% is as follows.  By 
waiting, there is a 65% chance that ten percent of the potential value of the 
investment is lost.  However, there is a 35% of an even higher value.  The 
optimum value of V0 trades these considerations off against each other. 
For C = 0.25, at 10% the cutoff value for taking an investment is 0.7, nearly three 
times the actual cost of the investment.  Indeed, the cutoff value incorporates two 
separate costs: the actual expenditure on the investment C, and the lost 
opportunity to invest in the future.  The latter cost is much larger than the 
expenditure on the investment in many circumstances, and in this example, can 
be quantitatively much larger than the actual expenditure on the investment. 
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Figure  4-22 Investment Strike Price Given r  
 
Some investments can be replicated.  There are over 13,000 McDonald’s 
restaurants in the United States, and building another doesn’t foreclose building 
even more.  For such investments, NPV analysis gets the right answer, provided 
that appropriate interest rates and expectations are used.  Other investments are 
difficult to replicate or logically impossible to replicate – having pumped and sold 
the oil from a tract, that tract is now dry.  For such investments, NPV is 
consistently wrong because it neglects the value of the option to delay the 
investment.  A correct analysis adds a lost value for the option to delay the cost 
of the investment, a value which can be quantitatively large, as we have seen. 
 
Example: When should you refinance a mortgage?  Suppose you are paying 
10% on a $100,000 mortgage, and it costs $5,000 to refinance, but refinancing 
permits you to lock in a lower interest rate, and hence pay less.  When is it a 
good idea?  To answer this question, we assume that the $5,000 cost of 
refinancing is built into the loan, so that in essence you borrow $105,000 at a 
lower interest rate when you refinance.  This is actually the most common 
method of refinancing a mortgage. 
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To simplify the calculations, we will consider a mortgage that is never paid off, 
that is, one pays the same amount per year forever.  If the mortgage isn’t 
refinanced, one pays ten percent of the $100,000 face value of the mortgage 
each year, or $10,000 per year.  If one refinances at interest rate r, one pays r × 
$105,000 per year, so the NPV of refinancing is 
 
NPV = $10,000 - r × $105,000. 
 
Thus NPV is positive whenever %52.9
105
10 =<r . 
 
Should you refinance when the interest rate drops to this level?  No.  At that 
level, you would exactly break even, but would also be carrying a $105,000 
mortgage rather than a $100,000 mortgage, making it harder to benefit from any 
further interest rate decreases.  The only circumstance in which refinancing at 
9.52% is sensible is if interest rates can’t possibly fall further. 
 
When should you refinance?  That depends on the nature and magnitude of the 
randomness governing interest rates, preferences over money today versus 
money in the future, and attitudes to risk.  The model developed in this section is 
not a good guide to answering this question, primarily because the interest rates 
are strongly correlated over time.  However, an approximate guide to 
implementing the option theory of investment is to seek an NPV of twice the 
investment, which would translate into a refinance point of around 8.5%. 
 
4.3.3.1 (Exercise) You are searching for a job.  The net value of jobs that arise 
is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1].  When you accept a job, you 
must stop looking at subsequent jobs.  If you can interview with one 
employer per week, what jobs should you accept?  Use a 7% annual 
interest rate. 
 
Hint: Relate the job search problem to the investment problem, where accepting 
a job is equivalent to making the investment.  What is c in the job search 
problem?  What is the appropriate interest rate? 
4.3.4 Resource Extraction 
For the past sixty years, the world has been “running out of oil.”  There are news 
stories about the end of the reserves being only ten, fifteen or twenty years away.  
The tone of these stories is that, at that time, we will run out of oil completely and 
prices will be extraordinarily high.  Industry studies counter that more oil 
continues to be found and that the world is in no danger of running out of oil. 
 
If you believe that the world will run out of oil, what should you do?  You should 
buy and hold.  That is, if the price of oil in twenty years is going to be $1,000 per 
barrel, then you can buy oil at $40 and hold it for twenty years, and sell it at 
$1,000.  The rate of return from this behavior is the solution to 
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40
1000)1( 20 =+ r . 
 
This equation solves for r = 17.46%, which represents a healthy rate of return on 
investment.  This substitution is part of a general conclusion known as the 
Ramsey44 rule: for resources in fixed supply, prices rise at the interest rate.  With 
a resource in fixed supply, owners of the resource will sell at the point 
maximizing the present value of the resource.  Even if they do not, others can 
buy the resource at the low present value of price point and resell at the high 
present value, and make money. 
 
The Ramsey rule implies that prices of resources in fixed supply rise at the 
interest rate.  An example of the Ramsey rule in action concerns commodities 
that are temporarily fixed in supply, such as grains, after the harvest.  During the 
period between harvests, these products rise in price on average at the interest 
rate, where the interest rate includes storage and insurance costs, as well as the 
cost of funds. 
 
Example: Let time run t = 0, 1, … and suppose the demand for a resource in 
fixed supply has constant elasticity: ε
1
)(
−= aQQp .  Suppose there is a total 
stock R of the resource, and the interest rate is fixed at r.  What is the price and 
consumption of the resource at each time? 
 
Solution: Let Qt represent the quantity consumed at time t.  Then the arbitrage 
condition requires: 
 
εε 1
0
1
0 )()1)(()1(
−− ==+=+ tttt aQQprQpraQ . 
 
Thus, εtt rQQ −+= )1(0 . 
 
Finally, the resource constraint implies 
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This solves for the initial consumption Q0.  Consumption in future periods 
declines geometrically, thanks to the constant elasticity assumption. 
 
                                            
44 The solution to this problem is known as Ramsey pricing, after the discoverer Frank Ramsey 
(1903-1930). 
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Market arbitrage insures the availability of the resource in the future, and drives 
the price up to ration the good.  The world runs out slowly, and the price of a 
resource in fixed supply rises on average at the interest rate. 
 
Resources like oil and minerals are ostensibly in fixed supply – there is only so 
much oil, or gold, or bauxite, or palladium in the earth.  Markets, however, 
behave as if there is an unlimited supply, and with good reason.  People are 
inventive, and find substitutes.  England’s wood shortage of 1651 didn’t result in 
England being cold permanently, nor was England limited to the wood it could 
grow as a source of heat.  Instead, coal was discovered.  The shortage of whale 
oil in the mid-nineteenth century led to the development of oil resources as a 
replacement.  If markets expect that price increases will lead to substitutes, then 
we rationally should use more today, trusting that technological developments 
will provide substitutes.45  Thus, while some believe we are running out of oil, 
most investors are betting that we are not, and that energy will not be very 
expensive in the future, either because of continued discovery of oil, or because 
of the creation of alternative energy sources.  If you disagree, why not invest and 
take the bet?  If you bet on future price increases, that will tend to increase the 
price today, encouraging conservation today, and increase the supply in the 
future. 
 
4.3.4.1 (Exercise) With an elasticity of demand of 2, compute the percentage of 
the resource that is used each year if the interest rate is 10%.  If the 
interest rate falls, what happens to the proportion quantity used? 
4.3.5 A Time to Harvest 
A tree grows slowly, but is renewable, so the analysis of Section  4.3.4 doesn’t 
help us understand when it is most profitable to cut the tree down.  Consider 
harvesting for pulp and paper use.  In this use, the amount of wood chips is what 
matters to the profitability of cutting down the tree, and the biomass of the tree 
provides a direct indication of this.  Suppose the biomass sells for a net price p, 
which has the costs of harvesting and replanting deducted from it , and the 
biomass of the tree is b(t) when the tree is t years old.  It simplifies the analysis 
slightly to use continuous time discounting 
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45 Unlike oil and trees, whales were overfished and there was no mechanism for arbitraging them 
into the future, that is, no mechanism for capturing and saving whales for later use.  This problem, 
known as the tragedy of the commons, results in too much use and is taken up in Section  6.3.6.  
Trees have also been over-cut, most notably on Easter Island. 
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Consider the policy of cutting down trees when they are T years old.  This 
induces a cutting cycle of length T.  A brand new tree will produce a present 
value of profits of: 
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This profit arises because the first cut occurs at time T, with discounting e-ρT, and 
produces a net gain of pb(T).  The process then starts over, with a second tree 
cut down at time 2T, and so on. 
 
Profit maximization gives a first order condition on the optimal cycle length T of 
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This can be rearranged to yield: 
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The left hand side of this equation is the growth rate of the tree.  The right hand 
side is approximately the continuous-time discount factor, at least when T is 
large, as it tends to be for trees, which are usually on a 20 to 80 year cycle, 
depending on the species.  This is the basis for a conclusion: cut down the tree 
slightly before it is growing at the interest rate.  The higher are interest rates, the 
shorter the cycle on which the trees should be cut down. 
 
The pulp and paper use of trees is special, because the tree is going to be 
ground up into wood chips.  What happens when the object is to get boards from 
the tree, and larger boards sell for more?  In particular, it is more profitable to get 
a 4 × 4 than two 2 × 4s.  Doubling the diameter of the tree, which approximately 
raises the biomass by a factor of six to eight, more than increases the value of 
the timber by the increase in the biomass. 
 
It turns out our theory is already capable of handling this case.  The only 
adaptation is a change in the interpretation of the function b.  Now, rather than 
representing the biomass, b(t) must represent the value in boards of a tree that is 
t years old.  (The parameter p may be set to one.)  The only amendment to the 
rule for cutting down trees is that the most profitable point in time to cut down the 
tree occurs slightly before the time when the value (in boards) of the tree is 
growing at the interest rate. 
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For example, lobsters become more valuable as they grow; the profit-maximizing 
time to harvest lobsters is governed by the same equation, where b(T) is the 
value of a lobster of age T.  Prohibiting the harvest of lobsters under age T is a 
means of insuring the profit-maximizing capture of lobsters, and preventing over-
fishing, a topic considered in section  6.3.6. 
 
The implementation of the formula is illustrated in Figure  4-23.  The dashed line 
represents the growth rate )(
)(
Tb
Tb′ , while the solid line represents the 
discount rate, which was set at 5%.  Note that the best time to cut down the trees 
is when they are approximately 28.7 years old, and at that time, they are growing 
at 6 ½ %.  Figure  4-23 also illustrates another feature of the optimization – there 
may be multiple solutions to the optimization problem, and the profit-maximizing 
solution involves )(
)(
Tb
Tb′  cutting 
Te ρ
ρ
−−1  from above. 
 
  
Figure  4-23: Optimal Solution for T 
 
The U.S. Department of the Interior is in charge of selling timber rights on federal 
lands.  The Department uses the policy of maximum sustainable yield to 
determine the time that the tree is cut down.  Maximum sustainable yield 
maximizes the long-run average value of the trees cut down, that is, it maximizes 
 
T
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4.3.5.1 (Exercise) Show maximum sustainable yield results in cutting down the 
tree when it is T years old, where T satisfies 
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Maximum sustainable yield is actually a special case of the policies considered 
here, and arises for a discount factor of 0.  It turns out (thanks to a formula 
known variously as L’Hôpital’s or L’Hospital’s rule) that 
 
.1
1
lim
0 Te T
=
− −→ ρρ
ρ  
 
Thus, the rule 
TeTb
Tb
T
1
1)(
)( →
−
=′ −ρ
ρ  as ρ→0, and this is precisely the same rule 
that arises under maximum sustainable yield. 
 
Thus, the Department of the Interior acts as if the interest rate is zero, when it is 
not.  The justification given is that the Department is valuing future generations at 
the same level as current generations, that is, increasing the supply for future 
generations, while slightly harming the current generation of buyers.  The major 
consequence of the Department’s policy of maximum sustainable yield is to force 
cutting of timber even when prices are low during recessions.  
4.3.5.2 (Exercise) Suppose the growth rate of trees satisfies tte
Tb
Tb −=′
)(
)( .  
Numerically approximate the efficient time to cut the tree if ρ=0.1.  How 
does this compare to the solution of maximum sustainable yield? 
4.3.6 Collectibles 
Many people purchase durable goods as investments, including Porsche 
Speedsters, Tiffany lamps, antique telephones, postage stamps and coins, 
baseball cards, original Barbie dolls, antique credenzas, autographs, original 
rayon Hawaiian shirts, old postcards, political campaign buttons, old clocks and 
even Pez dispensers.  How is the value of, say, a 1961 Porsche Speedster or a 
$500 bill from the confederacy, which currently sells for over $500, determined? 
 
 
Figure  4-24: The Porsche Speedster 
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The theory of resource prices can be adapted to cover these items, which are in 
fixed supply.  There are four major differences that are relevant.  First, using the 
item doesn’t consume it; the goods are durable.  I can own an “I Like Ike” 
campaign button for years, then sell the same button.  Second, these items may 
depreciate.  Cars wear out even when they aren’t driven, and the brilliant color of 
Pez dispensers fades.  Every time a standard 27 ½ pound gold bar, like the kind 
in the Fort Knox depository, is moved, approximately $5 in gold wears off the bar.  
Third, the goods may cost something to store.  Fourth, the population grows, and 
some of the potential buyers are not yet born. 
 
To understand the determinants of the prices of collectibles, it turns out to create 
a major simplification to perform the analysis in continuous time.  Let t, ranging 
from zero to infinity, be the continuous time variable.  If the good depreciates at 
rate δ, and q0 is the amount available at time 0, the quantity available at time t is  
 
 teqtq δ−= 0)( . 
 
For simplicity, assume that there is constant elasticity of demand ε.  If g is the 
population growth rate, the quantity demanded, for any price p, is given by 
 
 ε−= paetpx gtd ),( , 
 
for a constant a which represents the demand at time 0.  This represents 
demand for the good for direct use, but neglects the investment value of the good 
– that the good can be resold for a higher price later.  In other words, xd captures 
the demand for looking at Pez dispensers or driving Porsche Speedsters, but 
does not incorporate the value of being able to resell these items. 
 
The demand equation can be used to generate the lowest use value to a person 
owning the good at time t.  That marginal use value v arises from the equality of 
supply and demand: 
 
 εδ −− === vaetvxtqeq gtdt ),()(0  
 
or 
 
 tge
q
av )(
0
+= δε . 
 
Thus, the use value to the marginal owner of the good at time t satisfies 
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e
q
av ε
δε +
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
0
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An important aspect of this development is that the value to the owner is found 
without reference to the price of the good.  The reason this calculation is possible 
is that the individuals with high values will own the good, and the number of 
goods and the values of people are assumptions of the theory.  Essentially, we 
already know that the price will ration the good to the individuals with high values, 
so computing the lowest value individual who holds a good at time t is a 
straightforward “supply equals demand” calculation.  Two factors increase the 
marginal value to the owner – there are fewer units available because of 
depreciation, and there are more high-value people demanding them, because of 
population growth.  Together, these factors make the marginal use value grow at 
the rate ε
δ g+ . 
 
Assume that s be the cost of storage per unit of time and per unit of the good, so 
that storing x units for a period of length ∆ costs sx∆.  This is about the simplest 
possible storage cost technology. 
 
The final assumption that we make is that all potential buyers use a common 
discount rate r, so that the discount of money or value received ∆ units of time in 
the future is e-r∆.  It is worth a brief digression why it is sensible to assume a 
common discount rate, when it is evident that many people have different 
discount rates.  Different discount rates induce gains from trade in borrowing and 
lending, and create an incentive to have banks.  While banking is an interesting 
thing to study, this section is concerned with collectibles, not banks.  If we have 
different discount factors, then we must also introduce banks, which would 
complicate the model substantially.  Otherwise, we would intermingle the theory 
of banking and the theory of collectibles.  It is probably a good idea to develop a 
joint theory of banking and collectibles given the investment potential of 
collectibles, but it is better to start with the pure theory of either one before 
developing the joint theory. 
Consider a person who values the collectible at v.  Is it a good thing for this 
person to own a unit of the good at time t?  Let p be the function that gives the 
price across time, so that p(t) is the price at time t.  Buying the good at time t and 
then selling what remains (recall that the good depreciates at rate δ) at time t+∆ 
gives a net value of  
 
 )()()(
0
∆++−− ∆−∆−
∆
−∫ tpeetpdusve rru δ . 
 
For the marginal person, that is, the person who is just indifferent to buying or not 
buying at time t, this must be zero at every moment in time, for ∆=0.  If v 
represents the value to a marginal buyer (indifferent to holding or selling) holding 
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the good at time t, then this expression should come out to be zero.  Thus, 
dividing by ∆, 
 
∆
∆++∆−−∆=
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0
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r
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Recall that the marginal value is 
tg
e
q
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, which gives 
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The general solution to this differential equation is 
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It turns out that this equation only makes sense if 0>+−+ ε
δδ gr , for otherwise 
the present value of the marginal value goes to infinity, so there is no possible 
finite initial price.  Provided demand is elastic and discounting is larger than 
growth rates (which is an implication of equilibrium in the credit market), this 
condition will be met. 
 
What is the initial price?  It must be the case that the present value of the price is 
finite, for otherwise the good would always be a good investment for everyone at 
time 0, using the “buy and hold for resale” strategy.  That is, 
 
 .)(lim ∞<−∞→ tpe
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This condition implies 
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and thus 
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This equation may take on two different forms.  First, it may be solvable for a 
non-negative price, which happens if 
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Second, it may require destruction of some of the endowment of the good.  
Destruction must happen if the quantity of the good q0 at time 0 satisfies  
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In this case, there is too much of the good, and an amount must be destroyed to 
make the initial price zero.  Since the initial price is zero, the good is valueless at 
time zero, and destruction of the good makes sense – at the current quantity, the 
good is too costly to store for future profits.  Enough is destroyed to insure 
indifference between holding the good as a collectible and destroying it.  
Consider, for example, the $500 confederate bill pictured in Figure  4-25.  Many of 
these bills were destroyed at the end of the US Civil War, when the currency 
became valueless, burned as a source of heat.  Now, an uncirculated version 
retails for $900. 
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Figure  4-25: $500 Confederate States Bill 
The amount of the good that must be destroyed is such that the initial price is 
zero.  As q0 is the initial (pre-destruction) quantity, the amount at time zero after 
the destruction is the quantity q(0) satisfying 
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Given this construction, we have that  
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where either q(0)=q0 and p(0)≥0, or q(0)<q0 and p(0)=0. 
 
Destruction of a portion of the stock of a collectible, followed by price increases, 
is actually a quite common phenomenon.  In particular, consider the “Model 500” 
telephone by Western Electric illustrated in Figure  4-26.  This ubiquitous classic 
phone was retired as the US switched to tone dialing and push-button phones in 
the 1970s, and millions of phones – perhaps over 100 million – wound up in 
landfills.  Now, the phone is a collectible and rotary phone enthusiasts work to 
keep them operational. 
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Figure  4-26: Western Electric Model 500 Telephone 
The solution for p(0) dramatically simplifies the expression for p(t): 
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This formula lets us compare different collectibles.  The first insight is that 
storage costs enter linearly into prices, so that growth rates are approximately 
unaffected by storage costs.  That gold is easy to store, while stamps and art 
require control of humidity and temperature to preserve value and are hence 
more expensive to store, affects the level of prices but not the growth rate.  
However, depreciation and the growth of population affect the growth rate, and 
they do so in combination with the demand elasticity.  With more elastic demand, 
prices grow more slowly and start at a lower level.  
 
4.3.7 Summer Wheat 
Typically, wheat harvested in the fall has to last until the following harvest.  How 
should prices evolve over the season?  If I know that I need wheat in January, 
should I buy it at harvest time and store it myself, or wait and buy it in January?  
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We can use a theory analogous to the theory of collectibles developed in Section 
 4.3.6 to determine the evolution of prices for commodities like wheat, corn, 
orange juice, and canola oil. 
 
Unlike collectibles, buyers need not hold for their personal use, since there is no 
value in admiring the wheat in your home.  Let p(t) be the price at time t and 
suppose that the year has length T.  Generally there is a substantial amount of 
uncertainty regarding the size of wheat harvests and most countries maintain an 
excess inventory as a precaution.  However, if the harvest were not uncertain, 
there would be no need for a precautionary holding, and instead we would 
consume the entire harvest over the course of a year, at which point the new 
harvest comes in.  It is such a model that is investigated in this section. 
 
Let δ represent the depreciation rate (which for wheat includes the quantity eaten 
by rodents) and s be the storage cost.  Buying at time t and reselling at t+∆ 
should be a break-even proposition. If one purchases at time t, it costs p(t) to buy 
the good.  Reselling at t+∆, the storage cost is about s∆.  (This is not the 
precisely relevant cost, but rather it is the present value of the storage cost, and 
hence the restriction to small values of ∆.)  The good depreciates to only have 
∆−δe  left to sell, and discounting reduces the value of that amount by the factor 
∆−re .  For this to be a breakeven proposition, for small ∆, 
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Taking the limit as ∆→0, 
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This arbitrage condition insures that it is a break-even proposition to invest in the 
good; the profits from the price appreciation are exactly balanced by 
depreciation, interest and storage costs.  We can solve the differential equation 
to obtain: 
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The unknown is p(0).  The constraint on p(0), however, is like the resource 
extraction problem – p(0) is determined by the need to use up the harvest over 
the course of the year. 
 
Suppose demand has constant elasticity ε.  Then the quantity used comes in the 
form ε−= )()( taptx .  Let z(t) represent the stock at time t.  Then the equation for 
the evolution of the stock is ).()()( tztxtz δ−−=′   This equation is obtained by 
noting that the flow out of stock is composed of two elements: depreciation δz 
and consumption x.  The stock evolution equation solves for 
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Thus, the quantity of wheat is consumed exactly if 
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But this equation determines the initial price through 
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This equation doesn’t lead to a closed form for p(0) but is readily estimated, 
which provides a practical means of computing expected prices for commodities 
in temporarily fixed supply. 
 
Generally, the price equation produces a “saw-tooth” pattern, which is illustrated 
in Figure  4-27.  The increasing portion is actually an exponential, but of such a 
small degree that it looks linear.  When the new harvest comes in, prices drop 
abruptly as the inventory grows dramatically, and the same pattern is repeated. 
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Figure  4-27: Prices over a Cycle for Seasonal Commodities 
 
How well does the theory work?  Figure  4-28 shows the log of the future price of 
gold over time.   The relevant data comes from a futures market which 
establishes, at one moment in time, the price of gold for future delivery, and thus 
represents today’s estimate of the future price of gold.  These data, then, 
represent the expected future price at a particular moment in time (the afternoon 
of October 11, 2005), and thus correspond to the prices in the theory, since 
perceived risks are fixed.  (Usually in the real world, risk plays a salient role.)  We 
can observe that prices are approximately an exponential, because the log of 
prices is approximately linear.  However, the estimate of r+δ is surprisingly low, at 
an annual level of less than 0.03, or 3% for both discounting and depreciation.  
Depreciation of gold is low, but this still represents a very low interest rate.  
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Figure  4-28: Log of Price of Gold over Time 
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5 Consumer Theory 
Consumer theory is to demand as producer theory is to supply.  The major 
difference is that producer theory assumes that sellers are motivated by profit, 
and profit is something that one can usually directly measure.  Moreover, the 
costs that enter into profit arise from physical properties of the production 
process – how many coffee cups come from the coffee cup manufacturing plant?  
In contrast, consumer theory is based on what people like, so it begins with 
something that we can’t directly measure, but must infer.  That is, consumer 
theory is based on the premise that we can infer what people like from the 
choices they make. 
 
Now, inferring what people like from choices they make does not rule out 
mistakes.  But our starting point is to consider the implications of a theory in 
which consumers don’t make mistakes, but make choices that give them the 
most satisfaction. 
 
Economists think of this approach as analogous to studying gravitation in a 
vacuum before thinking about the effects of air friction.  There is a practical 
consideration that dictates ignoring mistakes.  There are many kinds of mistakes, 
e.g. “I meant to buy toothpaste but forgot and bought a toothbrush,” a memory 
problem, “I thought this toothpaste was better but it is actually worse,” a learning 
issue, and “I meant to buy toothpaste but I bought crack instead,” a self-control 
issue.  All of these kinds of mistakes lead to distinct theories.  Moreover, we 
understand these alternative theories by understanding the basic theory first, and 
then seeing what changes these theories lead to. 
5.1 Utility Maximization 
Economists use the term utility in a peculiar and idiosyncratic way.  Utility refers 
not to usefulness but to the flow of pleasure or happiness that a person enjoys – 
some measure of the satisfaction a person experiences.  Usefulness might 
contribute to utility, but so does style, fashion, or even whimsy. 
 
The term utility is unfortunate not just because it suggests usefulness, but 
because it makes the economic approach to behavior appear more limited than it 
actually is.  We will make very few assumptions about the form of utility that a 
consumer might have.  That is, we will attempt to avoid making value judgments 
about the preferences a consumer holds – whether they like smoking cigarettes 
or eating only carrots, watching Arnold Schwarzenegger movies or spending time 
with a hula hoop.  Consumers like whatever it is that they like; the economic 
assumption is that they attempt to obtain the goods that they like.  It is the 
consequences of the pursuit of happiness that comprise the core of consumer 
theory. 
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In this chapter, we will focus on two goods.  In many cases, the generalization to 
an arbitrary number of goods is straightforward.  Moreover, in most applications it 
won’t matter because we can view one of the goods as a “composite good” 
reflecting consumption of a bunch of other goods.46 
 
As a starting point, suppose the two goods are X and Y.  To distinguish the 
quantity of the good from the good itself, we’ll use capital letters to indicate the 
good and a lower case letter to indicate the quantity consumed.  If X is 
rutabagas, a consumer who ate three of them would have x=3.  How can we 
represent preferences for this consumer?  To fix ideas, suppose the consumer is 
both hungry and thirsty and the goods are beer and pizza.  The consumer would 
like more of both, reflected in greater pleasure for greater consumption.  Items 
one might consume are generally known as “bundles,” as in bundles of goods 
and services, and less frequently as “tuples,” a short-form for the “n-tuple,” 
meaning a list of n quantities.  Since we will focus on two goods, both of these 
terms are strained in the application; a bundle because a bundle of two things 
isn’t much of a bundle, and a tuple because what we have here is a “two-tuple,” 
also known as a pair.  But part of the job of studying economics is to learn the 
language of economics, and bundles it is. 
 
One might naturally consider measuring utility on some kind of physical basis – 
production of dopamine in the brain, for example – but it turns out that the actual 
quantities of utility don’t matter for the theory we develop.  What matters is 
whether a bundle produces more than another, or less, or the same.  Let u(x, y) 
represent the utility a consumer gets from consuming x units of beer and y units 
of pizza.  The function u guides the consumer’s choice, in the sense that, if the 
consumer can choose either (x1, y1) or (x2, y2), we expect him to choose (x1, y1) if 
u(x1, y1) > u(x2, y2). 
 
But notice that a doubling of u would lead to the same choices, because 
 
u(x1, y1) > u(x2, y2) if and only if 2u(x1, y1) > 2u(x2, y2). 
 
Thus, doubling the utility doesn’t change the preferences of the consumer.  But 
the situation is more extreme than this.  Even exponentiating the utility doesn’t 
change the consumer’s preferences, because 
 
u(x1, y1) > u(x2, y2) if and only if eu(x1, y1)> eu(x2, y2). 
 
Another way to put this is that there are no natural units for utility, at least until 
such time as we are able to measure pleasure in the brain. 
 
                                            
46 Thus, for example, savings for future consumption, or to provide for descendents, or to give to 
your alma mater, are all examples of consumption.  Our consumer will, in the end, always spend 
all of her income, although this happens because we adopt a very broad notion of spending.  In 
particular, savings are “future spending.” 
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It is possible to develop the theory of consumer choice without supposing that a 
utility function exists at all.  However, it is expedient to begin with utility, to 
simplify the analysis for introductory purposes. 
 
5.1.1 Budget or Feasible Set 
Suppose a consumer has a fixed amount of money to spend, M.  There are two 
goods X and Y, with associated prices pX and pY.  The feasible choices the 
consumer can make satisfy .Mypxp YX ≤+   In addition, we will focus on 
consumption and rule out negative consumption, so x≥0 and y≥0.  This gives a 
budget set or feasible set illustrated in Figure  5-1. 
 
 
Figure  5-1: Budget Set 
 
In this diagram, the feasible set of purchases that satisfy the budget constraint 
are illustrated with shading.  If the consumer spends all her money on X, she can 
consume the quantity x = 
Xp
M .  Similarly, if she spends all of her money on Y, 
she consumes 
Yp
M  units of Y.  The straight line between them, known as the 
budget line, represents the most of the goods she can consume.  The slope of 
the budget line is 
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An increase in the price of one good pivots or rotates the budget line.  Thus, if 
the price of X increases, the endpoint 
Yp
M  remains the same, but 
Xp
M  falls.  This 
is illustrated in Figure  5-2. 
 
 
Figure  5-2: Effect of an Increase in Price on the Budget 
The effect of increasing the available money M is to increase both 
Xp
M  and 
Yp
M  
proportionately.  This means an increase in M shifts the budget line out (away 
from the origin) in a parallel fashion, as in Figure  5-3. 
 
An increase in both prices by the same proportional factor has an effect identical 
to a decrease in income.  Thus, one of the three financial values – the two prices 
and income – is redundant.  That is, we can trace out all the possible budget 
lines with any two of the three parameters.  This can prove useful; we can 
arbitrarily set pX to be the number one without affecting the generality of the 
analysis.  When setting a price to one, that related good is called the numeraire, 
and essentially all prices are denominated with respect to that one good.  A real 
world example of a numeraire occurred when the currency used was based on 
gold so that the prices of other goods are denominated in terms of the value of 
gold. 
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Figure  5-3: An Increase in Income 
 
 
Money is not necessarily the only constraint on the consumption of goods that a 
consumer faces.  Time can be equally important.  One can own all the compact 
discs in the world, but they are useless if one doesn’t actually have time to listen 
to them.  Indeed, when we consider the supply of labor, time will be a major issue 
– supplying labor (working) uses up time that could be used to consume goods.  
In this case there will be two kinds of budget constraints – a financial one and a 
temporal one.  At a fixed wage, time and money translate directly into one 
another and the existence of the time constraint won’t present significant 
challenges to the theory.  The conventional way to handle the time constraint is 
to use as a baseline working “full out,” and then view leisure as a good which is 
purchased at a price equal to the wage.  Thus, if you earn $20/hour, we would 
set your budget at $480/day, reflecting 24 hours of work, but then permit you to 
buy leisure time, during which eating, sleeping, brushing teeth and every other 
non-work activity is accomplished at a price equal to $20 per hour. 
 
5.1.1.1 (Exercise) Graph the budget line for apples and oranges, with prices of 
$2 and $3 respectively and $60 to spend.  Now increase the price of 
apples from $2 to $4 and draw the budget line. 
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5.1.1.2 (Exercise) Suppose that apples cost $1 each.  Water can be purchased 
for 0.5 cents per gallon up to 20,000 gallons, and 0.1 cent per gallon for 
each gallon beyond 20,000 gallons.  Draw the budget constraint for a 
consumer who spends $200 per month on apples and water. 
 
5.1.1.3 (Exercise) Graph the budget line for apples and oranges, with prices of 
$2 and $3 respectively and $60 to spend.  Now increase expenditure to 
$90 and draw the budget line. 
5.1.2 Isoquants 
With two goods, we can graphically represent utility by considering the contour 
map of utility.  Utility contours are known as isoquants, meaning “equal quantity,” 
and are also known as indifference curves, since the consumer is indifferent 
between points on the line.  We have met this idea already in the description of 
production functions, where the curves represented input mixes that produced a 
given output.  The only difference here is that the output being produced is 
consumer “utility” instead of a single good or service. 
 
 
Figure  5-4: Utility Isoquants 
 
Figure  5-4 provides an illustration of isoquants or indifference curves.  Each 
curve represents one level of utility.  Higher utilities occur to the northeast, further 
away from the origin.  As with production isoquants, the slope of the indifference 
curves has the interpretation of the tradeoff between the two goods.  The amount 
of Y that the consumer is willing to give up to obtain an extra bit of X is the slope 
of the indifference curve.  Formally, the equation 
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 u(x, y) = u0 
 
defines an indifference curve for the reference utility u0.  Differentiating in such a 
way as to preserve the equality, we obtain the slope of the indifference curve: 
 
 0=∂
∂+∂
∂ dy
y
udx
x
u  or 
y
u
x
u
dx
dy
uu ∂∂
∂∂−=
= 0
. 
 
This slope is known as the marginal rate of substitution and reflects the tradeoff, 
from the consumer’s perspective, between the goods.  That is to say, the 
marginal rate of substitution (of Y for X) is the amount of Y the consumer is 
willing to lose to obtain an extra unit of X. 
 
An important assumption concerning isoquants is reflected in the diagram: 
“midpoints are preferred to extreme points.”  Suppose the consumer is indifferent 
between (x1, y1) and (x2, y2), that is, u(x1, y1) = u(x2, y2).  Then we say 
preferences are convex if any point on the line segment connecting (x1, y1) and 
(x2, y2) is at least as good as the extremes.  Formally, a point on the line segment 
connecting (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) comes in the form 
 
 (αx1 + (1 – α) x2, αy1 + (1 – α) y2), 
 
for α between zero and one.  This is also known as a “convex combination” 
between the two points.  When α is zero, the segment starts at (x2, y2) and 
proceeds in a linear fashion to (x1,y1) at α equal to one.  Preferences are convex 
if, for any α between 0 and 1, 
 
 u(x1, y1) = u(x2, y2) implies u(αx1 + (1 – α) x2, αy1 + (1 – α) y2) ≥ u(x1, y1). 
 
This property is illustrated in Figure  5-5.  The line segment that connects two 
points on the indifference curve lies to the northeast of the indifference curve, 
which means the line segment involves strictly more consumption of both goods 
than some points on the indifference curve, which means that it is preferred to 
the indifference curve.  Convex preferences mean that a consumer prefers a mix 
to any two equally valuable extremes.  Thus, if the consumer likes black coffee 
and also likes drinking milk, the consumer prefers some of each (not necessarily 
mixed) to only drinking coffee or only drinking milk.  This sounds more 
reasonable if you think of the consumer’s choices on a monthly basis; if you like 
drinking 60 cups of coffee, and no milk, per month the same as 30 glasses of 
milk and no coffee, convex preferences entails preferring 30 cups of coffee and 
15 glasses of milk to either extreme. 
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Figure  5-5: Convex Preferences 
 
How does a consumer choose which bundle to select?  The consumer is faced 
with the problem of maximizing u(x, y) subject to .Mypxp YX ≤+  
 
We can derive the solution to the consumer’s problem as follows.  First, “solve” 
the budget constraint Mypxp YX ≤+  for y, to obtain .
Y
X
p
xpMy −≤   If Y is a 
good, this constraint will be satisfied with equality and all the money will be spent.  
Thus, we can write the consumer’s utility as 
 
 ., ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
Y
X
p
xpMxu  
 
The first order condition for this problem, maximizing it over x, has 
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p
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This can be re-arranged to obtain the marginal rate of substitution (MRS). 
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The first order condition requires that the slope of the indifference curve equals 
the slope of the budget line, that is, there is a tangency between the indifference 
curve and the budget line.  This is illustrated in Figure  5-6.  Three indifference 
curves are drawn, two of which intersect the budget line, but are not tangent.  At 
these intersections, it is possible to increase utility by moving “toward the center,” 
until the highest of the three indifference curves is reached.  At this point, further 
increases in utility are not feasible, because there is no intersection between the 
set of bundles that produce a strictly higher utility and the budget set.  Thus, the 
large black dot is the bundle that produces the highest utility for the consumer. 
 
It will later prove useful to also state the second order condition, although we 
won’t use this condition now: 
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Figure  5-6: Graphical Utility Maximization 
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Note that the vector ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂=
y
u
x
uuu ,),( 21  is the gradient of u, and the gradient 
points in the direction of steepest ascent of the function u.  Second, the equation 
which characterizes the optimum, 
 
 ),(,0 XYYX ppy
u
x
u
x
up
y
up −•⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂=∂
∂−∂
∂= , 
 
where • is the “dot product” which multiplies the components of vectors and then 
adds them, says that the vectors (u1, u2) and (-pY, pX) are perpendicular, and 
hence that the rate of steepest ascent of the utility function is perpendicular to the 
budget line. 
 
When does this tangency approach fail to solve the consumer’s problem?  There 
are three ways it can fail.  First, the utility might not be differentiable.  We will set 
aside this kind of failure with the remark that fixing points of non-differentiability is 
mathematically challenging but doesn’t lead to significant alterations in the 
theory.  The second failure is that a tangency didn’t maximize utility.  Figure  5-7 
illustrates this case.  Here, there is a tangency, but it doesn’t maximize utility.  In 
Figure  5-7, the dotted indifference curve maximizes utility given the budget 
constraint (straight line).  This is exactly the kind of failure that is ruled out by 
convex preferences.  In Figure  5-7, preferences are not convex, because if we 
connect two points on the indifference curves and look at a convex combination, 
we get something less preferred, with lower utility, not more preferred as convex 
preferences would require. 
 
 
Figure  5-7: “Concave” Preferences, Prefer Boundaries 
x
y 
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The third failure is more fundamental: the derivative might fail to be zero because 
we’ve hit the boundary of x=0 or y=0.  This is a fundamental problem because in 
fact there are many goods that we do buy zero of, so zeros for some goods are 
not uncommon solutions to the problem of maximizing utility.  We will take this 
problem up in a separate section, but we already have a major tool to deal with it: 
convex preferences.   As we shall see, convex preferences insure that the 
consumer’s maximization problem is “well-behaved.” 
5.1.3 Examples 
The Cobb-Douglas utility function comes in the form ( ) αα −= 1, yxyxu .  Since 
utility is zero if either of the goods is zero, we see that a consumer with Cobb-
Douglas preferences will always buy some of each good.  The marginal rate of 
substitution for Cobb-Douglas utility is 
 
.
)1(
0
x
y
y
u
x
u
dx
dy
uu α
α
−=∂∂
∂∂=−
=
 
 
Thus, the consumer’s utility maximization problem yields 
 
.
)1(
0
x
y
y
u
x
u
dx
dy
p
p
uuY
X
α
α
−=∂∂
∂∂=−=
=
 
 
Thus, using the budget constraint, ).()1( XYX xpMypxp −==− ααα  
 
This yields 
YX p
My
p
Mx )1(, αα −== . 
 
Cobb-Douglas utility results in constant expenditure shares.  No matter what the 
price of X or Y, the expenditure xpX on X is αM.  Similarly, the expenditure on Y 
is (1-α)M.  This makes the Cobb-Douglas utility very useful for computing 
examples and homework exercises. 
 
5.1.3.1 (Exercise) Consider a consumer with utility xyyxu =),( .  If the 
consumer has $100 to spend, and the price of X is $5 and the price of Y 
is $2, graph the budget line, and then find the point that maximizes the 
consumer’s utility given the budget.  Draw the utility isoquant through this 
point.  What are the expenditure shares? 
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5.1.3.2 (Exercise) Consider a consumer with utility xyyxu =),( .  Calculate 
the slope of the isoquant directly, by solving 0),( uyxu =  for y as a 
function of x and the utility level u0.  What is the slope 
0uudx
dy
=
− ?  Verify 
that it satisfies the formula given above. 
 
5.1.3.3 (Exercise) Consider a consumer with utility 2)(),( xyyxu = .  Calculate 
the slope of the isoquant directly, by solving 0),( uyxu =  for y as a 
function of x and the utility level u0.  What is the slope 
0uudx
dy
=
− ?  Verify 
that the result is the same as in the previous exercise.  Why is it the 
same? 
 
 
When two goods are perfect complements, they are consumed proportionately.  
The utility that gives rise to perfect complements is in the form u(x, y) = min {x, 
βy} for some constant β (the Greek letter beta).  First observe that with perfect 
complements, consumers will buy in such a way that x = βy.  The reason is that, 
if x > βy, some expenditure on x is a waste since it brings in no additional utility, 
and the consumer gets higher utility by decreasing x and increasing y.  This lets 
us define a “composite good” which involves buying some amount y of Y and 
also buying βy of X.  The price of this composite commodity is βpX + pY, and it 
produces utility
YX pp
Mu +β= .  In this way, perfect complements boil down to a 
single good problem. 
 
5.1.3.4 (Exercise)  The case of perfect substitutes arises when all that matters 
to the consumer is the sum of the products – e.g. red shirts and green 
shirts for a color-blind consumer.  In this case, u(x, y) = x + y.  Graph the 
isoquants for perfect substitutes.  Show that the consumer maximizes 
utility by spending their entire income on whichever product is cheaper. 
 
If the only two goods available in the world were pizza and beer, it is likely that 
satiation would set in at some point.  How many pizzas can you eat per month?  
How much beer can you drink?  [Don’t answer that.] 
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Figure  5-8: Isoquants for a Bliss Point 
 
What does satiation mean for isoquants?  It means there is a point that 
maximizes utility, which economists call a bliss point.  An example is illustrated in 
Figure  5-8.  Near the origin, the isoquants behave as before.  However, as one 
gets full of pizza and beer, a point of maximum value is reached, illustrated by a 
large black dot.  What does satiation mean for the theory?  First, if the bliss point 
isn’t within reach, the theory behaves as before.  With a bliss point within reach, 
consumption will stop at the bliss point.  A feasible bliss point entails having a 
zero value of money.  There may be people with a zero value of money, but even 
very wealthy people, who reach satiation in goods that they personally consume, 
often like to do other things with the wealth and appear not to have reached 
satiation overall. 
 
5.1.3.5 (Exercise)  Suppose ( ) αα yxyxu +=,  for α<1.  Show 
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5.1.3.6 (Exercise) Suppose one consumer has the utility function u (which is 
always a positive number), and a second consumer has utility w.  
Suppose, in addition, that for any x, y, w(x, y) = (u(x, y))2, that is, the 
second person’s utility is the square of the first.  Show that these 
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consumers make the same choices – that is, u(xa, ya) ≥ u(xb, yb) if and 
only w(xa, ya) ≥ w(xb, yb). 
5.1.4 Substitution Effects 
It would be a simpler world if an increase in the price of a good always entailed 
buying less of it.  Alas, it isn’t so, as the following diagram illustrates.  In this 
diagram, an increase in the price of Y causes the budget line to pivot around the 
intersection on the X axis, since the amount of X that can be purchased hasn’t 
changed.  In this case, the quantity y of Y demanded rises. 
 
 
Figure  5-9: Substitution with an Increase in Price 
 
At first glance, this increase in the consumption of a good in response to a price 
increase sounds implausible, but there are examples where it makes sense.  The 
primary example is leisure.  As wages rise, the cost of leisure (forgone wages) 
rises.  But as people feel wealthier, they choose to work fewer hours.  The other 
examples given, which are hotly debated in the “tempest in a teapot” kind of way, 
involve people subsisting on a good like potatoes but occasionally buying meat.  
When the price of potatoes rises, they can no longer afford meat and buy even 
more potatoes than before. 
 
Thus, the logical starting point on substitution – what happens to the demand for 
a good when the price of that good increases? – does not lead to a useful theory.  
As a result, economists have devised an alternative approach, based on the 
following logic.  An increase in the price of a good is really a composition of two 
effects: an increase in the relative price of the good, and a decrease in the 
purchasing power of money.  As a result, it is useful to examine these two effects 
separately.  The substitution effect considers the change in the relative price, 
x
y 
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with a sufficient change in income to keep the consumer on the same utility 
isoquant.47  The income effect changes only income. 
 
 
Figure  5-10: Substitution Effect 
 
To graphically illustrate the substitution effect, consider Figure  5-10.  The starting 
point is the tangency between the isoquant and the budget line, denoted with a 
diamond shape and labeled “Initial Choice.”  The price of Y rises, pivoting the 
budget line inward.  The new budget line is illustrated with a heavy, dashed line.  
To find the substitution effect, increase income from the dashed line until the 
original isoquant is reached.  Increases in income shift the budget line out in a 
fashion parallel to the original.  We reach the original isoquant at a point labeled 
with a small circle, a point sometimes called the compensated demand, because 
we have compensated the consumer for the price increase by increasing income 
just enough to leave her unharmed, on the same isoquant.  The substitution 
effect is just the difference between these points – the substitution in response to 
the price change, holding constant the utility of the consumer. 
 
We can readily see that the substitution effect of a price increase in Y is to 
decrease the consumption of Y and increase the consumption of X.48  The 
income effect is the change in consumption resulting from the change in income.  
                                            
47 Some authors instead change the income enough to make the old bundle affordable.  This 
approach has the virtue of being readily computed, but the disadvantage that the substitution 
effect winds up increasing the utility of the consumer.  Overall the present approach is more 
economical for most purposes. 
48 To construct a formal proof, first show that if pY rises and y rises, holding utility constant, the 
initial choice prior to the price increase is feasible after the price increase.  Use this to conclude 
that after the price increase it is possible to have strictly more of both goods, contradicting the 
hypothesis that utility was held constant. 
x
y 
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The effect of any change in price can be decomposed into the substitution effect, 
which holds utility constant and changes the relative prices, and the income 
effect, which adjusts for the loss of purchasing power arising from the price 
increase. 
 
Example (Cobb-Douglas): Recall that the Cobb-Douglas utility comes in the form 
( ) αα −= 1, yxyxu .  Solving for x, y we obtain 
 
YX p
My
p
Mx )1(, αα −== , and ( ) .)1(, 11 αααα αα −−−=
YX pp
Myxu  
 
Thus, consider a multiplicative increase ∆ in pY, that is, multiplying pY by ∆>1.  In 
order to leave utility constant, M must rise by ∆1-α.  Thus, x rises by the factor ∆1-α 
and y falls, by the factor ∆-α < 1.  This is the substitution effect. 
 
What is the substitution effect of a small change in the price pY for any given 
utility function, not necessarily Cobb-Douglas?  To address this question, it is 
helpful to introduce some notation.  We will subscript the utility to mean the 
partial derivative with respect to the first argument, that is, 
 
y
uu
x
uu ∂
∂=∂
∂= 21 , . 
 
Note that, by the definition of the substitution effect, we are holding utility 
constant, so u(x, y) is being held constant.  This means, locally, that 
 
dyudxudu 210 +== .49 
 
In addition, we have ,ypxpM YX +=  so 
 
YYX ydpdypdxpdM ++=  
 
Finally, we have the optimality condition 
 
y
u
x
u
p
p
Y
X
∂∂
∂∂=  
 
                                            
49 Writing dx for an unknown infinitesimal change in x can be put on a formal basis.  The easiest 
way to do so is to think of dx as representing the derivative of x with respect to a parameter, 
which will be pY. 
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which is convenient to write as 12 upup YX = .  Differentiating this equation, and 
letting 2
2
22
2
122
2
11
)(
,
)( y
uuand
yx
uu
x
uu ∂
∂=∂∂
∂=∂
∂= , we have 
 
).()( 121112212 dyudxupdpudyudxup YYX ++=+  
 
For a given dpY, we now have three equations in three unknowns dx, dy, and dM.  
However, dM only appears in one of the three.  Thus, the effect of a price change 
on x and y can be solved by solving two equations:  
 
dyudxu 210 +=  and  
 
)()( 121112212 dyudxupdpudyudxup YYX ++=+  
 
for the two unknowns dx and dy.  This is straightforward and yields: 
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YYXX
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YYXX
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These equations imply that x rises and y falls.50  We immediately see 
 
Y
X
Y
Y
p
p
u
u
dp
dx
dp
dy
−=−=
2
1 . 
 
Thus, the change in (x,y) follows the budget line locally.  (This is purely a 
consequence of holding utility constant.) 
 
To complete the thought while we are embroiled in these derivatives, note that 
12 upup YX =  implies that 0=+ dypdxp YX . 
 
Thus, the amount of money necessary to compensate the consumer for the price 
increase, keeping utility constant, can be calculated from our third equation: 
 
                                            
50 This is a consequence of the fact that 02 22
2
1211
2 <++ upuppup YYXX , which follows 
from the already stated second order condition for a maximum of utility. 
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YYYX ydpydpdypdxpdM =++= . 
 
The amount of income necessary to insure the consumer makes no losses from 
a price increase in Y is the amount that lets them buy the bundle they originally 
purchased, that is, the increase in the amount of money is precisely the amount 
needed to cover the increased price of y.  This shows that locally there is no 
difference from a substitution effect that keeps utility constant (which is what we 
explored) and one that provides sufficient income to permit purchasing the 
previously purchased consumption bundle, at least when small changes in prices 
are contemplated. 
5.1.5 Income Effects 
Wealthy people buy more caviar than poor people.  Wealthier people buy more 
land, medical services, cars, telephones, and computers than poorer people, 
because they have more money to spend on goods and services, and overall, 
buy more of them.  But wealthier people also buy fewer of some goods, too.  
Rich people buy fewer cigarettes and processed cheese food.  You don’t see 
billionaires waiting in line at McDonald’s, and that probably isn’t because they 
have an assistant to wait for them.  For most goods, at a sufficiently high income, 
the purchase tends to trail off as income rises. 
 
When an increase in income causes a consumer to buy more of a good that 
good is called a normal good for that consumer.  When the consumer buys less, 
the good is called an inferior good, which is an example of sensible jargon that is 
rare in any discipline.  That is, an inferior good is any good whose quantity 
demanded falls as incomes rise.  At a sufficiently low income, almost all goods 
are normal goods, while at a sufficiently high income, most goods become 
inferior.  Even a Ferrari is an inferior good against some alternatives, such as 
Lear jets. 
 
The curve that shows the path of consumption as incomes rise is known as an 
Engel curve.51  An Engel curve graphs (x(M), y(M)) as M varies, where x(M) is 
the amount of X chosen with income M, and similarly y(M) is the amount of  is the 
amount of Y.  An example of an Engel curve is illustrated in Figure  5-11. 
 
                                            
51 The Engel curve is named for Ernst Engel (1821-1896), a statistician, not for Friedrich Engels, 
who wrote with Karl Marx. 
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Figure  5-11: Engel Curve 
 
Example (Cobb-Douglas): Since the equations 
YX p
My
p
Mx )1(, αα −==  define the 
optimal consumption, the Engel curve is a straight line through the origin with 
slope 
Y
X
p
p
α
α )1( − . 
 
5.1.5.1 (Exercise)  Show that, in the case of perfect complements, the Engel 
curve does not depend on prices. 
 
An inferior good has the quantity fall as incomes rise.  Note that, with two goods, 
at least one is normal good – they can’t both be inferior goods, for otherwise 
when income rose, less of both would be purchased.  An example of an inferior 
good is illustrated in Figure  5-12.  Here, as incomes rise, the consumption of x 
rises, reaches a maximum, then begins to decline.  In the declining portion, X is 
an inferior good. 
 
The definition of the substitution effect now permits us to decompose the effect of 
a price change into a substitution effect and an income effect.  This is illustrated 
in Figure  5-13. 
 
What is the mathematical form of the income effect?  This is actually more 
straightforward to compute than the substitution effect computed above.  As with 
the substitution effect, we differentiate the conditions ypxpM yx +=  and 
12 upup yx = , holding pX and pY constant, to obtain: 
 
x
y 
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dypdxpdM YX +=  and )()( 12112212 dyudxupdyudxup YX +=+ . 
 
 
Figure  5-12: Backward Bending – Inferior Good 
 
 
Figure  5-13: Income and Substitution Effects 
 
 
The second condition can also be written as 
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x
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McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 5-169
1222
1211
upup
upup
dx
dy
YX
XY
−
−= . 
 
This equation alone defines the slope of the Engel curve, without determining 
how large a change arises from a given change in M.  The two conditions 
together can be solved for the effects of M on X and Y.  The Engel curve is given 
by 
 
1222
22
2
1211
2 2
upup
upupup
dM
dx
YX
XXY
−
+−=  and 
1211
22
2
1211
2 2
upup
upupup
dM
dy
XY
XXY
−
+−= . 
 
Note (from the second order condition) that good Y is inferior if 
01211 >− upup XY , or if 0
2
12
1
11 >−
u
u
u
u , or 
2
1
u
u  is increasing in x.  Since 
2
1
u
u  is 
locally constant when M increases, equaling the price ratio, and an increase in y 
increases 
2
1
u
u  (thanks to the second order condition), the only way to keep 
2
1
u
u  
equal to the price ratio is for x to fall.  This property characterizes an inferior good 
– an increase in the quantity of the good increases the marginal rate of 
substitution of that good for another good. 
 
5.1.5.2 (Exercise) Compute the substitution effect and income effect 
associated with a multiplicative price increase ∆ in pY, that is, multiplying 
pY by ∆>1, for the case of Cobb-Douglas utility ( ) αα −= 1, yxyxu .  
5.2 Additional Considerations 
Let us revisit the maximization problem considered in this chapter.  The 
consumer can spend M on either or both of two goods.  This yields a payoff of 
.,)( ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
Y
X
p
xpMxuxh   When is this problem well behaved?  First, if h is a 
concave function of x, which implies 0)( ≤′′ xh ,52 then any solution to the first 
order condition is in fact a maximum.  To see this, note that 0)( ≤′′ xh  entails 
)(xh′  decreasing.  Moreover, if the point x* satisfies 0*)( =′ xh , then for x≤x*, 
0)( ≥′ xh , and for x≥x*, 0)( ≤′ xh , because )(xh′  gets smaller as x gets larger, 
and 0*)( =′ xh .  Now consider x≤x*.  Since 0)( ≥′ xh , h is increasing as x gets 
larger.  Similarly, for x≥x*, 0)( ≤′ xh , which means h gets smaller as x gets larger.  
Thus, h concave and 0*)( =′ xh  means that h is maximized at x*. 
                                            
52 The definition of concavity is that h is concave if 0<a<1 and for all x, y, h(ax+(1-a)y)≥ah(x)+ (1-
a)h(y).  It is reasonably straightforward to show this implies the second derivative of h is negative, 
and if h is twice differentiable, the converse is true as well. 
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Thus, a sufficient condition for the first order condition to characterize the 
maximum of utility is that 0)( ≤′′ xh , for all x, pX, pY, and M.  Letting 
Y
X
p
pz = , this 
is equivalent to 
02 22
2
1211 ≤++ uzzuu  for all z>0. 
 
In turn, we can see that this requires (i) u11≤0 (z=0) and (ii) u22≤0 (z →∞), and (iii) 
0122211 ≥−uuu  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ =
22
11
u
uz .  In addition, since 
 ( ) ( ) ( )122211222112221211 22 uuuzuzuuzzuu −+−−−=++− , 
 
(i), (ii) and (iii) are sufficient for 02 22
2
1211 ≤++ uzzuu . 
 
Therefore, if (i) u11≤0 and (ii) u22≤0, and (iii) 0122211 ≥−uuu ,  a solution to the 
first order conditions characterizes utility maximization for the consumer.  We will 
assume that these conditions are met for the remainder of this chapter. 
5.2.1  Corner Solutions 
When will a consumer specialize and consume zero of a good?  A necessary 
condition for the choice of x to be zero is that the consumer doesn’t benefit from 
consuming a very small x, that is, 0)0( ≤′h .  This means 
 
0,0,0)0( 21 ≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=′
Y
X
YY p
p
p
Mup
Muh , 
 
or 
 
Y
X
Y
Y
p
p
p
Mu
p
Mu
≤
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
,0
,0
2
1
. 
 
Moreover, if the concavity of h is met, as assumed above, then this condition is 
sufficient to guarantee that the solution is zero.  To see that, note that concavity 
of h implies h′  is decreasing.  Combined with 0)0( ≤′h , that entails h maximized 
at 0.  An important class of examples of this behavior are quasilinear utility.  
Quasilinear utility comes in the form u(x, y) = y + v(x), where v is a concave 
function ( 0)( ≤′′ xv  for all x). 
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5.2.1.1 (Exercise) Demonstrate that the quasilinear consumer will consume 
zero X if and only if 1)0( ≤′v , and that the consumer instead consumes 
zero Y if .1≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛′
Xp
Mv   The quasilinear utility isoquants, for 
3.0)03.0()( += xxv , are illustrated in Figure  5-14.  Note that even though 
the isoquants curve, they are nonetheless parallel to each other 
 
 
Figure  5-14: Quasilinear Isoquants 
 
The procedure for dealing with corners is generally this.  First, check concavity of 
the h function.  If h is concave, we have a procedure to solve the problem; when 
h is not concave, an alternative strategy must be devised.  There are known 
strategies for some cases that are beyond the scope of this text.  Given h 
concave, the next step is to check the endpoints, and verify that 0)0( >′h  (for 
otherwise x=0 maximizes the consumer’s utility) and that 0<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛′
Xp
Mh  (for 
otherwise y=0 maximizes the consumer’s utility).  Finally, at this point we seek 
the interior solution 0)( =′ xh .  With this procedure we can insure we find the 
actual maximum for the consumer, rather than a solution to the first order 
conditions that doesn’t maximize the consumer’s utility. 
5.2.2 Labor Supply 
Consider a taxi driver who owns a car or convenience store owner, or anyone 
else who can set his own hours.  Working has two effects on this consumer – 
more goods consumption, but less leisure consumption.  To model this, we let x 
be the goods consumption, L the amount of non-work time or leisure, and 
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working time T – L, where T is the amount of time available for activities of all 
kinds.  The variable L includes a lot of activities that aren’t necessarily fun, like 
trips to the dentist and haircuts and sleeping, but for which the consumer isn’t 
paid, and which represent choices.  One could argue that sleeping isn’t really a 
choice, in the sense that one can’t choose zero sleep, but this can be handled by 
adjusting T to represent “time available for chosen behavior” so that T – L is work 
time and L the chosen non-work activities.  We set L to be leisure rather than 
labor supply because it is leisure that is the good thing, whereas most of us view 
working as something we are willing to do provided we’re paid for it. 
 
Labor supply is different from other consumption because the wage enters the 
budget constraint twice – first as the price of leisure and second as income from 
working.  One way of expressing this is to write the consumer’s budget constraint 
as 
 
 px + wL = M + wT. 
 
Here, M represents non-work income, such as gifts, government transfers, and 
interest income.  We drop the subscript on the price of X, and use w as the wage.  
Finally, we use a capital L for leisure because a small el looks like the number 
one. The somewhat Dickensian idea is that the consumer’s maximal budget 
entails working the total available hours T, and any non-worked hours are 
purchased at the wage rate w.  Alternatively, one could express the budget 
constraint so as to reflect that expenditures on goods px equals the total money, 
which is the sum of non-work income M and work income w(T – L), or 
 
px = M + w(T – L). 
 
These two formulations of the budget constraint are mathematically equivalent. 
 
The strategy for solving the problem is also equivalent to the standard 
formulation, although there is some expositional clarity used by employing the 
budget constraint to eliminate x.  That is, we write the utility u(x,L) 
 
 .,)()( ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= L
p
LTwMuLh  
 
As before, we obtain the first order condition 
 
21*)(0 up
wuLh +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−=′=  
 
where the partial derivatives u1 and u2 are evaluated at ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+ *,*)( L
p
LTwM .  
Note that the first order condition is the same as the standard two-good theory 
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developed already.  This is because the effect so far is merely to require two 
components to income: M and wT, both of which are constant.  It is only when we 
evaluate the effect of a wage increase that we see a difference. 
 
To evaluate the effect of a wage increase, differentiate the first order condition to 
obtain 
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Since 02 2212
2
11 <+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ upwupwu  by the standard second order condition, 
 
 
0>
dw
dL  if, and only if, 012111 <−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+
p
LTu
p
LTu
p
w
p
u , that is, these 
expressions are equivalent to one another.  Simplifying the latter, we obtain 
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LT , or, 
 
)(1)( 1 LTLogLLT
uLog
L
−∂
∂−=−>∂
∂ , or, 
 
0)()( 1 >−∂
∂+∂
∂ LTLog
L
uLog
L
, or, 
 
( ) 0)(1 >−∂
∂ LTuLog
L
. 
 
Since the logarithm is increasing, this is equivalent to )(1 LTu −  being an 
increasing function of L.  That is, L rises with an increase in wages, and hours 
worked falls, if the marginal utility of goods times the hours worked is an 
increasing function of L, holding constant everything else, but evaluated at the 
optimal values.  The value u1 is the marginal value of an additional good, while 
the value T-L is the hours worked.  Thus, in particular, if goods and leisure are 
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substitutes, so that an increase in L decreases the marginal value of goods, then 
an increase in the wage must decrease leisure, and labor supply increases in the 
wage.  The case where the goods are complements holds a hope for a 
decreasing labor supply, so we consider first the extreme case of complements. 
 
Example (perfect complements): u(x, L)= Min {x, L} 
 
In this case, the consumer will make consumption and leisure equal to maximize 
the utility, so 
 
**)( L
p
LTwM =−+  
 
or 
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p
wTM
L +
+=
+
+
=  
 
Thus, L is increasing in the wage if pT>M, that is, if M is sufficiently small that 
one can’t buy all one’s needs and not work at all.  (This is the only reasonable 
case for this utility function.)  With strong complements between goods and 
leisure, an increase in the wage induces fewer hours worked. 
 
Example (Cobb-Douglas): .)()( 1 α
α −⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= L
p
LTwMLh  
 
The first order condition gives 
 
αααα αα −−
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or ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−= T
w
ML )1( α  
 
If M is high enough, the consumer doesn’t work but takes L=T; otherwise, the 
equation gives the leisure, and labor supply is given by 
 ( ){ }wMTMaxLT )1(,0 αα −−=−  
 
Labor supply increases with the wage, no matter how high the wage goes. 
 
5.2.2.1 (Exercise) Show that an increase in the wage increases the 
consumption of goods, that is, x increases when the wage increases. 
 
The wage affects not just the price of leisure, but also the income level; this 
makes it possible that the income effect of a wage increase dominates the 
substitution effect.  Moreover, we saw that this is more likely when the 
consumption of goods takes time, that is, the goods and leisure are 
complements. 
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Figure  5-15: Hours per Week 
 
As a practical matter, for most developed nations, increases in wages are 
associated with fewer hours worked.  The average workweek prior to 1950 was 
55 hours, which fell to 40 hours by the mid-1950s.  The workweek has gradually 
declined since then, as Figure  5-15 illustrates. 
 
Thought Question: Does a bequest motive – the desire to give money to others – 
change the likelihood that goods and leisure are complements? 
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5.2.3 Compensating Differentials 
A number of physicists have changed careers, to become researchers in finance 
or financial economics.  Research in finance pays substantially better than 
research in physics, and yet requires many of the same mathematical skills like 
stochastic calculus.  Physicists who see their former colleagues driving Porsches 
and buying summer houses are understandably annoyed that finance research – 
which is intellectually no more difficult or challenging than physics – pays so 
much better.  Indeed, some physicists say that other fields – finance, economics, 
and law – “shouldn’t” pay more than physics. 
 
The difference in income between physics researchers and finance researchers 
is an example of a compensating differential.  A compensating differential is 
income or costs that equalize different choices.  There are individuals who could 
become either physicists or finance researchers.  At equal income, too many 
choose physics and too few choose finance, in the sense that there is a surplus 
of physicists, and a shortage of finance researchers.  Finance salaries must 
exceed physics salaries in order to induce some of the researchers capable of 
doing either one to switch to finance, which compensates those individuals for 
doing the less desirable task. 
 
Jobs that are dangerous or unpleasant must pay more than jobs requiring similar 
skills but without the bad attributes.  Thus, oil field workers in Alaska’s North 
Slope, well above the Arctic Circle, earn a premium over workers in similar jobs 
in Houston, Texas.  The premium – or differential pay – must be such that the 
marginal worker is indifferent between the two choices – the extra pay 
compensates the worker for the adverse working conditions.  This is why it is 
known in economics jargon by the phrase of a compensating differential. 
 
The high salaries earned by professional basketball players are not 
compensating differentials.  These salaries are not created by a need to induce 
tall people to choose basketball over alternative jobs like painting ceilings, but 
instead are payments that reflect the rarity of the skills and abilities involved.  
Compensating differentials are determined by alternatives, not by direct scarcity.  
Professional basketball players are well-paid for the same reason that Picasso’s 
paintings are expensive: there aren’t very many of them relative to demand. 
 
A compensating differential is a feature of other choices as well as career 
choices.  For example, many people would like to live in California, for its 
weather and scenic beauty.  Given the desirability of California over, say, Lincoln, 
Nebraska or Rochester, New York, there must be a compensating differential for 
living in Rochester, and two significant ones are air quality and housing prices.  
Air quality worsens as populations rise, thus tending to create a compensating 
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differential.  In addition, the increase in housing prices also tends to compensate 
– housing is inexpensive in Rochester, at least compared to California.53 
 
Housing prices also compensate for location within a city.  For most people, it is 
more convenient – both in commuting time and for services – to be located near 
the central business district than in the outlying suburbs.  The main 
compensating differentials are school quality, crime rates, and housing prices.  
We can illustrate the ideas with a simple model of a city. 
5.2.4 Urban Real Estate Prices 
An important point to understand is that the good in limited supply in cities is not 
physical structures like houses, but the land on which the houses sit.  The cost of 
building a house in Los Angeles is quite similar to the cost of building a house in 
Rochester, New York.  The big difference is the price of land.  A $1 million house 
in Los Angeles might be a $400,000 house sitting on a $600,000 parcel of land.  
The same house in Rochester might be $500,000 – a $400,000 house on a 
$100,000 parcel of land. 
 
Usually, land is what fluctuates in value, rather than the price of the house that 
sits on the land.  When the newspaper reports that house prices rose, in fact 
what rose was land prices, for the price of housing has changed only at a slow 
pace, reflecting increased wages of house builders and changes in the price of 
lumber and other inputs.  These do change, but historically the changes have 
been small compared to the price of land. 
 
We can construct a simple model of a city to illustrate the determination of land 
prices.  Suppose the city is constructed in a flat plane.  People work at the origin 
(0,0).  This simplifying assumption is intended to capture the fact that a relatively 
small, central portion of most cities involves business, with a large area given 
over to housing.  The assumption is extreme, but not unreasonable as a 
description of some cities.   
 
Suppose commuting times are proportional to distance from the origin.  Let c(t) 
be the cost to the person of a commute of time t, and let the time taken be t = λr, 
where r is the distance.  The function c should reflect both the transportation 
costs and the value of time lost.  The parameter λ accounts for the inverse of the 
speed in commuting, with a higher λ indicating slower commuting.  In addition, 
we assume that people occupy a constant amount of land.  This assumption is 
clearly wrong empirically, and we will consider making house size a choice 
variable later. 
 
                                            
53 There are other compensations besides housing to living in Rochester – cross-country skiing, 
proximity to mountains and lakes.  Generally employment is only a temporary factor that might 
compensate, because employment tends to be mobile, too, and move to the location the workers 
prefer, when that is possible.  It is not possible on Alaska’s North Slope. 
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A person choosing a house priced at p(r) at distance r thus pays c(λr) + p(r) for 
the combination of housing and transportation.  People will choose the lowest 
cost alternative.  If people have identical preferences about housing and 
commuting, then house prices p will depend on distance, and will be determined 
by c(λr) + p(r) equal to a constant, so that people are indifferent to the distance 
from the city center – decreased commute time is exactly compensated by 
increased house prices. 
 
The remaining piece of the model is to figure out the constant.  To do this, we 
need to figure out the area of the city.  If the total population is N, and people 
occupy an area of one per person, the city size rmax satisfies 2maxrN π= , and 
thus  
 
π
Nr =max  
 
At the edge of the city, the value of land is given by some other use, like 
agriculture.  From the perspective of the determinant of the city’s prices, this 
value is approximately constant.  As the city takes more land, the change in 
agricultural land is a very small portion of the total land used for agriculture.  Let 
the value of agricultural land be v per housing unit size.  Then the price of 
housing p(rmax) = v, because that is the value of land at the edge of the city.  This 
lets us compute the price of all housing in the city: 
 
  c   )c( )p(  )c(p(r)  )c( maxmaxmax v
Nvrrrr +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=+=+=+ πλλλλ  
or 
 )c(-  cp(r) rvN λπλ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= . 
 
This equation produces housing prices like those illustrated in Figure  5-16, where 
the peak is the city center.  The height of the figure indicates the price of housing. 
 
 
Figure  5-16: House Price Gradient 
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It is straightforward to verify that house prices increase in the population N and 
the commuting time parameter λ, as one would expect.  To quantify the 
predictions, we consider a city with a population of 1,000,000, a population 
density of 10,000 per square mile, and an agricultural use value of $6 million per 
square mile.  To translate these assumptions into the model’s structure, first note 
that a population density of 10,000 per square mile creates a fictitious “unit of 
measure” of about 52.8 feet, which we’ll call a purlong, so that there is one 
person per square purlong (2788 square feet).  Then the agricultural value of a 
property is v = $600 per square purlong.  Note that this density requires a city of 
radius rmax equal to 564 purlongs, which is 5.64 miles. 
 
The only remaining structure to identify in the model is the commuting cost c.  To 
simplify the calculations, let c be linear.  Suppose that the daily cost of 
commuting is $2 per mile (roundtrip), so that the present value of daily 
commuting costs in perpetuity is about $10,000 per mile.54  This translates into a 
cost of commuting of $100.00 per purlong.  Thus, we obtain 
 
600$100$ )c(-  cp(r) +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= rNrvN πλπλ r100$000,57$ −= . 
 
Thus, the same 2788 square foot property at the city edge sells for $600, versus 
$57,000 less than six miles away at the city center.  With reasonable parameters, 
this model readily creates dramatic differences in land prices, based purely on 
commuting time. 
 
As constructed, a quadrupling of population approximately doubles the price of 
land in the central city.  This probably understates the change, since a doubling 
of the population would likely increase road congestion, increasing λ and further 
increasing the price of central city real estate. 
 
As presented, the model contains three major unrealistic assumptions.  First, 
everyone lives in an identically-sized piece of land.  In fact, however, the amount 
of land used tends to fall as prices rise.  At $53 per square foot, most of us buy a 
lot less land than at twenty cents per square foot.  As a practical matter, the 
reduction of land per capita is accomplished both through smaller housing units 
and through taller buildings, which produce more housing floor space per acre of 
land.  Second, people have distinct preferences, and the disutility of commuting, 
as well as the value of increased space, vary with the individual.  Third, 
congestion levels are generally endogenous – the more people that live between 
                                            
54 Figure 250 working days per year, for an annual cost of about $500 per mile, yielding a present 
value at 5% interest of $10,000.  See Section  4.3.1.  With a time value of $25 per hour, and an 
average speed of 40 mph (1.5 minutes per mile), the time cost is 62.5 cents per minute.  
Automobile costs (gas, car depreciation, insurance) are about 35-40 cents per mile.  Thus the 
total is around $1 per mile, which doubles with roundtrips. 
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two points, the greater the traffic density and consequently the lower the level of 
λ.  The first two problems arise because of the simplistic nature of consumer 
preferences embedded in the model, while the third is an equilibrium issue 
requiring consideration of transportation choices. 
 
This model can readily be extended to incorporate different types of people, 
different housing sizes, and endogenous congestion.  To illustrate such 
generalizations, consider making the housing size endogenous.  Suppose 
preferences are represented by the utility function: 
 
HrprHu )(−−= λα , 
 
where H is the house size that the person chooses, and r is the distance they 
choose.  This adaptation of the model reflects two issues.  First, the transport 
cost has been set to be linear in distance, for simplicity.  Second, the marginal 
value of housing decreases in the house size, but the value of housing doesn’t 
depend on distance from the center.  For these preferences to make sense, α<1 
(otherwise either zero or an infinite house size emerges).  A person with these 
preferences optimally would choose a house size of 
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A valuable attribute of the form of the equation for p is that the general form 
depends on the equilibrium values only through the single number u*.  This 
functional form produces the same qualitative shapes as in Figure  5-16.  Using 
the form, we can solve for the housing size H. 
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r  people.  Thus, the 
number of people within rmax of the city center is 
 
. 
 
This equation, when combined with the value of land on the periphery: 
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jointly determine rmax and u*. 
 
5.2.4.1 (Exercise) For the case of α= ½, solve for the equilibrium values of u* 
and rmax. 
 
When different people have different preferences, the people with the highest 
disutility of commuting will tend to live closer to the city center.  These tend to be 
people with the highest wages, since one of the costs of commuting is time that 
could have been spent working. 
5.2.5 Dynamic Choice 
The consumption of goods doesn’t take place in a single instance, but over time.  
How does time enter into choice?  We’re going to simplify the problem a bit, and 
focus only on consumption and set aside working for the time being.  Let x1 be 
consumption in the first period, x2 in the second period.  Suppose the value of 
consumption is the same in each period, so that 
 
u(x1, x2) = v(x1) + δv(x2), 
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where δ is called the rate of “pure” time preference.  The consumer is expected 
to have income M1 in the first period and M2 in the second.  There is a market for 
loaning and borrowing, which we assume has a common interest rate r. 
 
The consumer’s budget constraint, then, can be written 
 
(1+r)(M1 – x1) = x2 – M2. 
 
This equation says that the net savings in period 1, plus the interest on the net 
savings in period 1 equals the net expenditure in period 2.  This is because 
whatever is saved in period 1 earns interest and can then be spent in period 2; 
alternatively, whatever is borrowed in period 1 must be paid back with interest in 
period 2.  Rewriting the constraint: 
 
(1+r)x1 + x2 = (1+r)M1 + M2. 
 
This equation is known as the intertemporal budget constraint.  It has two 
immediate consequences.  First, 1+r is the price of period 2 consumption in 
terms of period 1 consumption.  Thus, the interest rate gives the relative prices.  
Second, the relevant income is “permanent income” rather than “current income.”  
That is, a change in incomes that leaves the present value of income the same 
should have no effect on the choice of consumption. 
 
Once again, as with the labor supply, a change in the interest rate affects not just 
the price of consumption, but also the budget for consumption.  Put another way, 
an increase in the interest rate represents an increase in budget for net savers, 
but a decrease in budget for net borrowers. 
 
As always, we rewrite the optimization problem to eliminate one of the variables, 
to obtain 
 ( )2111 ))(1()( MxMrvxvu +−++= δ  
 
Thus the first order conditions yield 
 ( )21 )1()(0 xvrxv ′+−′= δ  
 
This condition says that the marginal value of consumption in period 1, )( 1xv ′ , 
equals the marginal value of consumption in period 2, ( )2xv ′δ , times the interest 
factor.  That is, the marginal present values are equated.  Note that the 
consumer’s private time preference, δ, need not be related to the interest rate.  If 
the consumer values period 1 consumption more than does the market, so δ(1+r) 
< 1, then ( )21)( xvxv ′<′ , that is, the consumer consumes more in period 1 than 
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in period 2.55  Similarly, if the consumer’s discount of future consumption is 
exactly equal to the market discount, δ(1+r) = 1, the consumer will consume the 
same amount in both periods.  Finally, if the consumer values period 1 
consumption less than the market, δ(1+r) > 1, the consumer will consume more 
in period 2.  In this case, the consumer is more patient than the market. 
 
Whether the consumer is a net lender or borrower depends not just on the 
preference for earlier versus later consumption, but also on incomes.  This is 
illustrated in Figure  5-17.  In this figure, the consumer’s income mostly comes in 
the second period.  As a consequence, the consumer borrows in the first period, 
and repays in the second period. 
 
 
 
Figure  5-17: Borrowing and Lending 
The effect of an interest rate increase is to pivot the budget constraint around the 
point (M1,M2).  Note that this point is always feasible – that is, it is feasible to 
consume one’s own endowment.  The effect of an increase in the interest rate is 
going to depend on whether the consumer is a borrower or a lender.  As Figure 
 5-18 illustrates, the net borrower borrows less in the first period – the price of first 
period consumption has risen and the borrower’s wealth has fallen.  It is not clear 
whether the borrower consumes less in the second period because the price of 
second period consumption has fallen even though wealth has fallen, too, two 
conflicting effects. 
 
                                            
55 As usual, we are assuming that utility is concave, which in this instance means the second 
derivative of v is negative, which means the derivative of v is decreasing.  In addition, to insure an 
interior solution, it is useful to require the Inada conditions: ( ) 0,)0( =∞′∞=′ vv . 
x1
x2 
(M1,M2) 
Period 1 
Borrowing
Repayment 
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An increase in interest rates is a benefit to a net lender.  The lender has more 
income, and the price of period 2 consumption has fallen.  Thus the lender must 
consume more in the second period, but only consumes more in the first period 
(lends less) if the income effect outweighs the substitution effect.  This is 
illustrated in Figure  5-19. 
 
 
Figure  5-18: Interest Rate Change 
 
The government from time to time will rebate a portion of taxes to “stimulate” the 
economy.  An important aspect of the effects of such a tax rebate is the effect to 
which consumers will spend the rebate, versus savings the rebate, because the 
stimulative effects of spending are thought to be larger than the stimulative 
effects of savings.56  The theory suggests how people will react to a “one-time” or 
transitory tax rebate, compared to a permanent lowering of taxes.  In particular, 
the budget constraint for the consumer spreads lifetime income over the lifetime.  
Thus, for an average consumer that might spend a present value of $750,000 
over a lifetime, a $1,000 rebate is small potatoes.  On the other hand, a 
$1,000/year reduction is worth $20,000 or so over the lifetime, which should have 
twenty times the effect of the transitory change on the current expenditure. 
 
Tax rebates are not the only way we receive one-time payments.  Money can be 
found, or lost, and we can have unexpected costs or windfall gifts.  From an 
intertemporal budget constraint perspective, these transitory effects have little 
                                            
56 This belief shouldn’t be accepted as necessarily true; it was based on a model that has since 
been widely rejected by the majority of economists.  The general idea is that spending creates 
demand for goods, thus encouraging business investment in production.  However, savings 
encourage investment by producing loanable funds, so it isn’t at all obvious whether spending or 
savings have a larger effect. 
x1
x2 
(M1,M2) 
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significance, and thus the theory suggests people shouldn’t spend much of a 
windfall gain in the current year, nor cut back significantly when they have a 
moderately-sized unexpected cost. 
 
 
Figure  5-19: Interest Rate Increase on Lenders 
As a practical matter, most individuals can’t borrow at the same rate at which 
they lend.  Many students borrow on credit cards at very high interest rates, and 
obtain a fraction of that in interest on savings.  That is to say, borrowers and 
lenders face different interest rates.  This situation is readily explored with a 
diagram like Figure  5-20.  The cost of a first period loan is a relatively high loss of 
x2, and similarly the value of first period savings is a much more modest increase 
in second period consumption.  Such effects tend to favor “neither a borrower nor 
a lender be,” as Shakespeare recommends, although it is still possible for the 
consumer to optimally borrow in the first period (e.g. if M1=0) or in the second 
period (if M2 is small relative to M1). 
(M1,M2)
x1
x2 
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Figure  5-20: Different Rates for Borrowing and Lending 
 
 
Differences in interest rates causes transitory changes in income to have much 
larger effects than the intertemporal budget constraint would suggest, and may 
go a long way to explaining why people don’t save much of a windfall gain, and 
suffer a lot temporarily, rather than a little for a long time, when they have 
unexpected expenses.  This is illustrated in Figure  5-21. 
 
 
Figure  5-21: The Effect of a Transitory Income Increase 
x1
x2 
(M1,M2) 
x1
x2 
(M1,M2) 
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5.2.6 Risk 
There are many risks in life, even if one doesn’t add to these risks by intentionally 
buying lottery tickets.  Gasoline prices go up and down, the demand for people 
trained in your major fluctuates, house prices change.  How do people value 
gambles?  The starting point for the investigation is the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function.  The idea of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function for a given person is that for each possible outcome x, there is a value 
v(x) assigned by the person, and the average value of v is the value the person 
assigns to the risky outcome.  This is a “state of the world” approach, in the 
sense that each of the outcomes is associated with a state of the world, and the 
person maximizes the expected value of the various possible states of the world.  
Value here doesn’t mean a money value, but a psychic value or utility. 
 
To illustrate the assumption, consider equal probabilities of winning $100 and 
winning $200.  The expected outcome of this gamble is $150 – the average of 
$100 and $200.  However, the expected value of the outcome could be anything 
between the value of $100 and the value of $200.  The von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility is ½v($100) + ½v($200). 
 
The von Neumann-Morgenstern formulation has certain advantages, including 
the logic that what matters is the average value of the outcome.  On the other 
hand, in many tests, people behave in ways not consistent with the theory.57  
Nevertheless, the von Neumann approach is the prevailing model of behavior 
under risk. 
 
To introduce the theory, we will consider only money outcomes, and mostly the 
case of two money outcomes.  The person has a Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function v of these outcomes.  If the possible outcomes are x1, x2, … , xn and 
these occur with probability π1, π2, … , πn respectively, the consumer’s utility is 
 
∑
=
=+++=
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iinn xvxvxvxvu
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2211 )()(...)()( ππππ  
 
This is the meaning of “having a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function” – 
that utility can be written in this weighted sum form. 
 
The first insight that flows from this definition is that a individual dislikes risk if v is 
concave.  To see this, note that the definition of concavity posits that v is 
concave if, for all π in [0,1], and all values x1 and x2,  
 
                                            
57 For example, people tend to react more strongly to very unlikely events than is consistent with 
the theory. 
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For smoothly differentiable functions, concavity is equivalent to a second 
derivative that is not positive.  Using induction, the definition of concavity can be 
generalized to show: 
 
)(...)()()...( 22112211 nnnn xvxvxvxxxv ππππππ +++≥+++  
 
That is, a consumer with concave value function prefers the average outcome to 
the random outcome.  This is illustrated in Figure  5-22.  There are two possible 
outcomes, x1 and x2.  The value x1 occurs with probability π and x2 with 
probability 1-π.  This means the average or expected outcome is πx1+(1-π)x2.  
The value v(πx1+(1-π)x2) is the value at the expected outcome πx1+(1-π)x2, while 
πv(x1)+(1-π)v(x2) is the average of the value of the outcome.  As is plainly visible 
in the picture, concavity makes the average outcome preferable to the random 
outcome.  People with concave von Neumann-Morganstern utility functions are 
known as risk averse people. 
 
 
Figure  5-22: Expected Utility and Certainty Equivalents 
A useful concept is the certainty equivalent of a gamble.  The certainty equivalent 
is an amount of money that provides equal utility to the random payoff of the 
gamble.  The certainty equivalent is labeled CE in the diagram.  Note that CE is 
less than the average outcome, if the person is risk averse.  This is because risk 
averse individuals prefer the average outcome to the risky outcome. 
 
x 
x1 x2πx1+(1-π)x2
v(πx1+(1-π)x2) 
πv(x1)+(1-π)v(x2) 
v
CE 
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The risk premium is defined to be the difference between the expected payoff 
and the certainty equivalent.  This is the cost of risk – it is the amount of money 
an individual would be willing to pay to avoid risk.  This means as well that the 
risk premium is the value of insurance.  How does the risk premium of a given 
gamble change when the base wealth is increased?  It can be shown that the risk 
premium falls as wealth increases for any gamble if, and only if,58 
 
 
)(
)(
xv
xv
′
′′−  is decreasing. 
 
The measure 
)(
)()(
xv
xvx ′
′′−=ρ  is known as the Arrow-Pratt59 measure of risk 
aversion, and also as the measure of absolute risk aversion.  To get an idea why 
this measure matters, consider a quadratic approximation to v. Let µ be the 
expected value and σ2 be the expected value of (x – µ)2.  Then we can 
approximate v(CE) two different ways. 
 
}))((½))(()({)}({)())(()( 2µµµµµµµµ −′′+−′+≈=≈−′+ xvxvvExvECEvCEvv , 
 
thus 
 
}))((½))(()({))(()( 2µµµµµµµµ −′′+−′+≈−′+ xvxvvECEvv . 
 
Canceling v(µ) from both sides and noting that the average value of x is µ, so 
E(x–µ)=0, we have  
 
2)(½))(( σµµµ vCEv ′′≈−′ . 
 
Then, dividing by )(xv ′ , 
 
22 )(½
)(
)(½ σµρσµ
µµ =′
′′−≈−
v
vCE . 
 
That is, the risk premium, the difference between the average outcome and the 
certainty equivalent, is approximately equal to the Arrow-Pratt measure, times 
half the variance, at least when the variance is small. 
 
5.2.6.1 (Exercise) Use a quadratic approximation on both sides to sharpen the 
estimate of the risk premium.  First, note 
 
                                            
58 R. Preston McAfee and Daniel Vincent, The Price Decline Anomaly, Journal of Economic 
Theory 60, June, 1993, 191-212. 
59 The measure was named after its discoverers Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow and John Pratt. 
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Conclude that ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+≈− 111 22σρρµ CE .  This approximation is exact to the 
second order. 
 
The translation of risk into dollars, by way of a risk premium, can be assessed 
even for large gambles if we are willing to make some technical assumptions.  
Suppose the utility has constant absolute risk aversion or CARA, that is 
)(
)(
xv
xv
′
′′−=ρ  is a constant.  This turns out to imply, after setting the utility of zero 
to zero, that 
 
).1(1)( xexv ρρ
−−=  
 
(This formulation is derived by setting v(0)=0 handling the case of ρ=0 with 
appropriate limits.)  Now also assume that the gamble x is normally distributed 
with mean µ and variance σ2.  Then the expected value of v(x) is 
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It is an immediate result from this formula that the certainty equivalent, with 
CARA preferences and normal risks, is 2
2
σρµ − .  Hence the risk premium of a 
normal distribution for a CARA individual is 2
2
σρ .  This formulation will appear 
when we consider agency theory and the challenges of motivating a risk averse 
employee when outcomes have a substantial random component. 
 
An important aspect of CARA with normally distributed risks is that the 
preferences of the consumer are linear in the mean of the gamble and the 
variance.   In fact, given a choice of gambles, the consumer selects the one with 
the highest value of 2
2
σρµ − .  Such preferences are often called “mean variance 
preferences,” and they comprise the foundation of modern finance theory. 
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5.2.6.2 (Exercise) Suppose u(x) = x0.95 for a consumer with a wealth level of 
$50,000.  Consider a gamble with equal probability of winning $100 and 
losing $100 and compute the risk premium associated with the gamble. 
 
5.2.6.3 (Exercise) Suppose u(x) = x0.99 for a consumer with a wealth level of 
$100,000.  A lottery ticket costs $1 and pays $5,000,000 with the 
probability 
000,000,10
1 .  Compute the certainty equivalent of the lottery 
ticket. 
 
5.2.6.4 (Exercise) The return on U.S. government treasury investments is 
approximately 3%.  Thus, a $1 investment returns $1.03 after one year.  
Treat this return as risk-free.  The stock market (S&P 500) returns 7% on 
average and has a variance that is around 16% (the variance of return 
on a $1 investment is $0.16).  Compute the value of ρ for a CARA 
individual.  What is the risk premium associated equal probabilities of a 
$100 gain or loss given the value of ρ? 
 
5.2.7 Search 
In most communities, every Wednesday grocery stores advertise sale prices in a 
newspaper insert, and these prices vary from week to week.  Prices can vary a 
lot from week to week and from store to store.  The price of gasoline varies as 
much as fifteen cents per gallon in a one mile radius.  Decide you want a specific 
Sony television, and you may see distinct prices at Best Buy, Circuit City, and 
other electronics retailers.  For many goods and services, there is substantial 
variation in prices, which implies that there are gains for buyers to search for the 
best price. 
 
The theory of consumer search behavior is just a little bit arcane, but the basic 
insight will be intuitive enough.  The general idea is that, from the perspective of 
a buyer, the price that is offered is random, and has a probability density function 
f(p).  If a consumer faces a cost of search (e.g. if you have to visit a store, in 
person, telephonically or virtually, the cost includes your time and any other costs 
necessary to obtain a price quote), the consumer will set a reservation price, 
which is a maximum price they will pay without visiting another store.  That is, if a 
store offers a price below p*, the consumer will buy, and otherwise they will visit 
another store, hoping for a better price. 
 
Call the reservation price p* and suppose that the cost of search is c.  Let J(p*) 
represent the expected total cost of purchase (including search costs).  Then J 
must equal 
 
 ∫∫ ∞ ++= **0 )()*)(()(*)( pp dppfcpJdpppfpJ  
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This equation arises because the current draw could either result in a price less 
than p*, in which case observed price, with density f, will determine the price paid 
J, or the price will be too high, in which case the consumer is going to take 
another draw, at cost c, and on average get the average price J(p*).  It is useful 
to introduce the cumulative distribution function F, with ∫= x dppfxF 0 )()( .  Note 
that something has to happen, so F(∞)=1. 
 
We can solve the equality for J(p*), 
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*)(
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This expression has a simple interpretation.  The expected price J(p*) is 
composed of two terms.  The first is the expected price, which is ∫ *0 *)( )(p dppF pfp .  
This has the interpretation of the average price conditional on that price being 
less than p*.  This is because 
*)(
)(
pF
pf  is in fact the density of the random variable 
which is the price given that the price is less than p*.  The second term is 
*)(pF
c .  
This is the expected search costs, and it arises because 
*)(
1
pF
 is the expected 
number of searches.  This arises because the odds of getting a price low enough 
to be acceptable is F(p*).  There is a general statistical property underlying the 
number of searches.  Consider a basketball player who successfully shoots a 
free throw with probability y.  How many throws on average must he throw to sink 
one basket?  The answer is 1/y.  To see this, note that the probability that exactly 
n throws are required is (1-y)n-1 y.  This is because n are required means n-1 
must fail (probability (1-y)n-1) and then the remaining one go in, with probability y.  
Thus, the expected number of throws is 
 
 …++++ yy)-(1 4 y y)-3(1 y)y -2(1 y 32  
 
 = )y)-(1 4  y)-3(1  y)-2(1  y(1 32 …++++  
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McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 5-193
 +
...) y)-(1  y)-(1  (1)1()y)-(1   y)-(1  y)-(1  (1)1( 23322 +…+++−+…++++− yy  
 
 = .1...1)1(1)1(1)1(1y 32
yy
y
y
y
y
y
y
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+−+−+  
 
Our problem has the same logic, where a successful basketball throw 
corresponds to finding a price less than p*. 
 
The expected total cost of purchase, given a reservation price p* is given by 
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But what value of p* minimizes cost?  Let’s start by differentiating: 
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Thus, if p*<J(p*), J is decreasing, and it lowers cost to increase p*.  Similarly, if 
p*>J(p*), J is increasing in p*, and it reduces cost to decrease p*.  Thus, 
minimization occurs at a point where p*=J(p*). 
 
Moreover, there is only one such solution to the equation p*=J(p*) in the range 
where f is positive.  To see this, note that at any solution to the equation p*=J(p*), 
0*)( =′ pJ  and 
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This means that J takes a minimum at this value, since its first derivative is zero 
and its second derivative is positive, and that is true about any solution to 
p*=J(p*).  Were there to be two such solutions, J ′  would have to be both positive 
and negative on the interval between them, since J is increasing to the right of 
the first (lower) one, and decreasing to the left of the second (higher) one.  
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Consequently, the equation p*=J(p*) has a unique solution that minimizes the 
cost of purchase. 
 
Consumer search to minimize cost dictates setting a reservation price equal to 
the expected total cost of purchasing the good, and purchasing whenever the 
price offered is lower than that level.  That is, it is not sensible to “hold out” for a 
price lower than what you expect to pay on average, although this might be well 
useful in a bargaining context rather than in a store searching context. 
 
Example (Uniform): Suppose prices are uniformly distributed on the interval [a,b].  
For p* in this interval, 
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Thus, the first order condition for minimizing cost is 
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)(½*)(0
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There are a couple of interesting observations about this solution.  First, not 
surprisingly, as c→0, p*→a, that is, as the search costs go to zero, one holds out 
for the lowest possible price.  This is sensible in the context of the model, but in 
the real search situations delay may also have a cost that isn’t modeled here.  
Second, p* < b, the maximum price, if 2c<(b – a).  Put another way, if the most 
you can save by a search is twice the search cost, don’t search, because the 
expected gains from search will be half the maximum gains (thanks to the 
uniform distribution) and the search unprofitable. 
 
The third observation, which is much more general than the specific uniform 
example, is that the expected price is a concave function of the cost of search 
(second derivative negative).  That is in fact true for any distribution.  To see this, 
define a function 
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Since 0*)( =′ pJ , 
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It then needs only a modest effort to show p* is increasing in c, from which it 
follows that H is concave.  This means that the effects of an increase in c are 
passed on at a decreasing rate.  Moreover, it means that a consumer should 
rationally be risk averse about the cost of search. 
 
5.2.7.1 (Exercise) Suppose that there are two possible prices, 1 and 2, and that 
the probability of the lower price 1 is x.  Compute the consumer’s 
reservation price, which is the expected cost of searching, as a function 
of x and the cost of search c.  For what values of x and c should the 
consumer accept 2 on the first search, or continue searching until the 
lower price 1 is found? 
5.2.8 Edgeworth Box 
The Edgeworth60 box considers a two person, two good “exchange economy.”  
That is, two people have utility functions of two goods and endowments (initial 
allocations) of the two goods.  The Edgeworth box is a graphical representation 
of the exchange problem facing these people, and also permits a straightforward 
solution to their exchange problem. 
 
The Edgeworth box is represented in Figure  5-23.  Person 1 is “located” in the 
lower left (southwest) corner, and person 2 in the upper right (northeast).  The X 
good is given on the horizontal axis, the Y good on the vertical.  The distance 
between them is the total amount of the good they have between them.  A point 
in the box gives the allocation of the good – the distance to the lower left to 
person 1, remainder to person 2.  Thus, for the point illustrated, person 1 obtains 
(x1, y1), and person 2 obtains (x2, y2).  The total amount of each good available to 
the two people will be fixed. 
 
 
                                            
60 Francis Edgeworth, 1845-1926, introduced a variety of mathematical tools including calculus 
for considering economics and political issues, and was certainly among the first to use advanced 
mathematics for studying ethical problems. 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 5-196
 
Figure  5-23: The Edgeworth Box 
 
What points are efficient?  The economic notion of efficiency is that an allocation 
is efficient if it is impossible to make one person better off without harming the 
other, that is, the only way to improve 1’s utility is to harm 2, and vice versa.  
Otherwise, if the consumption is inefficient, there is a re-arrangement that makes 
both parties better off, and the parties should prefer such a point.  Now, there is 
no sense of fairness embedded in the notion, and there is an efficient point in 
which one person gets everything and the other nothing.  That might be very 
unfair, but it could still be the case that improving 2 must necessarily harm 1.  
The allocation is efficient if there is no waste or slack in the system, even if it is 
wildly unfair.  To distinguish this economic notion, it is sometimes called Pareto 
Efficiency.61 
 
We can find the Pareto-efficient points by fixing person 1’s utility and then asking 
what point, on the indifference isoquant of person 1, maximizes person 2’s utility?  
At that point, any increase in person 2 utility must come at the expense of person 
1, and vice versa, that is, the point is Pareto-efficient.  An example is illustrated in 
Figure  5-24. 
 
                                            
61 Vilfredo Pareto, 1848-1923, was a pioneer in replacing concepts of utility with abstract 
preferences, which was later adopted by the economics profession and remains the modern 
approach. 
1 
2 
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Figure  5-24: An Efficient Point 
 
In Figure  5-24, the isoquant of person 1 is drawn with a dark thick line.  This 
utility level is fixed.  It acts like the “budget constraint” for person 2.  Note that 
person 2’s isoquants face the opposite way because a movement southwest is 
good for 2, since it gives him more of both goods.  Four isoquants are graphed 
for person 2, and the highest feasible isoquant, which leaves person 1 getting the 
fixed utility, has the Pareto-efficient point illustrated with a large dot.  Such points 
occur at tangencies of the isoquants. 
 
This process, of identifying the points that are Pareto-efficient, can be carried out 
for every possible utility level for person 1.  What results is the set of Pareto-
efficient points, and this set is also known as the contract curve.  This is 
illustrated with the thick line in Figure  5-25.  Every point on this curve maximizes 
one person’s utility given the other, and they are characterized by the tangencies 
in the isoquants. 
 
The contract curve need not have a simple shape, as Figure  5-25 illustrates.  The 
main properties are that it is increasing and goes from person 1 consuming zero 
of both goods to person 2 consuming zero of both goods. 
 
 
1 
2 
u1
2
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Figure  5-25: The Contract Curve 
 
Example: Suppose both people have Cobb-Douglas utility.  Let the total 
endowment of each good be 1, so that x2 = 1 – x1.  Then person 1’s utility can be 
written as 
u1 = xα y1-α, and 2’s utility is u2 = (1-x)β (1-y)1-β.  Then a point is Pareto-efficient if 
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Thus, solving for y, a point is on the contract curve if 
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Thus, the contract curve for the Cobb-Douglas case depends on a single 
parameter βα
αβ
)1(
)1(
−
− .  It is graphed for a variety of examples (α and β) in Figure 
 5-26. 
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2
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Figure  5-26: Contract Curves with Cobb-Douglas Utility 
 
5.2.8.1 (Exercise) If two individuals have the same utility function concerning 
goods, is the contract curve the diagonal?  Why or why not? 
 
5.2.8.2 (Exercise) For two individuals with Cobb-Douglas preferences, when is 
the contract curve the diagonal? 
 
The contract curve provides the set of efficient points.  What point will actually be 
chosen?  Let’s start with an endowment of the goods.  An endowment is just a 
point in the Edgeworth box, which gives the initial ownership of both goods for 
both people.  The endowment is marked with a triangle in Figure  5-27.  Note that 
this point gives the endowment of both person 1 and 2, because it shows the 
shares of each. 
 
Figure  5-27 also shows isoquants for persons 1 and 2 going through the 
endowment.  Note that the isoquant for 1 is concave toward the point labeled 1, 
and the isoquant for 2 is concave toward the point labeled 2.  These utility 
isoquants define a reservation utility level for each person – the utility they could 
get alone, without exchange.  This “no exchange” state is known as autarky.  
There are a variety of efficient points that give these people at least as much as 
they get under autarky, and those points are along the contract curve but have a 
darker line. 
 
In Figure  5-27, starting at the endowment, the utility of both players is increased 
by moving in the general direction of the southeast, that is, down and to the right, 
until the contract curve is reached.  This involves person 1 getting more X 
(movement to the right) in exchange for giving up some Y (movement down).  
Thus, we can view the increase in utility as a trade – 1 trades some of his Y for 
some of 2’s X. 
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Figure  5-27: Individually Rational Efficient Points 
 
In principle, any of the darker points on the contract curve, which give both 
people at least as much as they achieve under autarky, might result from trade.  
The two people get together and agree on exchange that puts them at any point 
along this segment of the curve, depending on the bargaining skills of the 
players.  But there is a particular point, or possibly a set of points, that result from 
exchange using a price system.  A price system involves a specific price for 
trading Y for X, and vice versa, that is available to both parties.  In this diagram, 
prices define a straight line, whose slope is the negative of the Y for X price (the 
X for Y price is the reciprocal). 
 
Figure  5-28 illustrates trade with a price system.  The O in the center is the point 
on the contract curve connected to the endowment (triangle) by a straight line 
(the price line), in such a way that the straight line is tangent to both 1 and 2’s 
isoquants at the contract curve.  This construction means that, if each person 
took the price line as a budget constraint, they would maximize their utility 
function by choosing the point labeled O. 
 
That a price line that (i) goes through the endowment and (ii) goes through the 
contract curve at a point tangent to both people’s utility exists is relatively easy to 
show.  Consider lines that satisfy property (ii) and let’s see if we can find one that 
goes through the endowment.  Start on the contract curve at the point that 
maximizes 1’s utility given 2’s reservation utility, and you can easily see that the 
price line through that point passes above and to the right of the endowment.  
The similar price line maximizing 2’s utility given 1’s reservation utility passes 
1 
2
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below and to the left of the endowment.  These price lines are illustrated with 
dotted lines.  Thus, by continuity, somewhere in between is a price line that 
passes through the endowment. 
 
 
Figure  5-28: Equilibrium with a Price System 
 
The point marked with the O represents an equilibrium of the price system, in the 
sense that supply and demand are equated for both goods.  Note that, given the 
endowment and given the price through the endowment, both parties maximize 
utility by going to the O.  To see this, it may help to consider a version of the 
picture that only shows person 2’s isoquants and the price line. 
 
Figure  5-29 removes player 1’s isoquants, leaving only player 2’s isoquants and 
the price line through the endowment.  The price line through the endowment is 
the budget facing each player at that price.  Note that, given this budget line, 
player 2, who gets more the less player 1 gets, maximizes utility at the middle 
isoquant, given the budget.  That is, taking the price as given, player 2 would 
choose the O given player 2’s endowment.  The logic for player 1 is analogous.  
This shows that, if both players believe that they can buy or sell as much as they 
like at the tradeoff of the price through the O, both will trade to reach the O.  This 
1 
2
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means that, if the players accept the price, a balance of supply and demand 
emerges.  In this sense, we have found an equilibrium price. 
 
 
 
Figure  5-29: Illustration of Price System Equilibrium 
 
In the Edgeworth box, we see that, given an endowment, it is possible to reach 
some Pareto-efficient point using a price system.  Moreover, any point on the 
contract curve arises from as an equilibrium of the price system for some 
endowment.  The proof of this proposition is startlingly easy.  To show that a 
particular point on the contract curve is an equilibrium for some endowment, just 
start with an endowment equal to the point on the contract curve.  No trade can 
occur because the starting point is Pareto-efficient – any gain by one party 
entails a loss by the other. 
 
Furthermore, if a point in the Edgeworth box represents an equilibrium using a 
price system (that is, if the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded for 
both goods), it must be Pareto-efficient.  At an equilibrium to the price system, 
each player’s isoquant is tangent to the price line, and hence tangent to each 
other.  This implies the equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. 
 
Two of these three propositions – any equilibrium of the price system is Pareto-
efficient, any Pareto-efficient point is an equilibrium of the price system for some 
endowment, are known as the first and second welfare theorems of general 
equilibrium.  They have been demonstrated by Nobel laureates Kenneth Arrow 
and Gerard Debreu, for an arbitrary number of people and goods.  They also 
demonstrated the third proposition, that for any endowment, there exists an 
equilibrium of the price system, with the same high level of generality. 
1 
2
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5.2.9 General Equilibrium 
We will illustrate general equilibrium, for the case when all consumers have 
Cobb-Douglas utility in an exchange economy.  An exchange economy is an 
economy where the supply of each good is just the total endowment of that good 
and there is no production.  Suppose there are N people, indexed by n = 1, 2, …, 
N.  There are G goods, indexed by g = 1, 2, …, G.  Person n has Cobb-Douglas 
utility, which we can represent using exponents α(n,g), so that the utility of 
person n can be represented as ∏
=
G
g
gngnx
1
),(),( α , where x(n,g) is person n’s 
consumption of good g.  Assume that α(n,g)≥0 for all n and g, which amounts to 
assuming that the products are in fact goods.  Without any loss of generality, we 
can require 
 
 1),(
1
=∑
=
G
g
gnα , 
 
for each n.  (To see this, note that maximizing the function U is equivalent to 
maximizing the function Uβ for any positive β.) 
 
Let y(n,g) be person n’s endowment of good g.  The goal of general equilibrium is 
to find prices p1, p2, …, pG for the goods, in such a way that demand for each 
good exactly equals supply of the good.  The supply of good g is just the sum of 
the endowments of that good.  The prices yield a wealth for person n equal to 
 
  ∑
=
=
G
g
gn gnypW
1
),( . 
 
We will assume that 0),(),(
1
>∑
=
N
n
inygnα  for every pair of goods g and i.  This 
assumption states that for any pair of goods, there is at least one agent that 
values good g and has an endowment of good i.  The assumption insures that 
there is always someone willing and able to trade if the price is sufficiently 
attractive.  The assumption is much stronger than necessary but useful for 
exposition.  The assumption also insures the endowment of each good is 
positive. 
 
Cobb-Douglas utility simplifies the analysis because of a feature that we already 
met in the case of two goods, but which holds in general: the share of wealth for 
a consumer n on good g equals the exponent α(n,g).  Thus, the total demand for 
good g is  
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The equilibrium conditions, then, can be expressed as saying supply (sum of the 
endowments) equals demand, or, for each good g, 
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We can rewrite this expression, provided pg>0 (and it must be for otherwise 
demand is infinite), to be 
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Let B be the G × G matrix whose (g, i) term is  
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Let p be the vector of prices.  Then we can write the equilibrium conditions as  
 
 (I–B)p=0,  
 
where 0 is the zero vector.  Thus, for an equilibrium (other than p=0) to exist, B 
must have an eigenvalue equal to 1, and a corresponding eigenvector p that is 
positive in each component.  Moreover, if such an eigenvector, eigenvalue pair 
exists, it is an equilibrium, because demand is equal to supply for each good. 
 
The actual price vector is not completely identified, because if p is an equilibrium 
price vector, so is any positive scalar times p.  Scaling prices doesn’t change the 
equilibrium because both prices and wealth (which is based on endowments) rise 
by the scalar factor.  Usually economists assign one good to be a numeraire, 
which means all other goods are indexed in terms of that good, and the 
numeraire’s price is artificially set to be 1.  We will treat any scaling of a price 
vector as the same vector. 
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The relevant theorem is the Perron-Frobenius theorem.62  It states that if B is a 
positive matrix (each component positive), then there is an eigenvalue λ>0 and 
an associated positive eigenvector p, and moreover λ is the largest (in absolute 
value) eigenvector of B.63  This conclusion does most of the work of 
demonstrating the existence of an equilibrium.  The only remaining condition to 
check is that the eigenvalue is in fact 1, so that (I–B)p=0. 
 
Suppose the eigenvalue is λ.  Then λp = Bp.  Thus for each g, 
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Summing both sides over g, 
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Thus λ=1 as desired. 
 
The Perron-Frobenius theorem actually provides two more useful conclusions.  
First, the equilibrium is unique.  This is a feature of the Cobb-Douglas utility and 
does not necessarily occur for other utility functions.  Moreover, the equilibrium is 
                                            
62 Oskar Perron, 1880 - 1975 and Georg Frobenius, 1849 – 1917. 
63 The Perron-Frobenius theorem, as usually stated, only assumes that B is non-negative and 
that B is irreducible.  It turns out that a strictly positive matrix is irreducible, so this condition is 
sufficient to invoke the theorem.  In addition, we can still apply the theorem even when B has 
some zeros in it, provided that it is irreducible.  Irreducibility means that the economy can’t be 
divided into two economies, where the people in one economy can’t buy from the people in the 
second because they aren’t endowed with anything the people in the first value.  If B is not 
irreducible, then some people may wind up consuming zero of things they value. 
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readily approximated.  Denote by Bt the product of B with itself t times.  Then for 
any positive vector v, pvB =∞→
t
t
lim .  While approximations are very useful for 
large systems (large numbers of goods), the system can readily be computed 
exactly with small numbers of goods, even with a large number of individuals.  
Moreover, the approximation can be interpreted in a potentially useful manner.  
Let v be a candidate for an equilibrium price vector.  Use v to permit people to 
calculate their wealth, which for person n is ∑
=
=
G
i
in inyvW
1
),( .  Given the wealth 
levels, what prices clear the market?  Demand for good g is 
 
∑ ∑∑
= ==
==
G
i
N
n
i
N
n
ng inygnvWgnvx
1 11
),(),(),()( αα  
 
and the market clears, given the wealth levels, if 
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which is equivalent to p = Bv.  This defines an iterative process.  Start with an 
arbitrary price vector, compute wealth levels, then compute the price vector that 
clears the market for the given wealth levels.  Use this price to recalculate the 
wealth levels, and then compute a new market-clearing price vector for the new 
wealth levels.  This process can be iterated, and in fact converges to the 
equilibrium price vector from any starting point. 
 
We finish this section by considering three special cases.  If there are two goods, 
we can let an = α(n, 1), and then conclude α(n, 2) = 1 – an.  Then let 
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be the endowment of good g.  Then the matrix B is 
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The relevant eigenvector of B is 
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The overall level of prices is not pinned down – any scalar multiple of p is also an 
equilibrium price – so the relevant term is the price ratio, which is the price of 
good 1 in terms of good 2, or 
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We can readily see that an increase in the supply of good 1, or a decrease in the 
supply of good 2, decreases the price ratio.  An increase in the preference for 
good 1 increases the price of good 1.  When people who value good 1 relatively 
highly are endowed with a lot of good 2, the correlation between preference for 
good 1 an and endowment of good 2 is higher. The higher the correlation, the 
higher is the price ratio.  Intuitively, if the people who have a lot of good 2 want a 
lot of good 1, the price of good 1 is going to be higher.  Similarly, if the people 
who have a lot of good 1 want a lot of good 2, the price of good 1 is going to be 
lower.  Thus, the correlation between endowments and preferences also matters 
to the price ratio. 
 
In our second special case, we consider people with the same preferences, but 
who start with different endowments.  Hypothesizing identical preferences sets 
aside the correlation between endowments and preferences found in the two 
good case.  Since people are the same, α(n, g) = Ag for all n.  In this case, 
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where as before ∑
=
=
N
n
g gnyY
1
),(  is the total endowment of good g.  The matrix B 
has a special structure, and in this case, 
g
g
g Y
A
p =  is the equilibrium price vector.  
Prices are proportional to the preference for the good divided by the total 
endowment for that good. 
 
Now consider a third special case, where no common structure is imposed on 
preferences, but endowments are proportional to each other, that is, the 
endowment of person n is a fraction wn of the total endowment.  This implies that 
we can write y(n, g) = wn Yg, an equation assumed to hold for all people n and 
goods g.  Note that by construction, 1
1
=∑
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N
n
nw , since the value wn represents n’s 
share of the total endowment.  In this case, we have 
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These matrices also have a special structure, and it is readily verified that the 
equilibrium price vector satisfies 
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This formula receives a similar interpretation – the price of good g is the strength 
of preference for good g, where strength of preference is a wealth-weighted 
average of the individual preference, divided by the endowment of the good.  
Such an interpretation is guaranteed by the assumption of Cobb-Douglas 
preferences, since these imply that individuals spend a constant proportion of 
their wealth on each good.  It also generalizes the conclusion found in the two 
good case to more goods, but with the restriction that the correlation is now 
between wealth and preferences.  The special case has the virtue that individual 
wealth, which is endogenous because it depends on prices, can be readily 
determined. 
 
5.2.9.1 (Exercise) Consider a consumer with Cobb-Douglas utility,  
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6 Market Imperfections 
We have so far focused on unimpeded markets, and seen that markets may 
perform efficiently.64  In this chapter, we examine impediments to the efficiency of 
markets.  Some of these impediments are imposed on otherwise efficiently 
functioning markets, as occurs with taxes.  Others, such as monopoly or 
pollution, are problems that may arise in some circumstances, and may require 
correction by the government. 
6.1 Taxes 
There are a variety of types of taxes, such as income taxes, property taxes, ad 
valorem (percentage of value) taxes, and excise taxes (taxes on a specific good 
like cigarettes or gasoline).  Here, we are primarily concerned with sales taxes, 
which are taxes on goods and services sold at retail.  Our insights into sales 
taxes translate naturally into some other taxes. 
6.1.1 Effects of Taxes 
Consider first a fixed tax such as a twenty cent tax on gasoline.  The tax could 
either be imposed on the buyer or the supplier.  It is imposed on the buyer if the 
buyer pays a price for the good, and then also pays the tax on top of that.  
Similarly, if the tax is imposed on the seller, the price charged to the buyer 
includes the tax.  In the United States, sales taxes are generally imposed on the 
buyer – the stated price does not include the tax – while in Canada, the sales tax 
is generally imposed on the seller. 
 
An important insight of supply and demand theory is that it doesn’t matter – to 
anyone – whether the tax is imposed on the supplier or the buyer.  The reason is 
that ultimately the buyer cares only about the total price paid, which is the 
amount the supplier gets plus the tax, and the supplier cares only about the net 
to the supplier, which is the total amount the buyer pays minus the tax.  Thus, 
with a twenty cent tax, a price of $2.00 to the buyer is a price of $1.80 to the 
seller.  Whether the buyer pays $1.80 to a seller and additional twenty cents in 
tax, or pays $2.00, produces the same outcome to both the buyer and seller.  
Similarly, from the seller’s perspective, whether the sellers charge $2.00 and 
then pay twenty cents to the government, or charges $1.80 and pay no tax, leads 
to the same profit.65 
                                            
64 The standard term for an unimpeded market is a free market, which is free in the sense of “free 
of external rules and constraints.”  In this terminology, eBay is free market, even though it 
charges for the use of the market. 
65 There are two minor issues here that won’t be considered further.  First, the party who collects 
the tax has a legal responsibility and it could be that businesses have an easier time complying 
with taxes than individual consumers.  The transaction costs associated with collecting taxes 
could create a difference arising from who pays the tax.  Such differences will be ignored in this 
book.  Second, if the tax is percentage tax, it won’t matter to the outcome but the calculations are 
more complicated, because a ten percent tax on the seller at a seller’s price of $1.80 is different 
from a ten percent tax on a buyer’s price of $2.00.  Then the equivalence between taxes imposed 
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Figure  6-1: Effect of a Tax on Supply 
 
First, consider a tax imposed on the seller.  At a given price p, and tax t, each 
seller obtains p-t, and thus supplies the amount associated with this net price.  
Taking the before tax supply to be SBefore Tax, the after tax supply is shifted up by 
the amount of the tax.  This is the amount that covers the marginal value of the 
last unit, plus providing for the tax.  Another way of saying this is that at any 
lower price, the sellers would reduce the number of units offered.  The change in 
supply is illustrated in Figure  6-1. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
on the seller and taxes imposed on the buyer requires different percentages that produce the 
same effective tax level.  In addition, there is a political issue: imposing the tax on buyers makes 
the presence and size of taxes more transparent to voters. 
SAfter Taxp 
q
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Figure  6-2: Effect of a Tax on Demand 
Now consider the imposition of a tax on the buyer, illustrated in Figure  6-2.  In 
this case, the buyer pays the price of the good, p, plus the tax, t.  This reduces 
the willingness to pay for any given unit by the amount of the tax, thus shifting 
down the demand curve by the amount of the tax. 
 
 
Figure  6-3: Effect of a Tax on Equilibrium 
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In both cases, the effect of the tax on the supply-demand equilibrium is to shift 
the quantity toward a point where the before tax demand minus the before tax 
supply is the amount of the tax.  This is illustrated in Figure  6-3.  The quantity 
traded before a tax was imposed was qB*.  When the tax is imposed, the price 
that the buyer pays must exceed the price the sellers receive, by the amount 
equal to the tax.  This pins down a unique quantity, denoted qA*.  The price the 
buyer pays is denoted by pD* and the sellers receive that amount minus the tax, 
which is noted as pS*.  The relevant quantities and prices are illustrated in Figure 
 6-3. 
 
Another thing notable from this picture is that the price that buyers pay rises, but 
generally by less than the tax.  Similarly, the price the sellers obtain falls, but by 
less than the tax.  These changes are known as the incidence of the tax – is a 
tax mostly borne by buyers, in the form of higher prices, or by sellers, in the form 
of lower prices net of taxation. 
 
There are two main effects of a tax: a fall in the quantity traded, and a diversion 
of revenue to the government.  These are illustrated in Figure  6-4.  First, the 
revenue is just the amount of the tax times the quantity traded, which is the area 
of the shaded rectangle.  The tax raised of course uses the after tax quantity qA* 
because this is the quantity traded once the tax is imposed. 
 
 
Figure  6-4: Revenue and Dead weight Loss 
In addition, a tax reduces the quantity traded, thereby reducing some of the gains 
from trade.  Consumer surplus falls because the price to the buyer rises, and 
producer surplus (profit) falls because the price to the seller falls.  Some of those 
losses are captured in the form of the tax, but there is a loss captured by no party 
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– the value of the units that would have been exchanged were there no tax.  The 
value of those units is given by the demand, and the marginal cost of the units is 
given by the supply.  The difference, shaded in black in the diagram, is the lost 
gains from trade of units that aren’t traded because of the tax.  These lost gains 
from trade are known as a dead weight loss.  That is, the dead weight loss is the 
buyers’ values minus the sellers’ costs of units that are not economic to trade 
only because of a tax or other interference in the market.  The net lost gains from 
trade, measured in dollars, of these lost units is illustrated by the black triangular 
region in the diagram. 
 
The dead weight loss is important because it represents a loss to society much 
the same as if resources were simply thrown away or lost.  The dead weight loss 
is value that people don’t enjoy, and in this sense can be viewed as an 
opportunity cost of taxation.  That is, to collect taxes, we have to take money 
away from people, but obtaining a dollar in tax revenue actually costs society 
more than a dollar.  The costs of raising tax revenues include the money raised 
(which the taxpayers lose), the direct costs of collection like tax collectors and 
government agencies to administer tax collection, and the dead weight loss – the 
lost value created by the incentive effects of taxes, which reduce the gains for 
trade.  The dead weight loss is part of the overhead of collecting taxes.  An 
interesting issue, to be considered in the subsequent section, is the selection of 
activities and goods to tax in order to minimize the dead weight loss of taxation. 
 
Without more quantification, only a little more can be said about the effect of 
taxation.  First, a small tax raises revenue approximately equal to the tax level 
times the quantity, or tq.  Second, the drop in quantity is also approximately 
proportional to the size of the tax.  Third, this means the size of the dead weight 
loss is approximately proportional to the tax squared.  Thus, small taxes have an 
almost zero dead weight loss per dollar of revenue raised, and the overhead of 
taxation, as a percentage of the taxes raised, grows when the tax level is 
increased.  Consequently, the cost of taxation tends to rise in the tax level. 
 
6.1.1.1 (Exercise) Suppose demand is given by qd(p) = 1 – p and supply qs(p) = 
p, with prices in dollars.  If sellers pay a 10 cent tax, what is the after tax 
supply?  Compute the before tax equilibrium price and quantity, and the 
after tax equilibrium quantity, and buyer’s price and seller’s price. 
 
6.1.1.2 (Exercise) Suppose demand is given by qd(p) = 1 – p and supply qs(p) = 
p, with prices in dollars.  If buyers pay a 10 cent tax, what is the after tax 
demand?  Do the same computations as the previous exercise and show 
that the outcomes are the same. 
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6.1.1.3 (Exercise) Suppose demand is given by qd(p) = 1 – p and supply qs(p) = 
p, with prices in dollars.  Suppose a tax of t cents is imposed, t ≤ 1.  What 
is the equilibrium quantity traded, as a function of t?  What is the revenue 
raised by the government, and for what level of taxation is it highest? 
6.1.2 Incidence of Taxes 
How much does the quantity fall when a tax is imposed?  How much does the 
buyer’s price rise and the price to the seller fall?  The elasticities of supply and 
demand can be used to answer this question.  To do so, we consider a 
percentage tax t and employ the methodology introduced in Chapter 2 and 
assume constant elasticity of both demand and supply.  Let the equilibrium price 
to the seller be ps and the equilibrium price to the buyer be pb.  As before, we will 
denote the demand function by qd(p)=ap-ε  and supply function by qs(p)=bpη.  
These prices are distinct because of the tax, and the tax determines the 
difference: 
 
pb = (1+t) ps. 
 
Equilibrium requires 
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Thus, a small proportional tax increases the price to the buyer by 
approximately ηε
η
+
t , and decreases the price to the seller by ηε
ε
+
t .  The quantity 
falls by approximately ηε
εη
+
t .  Thus, the price effect is mostly on the “relatively 
inelastic party.”  If demand is inelastic, ε is small, then the price decrease to the 
seller will be small and the price increase to the buyer close to the entire tax.  
Similarly, if demand is very elastic, ε is very large, and the price increase to the 
buyer will be small and the price decrease to the seller close to the entire tax. 
 
We can rewrite the quantity change as 
ηε
ηε
εη
11 +
=+
tt .  Thus the effect of a tax on 
quantity is small if either the demand or the supply is inelastic.  To minimize the 
distortion in quantity, it is useful to impose taxes on goods that either have 
inelastic demand, or inelastic supply. 
 
For example, cigarettes are a product with very inelastic demand and moderately 
elastic supply.  Thus a tax increase will generally increase the price almost the 
entire amount of the tax.  In contrast, travel tends to have relatively elastic 
demand, so taxes on travel – airport, hotel and rental car taxes – tend not to 
increase the final prices so much, but have large quantity distortions. 
 
6.1.2.1 (Exercise) For the case of constant elasticity (of both supply and 
demand), what tax rate maximizes the government’s revenue?  How 
does the revenue-maximizing tax rate change when demand becomes 
more inelastic? 
6.1.3 Excess Burden of Taxation 
The presence of the dead-weight loss implies that raising $1 in taxes costs 
society more than $1.  But how much more?  This idea – that the cost of taxation 
exceeds the taxes raised – is known as the excess burden of taxation, or just the 
excess burden.  We can quantify the excess burden with a remarkably sharp 
formula. 
 
To start, we will denote the marginal cost of the quantity q by c(q) and the 
marginal value by v(q).  The elasticities of demand and supply are given by the 
standard formulae: 
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Consider an ad valorem tax that will be denoted by t.  If sellers are charging c(q), 
the ad valorem (at value) tax is tc(q), and the quantity q* will satisfy 
 
v(q*) = (1 + t)c(q*). 
 
From this equation, we immediately deduce 
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Tax revenue is given by 
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The effect on taxes collected, Tax, of an increase in the tax rate t is 
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Thus, tax revenue is maximized when the tax rate is tmax, given by 
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The value 
1−ε
ε  is the monopoly markup rate, which we will meet in Section  6.5.  
Here, it is applied to the sum of the inverse elasticities. 
 
The gains from trade (including the tax) is the difference between value and cost 
for the traded units, and thus is 
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Thus, the change in the gains from trade as taxes increase is given by 
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The value tmax is the value of the tax rate t that maximizes the total tax take.  This 
remarkable formula permits the quantification of the cost of taxation.  The minus 
sign indicates it is a loss – the dead weight loss of monopoly, as taxes are raised, 
and it is composed of two components.  First, there is the term 
1−ε
ε , which 
arises from the change in revenue as quantity is changed, thus measuring the 
responsiveness of revenue to a quantity change.  The second term provides for 
the change in the size of the welfare loss triangle.  The formula can readily be 
applied in practice to assess the social cost of taxation, knowing only the tax rate 
and the elasticities of supply and demand. 
 
The formula for the excess burden is a local formula – it calculates the increase 
in the dead weight loss associated with raising an extra dollar of tax revenue.  All 
elasticities, including those in tmax, are evaluated locally around the quantity 
associated with the current level of taxation.  The calculated value of tmax is value 
given the local elasticities; if elasticities are not constant, this value will not 
necessarily be the actual value that maximizes the tax revenue.  One can think of 
tmax as the projected value.  It is sometimes more useful to express the formula 
directly in terms of elasticities rather than in terms of the projected value of tmax, 
in order to avoid the potential confusion between the projected (at current 
elasticities) and actual (at the elasticities relevant to tmax) value of tmax.  This level 
can be read directly from the derivation above: 
 
t
t
dTax
dGFT
)1( −−+−= εηηε
εη . 
6.2 Price Floors and Ceilings 
A price floor is a minimum price at which a product or service is permitted to sell.  
Many agricultural goods have price floors imposed by the government.  For 
example, tobacco sold in the United States has historically been subject to a 
quota and a price floor set by the Secretary of Agriculture.  Unions may impose 
price floors as well.  For example, the Screen Actors Guild imposes minimum 
rates for guild members, generally pushing up the price paid for actors above that 
which would prevail in an unconstrained market.  (The wages of big name stars 
aren’t generally affected by SAG,  because these are individually negotiated.)  
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The most important example of a price floor is the minimum wage, which 
imposes a minimum amount that a worker can be paid per hour. 
 
A price ceiling is a maximum price that can be charged for a product or service.  
Rent control imposes a maximum price on apartments (usually set at the 
historical price plus an adjustment for inflation) in many U.S. cities.  Taxi fares in 
New York, Washington, D.C. and other cities are subject to maximum legal fares.  
During World War II, and again in the 1970s, the United States imposed price 
controls to limit inflation, imposing a maximum price for legal sale of many goods 
and services.  For a long time, most U.S. states limited the legal interest rate that 
could be charged (these are called usury laws) and this is the reason so many 
credit card companies are located in South Dakota.  South Dakota was the first 
state to eliminate such laws.  In addition, ticket prices for concerts and sporting 
events are often set below the equilibrium price.  Laws prohibiting scalping then 
impose a price ceiling.  Laws preventing scalping are usually remarkably 
ineffective in practice, of course. 
6.2.1 Basic Theory 
The theory of price floors and ceilings is readily articulated with simple supply 
and demand analysis.  Consider a price floor – a minimum legal price.  If the 
price floor is low enough – below the equilibrium price – there are no effects, 
because the same forces that tend to induce a price equal to the equilibrium 
price continue to operate.  If the price floor is higher than the equilibrium price, 
there will be a surplus, because at the price floor, more units are supplied than 
are demanded.  This surplus is illustrated in Figure  6-5. 
 
In Figure  6-5, the price floor is illustrated with a horizontal line and is above the 
equilibrium price.  Consequently, at the price floor, a larger quantity is supplied 
than is demanded, leading to a surplus.  There are units that are socially efficient 
to trade but aren’t traded – because their value is less than the price floor.  The 
gains from trade associated with these units, which is lost due to the price floor, 
represent the dead weight loss. 
 
The price increase created by a price floor will increase the total amount paid by 
buyers when the demand is inelastic, and otherwise will reduce the amount paid.  
Thus, if the price floor is imposed in order to be a benefit to sellers, we would not 
expect to see the price increased to the point where demand becomes elastic, for 
otherwise the sellers receive less revenue.  Thus, for example, if the minimum 
wage is imposed in order to increase the average wages to low-skilled workers, 
then we would expect to see the total income of low-skilled workers rise.  If, on 
the other hand, the motivation for the minimum wage is primarily to make low-
skilled workers a less effective substitute for union workers, and hence allow 
union workers to increase their wage demands, then we might observe a 
minimum wage which is in some sense “too high” to be of benefit to low-skilled 
workers. 
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Figure  6-5: A Price Floor 
 
 
Figure  6-6: Dead weight Loss of a Price Floor 
 
The dead weight loss illustrated in Figure  6-6 is the difference between the value 
of the units not traded, and value is given by the demand curve, and the cost of 
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producing these units.  The triangular shaped region representing the difference 
between value and cost is illustrated in the above diagram, in the shaded region. 
 
However, this is the minimum loss to society associated with a price floor.  
Generally there will be other losses.  In particular, the loss given above assumes 
that suppliers who don’t sell don’t produce.  As a practical matter, some suppliers 
who won’t in the end sell may still produce because they hope to sell.  In this 
case additional costs are incurred and the dead weight loss will be larger to 
reflect these costs. 
 
Example:  Suppose both supply and demand are linear, with the quantity 
supplied equal to the price, and the quantity demanded equal to one minus the 
price.  In this case, the equilibrium price, and the equilibrium quantity, are both ½.  
A price floor of p > ½ induces a quantity demanded of 1–p.  How many units will 
suppliers offer, if a supplier’s chance of trading is random?  Suppose q≥1–p units 
are offered.  A supplier’s chance of selling is 
q
p−1 .  Thus, the marginal supplier 
(who has a marginal cost of q by assumption) has a probability 
q
p−1  of earning 
p, and a certainty of paying q. Exactly q units will be supplied when this is a 
break-even proposition for the marginal supplier, that is, 
 
  01 =−− qp
q
p , or ).1( ppq −=  
 
The dead weight loss then includes not just the triangle illustrated in the previous 
picture, but also the cost of the )1()1( ppp −−−  unsold units. 
 
6.2.1.1 (Exercise)  In this example, show that the quantity produced is less 
than the equilibrium quantity, which is ½.  Compute the gains from trade, 
given the overproduction of suppliers.  What is the dead weight loss of 
the price floor? 
 
6.2.1.2 (Exercise)  Suppose that units aren’t produced until after a buyer has 
agreed to purchase, as typically occurs with services.  What is the dead 
weight loss in this case?  (Hint: what potential sellers will offer their 
services?  What is the average cost of supply of this set of potential 
sellers?) 
 
The Screen Actors Guild, a union of actors, has some ability to impose minimum 
prices (a price floor) for work on regular Hollywood movies.  If the Screen Actors 
Guild would like to maximize the total earnings of actors, what price should they 
set in the linear demand and supply example? 
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The effects of a price floor include lost gains from trade, because too few units 
are traded (inefficient exchange), units produced that are never consumed 
(wasted production), and more costly units produced than necessary (inefficient 
production) 
 
A price ceiling is a maximum price.  Analogous to a low price floor, a price ceiling 
that is larger than the equilibrium price has no effect.  Tell me that I can’t charge 
more than a billion dollars for this book (which is being given away free) and it 
won’t affect the price charged or the quantity traded.  Thus, the important case of 
a price ceiling is a price ceiling less than the equilibrium price. 
 
In this case, which should now look familiar, the price is forced below the 
equilibrium price, and too few units are supplied, while a larger number are 
demanded, leading to a shortage.  The dead weight loss is illustrated in Figure 
 6-7, and again represents the loss associated with units that are valued more 
than they cost but aren’t produced. 
 
 
 
Figure  6-7: A Price Ceiling 
 
Analogous to the case of a price floor, there can be additional losses associated 
with a price ceiling.  In particular, some lower value buyers may succeed in 
purchasing, denying the higher value buyers the ability to purchase.  This effect 
results in buyers with high values failing to consume, and hence their value is 
lost. 
 
D
S
qS 
p 
q
qD 
Price 
Ceiling 
Shortage
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 6-223
6.2.1.3 (Exercise) Adapt the price floor example above to the case of a price 
ceiling, with p < ½, and compute the lost gains from trade if buyers willing 
to purchase are all able to purchase with probability qS/qD.  (Hint: 
Compute the value of qD units; the value realized by buyers collectively 
will be that amount times the probability of trade.) 
 
In addition to the misallocation of resources (too few units, and units not 
allocated to those who value them the most), price ceilings tend to encourage 
illegal trade as people attempt to exploit the prohibited gains from trade.  For 
example, it became common practice in New York to attempt to bribe landlords 
to offer rent-controlled apartments, and such bribes could exceed $50,000.  In 
addition, potential tenants expended a great deal of time searching for 
apartments, and a common strategy was to read the obituaries late at night, 
when the New York Times had just come out, hoping to find an apartment that 
would be vacant and available for rent. 
 
An important and undesirable by-product of price ceilings is discrimination.  In a 
free or unconstrained market, discrimination against a particular group, based on 
race, religion, or other factors, requires transacting not based on price but on 
another factor.  Thus, in a free market, discrimination is costly – discrimination 
entails, for instance, not renting an apartment to the highest bidder, but the 
highest bidder of the favored group.  In contrast, with a price ceiling, there is a 
shortage, and sellers can discriminate at lower cost, or even at no cost.  That is, 
if there are twice as many people seeking apartments as there are apartments at 
the price ceiling, landlords can “pick and choose” among prospective tenants and 
still get the maximum legal rent.  Thus a price ceiling has the undesirable by-
product of reducing the cost of discrimination. 
6.2.2 Long- and Short-run Effects 
Both demand and supply tend to be more elastic in the long run.  This means 
that the quantity effects of price floors and ceilings tend to be larger over time.  
An extreme example of this is rent control, a maximum price imposed on 
apartments. 
 
Rent control is usually imposed in the following way: as a prohibition or limitation 
on price increases.  For example, New York City’s rent control, imposed during 
World War II, prevented landlords from increasing rent, even when their own 
costs increased, such as when property taxes increased.  This law was softened 
in 1969 to be gradually replaced by a rent stabilization law that permitted modest 
rent increases for existing tenants. 
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Figure  6-8: Rent Control, Initial Effect 
 
Thus the nature of rent control is that it begins with at most minor effects 
because it doesn’t bind until the equilibrium rent increases.  Moreover, the short-
run supply of apartments tends to be extremely inelastic, because one doesn’t 
tear down an apartment or convert it to a condominium (there were limitations on 
this) or abandon it without a pretty significant change in price.  Demand also 
tends to be relatively inelastic, because one has to live somewhere and the 
alternatives to renting in the city are to live a long distance away or buy (which is 
relatively expensive), neither of which is a very good substitute for many 
consumers.  Long-run demand and short-run demand are not very different and 
are treated as being identical.  Finally, the long-run supply is much more elastic 
than the short-run supply, because in the long-run a price increase permits the 
creation of apartments from warehouses (lofts), rooms rented in houses, etc.  
Thus, the apartment market in New York is characterized by inelastic short-run 
supply, much more elastic long-run supply, and inelastic demand.  This is 
illustrated in Figure  6-8. 
 
We start with a rent control law that has little or no immediate effect because it is 
set at current rents.  Thus, in the near term, tenants’ fears of price increases are 
eased and there is little change in the apartment rental market.  This is not to say 
there is zero effect – some companies considering building an apartment on the 
basis of an expectation of higher future rents may be deterred, and a few 
marginal apartments may be converted to other uses because the upside 
potential for the owner has been removed, but such effects are modest at best. 
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Figure  6-9: Rent Control, Long-Run Effect 
Over time, however, the demand for apartments grows as the city population and 
incomes grow.  Moreover, as the costs of operating an apartment rise due to 
property tax increases, wage increases and cost of maintenance increases, the 
supply is reduced.  This has little effect on the short-run supply but a significant 
effect on the long-run supply.  The supply reduction and demand increases 
cause a shortage, but results in few apartments being lost because the short-run 
supply is very inelastic.  Over time, however, apartments are withdrawn from the 
market and the actual quantity falls, even as the demand rises, and the shortage 
gets worse and worse.  These changes are illustrated in Figure  6-9.  The old 
values of demand, short-run supply and long-run supply are illustrated in dashed 
grey lines.  The new values, reflecting an increase in demand, a fall in long-run 
supply, and a reduction in the number available set of apartments (where the rent 
control covers the long-run cost) are given in dark black lines. 
 
The shortage is created by two separate factors – demand is increasing as 
incomes and population rise, and supply is decreasing as costs rise.  This 
reduces the quantity of available housing units supplied and increases the 
demand for those units. 
 
How serious is the threat that units will be withdrawn from the market?  In New 
York City, over 200,000 apartment units were abandoned by their owners, 
usually because the legal rent didn’t cover the property taxes and legally 
mandated maintenance.  In some cases, tenants continued to inhabit the 
buildings even after the electricity and water were shut off.  It is fair to say that 
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rent control devastated large areas of New York City, such as the Bronx.  So why 
would New York, and so many other communities, impose rent control on itself? 
6.2.3 Political Motivations 
The politics of rent control are straightforward.  First, rent control involves a 
money transfer from landlords to tenants, because tenants pay less than they 
would absent the law, and landlords obtain less revenue.  In the short run, due to 
the inelastic short-run supply, the effect on the quantity of apartments is small, so 
rent control is primarily just a transfer from landlords to tenants. 
 
In a city like New York, the majority of people rent.  A tiny fraction of New Yorkers 
are landlords.  Thus, it is easy to attract voters to support candidates who favor 
rent control – most renters will benefit, while landlords don’t.  The numbers of 
course don’t tell the whole story, because while landlords are small in numbers, 
they are wealthier on average, and thus likely have political influence beyond the 
number of votes they cast.  However, even with their larger economic influence, 
the political balance favors renters. In the 100ab zip codes of Manhattan (first 
three digits are 100), 80% of families were renters in the year 2000.  Thus, a 
candidate who runs on a rent control platform appeals to large portion of the 
voters. 
 
Part of the attraction of rent control is that there is little economic harm in the 
short run, and most of that harm falls on new residents to New York.  As new 
residents generally haven’t yet voted in New York, potential harm to them has 
only a small effect on most existing New Yorkers, and thus isn’t a major 
impediment to getting voter support for rent control.  The slow rate of harm to the 
city is important politically because the election cycle encourages a short time 
horizon – if successful at lower office, a politician hopes to move on to higher 
office, and is unlikely to be blamed for the long-run damage to New York by rent 
control. 
 
Rent control is an example of a political situation sometimes called the tyranny of 
the majority, where a majority of people have an incentive to confiscate the 
wealth of a minority.  But there is another kind of political situation that is in some 
sense the reverse, where a small number of people care a great deal about 
something, and the majority are only slightly harmed on an individual basis.  No 
political situation appears more extreme in this regard than that of refined sugar.  
There are few U.S. cane sugar producers (nine in 1997), yet the U.S. imposes 
quotas that raise domestic prices much higher than world prices, in some years 
tripling the price Americans pay for refined sugar.  The domestic sugar producers 
benefit, while consumers are harmed.  But consumers are harmed by only a 
small amount each, perhaps twelve to fifteen cents per pound – which is not 
enough to build a consensus to defeat politicians who accept donations from 
sugar producers.  This is a case where concentrated benefits and diffused costs 
determine the political outcome.  Because there aren’t many sugar producers, it 
is straightforward for them to act as a single force.  In contrast, it is pretty hard for 
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consumers to become passionate about twelve cents per pound increase in the 
domestic sugar price when they consume about 60 pounds per year of sugar. 
6.2.4 Price Supports 
A price support is a combination of two programs – a minimum price or price 
floor, and government purchase of any surplus.  Thus, a price support is different 
from a price floor, because with a price floor, any excess production by sellers 
was a burden on the sellers.  In contrast, with a price floor, any excess 
production is a burden on the government. 
 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture operates a price support for cheese, and has 
possessed warehouses full of cheese in the past.  There are also price supports 
for milk and other agricultural products. 
 
 
Figure  6-10: Price Supports 
 
Figure  6-10 illustrates the effect of a support program.  The government posts a 
price, called the support price, and purchases any excess production offered on 
the market.  The government purchases, which are the difference between the 
quantity supplied and quantity demanded, are illustrated on the diagram.  The 
cost of the program to the government is the support price times this quantity 
purchased, which is the area of the rectangle directly underneath the words 
“Gov’t Purchases.” 
 
There are two kinds of dead weight loss in a price support program.  First, 
consumers who would like to buy at the equilibrium price are deterred by the 
higher prices, resulting in the usual dead weight loss, illustrated with the vertical 
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shading.  In addition, however, there are goods produced that are then either 
destroyed or put in warehouses and not consumed, which means the costs of 
production of those goods is also lost, resulting in a second dead weight loss.  
That loss is the cost of production, which is given by the supply curve, and thus is 
the area under the supply curve, for the government purchases.  It is shaded in a 
horizontal fashion.  The total dead weight loss of the price support is the sum of 
these two individual losses.  Unlike the case of a price floor or ceiling, a price 
support creates no ambiguity about what units are produced, or which 
consumers are willing and able to buy, and thus the rationing aspect of a price 
floor or ceiling is not present for a price support, nor is the incentive to create a 
black market other than that created by selling the warehouse full of product. 
6.2.5 Quantity Restrictions and Quotas 
The final common way that governments intervene in market transactions is to 
impose a quota.  A quota is a maximal production quantity, usually set based on 
historical production.  In tobacco, peanuts, hops, California oranges, and other 
products, producers have production quotas based on their historical production.  
Tobacco quotas were established in the 1930s and today a tobacco farmer’s 
quota is a percentage of the 1930s level of production.  The percentage is set 
annually by the Secretary of Agriculture.  Agricultural products are not the only 
products with quotas.  The right to drive a tax in New York requires a medallion 
issued by the city, and there are a limited number of medallions.  This is a quota.  
Is it a restrictive quota?  The current price of a New York taxi medallion – the 
right to drive a taxi legally in New York City – is $300,000 (2004 number).  This 
adds approximately $30,000-$40,000 annually to the cost of operating a taxi in 
New York, using a risk adjusted interest rate. 
 
What are the effects of a quota?  A quota restricts the quantity below that which 
would otherwise prevail, forcing the price up, which is illustrated in Figure  6-11.  It 
works like a combination of a price floor and a prohibition on entry. 
 
Generally, the immediate effects of a quota involve a transfer of money from 
buyers to sellers.  The inefficient production and surplus of the price floor are 
avoided because a production limitation created the price increase.  This transfer 
has an undesirable and somewhat insidious attribute.  Because the right to 
produce is a capital good, it maintains a value, which must be captured by the 
producer.  For example, an individual who buys a taxi medallion today, and pays 
$300,000, makes no economic profits – he captures the foregone interest on the 
medallion through higher prices but no more than that.  The individuals who 
received the windfall gain were those who were driving taxis and were 
grandfathered in to the system, and issued free medallions.  Those people – who 
were driving taxis 70 years ago and thus are mostly dead at this point – received 
a windfall gain from the establishment of the system.  Future generations pay for 
the program, which provides no net benefits to the current generation; all the 
benefits were captured by people long since retired. 
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Figure  6-11: A Quota 
 
Does this mean it is harmless to eliminate the medallion requirement?  
Unfortunately not.  The current medallion owners, who if they bought recently 
paid a lot of money for their medallions, would see the value of these 
investments destroyed.  Thus, elimination of the program would harm current 
medallion owners. 
 
If the right to produce is freely tradable, the producers will remain the efficient 
producers, and the taxi medallions are an example of this.  Taxi medallions can 
be bought and sold.  Moreover, a medallion confers the right to operate a taxi, 
but doesn’t require that the owner of the medallion actually drive the taxi.  Thus, 
a “medallion owning company” can lease the right to drive a taxi to an efficient 
driver, thereby eliminating any inefficiency associated with who drives a taxi. 
 
In contrast, because tobacco farming rights aren’t legally tradable across county 
lines, tobacco is very inefficiently grown.  The average size of a burley tobacco 
farm is less than five acres, so some are much smaller.  There are tobacco farms 
in Florida and Missouri, which only exist because of the value of the quota – if 
they could trade their quota to a farm in North Carolina or Kentucky, which are 
much better suited to producing cigarette tobacco, it would pay to do so.  In this 
case, the quota, which locked in production rights, also locked in production 
which gets progressively more inefficient as the years pass. 
 
Quotas based on historical production have the problem that they don’t evolve as 
production methods and technology evolve, thus tending to become 
progressively more inefficient.  Tradable quotas eliminate this particular problem, 
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but continue to have the problem that future generations are harmed with no 
benefits. 
 
6.2.5.1 (Exercise) Suppose demand for a product is qd = 1 – p, and the 
marginal cost of production is c.  A quota at level Q ≤ 1 – c is imposed.  
What is the value of the quota, per unit of production?  Use this to derive 
the demand for the quota as a function of the level of quota released to 
the market.  If the government wishes to sell the quota, how much should 
they sell to maximize the revenue on the product? 
6.3 Externalities 
When the person sitting next to you lights up a cigarette, he gets nicotine, and 
the cigarette company gets some of his money.  You just suffer, with no 
compensation.  If your neighbor’s house catches fire because he fell asleep with 
that cigarette burning in his hand, your house may burn to the ground.  The 
neighbor on he other side who plays very loud music late into the night before 
your big economics test enjoys the music, and the record company and stereo 
component companies get his money.  You flunk out of college and wind up 
borrowing $300,000 to buy a taxi medallion.  Drunk drivers, cell phones ringing in 
movies, loud automobiles, polluted air, and rivers polluted to the point that they 
catch fire like Cleveland’s Cuyahoga did, are all examples where a transaction 
between two-parties harmed others.  These are “external effects.” 
 
But external effects are not necessarily negative.  The neighbor who plants 
beautiful flowers in her yard brightens your day.  Another’s purchase of an 
electric car reduces the smog you breathe.  Your neighbor’s investment in 
making his home safe from fire conveys a safety advantage to you.  Indeed, even 
your neighbor’s investment in her own education may provide an advantage to 
you – you may learn useful things from your neighbor.  Inventions and creations, 
whether products or poetry, produce value for others. The creator of a poem, or a 
mathematical theorem, provides a benefit to others. 
 
These effects are called external effects, or externalities.  An externality is any 
effect on people not involved in a particular transaction.  Pollution is the classic 
example.  When another person buys and smokes cigarettes, there is a 
transaction between the cigarette company and the smoker.  But if you are sitting 
near the smoker, you are an affected party not directly compensated from the 
transaction, at least before taxes were imposed on cigarettes.  Similarly, you pay 
nothing for the benefits you get from viewing your neighbor’s flowers, nor is there 
a direct mechanism to reward your neighbor for her efforts. 
 
Externalities will generally cause competitive markets to behave inefficiently from 
a social perspective, absent a mechanism to involve all the affected parties.  
Without such a mechanism, the flower-planter will plant too few beautiful flowers, 
for she has no reason to take account of your preferences in her choices.  The 
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odious smoker will smoke too much, and too near others, and the loud neighbor 
will play music much too late into the night.  Externalities create a market failure, 
that is, a competitive market does not yield the socially efficient outcome. 
 
Education is viewed as creating an important positive externality.  Education 
generates many externalities, including more and better employment, less crime, 
and fewer negative externalities of other kinds.  It is widely believed that 
educated voters elect better politicians.66  Educated individuals tend to make a 
society wealthy, an advantage to all of society’s members.  As a consequence, 
most societies subsidize education, in order to promote it. 
 
A major source of externalities arises in communicable diseases.  Your 
vaccination not only reduces the likelihood that you contract a disease, but also 
makes it less likely that you infect others with the disease. 
6.3.1 Private and Social Value, Cost 
Let’s consider pollution as a typical example.  A paper mill produces paper, and a 
bad smell is an unfortunate by-product of the process.  Each ton of paper 
produced increases the amount of bad smells produced.  The paper mill incurs a 
marginal cost, associated with inputs like wood and chemicals and water.  For 
the purposes of studying externalities, we will refer to the paper mill’s costs as a 
private cost, the cost to the paper mill itself.  In addition, there are external costs, 
which are the costs borne by others, which arise in this case from the smell.  
Adding the private costs and the external costs yields the social costs.  These 
costs, in their marginal form, are illustrated in Figure  6-12. 
 
In Figure  6-12, the demand has been labeled “marginal benefit,” for reasons that 
will become apparent, but it is at this point just the standard demand, the 
marginal value of the product.  The paper mill’s costs have been labeled marginal 
private cost to reflect the fact that these costs are only the mill’s costs and don’t 
include the cost of the bad smell imposed on others.  The marginal social cost is 
obtained by adding the marginal external cost to the marginal private cost.  The 
marginal external cost isn’t graphed on the diagram, but the size of it is illustrated 
at one quantity, and it is generally the difference between marginal social cost 
and marginal private cost. 
 
Left to its own devices, the paper market would equate the marginal private cost 
and the marginal benefit, to produce the competitive quantity sold at the 
competitive price.  Some of these units – all of those beyond the quantity labeled 
“Socially Efficient Quantity,” are bad from a social perspective – they cost more 
to society than they provide in benefits.  This is because the social cost of these 
units includes pollution, but paper buyers have no reason to worry about pollution 
or even to know it is being created in the process of manufacturing paper. 
 
                                            
66 This is a logical proposition, but there is scant evidence in favor of it.  There is evidence that 
educated voters are more likely to vote, but little evidence that they vote for better candidates. 
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Figure  6-12: A Negative Externality 
 
 
The dead weight loss of these units is a shaded triangle.  The loss arises 
because the marginal social cost of the units exceeds the benefit, and the 
difference between the social cost and the benefits yields the loss to society.  
This is a case where too much is produced because the market has no reason to 
account for all the costs; some of the costs are borne by others. 
 
Generally, a negative externality like pollution creates a marginal social cost 
higher than the marginal private cost.  Similarly, a positive externality like 
beautification creates a higher marginal social benefit than the marginal private 
benefit (demand).  These are to some extent conventions – one could have 
incorporated a positive externality by a reduction in cost – but the convention 
remains.  An example of a product that produces both positive and negative 
externalities is illustrated in Figure  6-13.  Street lights are an example of a 
product that produces both externalities – most of us like lit streets, but they are 
terrible for astronomers.  Similarly, large highways produce benefits for 
commuters and harm to nearby residents. 
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Figure  6-13: External Costs and Benefits 
 
The marginal private benefit and the marginal private cost give the demand and 
supply of a competitive market, and hence the competitive quantity results from 
the intersection of these two.  The marginal social benefit and the marginal social 
cost gives the value and cost from a social perspective; equating these two 
generates the socially efficient outcome.  This can be either greater or less than 
the competitive outcome depending on which externality is larger. 
 
Example (Tragedy of the Commons): Consider a town on a scenic bay filled with 
lobsters.  The town members collect and eat lobsters, and over time the size of 
the lobsters collected falls, until they are hardly worth searching for.  This 
situation persists indefinitely; few large lobsters are caught and it is barely worth 
one’s time attempting to catch them. 
 
The tragedy of the commons is a problem with a common resource, in this case 
the lobster bay.  Catching lobsters creates an externality, by lowering the 
productivity of other lobster catchers.  The externality leads to over-fishing, since 
individuals don’t take into account the negative effect they have on each other, 
ultimately leading to a nearly useless resource and potentially driving the lobsters 
into extinction.  As a consequence, the lobster catch is usually regulated.   
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6.3.1.1 (Exercise) A child who is vaccinated against polio is more likely to 
contract polio (from the vaccine) than an unvaccinated child.  Does this 
fact imply that programs forcing vaccination on schoolchildren are ill-
advised?  Include with your answer with a diagram illustrating the 
negative marginal benefit of vaccination, and a horizontal axis 
representing the proportion of the population vaccinated. 
 
6.3.1.2 (Exercise) The total production from an oil field generally depends on 
the rate at which the oil is pumped, with faster rates leading to lower total 
production but earlier production.  Suppose two different producers can 
pump from the field.  Illustrate, using an externality diagram where the 
horizontal axis is the rate of production for one of the producers, the 
difference between the socially efficient outcome and the equilibrium 
outcome.  Like many other states, Texas’ law requires that when multiple 
people own land over a single oil field, the output is shared among the 
owners, with each owner obtaining a share equal to proportion of the 
field under their land.  This process is called unitization.  Does it solve 
the problem of externalities in pumping and yield an efficient outcome?  
Why or why not? 
6.3.2 Pigouvian Taxes 
Arthur Cecil Pigou, 1877-1959, proposed a solution to the problem of 
externalities that has become a standard approach.  This simple idea is to 
impose a per-unit tax on a good generating negative externalities equal to the 
marginal externality at the socially efficient quantity.  Thus, if at the socially 
efficient quantity, the marginal external cost is a dollar, then a one dollar per unit 
tax would lead to the right outcome.  This is illustrated in Figure  6-14. 
 
The tax that is added is the difference, at the socially efficient quantity, between 
the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost, which equals the marginal 
external cost.  The tax level need not equal the marginal external cost at other 
quantities, and the diagram reflects a marginal external cost that is growing as 
the quantity grows.  Nevertheless, the new supply curve created by the addition 
of the tax intersects demand (the marginal benefit) at the socially efficient 
quantity.  As a result, the new competitive equilibrium, taking account of the tax, 
is efficient. 
 
6.3.2.1 (Exercise) Identify the tax revenue produced by a Pigouvian tax in 
Figure  6-14.  What is the relationship between the tax revenue and the 
damage produced by the negative externality?  Is the tax revenue 
sufficient to pay those damaged by the external effect an amount equal 
to their damage?  Hint: Is the marginal external effect increasing or 
decreasing. 
 
The case of a positive externality is similar.  In this case, a subsidy is needed to 
induce the efficient quantity.  It is left as an exercise. 
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Figure  6-14: The Pigouvian Tax 
 
6.3.2.2 (Exercise) Identify on a diagram the Pigouvian subsidy needed to 
induce the efficient quantity in the case of a positive externality.  When is 
the subsidy expended smaller than the total external benefit? 
 
6.3.2.3 (Exercise) Use the formulae for estimating the effect of a tax on 
quantity to deduce the size of the tax needed to adjust for an externality 
when the marginal social cost is twice the marginal private cost. 
 
Taxes and subsidies are fairly common instruments to control externalities.  We 
subsidize higher education with state universities, and the federal government 
provides funds for research and limited funds for the arts.  Taxes on cigarettes 
and alcoholic beverages are used to discourage these activities, perhaps 
because smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages create negative externalities.  
(Cigarettes and alcohol also have inelastic demand, which also make them good 
candidates for taxation since there is only a small distortion of the quantity.)  
However, while important in some arenas, taxes and subsidies are not the most 
common approach to regulation of externalities. 
6.3.3 Quotas 
The Pigouvian tax and subsidy approach to dealing with externalities has several 
problems.  First, it requires knowing the marginal value or cost of the external 
effect, and this may be a challenge to estimate.  Second, it requires the 
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imposition of taxes and permits the payment of subsidies, which encourages 
what might be politely termed as “misappropriation of funds.”  That is, once a 
government agency is permitted to tax some activities and subsidize others, 
there will be a tendency to tax things people in the agency don’t like, and 
subsidize “pet” projects, using the potential for externalities as an excuse rather 
than a real reason.  U.S. politicians have been especially quick to see positive 
externalities in oil, cattle and the family farm, externalities that haven’t been 
successfully articulated.  (The Canadian government, in contrast, sees 
externalities in film-making and railroads.) 
 
An alternative to the Pigouvian tax or subsidy solution is to set a quota, which is 
a limit on the activity.  Quotas can be maxima or minima, depending on whether 
the activity generates negative or positive externalities.  We set maximum levels 
of many pollutants rather than tax them, and ban some activities, like lead in 
gasoline or paint, or chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) outright (a quota equal to zero).  
We set maximum amounts of impurities, like rat feces, in foodstuffs.  We impose 
minimum educational attainment (eighth grade or age 16, whichever comes first), 
minimum age to drive, minimum amount of rest time for truck drivers and airline 
pilots.  A large set of regulations govern electricity and plumbing, designed to 
promote safety, and these tend to be “minimum standards.”  Quotas are a much 
more common regulatory strategy for dealing with externalities than taxes and 
subsidies. 
 
The idea behind a quota is to limit the quantity to the efficient level.  If a negative 
externality in pollution means our society pollutes too much, then impose a limit 
or quantity restriction on pollution.  If the positive externality of education means 
individuals in our society receive too little education from the social perspective, 
force them to go to school. 
 
As noted, quotas have the advantage that they address the problem without 
letting the government spend more money, limiting the government’s ability to 
misuse funds.  On the other hand, quotas have the problem of identifying who 
should get the quota; quotas will often misallocate the resource.  Indeed, a small 
number of power plants account for almost half of the man-made sulfur dioxide 
pollution emitted into the atmosphere, primarily because these plants historically 
emitted a lot of pollution and their pollution level was set by their historical levels.  
Quotas tend to harm new entrants compared to existing firms, and discourage 
the adoption of new technology.  Indeed, the biggest polluters must stay with old 
technology in order to maintain their right to pollute. 
 
6.3.3.1 (Exercise) If a quota is set to the socially efficient level, how does the 
value of a quota right compare to the Pigouvian tax? 
 
6.3.3.2 (Exercise) Speeding (driving fast) creates externalities by increasing 
the likelihood and severity of automobile accidents, and most countries 
put a limit on speed, but one could instead require fast drivers to buy a 
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permit to speed.  Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
“speeding permits.” 
6.3.4 Tradable Permits and Auctions 
A solution to inefficiencies in the allocation of quota rights is to permit trading 
them.  Tradable permits for pollution create a market in the right to pollute, and 
thereby create a tax on polluting: the emission of pollution requires the purchase 
of permits to pollute, and the price of these permits represents a tax on pollution.  
Thus, tradable permits represent a hybrid of a quota system and a Pigouvian 
taxation system – a quota determines the overall quantity of pollution as in a 
quota system, determining the supply of pollution rights, but the purchase of 
pollution rights acts like a tax on pollution, a tax whose level is determined by the 
quota supply and demand. 
 
 
Figure  6-15: SO2 Permit Prices 
 
The United States has permitted the trading of permits for some pollutants, like 
sulfur dioxide.  Figure  6-15 shows the price of sulfur dioxide permits over the past 
decade.67  Each permit conveys the right to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide into the 
air.  The overall pollution level is being reduced over time, which accounts for 
some of the increase in prices.  These prices represent significant taxes on large 
polluters, as a coal-fired power plant, using coal with high sulfur content, can 
annually produce as much as 200,000 tons of sulfur dioxide. 
 
                                            
67 Source: Environmental Protection Agency, July 22, 2004, 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/so2market/alprices.html 
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The major advantage of a tradable permits system is that it creates the 
opportunity for efficient exchange – one potential polluter can buy permits from 
another, leaving the total amount of pollution constant.  Such exchange is 
efficient because it uses the pollution in the manner creating the highest value, 
eliminating a bias toward “old” sources.  Indeed, a low value polluter might sell its 
permits and just shut down, if the price of pollution were high enough. 
 
A somewhat unexpected advantage of tradable permits was the purchase of 
permits by environmental groups like the Sierra Club.  Environmental groups can 
buy permits and then not exercise them, as a way of cleaning the air.  In this 
case, the purchase of the permits creates a major positive externality on the rest 
of society, since the environmental group expends its own resources to reduce 
pollution of others. 
 
Tradable permits offer the advantages of a taxation scheme – efficient use of 
pollution – without needing to estimate the social cost of pollution directly.  This is 
especially valuable when the strategy is to set a quantity equal to the current 
quantity, and then gradually reduce the quantity to reduce the effects of the 
pollution.  The price of permits can be a very useful instrument is assessing the 
appropriate time to reduce the quantity, since high permit prices, relative to likely 
marginal external costs, suggests that the quantity of the quota is too low, while 
low prices suggest that the quantity is too large and should be reduced. 
6.3.5 Coasian Bargaining 
The negative externality of a neighbor playing loud music late at night is not 
ordinarily solved with a tax or with a quota, but instead though an agreement.  
When there aren’t many individuals involved, the individuals may be able to solve 
the problem of externalities without involving a government, but through 
negotiation.  This insight was developed by Nobel laureate Ronald Coase (1910 
– ). 
 
Coase offered the example of a cattle ranch next to a farm.  There is a negative 
externality, in that the cattle tend to wander over to the farm and eat the crops, 
rather than staying on the ranch.  What happens next depends on property 
rights, which are the rights that come with ownership.   
 
One of three things might be efficient from a social perspective.  It might be 
efficient to erect a fence to keep the cows away from the crops.  It might be 
efficient to close down the farm.  Finally, it might be efficient to close down the 
ranch, if the farm is valuable enough, and the fence costs more than the value of 
the ranch. 
 
If the farmer has a right not to have his crops eaten, and can confiscate the cows 
if they wander onto the farm, then the rancher will have an incentive to erect a 
fence to keep the cows away, if that is the efficient solution.  If the efficient 
solution is to close down the ranch, then the rancher will do that, since the farmer 
can confiscate the cows if they go to the farm and it isn’t worth building the fence 
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by hypothesis.  Finally, if the efficient solution to the externality is to close down 
the farm, the rancher will have an incentive to buy the farm in order to purchase 
the farm’s rights, so that he can keep the ranch in operation.  Since it is efficient 
to close down the farm only if the farm is worth less than the ranch, there is 
enough value in operating the ranch to purchase the farm at its value and still 
have money left over – that is there are gains from trade from selling the farm to 
the rancher.  In all three cases, if the farmer has the property rights, the efficient 
outcome is reached. 
 
 Now suppose instead that the rancher has the rights, and that the farmer has no 
recourse if the cows eat his crops.  If shutting down the farm is efficient, the 
farmer has no recourse but to shut down.  Similarly, if building the fence is 
efficient, the farmer will build the fence to protect his crops.  Finally, if shutting 
down the ranch is efficient, the farmer will buy the ranch from the rancher, in 
order to be able to continue to operate the more valuable farm.  In all cases, the 
efficient solution is reached through negotiation. 
 
Coase argued that bargaining can generally solve problems of externalities, and 
that the real problem is ill-defined property rights.  If the rancher and the farmer 
can’t transfer their property rights, then the efficient outcome may not arise.  In 
the Coasian view of externalities, if an individual owned the air, air pollution 
would not be a problem, because the owner would charge for the use and 
wouldn’t permit an inefficient level of pollution.  The case of air pollution 
demonstrates some of the limitations of the Coasian approach, because 
ownership of the air, or even the more limited right to pollute into the air, would 
create an additional set of problems, a case where the cure is likely worse than 
the disease. 
 
Bargaining to solve the problem of externalities is often feasible when a small 
number of people are involved.  When a large number of people are potentially 
involved, as with air pollution, bargaining is unlikely to be successful in 
addressing the problem of externalities, and a different approach required. 
6.3.6 Fishing and Extinction 
Consider an unregulated fishing market like the lobster market considered above, 
and let S be the stock of fish.  The purpose of this example is illustrative of the 
logic, rather than an exact accounting of the biology of fish populations, but is not 
unreasonable.  Let S be the stock of a particular species of fish.  Our starting 
point is an environment without fishing: how does the fish population change over 
time?  Denote the change over time in the fish population by S&  (S&  is notation for 
the derivative with respect to time, notation that dates back to Sir Isaac Newton.)  
We assume that population growth follows the logistic equation ).1( SrSS −=&   
This equation reflects two underlying assumptions.  First, mating and 
reproduction is proportional to the stock of fish S.  Second, survival is 
proportional to the amount of available resources 1-S, where 1 is set to be the 
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maximum sustainable population.  (Set the units of the number of fish so that 1 is 
the full population.) 
 
The dynamics of the number of fish is illustrated in Figure  6-16.  On the 
horizontal axis is the number of fish, and on the vertical axis is the change in S.  
When S& >0, S is increasing over time, and the arrows on the horizontal axis 
reflect this.  Similarly, if S& <0, S is decreasing. 
 
Absent fishing, the value 1 is a stable steady state of the fish population.  It is a 
steady state because, if S=1, S& =0, that is, there is no change in the fish 
population.  It is stable because the effect of a small perturbation – S near but not 
exactly equal to 1 – is to return to 1.  (In fact, the fish population is very nearly 
globally stable – start with any population other than zero and the population 
returns to 1.)68 
 
 
 
Figure  6-16: Fish Population Dynamics 
 
Now we introduce a human population and turn to the economics of fishing.  
Suppose that a boat costs b to launch and operate, and that it captures a fixed 
fraction a of the total stock of fish S, that is, each boat catches aS.  Fish sell for a 
price ε
1−=Qp , where the price arises from the demand curve, which in this case 
has constant elasticity ε, and Q is the quantity of fish offered for sale.  Suppose 
there be n boats launched; then the quantity of fish caught is Q=naS.  Fishers 
enter the market as long as profits are positive, which leads to zero profits for 
                                            
68 It turns out that there is a closed form solution for the fish population: 
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fishers, that is, )(Qpn
Qb ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= .  This equation makes a company just indifferent 
to launching an additional boat, because the costs and revenues are balanced.  
These two equations yield two equations in the two unknowns n and Q: 
 
ε
ε 1
1)(
−
== Q
bb
QQp
n , and 
 
Q=naS.  These two equations solve for the number of fish caught: 
 
ε
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
b
aSQ  
 
and the number of boats 1
1 −−= εε
ε
S
b
an . 
 
Subtracting the capture by humans from the growth in the fish population yields: 
 
.)1(
ε
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−=
b
aSSrSS&  
 
Thus, a steady state satisfies .)1(0
ε
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−==
b
aSSrSS&  
 
 
Figure  6-17: Fish Population Dynamics with Fishing 
S&
S 
S*
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Will human fishing drive the fish to extinction?  Extinction must occur when the 
only stable solution to the stock of fish is zero.  Consider first the case when 
demand is elastic (ε>1).  In this case, for S near zero but positive, 0>≈ rSS& , 
because the other terms are small relative to the linear term.  Thus, with elastic 
demand, there is always a steady state without extinction.  (Extinction is also an 
equilibrium, too, but over-fishing won’t get the system there.)  This equilibrium is 
illustrated in Figure  6-17. 
 
The dark curve represents S& , and thus for S between 0 and the point labeled S*, 
S&  is positive and thus S is increasing over time.  Similarly, to the right of S*, S is 
decreasing.  Thus, S* is stable under small perturbations in the stock of fish and 
is an equilibrium. 
 
We see that if demand for fish is elastic, fishing will not drive the fish to 
extinction.  Even so, fishing will reduce the stock of fish below the efficient level, 
because individual fishers don’t take account of the externality they impose – 
their fishing reduces the stock for future generations.  The level of fish in the sea 
converges to S* satisfying 
 
.**)1(*0
ε
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−=
b
aSSrS  
 
In contrast, if demand is inelastic, fishing may drive the fish to extinction.  For 
example, if r=2 and a=b=1, and ε=0.7, extinction is necessary, as is illustrated in 
Figure  6-18. 
 
 
Figure  6-18: Fish Population Dynamics: Extinction 
 
Figure  6-18 shows that, for the given parameters, the net growth of the fish 
population is negative for every value of the stock S.  Thus the population of fish 
consistently dwindles. This is a case when the fishing externality (overfishing 
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today reduces the stock of fish tomorrow) has particularly dire consequences.  
The reason why the elasticity of demand matters is that, with inelastic demand, 
the fall in the stock of fish increases the price by a large amount (enough so that 
total revenue rises).  This, in turn, increases the number of fishing boats, in spite 
of the fall in the catch.  In contrast, with elastic demand, the number of fishing 
boats falls as the stock falls, reducing the proportion of fish caught, and thus 
preventing extinction.  We see this for the equation for the number of fishing 
boats 
 
1
1 −−= εε
ε
S
b
an  
 
which reflects the fact that fishing effort rises as the stock falls if and only if 
demand is inelastic. 
 
It is possible, even with inelastic demand, for there to be a stable fish population: 
not all parameter values lead to extinction.  Using the same parameters as 
before, but with ε=0.9, we obtain a stable outcome illustrated in Figure  6-19. 
 
 
Figure  6-19: Possibility of Multiple Equilibria 
 
In addition to the stable equilibrium outcome, there is an unstable steady state, 
which might either converge upward or downward.  It is a feature of fishing with 
inelastic demand that there is a region where extinction is inevitable, for when the 
stock is near zero, the high demand price induced by inelasticity forces sufficient 
fishing to insure extinction. 
 
As a consequence of the fishing externality, nations attempt to regulate fishing, 
both by extending their own reach 200 miles into the sea, and by treaties limiting 
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fishing in the open sea.  These regulatory attempts have met with only modest 
success at preventing over-fishing. 
 
What is the efficient stock of fish?  This is a challenging mathematical problem, 
but some insight can be gleaned via a steady state analysis.  A steady state arise 
when 0=S& .  If a constant amount Q is removed, a steady state in the stock 
must occur at QSrSS −−== )1(0 & .  This maximum catch then occurs at S = 
½, and Q = ¼ r.  This is not the efficient level, for it neglects the cost of boats, 
and the efficient stock will actually be larger.  More generally, it is never efficient 
to send the population below the maximum point on the survival curve plotted in 
Figure  6-16. 
 
Conceptually, fishing is an example of the tragedy of the commons externality 
already discussed.  However, the threat of a permanent extinction and alluring 
possibility of solving dynamic models make it a particularly dramatic example. 
 
6.3.6.1 (Exercise) Suppose ε = 1.  For what parameter values are fish 
necessarily driven to extinction?  Can you interpret this condition to say 
that the demand for caught fish exceeds the production via reproduction? 
6.4 Public Goods 
A public good has two attributes: nonexcludability, which means the producer 
can’t prevent the use of the good by others, and nonrivalry, which means that 
many people can use the good simultaneously. 
6.4.1 Examples 
Consider a company offering a fireworks display.  Pretty much anyone nearby 
can watch the fireworks, and people with houses in the right place have a great 
view of them.  The company that creates the fireworks can’t compel those with 
nearby homes to pay for the fireworks, and so a lot of people get to watch them 
without paying.  This will make it difficult or impossible for the fireworks company 
to make a profit.  In addition, fireworks offer nonrivalry, in that one person’s 
viewing of the display doesn’t impinge significantly on another’s viewing.  
Nonrivalry has the implication that the efficient price is zero, since the marginal 
cost of another viewer is zero. 
 
The classic example of a public good is national defense.  National defense is 
clearly non-excludable, for if we spend the resources necessary to defend our 
national borders, it isn’t going to be possible to defend everything except one 
apartment on the second floor of a three story apartment on East Maple Street.  
Once we have kept our enemies out of our borders, we’ve protected everyone 
within the borders.  Similarly, the defense of the national borders exhibits a fair 
degree of nonrivalry, especially insofar as the strategy of defense is to deter an 
attack in the first place.  That is, the same expenditure of resources protects all. 
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It is theoretically possible to exclude some from the use of a poem, or a 
mathematical theorem, but exclusion is generally quite difficult.  Both poems and 
theorems are nonrivalrous.  Another good that permits exclusion at a cost is a 
highway.  A toll highway shows that exclusion is possible on the highways.  
Exclusion is quite expensive, partly because the tollbooths require staffing, but 
mainly because of the delays imposed on drivers associated with paying the tolls 
– the time costs of toll roads is high.  Highways are an intermediate case where 
exclusion is possible only at a significant cost, and thus should be avoided if 
possible.  Highways are also rivalrous at high congestion levels, but nonrivalrous 
at low congestion levels.  That is, the marginal cost of an additional user is 
essentially zero for a sizeable number of users, but then marginal cost grows 
rapidly in the number of users.  With fewer than 700 cars per lane per hour on a 
four lane highway, generally the flow of traffic is unimpeded.69  As congestion 
grows beyond this level, traffic slows down and congestion sets in.  Thus, west 
Texas interstate highways are usually nonrivalrous, while Los Angeles freeways 
are usually very rivalrous. 
 
Like highways, recreational parks are nonrivalrous at low use levels, becoming 
rivalrous as they become sufficiently crowded.  Also like highways, it is possible 
but expensive to exclude potential users, since exclusion requires fences and a 
means for admitting some but not others.  (Some exclusive parks provide keys to 
legitimate users, while others use gatekeepers to charge admission.) 
6.4.2 Free-Riders 
Consider a neighborhood association which is considering buying land and 
building a park in the neighborhood.  The value of the park is going to depend on 
the size of the park, and we suppose for simplicity that the value in dollars of the 
park to each household in the neighborhood is abnS − , where n is the number of 
park users, S is the size of the park and a and b a are parameters satisfying 
0<a≤b<1.  This functional form builds in the property that larger parks provide 
more value at a diminishing rate, but there is an effect from congestion.  The 
functional form gives a reason for parks to be public – it is more efficient for a 
group of people to share a large park than for each individual to possess a small 
park, at least if b > a, because the gains from a large park exceed the congestion 
effects.  That is, there is a scale advantage – doubling the number of people and 
the size of the park increases each individual’s enjoyment. 
 
How much will selfish individuals voluntarily contribute to the building of the park?  
That of course depends on what they think others will contribute.  Consider a 
single household, and suppose that household thinks the others will contribute S-
1 to the building of the park.  Should the household contribute, and if so, how 
much?  If the household contributes s, the park will have size S = S-1 + s, which 
                                            
69 The effect of doubling the number of lanes from 2 to 4 is dramatic.  A two lane highway 
generally flows at 60 mph or more provided there are fewer than 200 cars per lane per hour, 
while a four lane highway can accommodate 700 cars per lane per hour at the same speed. 
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the household values at ab nsS −− + )( 1 .  Thus, the net gain to a household who 
contributes s when the others contribute S-1 is snsS ab −+ −− )( 1 . 
 
6.4.2.1 (Exercise) Verify that individual residents gain from contributing to the 
park if babnS −−< 1
1
)(  and gain from reducing their contributions if 
babnS −−> 1
1
)( . 
 
The previous exercise shows that individual residents gain from their marginal 
contribution if and only if the park is smaller than babnS −−= 1
1
0 )( .  
Consequently, under voluntary contributions, the only equilibrium park size is S0.  
That is, for any park size smaller than S0, citizens will voluntarily contribute to 
make the park larger.  For any larger size, no one is willing to contribute.   
 
Under voluntary contributions, as the neighborhood grows in number, the size of 
the park shrinks.  This makes sense – the benefits of individual contributions to 
the park mostly accrue to others, which reduces the payoff to any one 
contributor. 
 
How large should the park be?  The total value of the park of size S to the 
residents together is n times the individual value, which gives a collective value 
of abnS −1 , and the park costs S, so from a social perspective the park should be 
sized to maximize SnS ab −−1 , which yields an optimal park of size 
babnS −−= 1
1
1 )(* .  Thus, as the neighborhood grows, the park should grow, but 
as we saw the park would shrink if the neighborhood has to rely on voluntary 
contributions.  This is because people contribute individually as if they were 
building the park for themselves, and don’t account for the value they provide to 
their neighbors when they contribute.  Under individual contributions, the hope 
that others contribute leads individuals not to contribute.  Moreover, use of the 
park by others reduces the value of the park to each individual, so that the size of 
the park shrinks as the population grows under individual contributions. In 
contrast, the park ought to grow faster than the number of residents grows, as 
the per capita park size is b
ab
b nbn
S −
−
−= 11
1
* , which is an increasing function of 
n.70 
 
                                            
70 Reminder: In making statements like should and ought, there is no conflict in this model 
because every household agrees about the optimal size of the park, so that a change to a park 
size of S*, paid with equal contributions, maximizes every household’s utility. 
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The lack of incentive for individuals to contribute to a social good is known as a 
free-rider problem.  The term refers to the individuals who don’t contribute, who 
are said to free-ride on the contributions of others.  There are two aspects of the 
free-rider problem apparent in this simple mathematical model.  First, the 
individual incentive to contribute to a public good is reduced by the contributions 
of others, and thus individual contributions tend to be smaller when the group is 
larger.  Put another way, the size of the free-rider problem grows as the 
community grows larger.  Second, as the community grows larger, the optimal 
size of the public good grows.  The market failure under voluntary contributions is 
greater the larger is the community.  In the theory presented, the optimal size of 
the public good is babnS −−= 1
1
1 )(* , and the actual size under voluntary 
contributions is babnS −−= 1
1
0 )( , a gap that gets very large as the number of 
people grows. 
 
The upshot is that people will voluntarily contribute too little from a social 
perspective, by free-riding on the contributions of others.  A good example of the 
provision of public goods is a co-authored term paper.  This is a public good 
because the grade given to the paper is the same for each author, and the 
quality of the paper depends on the sum of the efforts of the individual authors.  
Generally, with two authors, both work pretty hard on the manuscript in order to 
get a good grade.  Add a third author and it is a virtual certainty that two of the 
authors think the third didn’t work as hard and was a free-rider on the project. 
 
The term paper example also points to the limitations of the theory.  Many people 
are not as selfish as the theory assumed and will contribute more than would be 
privately optimal.  Moreover, with small numbers, bargaining between the 
contributors and the division of labor (each works on a section) may help reduce 
the free-rider problem.  Nevertheless, even with these limitations, the free-rider 
problem is very real and it gets worse the more people are involved.  The theory 
shows that if some individuals contribute more than their share in an altruistic 
way, the more selfish individuals contribute even less, undoing some of the good 
done by the altruists. 
 
6.4.2.2 (Exercise) For the model presented in this section, compute the 
elasticity of the optimal park size with respect to the number of residents, 
that is, the percent change in S* for a small percentage change in n.  
[Hint: use the linear approximation trick ∆≈∆+ rr)1(  for ∆ near zero.] 
 
6.4.2.3 (Exercise) For the model of this section, show that an individual’s utility 
when the park is optimally sized and the expenses are shared equally 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 6-248
among the n individuals is b
ab
bb
b
nbbu −
−
−−
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−= 11
1
1 .  Does this model 
predict an increase in utility from larger communities? 
 
6.4.2.4 (Exercise) Suppose two people, person 1 and person 2, want to 
produce a playground to share between them.  The value of the 
playground of size S to each person is S , where S is the number of 
dollars spent building it.  Show that under voluntary contributions, the 
size of the playground is ¼ and that the efficient size is 1. 
 
6.4.2.5 (Exercise) For the previous exercise, now suppose person 1 offers 
“matching funds,” that is, offers to contribute an equal amount to the 
contributions of the person 2.  How large a playground will person 2 
choose? 
6.4.3 Provision with Taxation 
Faced with the fact that voluntary contributions produce an inadequate park, the 
neighborhood turns to taxes.  Many neighborhood associations or condominium 
associations have taxing authority, and can compel individuals to contribute.  
Clearly in the example from the previous section, and indeed a solution is to 
require each resident to contribute the amount 1, resulting in a park that is 
optimally sized at n.  Generally it is possible in principle to provide the correct 
size of the public good using taxes to fund it.  However, it will be a challenge in 
practice, which can be illustrated with a slight modification of the example. 
 
Let individuals have different strengths of preferences, so that individual i values 
the public good of size S at abi nSv
−  in dollars.  (It is useful to assume that no 
two people have the same v values to simplify arguments.)  The optimal size of 
the park for the neighborhood is b
a
bbn
i i
b
a
nvbvbn −
−
−−=−
−
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∑ 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 )( , where 
∑ == ni ivnv 11  is the average value.  Again, taxes can be assessed to pay for an 
optimally-sized park, but some people (those with small v values) will view that 
as a bad deal, while others (with large v) view it as a good deal.  What will the 
neighborhood choose? 
 
If there are an odd number of voters in the neighborhood, the prediction is that 
the park will serve the median voter the best.71  With equal taxes, an individual 
                                            
71 The voting model used is that there is a status quo, which is a planned size of S.  Anyone can 
propose to change the size of S, and the neighborhood votes yes or no.  If an S exists such that 
no replacement gets a majority vote, that S is an equilibrium under majority voting. 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 6-249
obtains n
SnSv abi −− .  If there are an odd number of people, n can be written 
as 2k+1.  The median voter is the person for whom k have values vi larger than 
hers, and k have values smaller.  Consider increasing S.  If the median voter 
likes it, then so do all the people with higher v’s, and the proposition to increase 
S passes.  Similarly, a proposal to decrease S will get a majority if the median 
voter likes it.  If the median voter likes reducing S, all the individuals with smaller 
vi will vote for it as well.  Thus, we can see that voting maximizes the preferences 
of the median voter, and simple calculus shows that entails b
a
bk nbvS −
−
−= 1
1
1
1
)( . 
 
Unfortunately, voting does not result in an efficient outcome generally, and only 
does so when the average value equals the median value.  On the other hand, 
voting generally performs much better than voluntary contributions.  The park 
size can either be larger or smaller under median voting than is efficient.72 
 
6.4.3.1 (Exercise) For the model of this section, show that, under voluntary 
contributions, only one person contributes, and that person is the person 
with the largest vi.  How much do they contribute?  [Hint: which individual 
i is willing to contribute at the largest park size?  Given the park this 
individual desires, can anyone else benefit from contributing at all?] 
 
6.4.3.2 (Exercise) Show that if all individuals value the public good equally, 
voting on the size of the good results in the efficient provision of the 
public good. 
6.4.4 Local Public Goods 
The example in the previous section showed that there are challenges to a 
neighborhood’s provision of public goods created by differences in the 
preferences of the public good.  Voting does not generally lead to the efficient 
provision of the public good, and does so only in special circumstances, like 
agreement of preferences. 
 
A different solution was proposed by Tiebout73 in 1956.  This solution works only 
when the public goods are local in nature – people living nearby may or may not 
be excludable, but people living further away can be excluded, and such goods 
are called “local public goods.”  Schools are local – more distant people can 
readily be excluded.  Parks are harder to exclude from, but are still local in 
nature; few people will drive 30 miles to use a park. 
 
Suppose that there are a variety of neighborhoods, some with high taxes, better 
schools, big parks, beautifully maintained trees on the streets, frequent garbage 
                                            
72 The general principle here is that the median voting will do better when the distribution of 
values is such that the average of n values exceeds the median, which in turn exceeds the 
maximum divided by n.  This is true for most empirically relevant distributions. 
73 Charles Tiebout, 1919-1962.  His surname is pronounced “tee-boo.” 
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pickup, a first-rate fire department, extensive police protection and spectacular 
fireworks displays, and others with lower taxes and more modest provision of 
public goods.  People will tend to move to the neighborhood that fits their 
preferences.  The result is neighborhoods that are relatively homogeneous with 
respect to the desire for public goods.  That homogeneity, in turn, makes voting 
work better.  That is, the ability of people to choose their neighborhoods to suit 
their preferences over taxes and public goods will make the neighborhood 
provision of public goods more efficient.  The “Tiebout theory” shows that local 
public goods will tend to be efficiently provided.  In addition, even private goods 
like garbage collection and schools can be efficiently provided publicly if they are 
local goods, and there are enough distinct localities to offer a broad range of 
services. 
 
6.4.4.1 (Exercise) Consider a baby-sitting cooperative, where parents rotate 
supervision of the children of several families.  Suppose that, if the sitting 
service is available with frequency Y, the value placed by person i is vi Y 
and the costs of contribution y is ½ ny2, where Y is the sum of the 
individual contributions and n is the number of families.  Rank v1 ≥ v2 ≥ 
… ≥ vn.  (i) What is the size of the service under voluntary contributions? 
(Hint: Let yi be the contribution of family i.  Identify the payoff of family j 
as  
 ( ) ( )2½ jji ijj ynyyv −+∑ ≠  
 
What value of yj maximizes this expression?) 
 
(ii) What contributions maximize the total social value 
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6.5 Monopoly 
We have spent a great deal of time on the competitive model, and we now turn to 
the polar opposite case, that of monopoly.  A monopoly is a firm that faces a 
downward sloping demand, and has a choice about what price to charge – an 
increase in price doesn’t send most or all of the customers away to rivals. 
 
There are very few pure monopolies.  The U.S. post office has a monopoly in 
first-class mail, but faces competition by FedEx and other express mail 
companies, as well as by faxes and email, in the broader “send documents to 
others” market.  Microsoft has a great deal of market power, but a small 
percentage of personal computer users choose Apple or Linux operating 
systems.  There is only one U.S. manufacturer of aircraft carriers. 
 
However, there are many firms that have market power or monopoly power, 
which means that they can increase their price above marginal cost and sustain 
sales for a long period of time.74  The theory of monopoly is applicable to such 
firms, although they may face an additional and important constraint: a price 
increase may affect the behavior of rivals.  The behavior of rivals is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
 
A large market share is not a proof of monopoly, nor is a small market share 
proof that a firm lacks monopoly power.  U.S. Air dominated air traffic to 
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, but still lost money.  Porsche has a small share of 
the automobile market, or even the high-end automobile market, but still has 
monopoly power in that market. 
6.5.1 Sources of Monopoly 
There are three basic sources of monopoly.  The most common source is to be 
granted a monopoly by the government, either through patents, in which case the 
monopoly is temporary, or through a government franchise.  Intelsat was a 
government franchise granted a monopoly on satellite communications, a 
monopoly that ultimately proved lucrative indeed.  Many cities and towns license 
a single cable TV company or taxi company, although usually basic rates and 
fares are set by the terms of the license agreement.  New drugs are granted 
patents that provide a monopoly for a period of time.  (Patents generally last 
twenty years, but pharmaceutical drugs have their own patent laws.)  Copyright 
also confers a monopoly for a supposedly limited period of time.  Thus, the 
Disney Corporation owns copyrights on Mickey Mouse, copyrights which by law 
should have expired, but have been granted an extension by Congress each time 
they were due to expire.  Copyrights create monopoly power over music as well 
as cartoon characters, and Paul McCartney owns the rights to the song “Happy 
                                            
74 These terms are used somewhat differently by different authors.  Both require downward 
sloping demand, and usually some notion of sustainability of sales.  Some distinguish the terms 
by whether they are “large” or not, others by how long the price increase can be sustained.  We 
won’t need such distinctions here. 
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Birthday to You,” and receives royalties every time it is played on the radio or 
other commercial venue.75  This book is copyrighted under terms that expressly 
prohibit commercial use but permit most other uses. 
 
A second source of monopoly is a large economy of scale.  The scale economy 
needs to be large relative to the size of demand.  If the average cost when a 
single firm serves the entire market is lower than when two or more firms serve 
the market, a monopoly can be the result.  For example, long distance telephone 
lines were expensive to install, and the first company to do so, A.T. & T., wound 
up being the only provider of long distance service in the United States.  
Similarly, scale economies in electricity generation meant that most communities 
had a single electricity provider prior to the 1980s, when new technology made 
relatively smaller scale generation more efficient. 
 
The demand-side equivalent of an economy of scale is a network externality.  A 
network externality arises when others’ use of a product makes it more valuable 
to each consumer.  Standards are a common source of network externality.  That 
AA batteries are standardized makes them more readily accessible, helps drive 
down their price through competition and economies of scale, and thus makes 
the AA battery more valuable.  AA batteries are available everywhere, unlike 
proprietary batteries.  Fax machines are valuable only if others have similar 
machines.   In addition to standards, a source of network externality is third-party 
products.  Choosing Microsoft Windows as a computer operating system means 
that there is more software available than for Macintosh or Linux, as the 
widespread adoption of Windows has led a large variety of software to be written 
for it.  The JVC Video Home System of VCRs came to dominate the Sony Beta 
system, primarily because there were more movies to rent in the VHS format 
than in the Beta format at the video rental store.  In contrast, recordable DVD has 
been hobbled by incompatible standards of DVD+R and DVD-R, a conflict not 
resolved even as the next generation – 50GB discs such as Sony’s Blu-ray – 
start to reach the market.  DVDs themselves were slow to be adopted by 
consumers, because few discs were available for rent at video rental stores, 
which is a consequence of few adoptions of DVD players.  As DVD players 
became more prevalent, and the number of discs for rent increased, the market 
tipped and DVDs came to dominate VHS. 
 
The third source of monopoly is control of an essential, or a sufficiently valuable, 
input to the production process.  Such an input could be technology that confers 
a cost advantage.  For example, software is run by a computer operating system, 
and needs to be designed to work well with the operating system.  There have 
been a series of allegations that Microsoft kept secret some of the “application 
program interfaces” used by Word as a means of hobbling rivals.  If so, access to 
the design of the operating system itself is an important input. 
                                            
75 Fair use provisions protect individuals with non-commercial uses of copyrighted materials.  
Ironically, many of the Beatles songs which McCartney co-authored are owned by Michael 
Jackson. 
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6.5.2 Basic Analysis 
Even a monopoly is constrained by demand.  A monopoly would like to sell lots 
of units at very high prices, but higher prices necessarily lead to a loss in sales.  
So how does a monopoly choose its price and quantity? 
 
A monopoly can choose price, or a monopoly can choose quantity and let the 
demand dictate the price.  It is slightly more convenient to formulate the theory in 
terms of quantity rather than price, because costs are a function of quantity.  
Thus, we let p(q) be the demand price associated with quantity q, and c(q) be the 
cost of producing q.  The monopoly’s profits are 
 
)()( qcqqp −=π . 
 
The monopoly earns the revenue pq and pays the cost c.  This leads to the first 
order condition, for the profit-maximizing quantity qm: 
 
)()()(0 mmmm qcqpqqpq
′−′+=∂
∂= π . 
 
The term )()( qpqqp ′+  is known as marginal revenue.  It is the derivative of 
revenue pq with respect to quantity.  Thus, a monopoly chooses a quantity qm 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, and charges the maximum price 
p(qm) the market will bear at that quantity.  Marginal revenue is below demand 
p(q) because demand is downward sloping.  That is, )()()( qpqpqqp <′+ . 
 
6.5.2.1 (Exercise) If demand is linear, p(q)=a – bq, what is marginal revenue?  
Plot demand and marginal revenue, and total revenue qp(q) as a 
function of q. 
 
6.5.2.2 (Exercise) For the case of constant elasticity of demand, what is 
marginal revenue? 
 
6.5.2.3 (Exercise) If both demand and supply have constant elasticity, compute 
the monopoly quantity and price. 
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Figure  6-20: Basic Monopoly Diagram 
 
The choice of monopoly quantity is illustrated in Figure  6-20.  The key points of 
this diagram are, first, that marginal revenue lies below the demand curve.  This 
occurs because marginal revenue is the demand p(q) plus a negative number.  
Second, the monopoly quantity equates marginal revenue and marginal cost, but 
the monopoly price is higher than the marginal cost.  Third, there is a dead 
weight loss, for the same reason that taxes create a dead weight loss: the higher 
price of the monopoly prevents some units from being traded that are valued 
more highly than they cost.  Fourth, the monopoly profits from the increase in 
price, and the monopoly profit is shaded.  Fifth, since under competitive 
conditions supply equals marginal cost, the intersection of marginal cost and 
demand corresponds to the competitive outcome.  We see that the monopoly 
restricts output and charges a higher price than would prevail under competition. 
 
We can rearrange the monopoly pricing formula to produce an additional insight. 
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The left hand side of this equation is known as the price-cost margin or Lerner 
Index.76  The right hand side is one over the elasticity of demand.  This formula 
relates the markup over marginal cost to the elasticity of demand.  It is important 
because perfect competition forces price to equal marginal cost, so this formula 
provides a measure of the deviation from competition, and in particular says that 
the deviation from competition is small when the elasticity of demand is large, 
and vice versa. 
 
Marginal cost will always be at least zero or larger.  If marginal cost is less than 
zero, the least expensive way to produce a given quantity is to produce more and 
throw some away.  Thus, the price-cost margin is no greater than one, and as a 
result, a monopolist produces in the elastic portion of demand.  One implication 
of this observation is that if demand is everywhere inelastic (e.g. aqqp −=)(  for 
a>1), the optimal monopoly quantity is essentially zero, and in any event would 
be no more than one molecule of the product. 
 
In addition, the effects of monopoly are related to the elasticity of demand.  If 
demand is very elastic, the effect of monopoly on prices is quite limited.  In 
contrast, if the demand is relatively inelastic, monopolies will increase prices by a 
large margin. 
 
We can rewrite the formula to obtain 
 
).(
1
)( mm qcqp ′−= ε
ε  
 
Thus, a monopolist marks up marginal cost by the factor 
1−ε
ε , at least when ε>1.  
This formula is sometimes used to justify a “fixed markup policy,” which means a 
company adds a constant percentage markup to its products.  This is an ill-
advised policy not justified by the formula, because the formula suggests a 
markup which depends on the demand for the product in question and thus not a 
fixed markup for all products a company produces. 
6.5.3 Effect of Taxes 
A tax imposed on a seller with monopoly power performs differently than a tax 
imposed on a competitive industry.  Ultimately a perfectly competitive industry 
must pass on all of a tax to consumers, because in the long run the competitive 
industry earns zero profits.  In contrast, a monopolist might absorb some portion 
of a tax even in the long run. 
                                            
76 Abba Lerner, 1903-1982.  Note that 
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To model the effect of taxes on a monopoly, consider a monopolist who faces a 
tax rate t per unit of sales.  This monopolist earns 
 
tqqcqqp −−= )()(π . 
 
The first order condition for profit maximization yields 
 
tqcqpqqp
q mmmm
−′−′+=∂
∂= )()()(0 π . 
 
Viewing the monopoly quantity as a function of t, we obtain: 
 
0
)()()(2
1 <′′−′′+′= mmmm
m
qcqpqqpdt
dq , 
 
with the sign following from the second order condition for profit maximization.  In 
addition, the change in price satisfies 
 
.0
)()()(2
)()( >′′−′′+′
′=′
mmmm
mm
m qcqpqqp
qp
dt
dqqp  
 
Thus, a tax causes a monopoly to increase its price.  In addition, the monopoly 
price rises by less than the tax if 1)( <′
dt
dqqp mm , or 
 
.0)()()( <′′−′′+′ mmmm qcqpqqp  
 
This condition need not be true, but is a standard regularity condition imposed by 
assumption.  It is true for linear demand and increasing marginal cost.  It is false 
for constant elasticity of demand, ε>1 (which is the relevant case, for otherwise 
the second order conditions fail) and constant marginal cost.  In the latter case, a 
tax on a monopoly increases price by more than the amount of the tax. 
 
6.5.3.1 (Exercise) Use a revealed preference argument to show that a per unit 
tax imposed on a monopoly causes the quantity to fall.  That is, 
hypothesize quantities qb before the tax, and qa after the tax, and show 
that two facts – the before tax monopoly preferred qb to qa and the taxed 
monopoly made higher profits from qb together imply the qb ≤ qa. 
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6.5.3.2 (Exercise) When both demand and supply have constant elasticity, use 
the results of  6.5.2.3 (Exercise) to compute the effect of a proportional 
tax (i.e. a portion of the price paid to the government). 
6.5.4 Price Discrimination 
Pharmaceutical drugs for sale in Mexico are generally priced substantially below 
their U.S. counterparts.  Pharmaceutical drugs in Europe are also cheaper than 
in the U.S., although not as inexpensive as in Mexico, with Canadian prices 
usually between the U.S. and European prices.  (The comparison is between 
identical drugs produced by the same manufacturer.) 
 
Pharmaceutical drugs differ in price across countries primarily because demand 
conditions vary.  The formula 
 
).(
1
)( mm qcqp ′−= ε
ε  
 
shows that a monopoly seller would like to charge a higher markup over marginal 
cost to customers with less elastic demand than with customers with more elastic 
demand, because 
1−ε
ε  is a decreasing function of ε, for ε>1.  Charging different 
prices for the same product to different customers is known as price 
discrimination.  In business settings, it is sometimes known as value-based 
pricing, which is a more palatable term to tell to customers. 
 
Computer software vendors often sell a “student” version of their software, 
usually at substantially reduced prices, and requiring proof of being a student to 
qualify for the lower price.  Such student discounts are examples of price 
discrimination, and students have more elastic demand than business users.  
Similarly, the student and senior citizen discounts at movies and other venues 
sell the same thing – a ticket to the show – for different prices, and thus qualify 
as price discrimination. 
 
In order for a seller to price-discriminate, the seller must be able to 
• identify (approximately) the demand of groups of customers 
• prevent arbitrage 
 
Arbitrage is also known as “buying low and selling high,” and represents the act 
of being an intermediary.  Since price discrimination requires charging one group 
a higher price than another, there is potentially an opportunity for arbitrage, 
arising from members of the low price group buying at the low price and selling at 
the high price.  If the seller can’t prevent arbitrage, arbitrage essentially converts 
a two-price system to sales at the low price. 
 
Why offer student discounts at the movies?  You already know the answer to this 
– students have lower incomes on average than others, and lower incomes 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 6-258
translate into a lower willingness to pay for normal goods.  Consequently a 
discount to a student makes sense from a demand perspective.  Arbitrage can be 
mostly prevented by requiring a student identification card to be presented.  
Senior citizen discounts are a bit more subtle.  Generally seniors aren’t poorer 
than other groups of customers (in the United States, at least).  However, seniors 
have more free time, and thus are able to substitute to matinee showings77 or 
drive to more distant locations should those offer discounts.  Thus seniors have 
relatively elastic demand more because of their ability to substitute than because 
of their income. 
 
Airlines commonly price discriminate, using “Saturday night stay-overs” and other 
devices.  To see that such charges represent price discrimination, consider a 
passenger who lives in Dallas but needs to spend Monday through Thursday in 
Los Angeles two weeks in a row.  This passenger could buy two round-trip 
tickets: 
 
Trip One: 
First Monday: Dallas → Los Angeles 
First Friday: Los Angeles → Dallas 
 
Trip Two: 
Second Monday: Dallas → Los Angeles 
Second Friday: Los Angeles → Dallas 
 
At the time of this writing, the approximate combined cost of these two flights was 
US$2,000.  In contrast, another way of arranging exactly the same travel is to 
have two round-trips, one of which originates in Dallas, while the other originates 
in Los Angeles: 
 
Trip One: 
First Monday: Dallas → Los Angeles 
Second Friday: Los Angeles → Dallas 
 
Trip Two: 
First Friday: Los Angeles → Dallas 
Second Monday: Dallas → Los Angeles 
 
This pair of round trips involves exactly the same travel as the first pair, but costs 
less than $500 for both (at the time of this writing).  The difference is that the 
second pair involves staying over Saturday night for both legs, and that leads to 
a major discount for most U.S. airlines.  (American Airlines quoted the fares.) 
 
                                            
77 Matinee showings are those early in the day, which are usually discounted.  These discounts 
are not price discrimination because a show at noon isn’t the same product as a show in the 
evening. 
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How can airlines price discriminate?  There are two major groups of customers: 
business travelers and leisure travelers.  Business travelers have the higher 
willingness to pay overall, and the nature of their trips tends to be that they come 
home for the weekend.  In contrast, a leisure traveler will usually want to be away 
for a weekend, so a weekend stay-over is an indicator of a leisure traveler.  It 
doesn’t work perfectly as an indicator – some business travelers must be away 
for the weekend – but it is sufficiently correlated with leisure travel that it is 
profitable for the airline to price discriminate. 
 
These examples illustrate an important distinction.  Senior citizen and student 
discounts are based on the identity of the buyer, and qualifying for the discount 
requires showing an identity card.  In contrast, airline price discrimination is not 
based on the identity of the buyer but on the choices by the buyer.  The former is 
known as direct price discrimination, while the latter is known as indirect price 
discrimination.78 
 
Two common examples of indirect price discrimination are coupons and quantity 
discounts.  Coupons offer discounts for products and are especially common in 
grocery stores, where they are usually provided in a newspaper section available 
free at the front of the store.  Coupons discriminate on the basis of the cost of 
time.  It takes time to find the coupons for the products one is interested in 
buying, and thus those with a high value of time won’t find it worthwhile spending 
twenty minutes to save $5 (effectively a $15 per hour return), while those with a 
low value of time will find that return worthwhile.  Since those with a low value of 
time tend to be more price sensitive (more elastic demand), coupons offer a 
discount available to all but used primarily by customers with a more elastic 
demand, and thus increase the profits of the seller. 
 
Quantity discounts are discounts for buying more.  Thus, the large size of milk, 
laundry detergent and other items often cost less per unit than smaller sizes, and 
the difference is greater than the savings on packaging costs.  In some cases, 
the larger sizes entail greater packaging costs; some manufacturers “band 
together” individual units, incurring additional costs to create a larger size which 
is then discounted.  Thus, the “twenty-four pack” of paper towels sells for less per 
roll than the individual rolls; such large volumes appeal primarily to large families, 
who are more price-sensitive on average. 
6.5.5 Welfare Effects 
Is price discrimination a good thing, or a bad thing?  It turns out that there is no 
definitive answer to this question.  Instead, it depends on circumstances.  We 
illustrate this conclusion with a pair of exercises. 
 
                                            
78 The older and incoherent language for these concepts called direct price discrimination “third 
degree price discrimination,” while indirect price discrimination was called second degree price 
discrimination.  In the older language, first degree price discrimination meant perfect third degree 
price discrimination. 
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6.5.5.1 (Exercise) Let marginal cost be zero for all quantities.  Suppose there 
are two equal-sized groups of customers, group 1 with demand q(p)=12-
p, group 2 with demand q(p)=8-p.  Show that a non-discriminating 
monopolist charges a price of 5 and the discriminating monopolist 
charges group 1 the price 6 and group 2 the price 4.  Then calculate the 
gains from trade, with discrimination and without, and show that price 
discrimination reduces the gains from trade. 
 
This exercise illustrates a much more general proposition: if a price-
discriminating monopolist produces less than a non-discriminating monopolist, 
then price discrimination reduced welfare.  This proposition has an elementary 
proof.  Consider the price discriminating monopolist’s sales, and then allow 
arbitrage.  The arbitrage increases the gains from trade, since every transaction 
has gains from trade.  Arbitrage, however, leads to a common price like that 
charged by a non-discriminating monopolist.  Thus, the only way price 
discrimination can increase welfare is if it leads a seller to sell more output than 
she would otherwise.  This is possible, as the next exercise shows. 
 
6.5.5.2 (Exercise) Let marginal cost be zero for all quantities.  Suppose there 
are two equal-sized groups of customers, group 1 with demand q(p)=12-
p, group 2 with demand q(p)=4-p.  Show that a non-discriminating 
monopolist charges a price of 6 and the discriminating monopolist 
charges group 1 the price 6 and group 2 the price 2.  Then calculate the 
gains from trade, with discrimination and without, and show that price 
discrimination increases the gains from trade. 
 
In this exercise, we see that price discrimination that brings in a new group of 
customers may increase the gains from trade.  Indeed, this example involves a 
Pareto improvement: the seller and group 2 are better off, and group 1 no worse 
off, than without price discrimination.  (A Pareto improvement requires that no 
one is worse off and at least one person is better off.) 
 
Whether price discrimination increases the gains from trade overall depends on 
circumstances.  However, it is worth remembering that people with lower 
incomes tend to have more elastic demand, and thus get lower prices under 
price discrimination than absent price discrimination.  Consequently, a ban on 
price discrimination tends to hurt the poor and benefit the rich no matter what the 
overall effect. 
6.5.6 Two-Part Pricing 
A common form of price discrimination is known as two-part pricing.  Two-part 
pricing usually involves a fixed charge and a marginal charge, and thus offers an 
ability for a seller to capture a portion of the consumer surplus.  For example, 
electricity often comes with a fixed price per month and then a price per kilowatt-
hour, which is two-part pricing.  Similarly, long distance and cellular telephone 
companies charge a fixed fee per month, with a fixed number of “included” 
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minutes, and a price per minute for additional minutes.  Such contracts really 
involve three parts rather than two-parts, but are similar in spirit. 
 
From the seller’s perspective, the ideal two-part price is to charge marginal cost 
plus a fixed charge equal to the customer’s consumer surplus, or perhaps a 
penny less.  By setting price equal to marginal cost, the seller maximizes the 
gains from trade.  By setting the fixed fee equal to consumer surplus, the seller 
captures the entire gains from trade.  This is illustrated in Figure  6-21. 
 
 
Figure  6-21: Two-Part Pricing 
6.5.7 Natural Monopoly 
A natural monopoly arises when a single firm can efficiently serve the entire 
market because average costs are lower with one firm than with two firms.  An 
example is illustrated in Figure  6-22.  In this case, the average total cost of a 
single firm is lower than if two firms operate, splitting the output between them.  
The monopolist would like to price at pm, which maximizes profits.79 
 
                                            
79 The monopoly price may or may not be sustainable.  A monopoly price is not sustainable if it 
would lead to entry, thereby undercutting the monopoly.  The feasibility of entry, in turn, depends 
on whether the costs of entering are not recoverable (“sunk”), and how rapidly entry can occur.  If 
the monopoly price is not sustainable, the monopoly may engage in limit pricing, which is jargon 
for pricing to deter (limit) entry. 
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Figure  6-22: Natural Monopoly 
 
Historically, the United States and other nations have regulated natural 
monopolies like those found in electricity, telephony and water service.  An 
immediate problem with regulation is that the efficient price, that is, the price that 
maximizes the gains from trade, requires a subsidy from outside the industry.  
We see the need for a subsidy in Figure  6-22 because the price that maximizes 
the gains from trade is p1, which sets the demand (marginal value) equal to the 
marginal cost.  At this price, however, the average total cost exceeds the price, 
so that a firm with such a regulated price would lose money.  There are two 
alternatives.  The product could be subsidized, and subsidies are used with 
postal service and passenger rail in the United States, and historically for many 
more products in Canada and Europe including airlines and airplane 
manufacture.  Alternatively, regulation could be imposed that aims to limit the 
price to p2, the lowest break-even price.  This is the more common strategy in the 
United States. 
 
There are two strategies toward limiting the price: price-cap regulation, which 
directly imposes a maximum price, and rate of return regulation, that limits the 
profitability of firms.  Both of these approaches induce some inefficiency of 
production.  In both cases, an increase in average cost may translate into 
additional profits for the firm, causing regulated firms to engage in unnecessary 
activities. 
6.5.8 Peak Load Pricing 
Fluctuations in demand often require holding capacity which is used only a 
fraction of the time.  Hotels have off-seasons when most rooms are empty.  
Electric power plants are designed to handle peak demand, usually hot summer 
q
ATC 
MC 
P 
D
p1 
pm 
p2 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 6-263
days, with some of the capacity standing idle on other days.  Demand for trans-
Atlantic airline flights is much higher in the summer than the rest of the year.  
How should pricing be accomplished when demand fluctuates?  This can be 
thought of as a question of how to allocate the cost of capacity when demand 
fluctuates. 
 
Consider a firm that experiences two kinds of costs – a capacity cost and a 
marginal cost.  How should capacity be priced?  This issue is applicable to a 
wide variety of industries, including pipelines, airlines, telephone networks, 
construction, electricity, highways, and the internet.   
 
The basic peak-load pricing problem, pioneered by Marcel Boiteux (1922 – ), 
considers two periods.  The firm’s profits are given by 
 
 ).(},{max 21212211 qqmcqqqpqp +−−+= βπ  
 
Setting price equal to marginal costs is not sustainable, because a firm selling 
with price equal to marginal cost would not earn a return on the capacity, and 
thus would lose money and go out of business.   Consequently, a capacity 
charge is necessary.  The question of peak load pricing is how the capacity 
charge should be allocated.  This question is not trivial because some of the 
capacity is used in both periods.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume demands are independent, that is, q1 is 
independent of p2 and vice versa.  This assumption is often unrealistic, and 
generalizing it actually doesn’t complicate the problem too much.  The primary 
complication is in computing the social welfare when demands are functions of 
two prices.  Independence is a convenient starting point. 
 
Social welfare is 
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The Ramsey problem is to maximize W subject to a minimum profit condition.  A 
technique for accomplishing this maximization is to instead maximize 
 
 L = W + λπ. 
 
By varying λ, we vary the importance of profits to the maximization problem, 
which will increase the profit level in the solution as λ increases.  Thus, the 
correct solution to the constrained maximization problem is the outcome of the 
maximization of L, for some value of λ. 
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A useful notation is 1A, which is known as the characteristic function of the set A.  
This is a function which is 1 when A is true, and zero otherwise.  Using this 
notation, the first order condition for the maximization of L is:  
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where 
21
1 qq ≥ is the characteristic function of the event q1≥q2. 
 
Similarly, 
 
 
22
22 1
1
1)(
21
ελ
λβ
+=
−− ≤
p
mcqp qq  
 
Note as before that λ→∞ yields the monopoly solution. 
 
There are two potential types of solution.  Let the demand for good 1 exceed the 
demand for good 2.  Either q1>q2, or the two are equal. 
 
Case 1: q1>q2. 
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In case 1, with all of the capacity charge allocated to good 1, quantity for good 1 
still exceeds quantity for good 2.  Thus, the peak period for good 1 is an extreme 
peak.  In contrast, case 2 arises when assigning the capacity charge to good 1 
would reverse the peak – assigning all of the capacity charge to good 1 would 
make period 2 the peak. 
 
Case 2: q1=q2. 
 
The profit equation can be written 
 
p1(q) - mc + p2(q) – mc = β 
 
This equation determines q, and prices are determined from demand. 
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The major conclusion from peak load pricing is that either the entire cost of 
capacity is allocated to the peak period, or there is no peak period in the sense 
that the two periods have the same quantity demand given the prices.  That is, 
either the prices equalize the quantity demanded, or the prices impose the entire 
cost of capacity only on one peak period. 
 
Moreover, the price (or, more properly, the markup over marginal cost) is 
proportional to the inverse of the elasticity, which is known as Ramsey pricing. 
6.6 Information 
An important advantage of the price system is that it economizes on information.  
A typical consumer needs to know only the prices of goods and their own 
personal preferences in order to make a sensible choice of purchases, and 
manufacturers only need to know the prices of goods in order to decide what to 
produce.  Such economies of information are an advantage over centrally-
planned economies, which attempt to direct production and consumption 
decisions using something other than prices, and centrally-planned economies 
typically experience chronic shortages and occasional surpluses.  Shortages of 
important inputs to production may have dramatic effects and the shortages 
aren’t remedied by the price of the input rising in a centrally planned economy, 
and thus often persist for long periods of time. 
 
There are, however, circumstances where the prices are not the only necessary 
information required for firms and consumers to make good decisions.  In such 
circumstances, information itself can lead to market failures. 
6.6.1 Market for Lemons 
Nobel laureate George Akerlof (1940 – ) examined the market for used cars and 
considered a situation where the sellers are better informed than the buyers.  
This is quite reasonable, as sellers have owned the car for a while and are likely 
to know its quirks and potential problems.  Akerlof showed that this differential 
information may cause the used car market to collapse; that is, the information 
possessed by sellers of used cars destroys the market. 
 
To understand Akerlof’s insight, suppose that the quality of used cars lies on a 0 
to 1 scale and that the population of used cars is uniformly distributed on the 
interval from 0 to 1.  In addition, let that quality represent the value a seller places 
on the car, and suppose buyers put a value that is 50% higher than the seller.  
Finally, the seller knows the actual quality, while the buyer does not. 
 
Can a buyer and seller trade in such a situation?  First, note that trade is a good 
thing, because the buyer values the car more than the seller.  That is, both the 
buyer and seller know that they should trade.  But can they agree on a price?  
Consider a price p.  At this price, any seller who values the car less than p will be 
willing to trade.  But because of our uniform distribution assumption, this means 
the distribution of qualities of cars offered for trade at price p will be uniform on 
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the interval 0 to p.  Consequently, the average quality of these cars will be ½ p, 
and the buyer values these cars 50% more which yields ¾ p.  Thus, the buyer is 
not willing to pay the price p for the average car offered at price p. 
 
The effect of the informed seller, and uninformed buyer, produces a “lemons” 
problem.  At any given price, all the lemons and only a few of the good cars are 
offered, and the buyer – not knowing the quality of the car – isn’t willing to pay as 
much as the actual value of a high value car offered for sale.  This causes the 
market to collapse; and only the worthless cars trade at a price around zero.  
Economists call the differential information an informational asymmetry. 
 
In the real world, of course, the market has found partial or imperfect solutions to 
the lemons problem identified by Akerlof.  First, buyers can become informed and 
regularly hire their own mechanic to inspect a car they are considering.  
Inspections reduce the informational asymmetry but are costly in their own right.   
Second, intermediaries offer warranties and certification to mitigate the lemons 
problem.  The existence of both of these solutions, which involve costs in their 
own right, is itself evidence that the lemons problem is  a real and significant 
problem, even though competitive markets find ways to ameliorate the problems. 
 
An important example of the lemons problem is the inventor who creates an idea 
that is difficult or impossible to patent.  Consider an innovation that would reduce 
the cost of manufacturing computers.  The inventor would like to sell it to a 
computer company, but can’t tell the computer company what the innovation 
entails prior to price negotiations, because then the computer company could just 
copy the innovation.  Similarly, the computer company can’t possibly offer a price 
for the innovation in advance of knowing what the innovation is.  As a result, such 
innovations usually require the inventor to enter the computer manufacturing 
business, rather than selling to an existing manufacturer, entailing many 
otherwise unnecessary costs. 
 
6.6.1.1 (Exercise) In Akerlof’s market for lemons model, suppose it is possible 
to certify cars, verifying that they are better than a particular quality q.  
Thus, a market for cars “at least as good as q” is possible.  What price or 
prices are possible in this market?  [Hint: sellers offer cars only if q ≤ 
quality ≤ p.]  What quality maximizes the expected gains from trade? 
 
6.6.2 Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem 
The lemons problem is a situation where the buyers are relatively uninformed 
and care about the information held by sellers.  Lemons problems are limited to 
situations where the buyer isn’t well-informed and can be mitigated by making 
information public.  In many transactions, the buyer knows the quality of the 
product, so lemons concerns aren’t a significant issue.  There can still be a 
market failure, however, if there are a limited number of buyers and sellers. 
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Consider the case of one buyer and one seller bargaining over the sale of a 
good.  The buyer knows his own value v for the good, but not the seller’s cost.  
The seller knows her own cost c for the good, but not the buyer’s value.  The 
buyer views the seller’s cost as uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], and 
similarly the seller views the buyer’s value as uniformly distributed on [0,1].80  
Can efficient trade take place?  Efficient trade requires that trade occurs 
whenever v>c. 
 
The total gains from trade under efficiency are 
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An efficient means of arranging trade, or a mechanism, asks the buyer and seller 
for their value and cost, respectively, and then orders trade if the value exceeds 
the cost, and dictates a payment p by the buyer to the seller.  Buyers need not 
make honest reports to the mechanism, however, and the mechanisms must be 
designed to induce the buyer and seller to report honestly to the mechanism, so 
that efficient trades can be arranged.  Consider a buyer who actually has value v 
but reports a value r.  The buyer trades with the seller if the seller has a cost less 
than r, which occurs with probability r. 
 
u(r,v) = vr – Ecp(r, c). 
 
The buyer gets the actual value v with probability r, and makes a payment that 
depends on the buyer’s report and the seller’s report, but we can take 
expectations over the seller’s report to eliminate it (from the buyer’s perspective), 
and this is denoted Ecp(r, c), which is just the expected payment given the report 
r.  In order for the buyer to choose to be honest, u must be maximized at r=v for 
every v, for otherwise some buyers would lie and some trades would not be 
efficiently arranged.  Thus, we can conclude81 
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80 The remarkable fact proved by Roger Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite (Efficient Mechanisms 
for Bilateral Trade, Journal of Economic Theory, 28, 1983, 265-281) is that the distributions don’t 
matter; the failure of efficient trade is a fully general property.  Philip Reny and Preston McAfee 
(Correlated Information and Mechanism Design, Econometrica 60, No. 2, March 1992, 395-421) 
show the nature of the distribution of information matters, and Preston McAfee (Efficient 
Allocation with Continuous Quantities, Journal of Economic Theory 53, no. 1, February 1991: 51-
74.) showed that continuous quantities can overturn the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem. 
81 We maintain an earlier notation that the subscript refers to a partial derivative, so that if we 
have a function f, f1 is the partial derivative of f with respect to the first argument of f. 
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The first equality is just the total derivative of u(v,v), because there are two terms; 
the second equality because u is maximized over the first argument r at r=v, and 
the first order condition insures u1 = 0.  Finally, u2 is just r, and we are evaluating 
the derivative at the point r = v.  A buyer who has a value v + ∆, but who reports 
v, trades with probability v and makes the payment Ecp(v, c).  Such a buyer gets 
∆v more in utility than the buyer with value v.  Thus a ∆ increase in value 
produces an increase in utility of at least ∆v, showing that 
vvvuvvu ∆+≥∆+∆+ ),(),(  and hence that vvvu
dv
d ≥),( .  A similar argument 
considering a buyer with value v who reports v + ∆ shows that equality occurs. 
 
The value u(v,v) is the gain accruing to a buyer with value v who reports having 
value v.  Since the buyer with value 0 gets zero, the total gain accruing to the 
average buyer can be computed by integrating by parts 
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In the integration by parts, dv = d –(1–v) is used.  The remarkable conclusion is 
that, if the buyer is induced to truthfully reveal the buyer’s value, the buyer must 
obtain the entire gains from trade!  This is actually a quite general proposition.  If 
you offer the entire gains from trade to a party, they are induced to maximize the 
gains from trade.  Otherwise, they will want to distort away from maximizing the 
entire gains from trade, which will result in a failure of efficiency. 
 
The logic with respect to the seller is analogous: the only way to get the seller to 
report her cost honestly is to offer her the entire gains from trade. 
 
6.6.2.1 (Exercise) Let h(r, c) be the gains of a seller who has cost c and reports 
r, 
 
 h(r, c) = p(v, r) – (1-r)c. 
Noting that the highest cost seller (c=1) never sells and thus obtains zero 
profits, show that honesty by the seller implies the expected value of h is 
6
1 . 
 
The Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem shows that the gains from trade are 
insufficient to induce honesty by both parties.  (Indeed, they are half the 
necessary amount!)  Thus, any mechanism for arranging trades between the 
buyer and the seller must suffer some inefficiency.  Generally this occurs 
because buyers act like they value the good more than they do, and sellers act 
like their costs are higher than they truly are. 
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It turns out that the worst case scenario is a single buyer and a single seller.  As 
markets get “thick,” the per capita losses converge to zero, and markets become 
efficient.  Thus, informational problems of this kind are a “small numbers” issue.  
However, many markets do in fact have small numbers of buyers or sellers.  In 
such markets, it seems likely that informational problems will be an impediment 
to efficient trade. 
6.6.3 Signaling 
An interesting approach to solving informational problems involves signaling.82  
Signaling, in economic jargon, means expenditures of time or money whose 
purpose is to convince others of something.  Thus, people signal wealth by 
wearing Rolex watches, driving expensive cars or sailing in the America’s Cup.  
They signal erudition by tossing out quotes from Kafka or Tacitus into 
conversations.  They signal being chic by wearing the right clothes and listening 
to cool music.  Signaling is also rampant in the animal world, from peacock 
feathers to elk battles and the subject of a vibrant and related research program. 
 
A university education serves not just to educate, but also to signal the ability to 
learn.  Businesses often desire employees who are able to adapt to changing 
circumstances, and who can easily and readily learn new strategies and 
approaches.  Education signals such abilities because it will easier for quick 
learners to perform well in university.  A simple model suffices to illustrate the 
point.  Suppose there are two types of people.  Type A has a low cost cA of 
learning, and type B has a higher cost cB of learning.  It is difficult to determine 
from an interview whether someone is type A or not.  Type A is worth more to 
businesses, and the competitive wage wA (expressed as a present value of 
lifetime earnings) for type A’s is higher than the wage wB for type B’s. 
 
A person can signal that they are a type A by taking a sufficient amount of 
education.  Suppose the person spends devotes an amount of time x to learning 
in university, thus incurring the cost cA x.  If x is large enough so that 
 
 wA – cA x > 0 > wB – cB x, 
 
it pays the type A to obtain the education, but not the type B, if education in fact 
signals that the student is type A.  Thus, a level of education x in this case 
signals a trait (ease of learning) that is valued by business, and it does so by 
voluntary choice – those with a high cost of learning choose not to obtain the 
education, even though they could do it.  This works as a signal because only 
type A would voluntarily obtain the education in return from being perceived to be 
a type A. 
 
                                            
82 Signaling was introduced by Nobel laureate Michael Spence in his dissertation, part of which 
was reprinted in “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, August 1973, 355-
74. 
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There are several interesting aspects to this kind of signaling.  First, the 
education embodied in x need not be valuable in itself; the student could be 
studying astronomy or ancient Greek, neither of which are very useful in most 
businesses, but are nevertheless strong signals of the ability to learn.  Second, 
the best subject matter for signaling is that in which the difference in cost 
between the type desired by employers and the less desirable type is greatest, 
that is, where cB – cA is greatest.  Practical knowledge is somewhat unlikely to 
make this difference great; instead, challenging abstract problem-solving may be 
a better separator.  Clearly, it is desirable to have the subject matter be useful, if 
it can still do the signaling job.  But interpreting long medieval poems could more 
readily signal the kind of flexible mind desired in management than studying 
accounting, not because the desirable type is good at it, or that it is useful, but 
because the less desirable type is so much worse at it. 
 
Third, one interprets signals by asking “what kinds of people would make this 
choice?” while understanding that the person makes the choice hoping to send 
the signal.  Successful law firms have very fine offices, generally much finer than 
the offices of their clients.  Moreover, there are back rooms at most law firms, 
where much of the real work is done, that aren’t nearly so opulent.  The purpose 
of the expensive offices is to signal success, essentially making the statement 
that 
 
“we couldn’t afford to waste money on such expensive offices if we 
weren’t very successful.  Thus, you should believe we are successful.” 
 
The law firm example is similar to the education example.  Here, the cost of the 
expenditures on fancy offices is different for different law firms because more 
successful firms earn more money and thus value the marginal dollar less.  
Consequently, more successful firms have a lower cost of a given level of office 
luxury.  What is interesting about signaling is that it is potentially quite wasteful.  
A student spends four years studying boring poems and dead languages in order 
to demonstrate a love of learning, and a law firm pays $75,000 for a conference 
table that it rarely uses and gets no pleasure out of, in order to convince a client 
that the firm is extremely successful.  In both cases, it seems like a less costly 
solution should be available.  The student can take standardized tests, and the 
law firm could show its win-loss record to the potential client.  But standardized 
tests may measure test-taking skills rather than learning ability, especially if what 
matters is the learning ability over a long time horizon.  Win-loss records can be 
“massaged,” and in the majority of all legal disputes, the case settles and both 
sides consider themselves “the winner.”  Consequently, statistics may not be a 
good indicator of success, and the expensive conference table a better guide. 
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7 Strategic Behavior 
Competitive theory studies price-taking consumers and firms, that is, people who 
can’t individually affect the transaction prices.  The assumption that market 
participants take prices as given is justified only when there are many competing 
participants.  We have also examined monopoly, precisely because a monopoly 
by definition doesn’t have to worry about competitors.  Strategic behavior 
involves the examination of the intermediate case, where there are few enough 
participants that they take each other into account and their actions individually 
matter, and where the behavior of any one participant influences choices of the 
other participants.  That is, participants are strategic in their choice of action, 
recognizing that their choice will affect choices made by others. 
 
The right tool for the job of examining strategic behavior in economic 
circumstances is game theory, the study of how people play games.  Game 
theory was pioneered by the mathematical genius John von Neumann (1903-
1957).  Game theory has also been very influential in the study of military 
strategy, and indeed the strategy of the cold war between the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. was guided by game theoretic analyses.83 
7.1 Games 
The theory of games provides a description of games that fits common games 
like poker or the board game “Monopoly” but will cover many other situations as 
well.  In any game, there is a list of players.  Games generally unfold over time; 
at each moment in time, players have information, possibly incomplete, about the 
current state of play, and a set of actions they can take.  Both information and 
actions may depend on the history of the game prior to that moment.  Finally, 
players have payoffs, and are assumed to play in such a way as to maximize 
their expected payoff, taking into account their expectations for the play of others.  
When the players, their information and available actions, and payoffs have been 
specified, we have a game. 
7.1.1 Matrix Games 
The simplest game is called a matrix payoff game with two players.  In a matrix 
payoff game, all actions are chosen simultaneously.  It is conventional to 
describe a matrix payoff game as played by a row player and a column player.  
The row player chooses a row in a matrix; the column player simultaneously 
chooses a column.  The outcome of the game is a pair of payoffs where the first 
entry is the payoff of the row player and the second is the payoff of the column 
                                            
83 An important reference for game theory is John von Neumann (1903-1957) and Oskar 
Morgenstern (1902-1977), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1944.  Important extensions were introduced by John Nash (1928 – ), the 
mathematician made famous by Sylvia Nasar’s delightful book A Beautiful Mind (Simon & 
Schuster, 1998).  Finally, applications in the military arena were pioneered by Nobel Laureate 
Thomas Schelling (1921 – ), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1960. 
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player.  Table  7-1 provides an example of a “2 × 2” matrix payoff game, the most 
famous game of all, which is known as the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Table  7-1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
  Column 
 Confess Don’t 
Confess (-10,-10) (0,-20) 
R
ow
 
Don’t (-20,0) (-1,-1) 
 
In the prisoner’s dilemma, two criminals named Row and Column have been 
apprehended by the police and are being questioned separately.  They are jointly 
guilty of the crime.  Each player can choose either to confess or not.  If Row 
confesses, we are in the top row of the matrix (corresponding to the row labeled 
Confess).  Similarly, if Column confesses, the payoff will be in the relevant 
column.  In this case, if only one player confesses, that player goes free and the 
other serves twenty years in jail.  (The entries correspond to the number of years 
lost to prison.  The first entry is always Row’s payoff, the second Column’s 
payoff.)  Thus, for example, if Column confesses and Row does not, the relevant 
payoff is the first column and the second row, in reverse color in Table  7-2. 
 
Table  7-2: Solving the Prisoner's Dilemma 
  Column 
 Confess Don’t 
Confess (-10,-10) (0,-20) 
R
ow
 
Don’t (-20,0) (-1,-1) 
 
If Column confesses and Row does not, Row loses twenty years, and Column 
loses no years, that is, goes free.  This is the payoff (-20,0) in reverse color in 
Table  7-2.  If both confess, they are both convicted and neither goes free, but 
they only serve ten years each.  Finally, if neither confesses, there is a ten 
percent chance they are convicted anyway (using evidence other than the 
confession), in which case they average a year lost each. 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma is famous partly because it is readily solvable.  First, 
Row has a strict advantage to confessing, no matter what Column is going to do.  
If Column confesses, Row gets -10 from confessing, -20 from not, and thus is 
better off from confessing.  Similarly, if Column doesn’t confess, Row gets 0 from 
confessing, -1 from not confessing, and is better off confessing.  Either way, no 
matter what Column does, Row should choose to confess.84  This is called a 
dominant strategy, a strategy that is optimal no matter what the other players do. 
 
                                            
84 If Row and Column are friends are care about each other, that should be included as part of the 
payoffs.  Here, there is no honor or friendship among thieves, and Row and Column only care 
about what they themselves will get. 
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The logic is exactly similar for Column: no matter what Row does, Column should 
choose to confess.  That is, Column also has a dominant strategy, to confess.  
To establish this, first consider what Column’s best action is, when Column thinks 
Row will confess.  Then consider Column’s best action when Column thinks Row 
won’t confess.  Either way, Column gets a higher payoff (lower number of years 
lost to prison) by confessing. 
 
The presence of a dominant strategy makes the prisoner’s dilemma particularly 
easy to solve.  Both players should confess.  Note that this gets them ten years 
each in prison, and thus isn’t a very good outcome from their perspective, but 
there is nothing they can do about it in the context of the game, because for 
each, the alternative to serving ten years is to serve twenty years.  This outcome 
is referred to as (Confess, Confess), where the first entry is the row player’s 
choice, and the second entry is the column player’s choice. 
 
Consider an entry game, played by Microsoft (the row player) and Piuny (the 
column player), a small start-up company.  Both Microsoft and Piuny are 
considering entering a new market for an online service.  The payoff structure is 
 
Table  7-3: An Entry Game 
  Piuny 
 Enter Don’t 
Enter (2,-2) (5,0) 
M
S
 
Don’t (0,5) (0,0) 
 
In this case, if both companies enter, Microsoft ultimately wins the market, and 
earns 2, and Piuny loses 2.  If either firm has the market to itself, they get 5 and 
the other firm gets zero.  If neither enters, both get zero.  Microsoft has a 
dominant strategy to enter: it gets 2 when Piuny enters, 5 when Piuny doesn’t, 
and in both cases does better than when Microsoft doesn’t enter.  In contrast, 
Piuny does not have a dominant strategy: Piuny wants to enter when Microsoft 
doesn’t, and vice-versa.  That is, Piuny’s optimal strategy depends on Microsoft’s 
action, or, more accurately, Piuny’s optimal strategy depends on what Piuny 
believes Microsoft will do. 
 
Piuny can understand Microsoft’s dominant strategy, if it knows the payoffs of 
Microsoft.85  Thus, Piuny can conclude that Microsoft is going to enter, and this 
means that Piuny should not enter.  Thus, the equilibrium of the game is for MS 
to enter and Piuny not to enter.  This equilibrium is arrived at by the iterated 
elimination of dominated strategies, which sounds like jargon but is actually plain 
speaking.  First, we eliminated Microsoft’s dominated strategy in favor of its 
                                            
85 It isn’t so obvious that one player will know the payoffs of another player, and that often causes 
players to try to signal that they are going to play a certain way, that is, to demonstrate 
commitment to a particular advantageous strategy.  Such topics are taken up in business strategy 
and managerial economics. 
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dominant strategy.  Microsoft had a dominant strategy to enter, which means the 
strategy of not entering is dominated by the strategy of entering, so we 
eliminated the dominated strategy.  That leaves a simplified game in which 
Microsoft enters: 
 
Table  7-4; Eliminating a Dominated Strategy 
  Piuny 
 Enter Don’t 
M
S
 
Enter (2,-2) (5,0) 
 
In this simplified game, after the elimination of Microsoft’s dominated strategy, 
Piuny also has a dominant strategy: not to enter.  Thus, we iterate and eliminate 
dominated strategies again, this time eliminating Piuny’s dominated strategies, 
and wind up with a single outcome: Microsoft enters, and Piuny doesn’t.  The 
iterated elimination of dominated strategies solves the game.86 
 
Here is another game, with three strategies for each player. 
 
Table  7-5: A 3 X 3 Game 
  Column 
 Left Center Right 
Top (-5,-1) (2,2) (3,3) 
Middle (1,-3) (1,2) (1,1) R
ow
 
Bottom (0,10) (0,0) (0,-10)
 
The process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies is illustrated by 
actually eliminating the rows and columns, as follows.  A reverse color (white 
writing on black background) indicates a dominated strategy. 
 
Middle dominates bottom for Row, yielding: 
 
Table  7-6: Eliminating a Dominated Strategy 
  Column 
 Left Center Right 
Top (-5,-1) (2,2) (3,3) 
Middle (1,-3) (1,2) (1,1) R
ow
 
Bottom (0,10) (0,0) (0,-10)
 
                                            
86 A strategy may be dominated not by any particular alternate strategy but by a randomization 
over other strategies, which is an advanced topic not considered here. 
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With bottom eliminated, Left is now dominated for Column by either Center or 
Right, which eliminates the left column. 
 
Table  7-7: Eliminating Another Dominated Strategy 
  Column 
 Left Center Right 
Top (-5,-1) (2,2) (3,3) 
Middle (1,-3) (1,2) (1,1) R
ow
 
Bottom (0,10) (0,0) (0,-10)
 
With Left and Bottom eliminated, Top now dominates Middle for Row. 
 
Table  7-8: Eliminating a Third Dominated Strategy 
  Column 
 Left Center Right 
Top (-5,-1) (2,2) (3,3) 
Middle (1,-3) (1,2) (1,1) R
ow
 
Bottom (0,10) (0,0) (0,-10)
 
Finally, Column chooses Right over Center, yielding a unique outcome after the 
iterated elimination of dominated strategies, which is (Top, Right). 
 
Table  7-9: Game Solved 
  Column 
 Left Center Right 
Top (-5,-1) (2,2) (3,3) 
Middle (1,-3) (1,2) (1,1) R
ow
 
Bottom (0,10) (0,0) (0,-10)
 
The iterated elimination of dominated strategies is a useful concept, and when it 
applies, the predicted outcome is usually quite reasonable.  Certainly it has the 
property that no player has an incentive to change their behavior given the 
behavior of others.  However, there are games where it doesn’t apply, and these 
games require the machinery of a Nash equilibrium, named for Nobel laureate 
John Nash (1928 – ). 
7.1.2 Nash Equilibrium 
In a Nash equilibrium, each player chooses the strategy that maximizes their 
expected payoff, given the strategies employed by others.  For matrix payoff 
games with two players, a Nash equilibrium requires that the row chosen 
maximizes the row player’s payoff, given the column chosen by the column 
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player, and the column, in turn, maximizes the column player’s payoff given the 
row selected by the row player.  Let us consider first the prisoner’s dilemma, 
which we have already seen. 
Table  7-10: Prisoner's Dilemma Again 
  Column 
 Confess Don’t 
Confess (-10,-10) (0,-20) 
R
ow
 
Don’t (-20,0) (-1,-1) 
 
Given that the row player has chosen to confess, the column player also chooses 
confession because -10 is better than -20.  Similarly, given that the column 
player chooses confession, the row player chooses confession, because -10 is 
better than -20.  Thus, for both players to confess is a Nash equilibrium.  Now let 
us consider whether any other outcome is a Nash equilibrium.  In any outcome, 
at least one player is not confessing.  But that player could get a higher payoff by 
confessing, so no other outcome could be a Nash equilibrium. 
 
The logic of dominated strategies extends to Nash equilibrium, except possibly 
for ties.  That is, if a strategy is strictly dominated, it can’t be part of a Nash 
equilibrium.  On the other hand, if it involves a tied value, a strategy may be 
dominated but still part of a Nash equilibrium. 
 
The Nash equilibrium is justified as a solution concept for games as follows.  
First, if the players are playing a Nash equilibrium, no one has an incentive to 
change their play or re-think their strategy.  Thus, the Nash equilibrium has a 
“steady state” aspect in that no one wants to change their own strategy given the 
play of others.  Second, other potential outcomes don’t have that property: if an 
outcome is not a Nash equilibrium, then at least one player does have an 
incentive to change what they are doing.  Outcomes that aren’t Nash equilibria 
involve mistakes for at least one player.  Thus, sophisticated, intelligent players 
may be able to deduce each other’s play, and play a Nash equilibrium 
 
Do people actually play Nash equilibria?  This is a controversial topic and mostly 
beyond the scope of this book, but we’ll consider two well-known games: Tic-
Tac-Toe (see, e.g. http://www.mcafee.cc/Bin/tictactoe/index.html) and Chess.  
Tic-Tac-Toe is a relatively simple game, and the equilibrium is a tie.  This 
equilibrium arises because each player has a strategy that prevents the other 
player from winning, so the outcome is a tie.  Young children play Tic-Tac-Toe 
and eventually learn how to play equilibrium strategies, at which point the game 
ceases to be very interesting since it just repeats the same outcome.  In contrast, 
it is known that Chess has an equilibrium, but no one knows what it is.  Thus, at 
this point we don’t know if the first mover (White) always wins, or the second 
mover (Black) always wins, or if the outcome is a draw (neither is able to win).  
Chess is complicated because a strategy must specify what actions to take given 
the history of actions, and there are a very large number of potential histories of 
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the game thirty or forty moves after the start.  So we can be quite confident that 
people are not (yet) playing Nash equilibria to the game of Chess.   
 
The second most famous game in game theory is the battle of the sexes.  The 
battle of the sexes involves a married couple who are going to meet each other 
after work, but haven’t decided where they are meeting.  Their options are a 
baseball game or the ballet.  Both prefer to be with each other, but the man 
prefers the baseball game and the woman prefers the ballet.  This gives payoffs 
something like this: 
 
Table  7-11: The Battle of the Sexes 
  Woman 
 Baseball Ballet 
Baseball (3,2) (1,1) 
M
an
 
Ballet (0,0) (2,3) 
 
The man would rather that they both go to the baseball game, and the woman 
that they both go to the ballet.  They each get 2 payoff points for being with each 
other, and an additional point for being at their preferred entertainment.  In this 
game, iterated elimination of dominated strategies eliminates nothing.  You can 
readily verify that there are two Nash equilibria: one in which they both go to the 
baseball game, and one in which they both go to ballet.  The logic is: if the man is 
going to the baseball game, the woman prefers the 2 points she gets at the 
baseball game to the single point she would get at the ballet.  Similarly, if the 
woman is going to the baseball game, the man gets three points going there, 
versus zero at the ballet.  Thus, for both to go to the baseball game is a Nash 
equilibrium.  It is straightforward to show that for both to go to the ballet is also a 
Nash equilibrium, and finally that neither of the other two possibilities, involving 
not going to the same place, are equilibria. 
 
Now consider the game of matching pennies.  In this game, both the row player 
and the column player choose heads or tails, and if they match, the row player 
gets the coins, while if they don’t match, the column player gets the coins.  The 
payoffs are provided in the next table. 
 
Table  7-12: Matching Pennies 
  Column 
 Heads Tails 
Heads (1,-1) (-1,1) 
R
ow
 
Tails (-1,1) (1,-1) 
 
You can readily verify that none of the four possibilities represents a Nash 
equilibrium.  Any of the four involves one player getting -1; that player can 
convert -1 to 1 by changing his or her strategy.  Thus, whatever the hypothesized 
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equilibrium, one player can do strictly better, contradicting the hypothesis of a 
Nash equilibrium.  In this game, as every child who plays it knows, it pays to be 
unpredictable, and consequently players need to randomize.  Random strategies 
are known as mixed strategies, because the players mix across various actions. 
7.1.3 Mixed Strategies 
Let us consider the matching pennies game again. 
 
Table  7-13: Matching Pennies Again 
  Column 
 Heads Tails 
Heads (1,-1) (-1,1) 
R
ow
 
Tails (-1,1) (1,-1) 
 
Suppose that Row believes Column plays Heads with probability p.  Then if Row 
plays Heads, Row gets 1 with probability p and -1 with probability (1-p), for an 
expected value of 2p – 1.  Similarly, if Row plays Tails, Row gets -1 with 
probability p (when Column plays Heads), and 1 with probability (1-p), for an 
expected value of 1 – 2p.  This is summarized in the next table. 
 
Table  7-14: Mixed Strategy in Matching Pennies 
  Column  
 Heads Tails  
Heads (1,-1) (-1,1) 1p + -1(1-p)=2p-1
R
ow
 
Tails (-1,1) (1,-1) -1p + 1(1-p)=1-2p
 
If 2p – 1 > 1 – 2p, then Row is better off on average playing Heads than Tails.  
Similarly, if 2p – 1 < 1 – 2p, Row is better off playing Tails than Heads.  If, on the 
other hand, 2p – 1 = 1 – 2p, then Row gets the same payoff no matter what Row 
does.  In this case Row could play Heads, could play Tails, or could flip a coin 
and randomize Row’s play. 
 
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium involves at least one player playing a 
randomized strategy, and no player being able to increase their expected payoff 
by playing an alternate strategy.  A Nash equilibrium without randomization is 
called a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 
Note that that randomization requires equality of expected payoffs.  If a player is 
supposed to randomize over strategy A or strategy B, then both of these 
strategies must produce the same expected payoff.  Otherwise, the player would 
prefer one of them, and wouldn’t play the other. 
 
Computing a mixed strategy has one element that often appears confusing.  
Suppose Row is going to randomize.  Then Row’s payoffs must be equal, for all 
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strategies Row plays with positive probability.  But that equality in Row’s payoffs 
doesn’t determine the probabilities with which Row plays the various rows.  
Instead, that equality in Row’s payoffs will determine the probabilities with which 
Column plays the various columns.  The reason is that it is Column’s probabilities 
that determine the expected payoff for Row; if Row is going to randomize, then 
Column’s probabilities must be such that Row is willing to randomize. 
 
Thus, for example, we computed the payoff to Row of playing Heads, which was 
2p – 1, where p was the probability Column played Heads.  Similarly, the payoff 
to Row of playing Tails was 1 – 2p.  Row is willing to randomize if these are 
equal, which solves for p = ½ . 
 
7.1.3.1 (Exercise) Let q be the probability that Row plays Heads.  Show that 
Column is willing to randomize if, and only if, q = ½ .  (Hint: First compute 
Column’s expected payoff when Column plays Heads, and then 
Column’s expected payoff when Column plays Tails.  These must be 
equal for Column to randomize.) 
 
Now let’s try a somewhat more challenging example, and revisit the battle of the 
sexes. 
 
Table  7-15: Mixed Strategy in Battle of the Sexes 
  Woman 
 Baseball Ballet 
Baseball (3,2) (1,1) 
M
an
 
Ballet (0,0) (2,3) 
 
This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (Baseball,Baseball) and 
(Ballet,Ballet).  Is there a mixed strategy?  To compute a mixed strategy, let the 
woman go to the baseball game with probability p, and the Man go to the 
baseball game with probability q.  Table  7-16 contains the computation of the 
mixed strategy payoffs for each player. 
 
Table  7-16: Full Computation of the Mixed Strategy 
  Woman  
 Baseball (p) Ballet (1-p) Man’s E Payoff 
Baseball (prob q) (3,2) (1,1) 3p + 1(1-p)=1+2p
M
an
 
Ballet (prob 1-q) (0,0) (2,3) 0p + 2(1-p)=2-2p 
 Woman’s E Payoff 2q + 0(1-q)=2q 1q + 3(1-q)=3-2q  
 
For example, if the Man (row player) goes to the baseball game, he gets 3 when 
the Woman goes to the baseball game (probability p) and otherwise gets 1, for 
an expected payoff of 3p + 1(1-p) = 1 + 2p.  The other calculations are similar but 
you should definitely run through the logic and verify each calculation. 
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A mixed strategy in the Battle of the Sexes game requires both parties to 
randomize (since a pure strategy by either party prevents randomization by the 
other).  The Man’s indifference between going to the baseball game and the 
ballet requires 1+2p = 2 – 2p, which yields p = ¼ .  That is, the Man will be willing 
to randomize which event he attends if the Woman is going to the ballet ¾ of the 
time, and otherwise to the baseball game.  This makes the Man indifferent 
between the two events, because he prefers to be with the Woman, but he also 
likes to be at the baseball game; to make up for the advantage that the game 
holds for him, the woman has to be at the ballet more often. 
 
Similarly, in order for the Woman to randomize, the Woman must get equal 
payoffs from going to the game and going to the ballet, which requires 2q = 3 – 
2q, or q = ¾ .  Thus, the probability that the Man goes to the game is ¾, and he 
goes to the ballet ¼ of the time.  These are independent probabilities, so to get 
the probability that both go to the game, we multiply the probabilities, which 
yields 16
3 .  The next table fills in the probabilities for all four possible outcomes. 
 
 
Table  7-17: Mixed Strategy Probabilities 
  Woman 
 Baseball Ballet 
Baseball 
16
3  16
9  
M
an
 
Ballet 
16
1  16
3  
 
Note that more than half the time, (Baseball, Ballet) is the outcome of the mixed 
strategy, and the two people are not together.  This lack of coordination is a 
feature of mixed strategy equilibria generally.  The expected payoffs for both 
players are readily computed as well.  The Man’s payoff was 1+2p = 2 – 2p, and 
since p = ¼, the Man obtained 1 ½.  A similar calculation shows the Woman’s 
payoff is the same.  Thus, both do worse than coordinating on their less preferred 
outcome.  But this mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, undesirable as it may seem, 
is a Nash equilibrium in the sense that neither party can improve their payoff, 
given the behavior of the other party. 
 
In the Battle of the sexes, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium may seem 
unlikely, and we might expect the couple to coordinate more effectively.  Indeed, 
a simple call on the telephone should rule out the mixed strategy.  So let’s 
consider another game related to the Battle of the Sexes, where a failure of 
coordination makes more sense.  This is the game of “Chicken.”  Chicken is 
played by two drivers driving toward each other, trying to convince the other to 
yield, which involves swerving into a ditch.  If both swerve into the ditch, we’ll call 
the outcome a draw and both get zero.  If one swerves and the other doesn’t, the 
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swerver loses and the other wins, and we’ll give the winner one point.87  The only 
remaining question is what happens when both don’t yield, in which case a crash 
results.  In this version, that has been set at four times the loss of swerving, but 
you can change the game and see what happens. 
 
 
Table  7-18: Chicken 
  Column 
 Swerve Don’t 
Swerve (0,0) (-1,1) 
R
ow
 
Don’t (1,-1) (-4,-4) 
 
This game has two pure strategy equilibria: (Swerve, Don’t) and (Don’t, Swerve).  
In addition, it has a mixed strategy.  Suppose Column swerves with probability p.  
Then Row gets 0p + -1(1-p) from swerving, 1p + (-4)(1-p) from not swerving, and 
Row will randomize if these are equal, which requires p = ¾.  That is, the 
probability that Column swerves, in a mixed strategy equilibrium is ¾.  You can 
verify that the Row player has the same probability by setting the probability that 
Row swerves equal to q and computing Column’s expected payoffs.  Thus, the 
probability of a collision is 16
1  in the mixed strategy equilibrium. 
 
The mixed strategy equilibrium is more likely in some sense in this game; if the 
players already knew which player would yield, they wouldn’t actually need to 
play the game.  The whole point of the game is to find out who will yield, which 
means it isn’t known in advance, which means the mixed strategy equilibrium is 
in some sense the more reasonable equilibrium. 
 
Paper, Scissors, Rock is a child’s game in which two children simultaneously 
choose paper (hand held flat), scissors (hand with two fingers protruding to look 
like scissors) or rock (hand in a fist).  The nature of the payoffs is that paper 
beats rock, rock beats scissors, and scissors beat paper.  This game has the 
structure 
 
                                            
87 Note that adding a constant to a player’s payoffs, or multiplying that player’s payoffs by a 
positive constant, doesn’t affect the Nash equilibria, pure or mixed.  Therefore, we can always let 
one outcome for each player be zero, and another one. 
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Table  7-19: Paper, Scissors, Rock 
  Column 
 Paper Scissors Rock 
Paper (0,0) (-1,1) (1,-1) 
Scissors (1,-1) (0,0) (-1,1) R
ow
 
Rock (-1,1) (1,-1) (0,0) 
 
7.1.3.2 (Exercise) Show that, in the Paper, Scissors, Rock game, there are no 
pure strategy equilibria.  Show that playing all three actions with equal 
likelihood is a mixed strategy equilibrium. 
 
7.1.3.3 (Exercise) Find all equilibria of the following games: 
 
1  Column 
 Left Right 
Up (3,2) (11,1) 
R
ow
 
Down (4,5) (8,0) 
 
 
2  Column 
 Left Right 
Up (3,3) (0,0) 
R
ow
 
Down (4,5) (8,0) 
 
 
3  Column 
 Left Right 
Up (0,3) (3,0) 
R
ow
 
Down (4,0) (0,4) 
 
 
4  Column 
 Left Right 
Up (7,2) (0,9) 
R
ow
 
Down (8,7) (8,8) 
 
 
5  Column 
 Left Right 
Up (1,1) (2,4) 
R
ow
 
Down (4,1) (3,2) 
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6  Column 
 Left Right 
Up (4,2) (2,3) 
R
ow
 
Down (3,8) (1,5) 
 
7.1.4 Examples 
Our first example concerns public goods.  In this game, each player can either 
contribute, or not.  For example, two roommates can either clean their apartment, 
or not.  If they both clean, the apartment is nice.  If one cleans, that roommate 
does all the work and the other gets half of the benefits.  Finally, if neither clean, 
neither is very happy.  This suggests payoffs like: 
 
Table  7-20: Cleaning the Apartment 
  Column 
 Clean Don’t 
Clean (10,10) (0,15) 
R
ow
 
Don’t (15,0) (2,2) 
 
You can verify that this game is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma, in that the only 
Nash equilibrium is the pure strategy in which neither player cleans.  This is a 
game theoretic version of the tragedy of the commons – even though the 
roommates would both be better off if both cleaned, neither do.  As a practical 
matter, roommates do solve this problem, using strategies that we will investigate 
when we consider dynamic games. 
 
Table  7-21: Driving on the Right 
  Column 
 Left Right 
Left (1,1) (0,0) 
R
ow
 
Right (0,0) (1,1) 
 
The important thing about the side of the road the cars drive on is not that it is the 
right side but that it is the same side.  This is captured in the Driving on the Right 
game above.  If both players drive on the same side, then they both get one 
point, otherwise they get zero.  You can readily verify that there are two pure 
strategy equilibria, (Left,Left) and (Right,Right), and a mixed strategy equilibria 
with equal probabilities.  Is the mixed strategy reasonable?  With automobiles, 
there is little randomization.  On the other hand, people walking down hallways 
often seem to randomize whether they pass on the left or the right, and 
sometimes do that little dance where they try to get past each other, one going 
left and the other going right, then both simultaneously reversing, unable to get 
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out of each other’s way.  That dance suggests that the mixed strategy equilibrium 
is not as unreasonable as it seems in the automobile application.88 
 
 
Table  7-22: Bank Location Game 
  NYC 
 No Concession Tax Rebate 
No Concession (30,10) (10,20) 
LA
 
Tax Rebate (20,10) (20,0) 
 
Consider a foreign bank that is looking to open a main office and a smaller office 
in the United States.  The bank narrows its choice for main office to either New 
York (NYC) or Los Angeles (LA), and is leaning toward Los Angeles.  If neither 
city does anything, LA will get $30 million in tax revenue and New York ten 
million.  New York, however, could offer a $10 million rebate, which would swing 
the main office to New York, but now New York would only get a net of $20 M.  
The discussions are carried on privately with the bank.  LA could also offer the 
concession, which would bring the bank back to LA. 
 
7.1.4.1 (Exercise) Verify that the bank location game has no pure strategy 
equilibria, and that there is a mixed strategy equilibrium where each city 
offers a rebate with probability ½. 
 
Table  7-23: Political Mudslinging 
  Republican 
 Clean Mud 
Clean (3,1) (1,2) 
D
em
 
Mud (2,1) (2,0) 
 
On the night before the election, a Democrat is leading the Wisconsin senatorial 
race.  Absent any new developments, the Democrat will win, and the Republican 
will lose.  This is worth 3 to the Democrat, and the Republican, who loses 
honorably, values this outcome at one.  The Republican could decide to run a 
series of negative advertisements (“throwing mud”) against the Democrat, and if 
so, the Republican wins although loses his honor, which he values at 1, and so 
                                            
88 Continental Europe drove on the left until about the time of the French revolution.  At that time, 
some individuals began driving on the right as a challenge to royalty who were on the left, 
essentially playing the game of chicken with the ruling class.  Driving on the right became a 
symbol of disrespect for royalty.  The challengers won out, forcing a shift to driving on the right.  
Besides which side one drives on, another coordination game involves whether one stops or goes 
on red.  In some locales, the tendency for a few extra cars to go as a light changes from green to 
yellow to red forces those whose light changes to green to wait, and such a progression can lead 
to the opposite equilibrium, where one goes on red and stops on green.  Under Mao Tse-tung, 
the Chinese considered changing the equilibrium to going on red and stopping on green (because 
‘red is the color of progress’) but wiser heads prevailed and the plan was scrapped. 
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only gets 2.  If the Democrat runs negative ads, again the Democrat wins, but 
loses his honor, so only gets 2.  These outcomes are represented in the 
Mudslinging game above. 
 
7.1.4.2 (Exercise) Show that the only Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy with 
equal probabilities of throwing mud and not throwing mud. 
 
7.1.4.3 (Exercise) Suppose that voters partially forgive a candidate for throwing 
mud when the rival throws mud, so that the (Mud, Mud) outcome has 
payoff (2.5,.5).  How does the equilibrium change? 
 
You have probably had the experience of trying to avoid encountering someone, 
who we will call Rocky.  In this instance, Rocky is actually trying to find you.  The 
situation is that it is Saturday night and you are choosing which party, of two 
possible parties, to attend.  You like party 1 better, and if Rocky goes to the other 
party, you get 20.  If Rocky attends party 1, you are going to be uncomfortable 
and get 5.  Similarly, Party 2 is worth 15, unless Rocky attends, in which case it 
is worth 0.  Rocky likes Party 2 better (these different preferences may be part of 
the reason you are avoiding him) but he is trying to see you.  So he values Party 
2 at 10, party 1 at 5 and your presence at the party he attends is worth 10.  
These values are reflected in the following table. 
 
Table  7-24: Avoiding Rocky 
  Rocky 
 Party 1 Party 2 
Party 1 (5,15) (20,10) 
Y
ou
 
Party 2 (15,5) (0,20) 
 
7.1.4.4 (Exercise) (i) Show there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria in this 
game.  (ii) Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibria.  (iii) Show that the 
probability you encounter Rocky is 12
7 . 
 
Our final example involves two firms competing for customers.  These firms can 
either price high or low. The most money is made if they both price high, but if 
one prices low, it can take most of the business away from the rival.  If they both 
price low, they make modest profits.  This description is reflected in the following 
table: 
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Table  7-25: Price Cutting Game 
  Firm 2 
 High Low 
High (15,15) (0,25) 
Fi
rm
 1
 
Low (25,0) (5,5) 
 
7.1.4.5 (Exercise) Show that the firms have a dominant strategy to price low, 
so that the only Nash equilibrium is (Low, Low). 
7.1.5 Two Period Games 
So far, we have considered only games that are played simultaneously.  Several 
of these games, notably the price cutting and apartment cleaning games, are 
actually played over and over again.  Other games, like the bank location game, 
may only be played once but nevertheless are played over time.  Recall the bank 
location game: 
 
 
Table  7-26; Bank Location Revisited 
  NYC 
 No Concession Tax Rebate 
No Concession (30,10) (10,20) 
LA
 
Tax Rebate (20,10) (20,0) 
 
If neither city offered a rebate, then LA won the bidding.  So suppose instead of 
the simultaneous move game, that first New York decided whether to offer a 
rebate, and then LA could decide to offer a rebate.  This sequential structure 
leads to a game that looks like Figure  7-1: 
 
In this game, NYC makes the first move, and chooses Rebate (to the left) or No 
Rebate (to the right).  If NYC chooses Rebate, LA can then choose Rebate or 
None.  Similarly, if NYC chooses No Rebate, LA can choose Rebate or None.  
The payoffs (using the standard of (LA, NYC) ordering) are written below the 
choices. 
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Figure  7-1 Sequential Bank Location 
 
What NYC would like to do depends on what NYC believes LA will do.  What 
should NYC believe about LA?  (Boy does that rhetorical question suggest a lot 
of facetious answers.)  The natural belief is that LA will do what is in LA’s best 
interest.  This idea – that each stage of a game is played in a maximizing way – 
is called subgame perfection. 
7.1.6 Subgame Perfection 
Subgame perfection requires each player to act in its best interest, independent 
of the history of the game.89  This seems very sensible and in most contexts it is 
sensible.  In some settings, it may be implausible.  Even if I see a player make a 
particular mistake three times in a row, subgame perfection requires that I must 
continue to believe that player will not make the mistake again.  Subgame 
perfection may be implausible in some circumstances, especially when it pays to 
be considered somewhat crazy. 
 
In the example, subgame perfection requires LA to offer a rebate when NYC 
does (since LA gets 20 by rebating versus 10), and not when NYC doesn’t.  This 
is illustrated in the game using arrows to indicate LA’s choices.  In addition, the 
actions that LA won’t choose have been re-colored in a light grey in Figure  7-2. 
 
Once LA’s subgame perfect choices are taken into account, NYC is presented 
with the choice of offering a rebate, in which case it gets 0, or not offering a 
rebate, in which case it gets 10.  Clearly the optimal choice for NYC is to offer no 
rebate, in which case LA doesn’t either, and the result is 30 for LA, and 10 for 
NYC. 
 
                                            
89 Subgame perfection was introduced by Nobel laureate Reinhart Selten (1930 – ). 
NYC 
Rebate No Rebate
Rebate None 
Rebate
None
LA LA
(20,0) (10,20) (20,10) (30,10)
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Dynamic games are generally “solved backward” in this way.  That is, first 
establish what the last player does, then figure out based on the last player’s 
expected behavior, what the penultimate player does, and so on. 
 
 
 
Figure  7-2: Subgame Perfection 
 
We’ll consider one more application of subgame perfection.  Suppose, in the 
game “Avoiding Rocky,” Rocky is actually stalking you, and can condition his 
choice on your choice.  Then you might as well go to the party you like best, 
because Rocky is going to follow you wherever you go.  This is represented in 
Figure  7-3. 
 
 
Figure  7-3: Can’t Avoid Rocky 
 
You
Party 1 Party 2 
Party 1 Party 2 
Party 1 
Party 2
R R 
(5,15) (20,10) (15,5) (0,20)
NYC 
Rebate No Rebate
Rebate None 
Rebate 
None
LA LA 
(20,0) (10,20) (20,10) (30,10)
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Since Rocky’s optimal choice eliminates your best outcomes, you make the best 
of a bad situation by choosing Party 1.  Here, Rocky has a second mover 
advantage: Rocky’s ability to condition on your choice meant he does better than 
he would do in a simultaneous game. 
 
7.1.6.1 (Exercise) Formulate the battle of the sexes as a sequential game, 
letting the woman choose first.  (This situation could arise if the woman 
can leave a message for the man about where she has gone.)  Show 
that there is only one subgame perfect equilibrium, and that the woman 
enjoys a first-mover advantage over the man, and she gets her most 
preferred outcome. 
7.1.7 Supergames 
Some situations, like the pricing game or the apartment-cleaning game, are 
played over and over.  Such situations are best modeled as a supergame.90  A 
supergame is a game played over and over again without end, where the players 
discount the future.  The game played each time is known as a stage game.  
Generally supergames are played in times 1, 2, 3, … 
 
Cooperation may be possible in supergames, if the future is important enough.  
Consider the pricing game introduced above. 
 
 
Table  7-27: Price Cutting, Revisited 
  Firm 2 
 High Low 
High (15,15) (0,25) 
Fi
rm
 1
 
Low (25,0) (5,5) 
 
The dominant strategy equilibrium to this game is (Low, Low).  It is clearly a 
subgame perfect equilibrium for the players to just play (Low, Low) over and over 
again, because if that is what Firm 1 thinks Firm 2 is doing, Firm 1 does best by 
pricing Low, and vice versa.  But that is not the only equilibrium to the 
supergame. 
 
Consider the following strategy, called a grim trigger strategy.  Price high, until 
you see your rival price low.  After your rival has priced low, price low forever.  
This is called a trigger strategy because an action of the other player (pricing low) 
triggers a change in behavior.  It is a grim strategy because it punishes forever. 
 
If your rival uses a grim trigger strategy, what should you do?  Basically, your 
only choice is when to price low, because once you price low, your rival will price 
low, and then your best choice is to also price low from then on.  Thus, your 
                                            
90 The supergame was invented by Robert Aumann (1930 – ) in 1959. 
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strategy is to price high up until some point t – 1, and then price low from time t 
on.  Your rival will price high through t, and price low from t + 1 on.  This gives a 
payoff to you of 15 from period 1 through t – 1, 25 in period t, and then 5 in 
period t + 1 on.  We can compute the payoff for a discount factor δ. 
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If -15 + 25δ < 0, it pays to price low immediately, at t=0.  If -15 + 25δ > 0, it pays 
to wait forever to price low, that is, t = ∞.  Thus, in particular, the grim trigger 
strategy is an optimal strategy for a player when the rival is playing the grim 
trigger strategy if 5
3>δ .  In other words, cooperation in pricing is a subgame 
perfect equilibrium if the future is important enough, that is, the discount factor δ 
is high enough. 
 
The logic of this example is that the promise of future cooperation is valuable 
when the future itself is valuable, and that promise of future cooperation can be 
used to induce cooperation today.  Thus, firm 1 doesn’t want to cut price today, 
because that would lead firm 2 to cut price for the indefinite future.  The grim 
trigger strategy punishes price cutting today with future low profits. 
 
Supergames offer more scope for cooperation than is illustrated in the pricing 
game.  First, more complex behavior is possible.  For example, consider the 
following game: 
 
Table  7-28: A Variation of the Price Cutting Game 
  Firm 2 
 High Low 
High (10,10) (0,25) 
Fi
rm
 1
 
Low (25,0) (5,5) 
 
Here, again, the unique equilibrium in the stage game is (Low, Low).  But the 
difference between this game and the previous game is that the total profits of 
firms 1 and 2 are higher in either (High, Low) or (Low, High) than in (High, High).  
One solution is to alternate between (High, Low) and (Low, High).  Such 
alternation can also be supported as an equilibrium, using the grim trigger 
strategy – that is, if a firm does anything other than what is it supposed to in the 
alternating solution, the firms instead play (Low, Low) forever. 
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7.1.7.1 (Exercise) Consider the game in Table  7-28, and consider a strategy in 
which firm 1 prices high in odd numbered periods, and low in even 
numbered periods, while 2 prices high in even numbered periods, low in 
odd numbered periods.  If either deviate from these strategies, both price 
low from then on.  Let δ be the discount factor.  Show that these firms 
have a payoff of 21
25
δ−  or 21
25
δ
δ
− , depending on which period it is.  Then 
show that the alternating strategy is sustainable if .
1
25
1
510
2δ
δ
δ
δ
−
≤−+   
This, in turn, is equivalent to .26 −≥δ  
7.1.8 The Folk Theorem 
The folk theorem says that if the value of the future is high enough, any outcome 
that is individually rational can be supported as an equilibrium to the supergame.  
Individual rationality for a player in this context means that the outcome offers a 
present value of profits at least as high as that offered in the worst equilibrium in 
the stage game from that player’s perspective.  Thus, in the pricing game, the 
worst equilibrium of the stage game offered each player 5, so an outcome can be 
supported if it offers each player at least a running average of 5. 
 
The simple logic of the folk theorem is this.  First, any infinite repetition of an 
equilibrium of the stage game is itself a subgame perfect equilibrium.  If everyone 
expects this repetition of the stage game equilibrium, no one can do better than 
to play their role in the stage game equilibrium every period.  Second, any other 
plan of action can be turned into a subgame perfect equilibrium merely by 
threatening any agent who deviates from that plan with an infinite repetition of the 
worst stage game equilibrium from that agent’s perspective.  That threat is 
credible because the repetition of the stage game equilibrium is itself a subgame 
perfect equilibrium.  Given such a grim trigger type threat, no one wants to 
deviate from the intended plan. 
 
The folk theorem is a powerful result, and shows that there are equilibria to 
supergames that achieve very good outcomes.  The kinds of coordination failures 
we saw in the battle of the sexes, and the failure to cooperate in the prisoner’s 
dilemma, need not arise, and cooperative solutions are possible if the future is 
sufficiently valuable. 
 
However, it is worth noting some assumptions that have been made in our 
descriptions of these games, assumptions that matter and are unlikely to be true 
in practice.  First, the players know their own payoffs.  Second, they know their 
rival’s payoffs.  They possess a complete description of the available strategies 
and can calculate the consequences of these strategies, not just for themselves, 
but for their rivals.  Third, each player maximizes his or her expected payoff, and 
they know that their rivals do the same, and they know that their rivals know that 
everyone maximizes, and so on.  The economic language for this is the structure 
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of the game and the player’s preferences are common knowledge.  Few real 
world games will satisfy these assumptions exactly.  Since the success of the 
grim trigger strategy (and other strategies we haven’t discussed) generally 
depends on such knowledge, informational considerations may cause 
cooperation to break down.  Finally, the folk theorem shows us that there are lots 
of equilibria to supergames, and provides no guidance on which one will be 
played.  These assumptions can be relaxed, although they may lead to wars on 
the equilibrium path “by accident,” and a need to recover from such wars, so that 
the grim trigger strategy becomes sub-optimal. 
7.2 Cournot Oligopoly 
The Cournot91 oligopoly model is the most popular model of imperfect 
competition.  It is a model in which the number of firms matters, and represents 
one way of thinking about what happens when the world is neither perfectly 
competitive, nor a monopoly. 
 
In the Cournot model, there are n firms, who choose quantities.  We denote a 
typical firm as firm i and number the firms from i = 1 to i = n.  Firm i chooses a 
quantity qi ≥ 0 to sell and this quantity costs ci(qi).  The sum of the quantities 
produced is denoted by Q.  The price that emerges from the competition among 
the firms is p(Q) and this is the same price for each firm.  It is probably best to 
think of the quantity as really representing a capacity, and competition in prices 
by the firms determining a market price given the market capacity. 
 
The profit that a firm i obtains is 
 
)()( iiii qcqQp −=π . 
7.2.1 Equilibrium 
Each firm chooses qi to maximize profit.  The first order conditions92 give: 
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i qcqQpQp
q
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This equation holds with equality provided qi > 0.  A simple thing that can be 
done with the first order conditions is to rewrite them to obtain the average value 
of the price-cost margin: 
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91 Augustus Cournot, 1801-1877. 
92 Bear in mind that Q is the sum of the firms’ quantities, so that when firm i increases its output 
slightly, Q goes up by the same amount. 
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Here 
Q
qs ii =  is firm i’s market share.  Multiplying this equation by the market 
share and summing over all firms i = 1, … , n yields 
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where ∑
=
=
n
i
isHHI
1
2  is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index.93  The HHI has the 
property that if the firms are identical, so that si = 1/n for all i, then the HHI is also 
1/n.  For this reason, antitrust economists will sometimes use 1/HHI as a proxy 
for the number of firms, and describe an industry with “2 ½ firms,” meaning an 
HHI of 0.4.94 
 
We can draw several inferences from these equations.  First, larger firms, those 
with larger market shares, have a larger deviation from competitive behavior 
(price equal to marginal cost).  Small firms are approximately competitive (price 
nearly equals marginal cost) while large firms reduce output to keep the price 
higher, and the amount of the reduction, in price/cost terms, is proportional to 
market share.  Second, the HHI reflects the deviation from perfect competition on 
average, that is, it gives the average proportion by which price equal to marginal 
cost is violated.  Third, the equation generalizes the “inverse elasticity result” 
proved for monopoly, which showed that the price – cost margin was the inverse 
of the elasticity of demand.  The generalization states that the weighted average 
of the price – cost margins is the HHI over the elasticity of demand. 
 
Since the price – cost margin reflects the deviation from competition, the HHI 
provides a measure of how large a deviation from competition is present in an 
industry.  A large HHI means the industry “looks like monopoly.”  In contrast, a 
small HHI looks like perfect competition, holding constant the elasticity of 
demand. 
 
The case of a symmetric (identical cost functions) industry is especially 
enlightening.  In this case, the equation for the first order condition can be 
restated as 
 ( )nQcnQQpQp ′−′+= )()(0  
 
                                            
93 Named for Albert Hirschman (1918 – 1972), who invented it in 1945, and Orris Herfindahl 
(1915 – ), who invented it independently in 1950. 
94 To make matters more confusing, antitrust economists tend to state the HHI using shares in 
percent, so that the HHI is on a 0 to 10,000 scale. 
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or 
 ( )nQcnnQp ′−= 1)( ε ε . 
 
Thus, in the symmetric model, competition leads to pricing as if demand were 
more elastic, and indeed is a substitute for elasticity as a determinant of price. 
7.2.2 Industry Performance 
How does the Cournot industry perform?  Let us return to the more general 
model, that doesn’t require identical cost functions.  We already have one answer 
to this question: the average price – cost margin is the HHI divided by the 
elasticity of demand.  Thus, if we have an estimate of the demand elasticity, we 
know how much the price deviates from the perfect competition benchmark. 
 
The general Cournot industry actually has two sources of inefficiency.  First, price 
is above marginal cost, so there is the dead weight loss associated with 
unexploited gains from trade.  Second, there is the inefficiency associated with 
different marginal costs.  This is inefficient because a re-arrangement of 
production, keeping total output the same, from the firm with high marginal cost 
to the firm with low marginal cost, would reduce the cost of production.  That is, 
not only is too little output produced, but what output is produced is inefficiently 
produced, unless the firms are identical. 
 
To assess the productive inefficiency, we let 1c ′  be the lowest marginal cost.  The 
average deviation from the lowest marginal cost, then, is 
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Thus, while a large HHI means a large deviation from price equal to marginal 
cost and hence a large level of monopoly power (holding constant the elasticity of 
demand), a large HHI also tends to indicate greater productive efficiency, that is, 
less output produced by high cost producers.  Intuitively, a monopoly produces 
efficiently, even if it has a greater reduction in total output than other industry 
structures. 
 
There are a number of caveats worth mentioning in the assessment of industry 
performance.  First, the analysis has held constant the elasticity of demand, 
which could easily fail to be correct in an application.  Second, fixed costs have 
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not been considered.  An industry with large economies of scale, relative to 
demand, must have very few firms to perform efficiently and small numbers 
should not necessarily indicate the market performs poorly even if price – cost 
margins are high.  Third, it could be that entry determines the number of firms, 
and that the firms have no long-run market power, just short-run market power.  
Thus, entry and fixed costs could lead the firms to have approximately zero 
profits, in spite of price above marginal cost. 
 
7.2.2.1 (Exercise) Suppose the inverse demand curve is p(Q) = 1 – Q, and that 
there are n Cournot firms, each with constant marginal cost c, selling in 
the market.  (i) Show that the Cournot equilibrium quantity and price are 
1
)1(
+
−=
n
cnQ  and 
1
1)( +
+=
n
ncQp .  (ii) Show each firm’s gross profits are 
2
1
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⎛
+
−
n
c . 
 
Continuing with  7.2.2.1 (Exercise), suppose there is a fixed cost F to become a 
firm.  The number of firms n should be such that firms are able to cover their 
fixed costs, but add one more and they can’t.  This gives us a condition 
determining the number of firms n: 
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Thus, each firm’s net profits are 
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Note that the monopoly profits πm are ¼ (1-c)2.  Thus, with free entry, net profits 
are  less than m
nn
n π
22 )2()1(
4)32(
++
+ , and industry net profits are less than 
m
nn
nn π
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4)32(
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Table  7-29 shows the performance of the constant cost, linear demand Cournot 
industry, when fixed costs are taken into account, and when they aren’t.  With 
two firms, gross industry profits are 8/9ths of the monopoly profits, not 
substantially different from monopoly.  But when fixed costs sufficient to insure 
that only two firms enter are considered, the industry profits are at most 39% of 
the monopoly profits.  This number – 39% -- is large because fixed costs could 
be “relatively” low, so that the third firm is just deterred from entering.  That still 
leaves the two firms with significant profits, even though the third firm can’t 
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profitably enter.  As the number of firms rises, gross industry profits fall slowly 
toward zero.  The net industry profits, on the other hand, fall dramatically rapidly 
to zero.  With ten firms, the gross profits are still about a third of the monopoly 
level, but the net profits are only at most 5% of the monopoly level. 
 
Table  7-29: Industry Profits as a Fraction of Monopoly Profits 
Number 
of Firms 
Gross 
Industry 
Profits (%)
Net 
Industry 
Profits (%)
2 88.9 39.0 
3 75.0 27.0 
4 64.0 19.6 
5 55.6 14.7 
10 33.1 5.3 
15 23.4 2.7 
20 18.1 1.6 
 
The Cournot model gives a useful model of imperfect competition, a model that 
readily permits assessing the deviation from perfect competition.  The Cournot 
model embodies two kinds of inefficiency: the exercise of monopoly power, and 
technical inefficiency in production.  In settings involving entry and fixed costs, 
care must be taken in applying the Cournot model. 
7.3 Search and Price Dispersion 
Decades ago, economists used to make a big deal about the “Law of One Price,” 
which states that identical goods sell at the same price.  The argument in favor of 
the law of one price is theoretical.  Well-informed consumers will buy identical 
goods from the lowest price seller.  Consequently, the only seller to make any 
sales is the low-price seller.  This kind of consumer behavior forces all sellers to 
sell at the same price. 
 
There are few markets where the law of one price is actually observed to hold.  
Organized exchanges, like stock, bond and commodity markets, will satisfy the 
law of one price.  In addition, gas stations across the street from each other will 
often offer identical prices, but often is not always. 
 
Many economists considered that the internet would force prices of standardized 
goods – DVD players, digital cameras, MP3 players – to a uniform, and uniformly 
low, price.  However, this has not occurred.  Moreover, it probably can’t occur, in 
the sense that pure price competition would put the firms out of business, and 
hence can’t represent equilibrium behavior. 
 
There are many markets where prices appear unpredictable to consumers.  The 
price of airline tickets is notorious for unpredictability.  The price of milk, soft 
drinks, paper towels and canned tuna varies 50% or more depending on whether 
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the store has an advertised sale of the item or not.  Prices of goods sold on the 
internet varies substantially from day to day.95  Such variation is known as price 
dispersion by economists.  It is different from price discrimination, in that price 
dispersion entails a given store quoting the same price to all customers; the 
variation is across stores, while price discrimination is across customers. 
 
Why are prices so unpredictable? 
7.3.1 Simplest Theory 
To understand price dispersion, we divide consumers into two types: shoppers 
and loyal customers.  Loyal customers won’t pay more than a price pm for the 
good, but they only consult a particular store; if that store has the good for less 
than the price pm, the loyal customer buys, and otherwise not.  In contrast, the 
shoppers buy only from the store offering the lowest price; shoppers are informed 
about the prices offered by all stores.  We let the proportion of shoppers be s.  
The loyal customers are allocated to the other stores equally, so that, if there are 
n stores, each store gets a fraction (1 – s)/n of the customers.  Let the marginal 
cost of the good be c, and assume c < pm.  Both kinds of customers buy only one 
unit. 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that prices can be chosen from 
the continuum.  This makes the analysis more straightforward, but there is an 
alternate version of the analysis (not developed here) that makes the more 
reasonable assumption of prices that are an integer number of pennies. 
 
First note that there is no pure strategy equilibrium.  To see this, consider the 
lowest price p charged by any firm.  If that price is c, the firm makes no money, 
so would do better by raising its price to pm and selling only to the loyal 
customers.  Thus, the lowest price p exceeds c.  If there is a tie at p, it pays to 
break the tie by charging a billionth of a cent less than p, and thereby capturing 
all the shoppers rather than sharing them with the other firm charging p.  So 
there can’t be a tie. 
 
But no tie at p means the next lowest firm is charging something strictly greater 
than p, which means the lowest price firm can increase price somewhat and not 
suffer any loss of sales.  This contradicts profit maximization for that firm.  The 
conclusion is that firms must randomize and no pure strategy equilibrium exists. 
 
But how do they randomize?  We are going to look for a distribution of prices.  
Each firm will choose a price from the continuous distribution F, where F(x) is the 
probability the firm charges a price less than x.  What must F look like?  We use 
the logic of mixed strategies: the firm must get the same profits for all prices that 
might actually be charged under the mixed strategy, for otherwise it would not be 
willing to randomize. 
 
                                            
95 It is often very challenging to assess internet prices because of variation in shipping charges. 
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A firm that charges price p ≤ pm always sells to its captive customers.  In addition, 
it sells to the shoppers if the other firms have higher prices, which occurs with 
probability 1))(1( −− npF .  Thus, the firm’s profits are 
 
⎟⎠
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⎛ −+−−= −1))(1(1)()( npFs
n
scppπ . 
 
On each sale, the firm earns p – c.  The firm always sells to its loyal customers, 
and in addition captures the shoppers if the other firms price higher.  Since no 
firm will exceed pm, the profits must be the same as the level arising from 
charging pm, and this gives 
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This equation is readily solved for F: 
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The lower bound of prices arises at the point L where F(L)=0, or 
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These two equations provide a continuous distribution of prices charged by each 
firm which is an equilibrium to the pricing game.  That is, each firm randomizes 
over the interval [L, pm], according to the continuous distribution F.  Any price in 
the interval [L,pm] produces the same profits for each firm, so the firms are willing 
to randomize over this interval. 
 
The loyal customers get a price chosen randomly from F, so we immediately see 
that the shoppers make life better for the loyal customers, pushing average price 
down. (An increase in s directly increases F, which means prices fall – recall that 
F gives the probability that prices are below a given level, so an increase in F is 
an increase in the probability of low prices.) 
 
Similarly loyal customers make life worse for shoppers, increasing prices on 
average to shoppers.  The distribution of prices facing shoppers is actually the 
distribution of the minimum price.  Since all firms charge a price exceeding p with 
probability (1 – F(p))n, at least one charges a price less than p with probability 1 –  
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(1 – F(p))n, and this is the distribution of prices facing shoppers.  That is, the 
distribution of prices charged to shoppers is 
 
1
)(
)1)((1))(1(1 −⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−−=−− n
n
mn
ncps
spppF . 
 
7.3.2 Industry Performance 
How does a price dispersed industry perform?  First, average industry profits are 
 
).1)(()( scppn m −−=π  
 
An interesting aspect of this equation is that it doesn’t depend on the number of 
firms, only on the number of loyal customers.  Essentially, the industry profits are 
the same that it would earn as if the shoppers paid marginal cost and the loyal 
customers paid the monopoly price, although that isn’t what happens in the 
industry, except in the limit as the number of firms goes to infinity.  Note that this 
formula for industry profits does not work for a monopoly.  In order to capture 
monopoly, one must set s=0, because shoppers have no alternative under 
monopoly. 
 
Figure  7-4: Expected Prices in Search Equilibrium 
 
 
As the number of firms gets large, the price charged by any one firm converges 
to the monopoly price pm. However, the lowest price offered by any firm actually 
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converges to c, marginal cost.  Thus, in the limit as the number of firms get large, 
shoppers obtain price equal to marginal cost and loyal firms pay the monopoly 
price. 
 
The average price charged to shoppers and non-shoppers is a complicated 
object, so we consider the case where there are n firms, s = ½, pm =1 and c = 0.  
Then the expected prices for shoppers and loyal customers are given in Figure 
 7-4, letting the number of firms vary.  Thus, with many firms, most of the gains 
created by the shoppers flow to shoppers.  In contrast, with few firms, a 
significant fraction of the gains created by shoppers goes instead to the loyal 
customers. 
 
Similarly, we can examine the average prices for loyal customers and shoppers 
when the proportion of shoppers varies.  Increasing the proportion of shoppers 
has two effects.  First, it makes low prices more attractive, thus encouraging 
price competition, because capturing the shoppers is more valuable.  Second, it 
lowers industry profits, because the set of loyal customers is reduced.  Figure  7-5 
plots the average price for loyal customers and shoppers, as the proportion of 
shoppers ranges from zero to one, when there are five firms, pm = 1 and c = 0. 
 
 
Figure  7-5: Expected Prices (s=Proportion of Shoppers) 
 
People who are price-sensitive and shop around convey a positive externality on 
other buyers by encouraging price competition.  Similarly, people who are less 
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price sensitive and don’t shop around convey a negative externality on the other 
buyers.  In markets with dispersed information about the best prices, where some 
buyers are informed and some are not, randomized prices are a natural outcome.  
That is, randomization of prices, and the failure of the law of one price, is just a 
reflection of the different willingness or ability to search on the part of consumers. 
 
This difference in the willingness to search could arise simply because search is 
itself costly.  That is, the shoppers could be determined by their choice to shop, 
in such a way that the cost of shopping just balances the expected gains from 
searching.  The proportion of shoppers may adjust endogenously to insure that 
the gains from searching exactly equal the costs of searching.  In this way, a cost 
of shopping is translated into a randomized price equilibrium in which there is a 
benefit from shopping and all consumers get the same total cost of purchase on 
average. 
7.4 Hotelling Model 
Breakfast cereals range from indigestible, unprocessed whole grains to cereals 
that are almost entirely sugar with only the odd molecule or two of grain.  Such 
cereals are hardly good substitutes for each other.  Yet similar cereals are 
viewed by consumers as good substitutes, and the standard model of this kind of 
situation is the Hotelling model.96  Hotelling was the first to use a line segment to 
represent both the product that is sold and the preferences of the consumers 
who are buying the products.  In the Hotelling model, there is a line, and 
preferences of each consumer is represented by a point on this line.  The same 
line is used to represent products.  For example, movie customers are 
differentiated by age, and we can represent moviegoers by their ages.  Movies, 
too, are designed to be enjoyed by particular ages.  Thus a “pre-teen” movie is 
unlikely to appeal very much to a six year old or to a nineteen year old, while a 
Disney movie appeals to a six year old, but less to a fifteen year old.  That is, 
movies have a target age, and customers have ages, and these are graphed on 
the same line. 
 
 
Figure  7-6: Hotelling Model for Breakfast Cereals 
 
Breakfast cereal is a classic application of the Hotelling line, and this application 
is illustrated in Figure  7-6.  Breakfast cereals are primarily distinguished by their 
sugar content, which ranges on the Hotelling line from low on the left to high on 
the right.  Similarly, the preferences of consumers also fall on the same line.  
                                            
96 Hotelling Theory is named for Harold Hotelling, 1895-1973. 
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Each consumer has a “most desired point,” and prefers cereals closer to that 
point than those at more distant points. 
7.4.1 Types of Differentiation 
There are two main types of differentiation, each of which can be modeled using 
the Hotelling line.  These types are quality and variety.  Quality refers to a 
situation where consumers agree what product is better; the disagreement 
among consumers concerns whether higher quality is worth the cost.  In 
automobiles, faster acceleration, better braking, higher gas mileage, more cargo 
capacity, more legroom, and greater durability are all good things.  In computers, 
faster processing, brighter screens, higher resolution screens, lower heat, greater 
durability, more megabytes of RAM and more gigabytes of hard drive space are 
all good things.  In contrast, varieties are the elements about which there is not 
widespread agreement.  Colors and shapes are usually varietal rather than 
quality differentiators.  Some people like almond colored appliances, others 
choose white, with blue a distant third.  Food flavors are varieties, and while the 
quality of ingredients is a quality differentiator, the type of food is usually a 
varietal differentiator.  Differences in music would primarily be varietal. 
 
Quality is often called vertical differentiation, while variety is horizontal 
differentiation. 
7.4.2 The Standard Model 
The standard Hotelling model fits two ice cream vendors on a beach.  The 
vendors sell the identical product, and moreover they can choose to locate 
wherever they wish.  For the time being, suppose the price they charge for ice 
cream is fixed at $1.  Potential customers are also spread randomly along the 
beach. 
 
We let the beach span an interval from 0 to 1.  People desiring ice cream will 
walk to the closest vendor, since the price is the same.  Thus, if one vendor 
locates at x and the other at y, and x < y, those located between 0 and ½ (x + y) 
go to the left vendor, while the rest go to the right vendor.  This is illustrated in 
Figure  7-7. 
 
 
Figure  7-7: Sharing the Hotelling Market 
 
Note that the vendor at x sells more by moving toward y, and vice versa.  Such 
logic forces profit maximizing vendors to both locate in the middle!  The one on 
the left sells to everyone left of ½, while the one on the right sells to the rest.  
0 x ½ (x + y) y 1 
Buy at x Buy at y
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Neither can capture more of the market, so equilibrium locations have been 
found.  (To complete the description of an equilibrium, we need to let the two 
“share” a point and still have one on the right side, one on the left side of that 
point.) 
 
This solution is commonly used as an explanation of why U.S. political parties 
often seem very similar to each other – they have met in the middle in the 
process of chasing the most voters.  Political parties can’t directly buy votes, so 
the “price” is fixed; the only thing parties can do is locate their platform close to 
voters’ preferred platform, on a scale of “left” to “right.”  But the same logic that a 
party can grab the middle, without losing the ends, by moving closer to the other 
party will tend to force the parties to share the same “middle of the road” 
platform. 
 
7.4.2.1 (Exercise)  Suppose there are four ice cream vendors on the beach, 
and customers are distributed uniformly.  Show that it is a Nash 
equilibrium for two to locate at ¼, and two at ¾. 
 
The model with constant prices is unrealistic for the study of the behavior of 
firms.  Moreover, the two-firm model on the beach is complicated to solve and 
has the undesirable property that it matters significantly whether the number of 
firms is odd or even.  As a result, we will consider a Hotelling model on a circle, 
and let the firms choose their prices. 
7.4.3 The Circle Model 
In this model, there are n firms evenly spaced around the circle whose 
circumference is one.  Thus, the distance between any firm and each of its 
closest neighbors is 1/n.  Consumers care about two things: how distant the firm 
they buy from is, and how much they pay for the good, and they minimize the 
sum of the price paid and t times the distance between the consumer’s location 
(also on the circle) and the firm.  Each consumer’s preference is uniformly 
distributed around the circle.  The locations of firms are illustrated in Figure  7-8. 
 
 
Figure  7-8: A Segment of the Circle Model 
 
We conjecture a Nash equilibrium in which all firms charge the price p.  To 
identify p, we look for what p must be to make any one firm choose to charge p, 
given that the others all charge p.  So suppose the firm in the middle of Figure 
 7-8 charges an alternate price r, but every other firm charges p.  A consumer 
Firm 
length 1/n 
Firm Firm 
length 1/n
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who is x units away from the firm pays the price r + tx from buying at the firm, or 
p + t(1/n – x) from buying from the rival.  The consumer is just indifferent between 
the nearby firms if these are equal, that is, 
 
r + tx* = p + t(1/n – x*) 
 
where x* is the location of the consumer who is indifferent. 
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Thus, consumers who are closer than x* to the firm charging r buy from that firm, 
and consumers who are further away than x* buy from the alternative firm.  
Demand for the firm charging r is twice x* (because the firm sells to both sides), 
so profits are price minus marginal cost times two x*, that is, 
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The first order condition97 for profit maximization is 
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We could solve the first order condition for r.  But remember that the concern is 
when is p a Nash equilibrium price?  The price p is an equilibrium price if the firm 
wants to choose r = p.  Thus, we can conclude that p is a Nash equilibrium price 
when 
 
.
n
tcp +=  
 
This value of p insures that a firm facing rivals who charge p also chooses to 
charge p.  Thus, in the Hotelling model, price exceeds marginal cost by an 
amount equal to the value of the average distance between the firms, since the 
average distance is 1/n and the value to a consumer of traveling that distance is 
t.  The profit level of each firm is 2n
t , so industry profits are 
n
t . 
 
How many firms will enter the market?  Suppose the fixed cost is F.  We are 
going to take a slightly unusual approach and assume that the number of firms 
                                            
97 Since profit is quadratic in r, we will find a global maximum. 
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can adjust in a continuous fashion, in which case the number of firms is 
determined by the zero profit condition 2n
tF = , or .Ftn =  
 
What is the socially efficient number of firms?  The socially efficient number of 
firms minimizes the total costs, which are the sum of the transportation costs and 
the fixed costs.  With n firms, the average distance a consumer travels is 
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Thus, the socially efficient number of firms minimizes the transport costs plus the 
entry costs nF
n
t +
4
.  This occurs at F
tn
2
1= .  The socially efficient number of 
firms is half the level that enter with free entry! 
 
Too many firms enter in the Hotelling circle model.  This extra entry arises 
because efficient entry is determined by the cost of entry and the average 
distance of consumers, while prices are determined by the marginal distance of 
consumers, or the distance of the marginal consumer.  That is, competing firms’ 
prices are determined by the most distant customer, and that leads to prices that 
are too high relative to the efficient level; free entry then drives net profits to zero 
only by excess entry. 
 
The Hotelling model is sometimes used to justify an assertion that firms will 
advertise too much, or engage in too much R&D, as a means of differentiating 
themselves and creating profits. 
7.5 Agency Theory 
An agent is a person who works for, or on behalf of, another.  Thus, an employee 
is an agent of a company.  But agency extends beyond employee relationships.  
Independent contractors are also agents.  Advertising firms, lawyers and 
accountants are agents of their clients.  The CEO of a company is an agent of 
the board of directors of the company.  A grocery store is an agent of the 
manufacturer of corn chips sold in the store.  Thus, the agency relationship 
extends beyond the employee into many different economic relationships.  The 
entity – person or corporation – on whose behalf an agent works is called a 
principal. 
 
Agency theory is the study of incentives provided to agents.  Incentives are an 
issue because agents need not have the same interests and goals as the 
principal.  Employees spend billions of hours every year browsing the web, 
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emailing friends, and playing computer games while they are supposedly 
working.  Attorneys hired to defend a corporation in a lawsuit have an incentive 
not to settle, to keep the billing flowing.  (Such behavior would violate the 
attorneys’ ethics requirements.)  Automobile repair shops have been known to 
use cheap or used replacement parts and bill for new, high quality parts.  These 
are all examples of a conflict in the incentives of the agent and the goals of the 
principal. 
 
Agency theory focuses on the cost of providing incentives.  When you rent a car, 
an agency relationship is created.  Even though a car rental company is called an 
agency, it is most useful to look at the renter as the agent, because it is the 
renter’s behavior that is an issue.  The company would like the agent to treat the 
car as if it were their own car.  The renter, in contrast, knows it isn’t their own car, 
and often drives accordingly. 
 
"[T]here's a lot of debate on this subject---about what kind of car 
handles best.  Some say a front-engined car; some say a rear-engined 
car.  I say a rented car.  Nothing handles better than a rented car.  You 
can go faster, turn corners sharper, and put the transmission into 
reverse while going forward at a higher rate of speed in a rented car 
than in any other kind." 98 
 
How can the car rental company insure that you don’t put their car into reverse 
while going forward at a high rate of speed?  They could monitor your behavior, 
perhaps by putting a company representative in the car with you.  That would be 
a very expensive and unpleasant solution to the problem of incentives.  Instead, 
the company uses outcomes – if damage is done, the driver has to pay for it.  
That is also an imperfect solution, because some drivers who abuse the cars get 
off scot-free and others who don’t abuse the car still have cars that break down, 
and are then mired in paperwork while they try to prove their good behavior.  
That is, a rule that penalizes drivers based on outcomes imposes risk on the 
drivers.  Modern technology is improving monitoring with GPS tracking. 
7.5.1 Simple Model 
To model the cost of provision of incentives, we consider an agent like a door-to-
door encyclopedia salesperson.  The agent will visit houses, and sell 
encyclopedias to some proportion of the households; the more work the agent 
does, the more sales that are made.  We let x represent the average dollar value 
of sales for a given level of effort; x is a choice the agent makes.  However, x will 
come with risk to the agent, which we model using the variance σ2. 
 
The firm will pay the agent a share s of the money generated by the sales.  In 
addition, the firm will pay the agent a salary y, which is fixed independently of 
sales.  This scheme – a combination of salary and commission – covers many 
different situations.  Real estate agents receive a mix of salary and commission.  
                                            
98 P. J. O'Rourke, Republican Party Reptile, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987. 
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Authors receive an advance and a royalty, which works like a salary and 
commission. 
 
The monetary compensation of the agent is sx + y.  In addition, the agent has a 
cost of effort, which we take to be 
a
x
2
2
.  Here a represents the ability of the 
agent: more able agents, who have a higher value of a, have a lower cost of 
effort.  Finally, there is a cost of risk.  The actual risk imposed on the agent is 
proportional to the degree they share in the proceeds; if s is small, the agent 
faces almost no monetary risk, while if s is high, most of the risk is imposed on 
the agent.  We use the “linear cost of risk” model developed earlier, to impose a 
cost of risk which is sλσ2.  Here, σ2 is the variance of the monetary risk, λ defines 
the agent’s attitude or cost of risk, and s is the share of the risk imposed on the 
agent.  This results in a payoff to the agent of 
 
2
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The first two terms, sx + y, are the payments made to the agent.  The next term 
is the cost of generating that level of x.  The final term is the cost of risk imposed 
on the agent by the contract. 
 
The agency game works as follows.  First, the principal offers a contract, which 
involves a commission s and a salary y.  The agent can either accept or reject 
the contract and accepts if he obtains at least u0 units of utility, the value of his 
next best offer.  Then the agent decides how much effort to expend, that is, the 
agent chooses x. 
 
As with all subgame perfect equilibria, we work backwards to first figure out what 
x an agent would choose.  Because our assumptions make u quadratic in x, this 
is a straightforward exercise, and we conclude x=sa.  This can be embedded into 
u, and we obtain the agent’s optimized utility, u*, is 
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The agent won’t accept employment unless u*≥u0, the reservation utility.  The 
principal can minimize the cost of employing the agent by setting the salary such 
that u*=u0, which results in 
 
22
0 ½ λσsasuy +−= . 
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Incentive Compensation: A Percentage of What? 
 
Most companies compensate their sales force based on the revenue generated. However, 
maximizing revenue need not be the same thing as maximizing profit, which is generally the goal of 
the company. In what follows, Steve Bisset discusses the difference.  
 
“Many years ago I was CEO of a company called Megatest, founded by Howard Marshall and 
myself in 1975. Around 1987 we were selling test systems in the $1M+ price range. Every Monday 
morning we would have a meeting with sales management and product marketing, mediated by 
myself. Individual salesmen came in to make their cases for how they just had to have a huge 
discount, else they would lose a particular sale. The meeting was part circus, with great 
performances, and part dogfight.  
 
“I could visualize the sales guys spending their time in the car or the shower using their substantial 
creative powers to dream up good justifications for their next plea for a huge discount.  They knew 
that if we were willing to bleed enough we could usually win the sale. I wanted to solve both the 
resultant profitability problem and the problem of the unpleasant meeting.  
 
“Commissions were traditionally a percentage of bookings (net of discount), with part held back 
until cash was received. The percentage increased after a salesman met his individual quota for 
the quarter (the performances at quota-setting time to sandbag the quota were even more 
impressive). The fact that a discount reduced commission did not affect a salesman's behavior, 
because the difference in commission was small. Better to buy the order by giving a big discount 
and then move on quickly to the next sale.  
 
“Salesmen are "coin operated", and will figure out how to maximize their total commission.  Most 
salesmen I have met are quite good at math.  Further, they have learned to “watch the hips, not the 
lips” – in other words, they judge management intentions by actions rather than words.  They 
reason – and I agree with them – that if management really wanted them to maximize margins 
rather than revenues, then they would pay them more if they maximize margins. 
 
“We decided to try a new scheme, against some howling from the sales department. We set a 
base "cost" for each product, approximately representing the incremental cost to manufacture and 
support the product. Then we offered commission on the amount that the net sales price exceeded 
this base cost. The base cost may have been as much as 80% of the list price (it was a very 
competitive market at the time). Then we increased the commission rate by a factor of about six, so 
that if the salesman brought in an order at a price near list, then his commission was somewhat 
higher than before. If he started discounting, his commission dropped sharply. We gave broad 
discretion to sales management to approve discounts.  
 
“We still had sales guys claiming that a sale was massively strategic and had to be sold at or below 
cost, and that they needed their commission anyway to justify the effort. In some cases we 
approved this, but mostly we said that if it's strategic then you'll get your commission on the follow-
on sales. While salesmen have a strong preference for immediate cash, they will act so as to 
maximize income over time, and will think and act strategically if financially rewarded for such.  
 
“The results were that our margins increased significantly. Revenues were increasing too. It's hard 
to attribute the revenue gain to the new commission plan, given the number of other variables, but I 
like to think that it was a factor. Now our salesmen spent more of their creative energies devising 
ways to sell our customers on the value of our products and company, instead of conspiring with 
sales management as to the best tale of woe to present to marketing at the Monday pricing 
meeting.  
 
“The Monday meetings became shorter and more pleasant, focused on truly creative ways to make 
each sale. There certainly were steep discounts given in some cases, but they reflected the 
competitive situation and future sales potential at each account much more accurately.”  
 
(Source: private correspondence, quotation permission received)
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Observe that the salary has to be higher, the greater is the risk σ2.  That is, the 
principal has to cover the cost of risk in the salary term. 
7.5.2 Cost of Providing Incentives 
The principal obtains profits which are the remainder of the value after paying the 
agent, and minus the salary: 
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Note that the principal gets the entire output x = sa minus all the costs – the 
reservation utility of the agent u0, the cost of providing effort, and the risk cost on 
the agent.  That is, the principal obtains the full gains from trade – the value of 
production minus the total cost of production.  However, the fact that the principal 
obtains the full gains from trade doesn’t mean the principal induces the agent to 
work extremely hard, because there is no mechanism for the principal to induce 
the agent to work hard without imposing more risk on the agent, and this risk is 
costly to the principal.  Agents are induced to work hard by tying their pay to their 
performance, and such a link necessarily imposes risk on the agent, and risk is 
costly.99 
 
We take the principal to be risk neutral.  This is reasonable when the principal is 
“economically large” relative to the agent, so that the risks faced by the agent are 
small to the principal.  For example, the risks associated with any one car are 
small to a car rental company.  The principal who maximizes expected profits 
chooses s to maximize π, which yields 
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This formula is interesting for several reasons.  First, if the agent is neutral to 
risk, which means λ=0, then s is 1.  That is, the agent gets 100% of the marginal 
return to effort, and the principal just collects a lump sum.  This is reminiscent of 
some tenancy contracts used by landlords and peasants; the peasant paid a 
lump sum for the right to farm the land and then kept all of the crops grown.  
Since these peasants were unlikely to be risk neutral, while the landlord was 
relatively neutral to risk, such a contract was unlikely to be optimal.  The contract 
with s=1 is known as “selling the agency” since the principal sells the agency to 
the agent for a lump sum payment.  (Here, y will generally be negative – the 
                                            
99 There is a technical requirement that the principal’s return π must be positive, for otherwise the 
principal would rather not contract at all.  This amounts to an assumption that u0 is not too large.  
Moreover, if s comes out less than zero, the model falls apart, and in this case, the actual solution 
is s=0. 
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principal gets a payment rather than paying a salary.)  The more common 
contract, however, had the landowner and the tenant farmer share the proceeds 
of farming, which gives rise to the name sharecropper. 
 
Second, more risk or more risk aversion on the part of the agent decreases the 
share of the proceeds accruing to the agent.  Thus, when the cost of risk or the 
amount of risk is high, the best contract imposes less risk on the agent.  Total 
output sa falls as the risk costs rise. 
 
Third, more able agents (higher a) get higher commissions.  That is, the principal 
imposes more risk on the more able agent because the returns to imposition of 
risk – in the form of higher output – are greater, and thus worth the cost in terms 
of added risk. 
 
Most real estate agencies operate on a mix of salary and commission, with 
commissions paid to agents averaging about 50%.  The agency RE/MAX, 
however, pays commissions close to 100%, collecting a fixed monthly fee that 
covers agency expenses from the agents.  RE/MAX claims that their formula is 
appropriate for better agents.  The theory developed suggests that more able 
agents should obtain higher commissions.  But in addition, RE/MAX’s formula 
also tends to attract more able agents, since able agents earn a higher wage 
under the high commission formula.  (There is a potential downside to the 
RE/MAX formula, that it discourages agency-wide cooperation.) 
7.5.3 Selection of Agent 
Consider what contracts attract what kinds of agents.  For a fixed salary y and 
commission s, the agent’s utility, optimizing over x, is 
 
22½* λσsasyu −+= . 
 
The agent’s utility is increasing in a and decreasing in λ.  Thus, more able agents 
get higher utility, and less risk averse agents get higher utility. 
 
How do the terms of the contract affect the pool of applicants?  Let us suppose 
two contracts are offered, one with a salary y1 and commission s1, the other with 
salary y2 and commission s2.  We suppose y2 < y1 and s2 > s1.  What kind of 
agent prefers contract 2, the high commission, low salary contract, over contract 
1? 
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or, equivalently, 
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Thus, agents with high ability a or low level of risk aversion λ prefers the high 
commission, low salary contract.  A company that puts more of the compensation 
in the form of commission tends to attract more able agents, and agents less 
averse to risk.  The former is a desirable feature of the incentive scheme, since 
more able agents produce more.  The latter, the attraction of less risk averse 
agents, may or may not be desirable but is probably neutral overall. 
 
One important consideration is that agents who overestimate their ability will 
react the same as people who have higher ability.  Thus, the contract equally 
attracts those with high ability and those who overestimate their ability. 
 
Agency theory provides a characterization of the cost of providing incentives.  
The source of the cost is the link between incentives and risk.  Incentives link pay 
and performance; when performance is subject to random fluctuations, linking 
pay and performance also links pay and the random fluctuations.  Thus the 
provision of incentives necessarily imposes risk on the agent, and if the agent is 
risk averse, this is costly. 
 
In addition, the extent to which pay is linked to performance will tend to affect the 
type of agent who is willing to work for the principal.  Thus, a principal must not 
only consider the incentive to work hard created by the commission and salary 
structure, but also the type of agent who would choose to accept such a contract. 
7.5.4 Multi-tasking 
Multi-tasking refers to performing several activities simultaneously.  All of us 
multi-task.  We study while drinking a caffeinated beverage; we think about 
things in the shower; we talk all too much on cell phones and eat French fries 
while driving.  In the context of employees, an individual employee will be 
assigned a variety of tasks and responsibilities, and the employee must divide 
their time and efforts among the tasks.  Incentives provided to the employee 
must direct not only the total efforts of the employee, but also the allocation of 
time and effort across activities.  An important aspect of multi-tasking is the 
interaction of incentives provided to employees, and the effects of changes in 
one incentive on the behavior of the employee over many different dimensions.  
In this section, we will establish conditions under which the problem of an 
employer disaggregates, that is to say, the incentives on each individual task can 
be set independently of the incentives applied to the others. 
 
This section is relatively challenging and involves a number of pieces.  To 
simplify the presentation, some of the pieces are set aside as claims. 
 
To begin the analysis, we consider a person who has n tasks or jobs.  For 
convenience we will index these activities with the natural numbers 1, 2, … , n.  
The level of activity, which may also be thought of as an action, in task i will be 
denoted by xi.  It will prove convenient to denote the vector of actions by 
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) ,  ,(  1 nxx …=x .  We suppose the agent bears a cost c(x) of undertaking the 
vector of actions x.  We make four assumptions on c: 
 
• c is increasing in each xi, 
• c has a continuous second derivative 
• c is strictly convex, and 
• c is homogenous100 of degree r. 
 
For example, if there are two tasks (n=2), then all four of these assumptions are 
met by the cost function 21
2
2
2
121 ½x),( xxxxxc ++= .  This function is increasing 
in x1 and x2, has continuous derivatives, is strictly convex (more about this below) 
and is homogeneous of degree 2. 
 
It is assumed that c is increasing to identify the activities as costly.  Continuity of 
derivatives is used for convenience.  Convexity of c will insure that a solution to 
the first order conditions is actually an optimum for the employee.  Formally, it 
means that for any vectors x ≠ y and scalar α between zero and one (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), 
 
))1(()()1()( yxyx α−+α≥α−+α ccc . 
 
One way of interpreting this requirement is that it is less costly to do the average 
of two things than the average of the costs of the things.  Intuitively, convexity 
requires that doing a medium thing is less costly than the average of two 
extremes.  This is plausible when extremes tend to be very costly.  It also means 
the set of vectors which cost less than a fixed amount, {x | c(x) ≤ b}, is a convex 
set.  Thus, if two points cost less than a given budget, the line segment 
connecting them does, too.  Convexity of the cost function insures that the 
agent’s optimization problem is concave, and thus that the first order-conditions 
describe a maximum.  When the inequality is strict for α satisfying 0 < α < 1, is 
referred to as strict convexity. 
 
The assumption of homogeneity dictates that scale works in a particularly simple 
manner.  Scaling up activities increases costs at a fixed rate r.  Homogeneity has 
very strong implications that are probably unreasonable in many settings.  
Nevertheless, homogeneity leads to an elegant and useful theory, as we shall 
see.  Recall the definition of a homogeneous function: c is homogeneous of 
degree r means that for any λ > 0, 
 
)()( xx cc rλλ = . 
 
Claim: strict convexity implies that r > 1. 
 
                                            
100 Homogeneous functions were defined in  4.1.8.3 (Exercise). 
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Proof of Claim: Fix any x and consider the two points x and λx.  By 
convexity, for α=½, 
)()1()()()r)1(( xxx λα−+α=λα−+α ccc  
)(r))1(()))1(( xxx cc λα−+α=λα−+α>  
which implies r))1(()r)1(( λα−+α>λα−+α . 
 
Define a function k which is the left hand side minus the right hand side: 
 
rr ))1(()1()( λααλααα −+−−+=k .  Note that k(0)=k(1)=0.  Moreover, 
22-r )1())1()(1()( λλααα −−+−−=′′ rrk .  It is readily checked that if a 
convex function of one variable is twice differentiable, then the second 
derivative is greater than zero.  If r < 1, 0)( >α′′k , implying that k is 
convex, and hence, if 0 < α < 1, 
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Similarly, if r > 1, k is concave and k(α) > 0.  This completes the proof, 
showing that r≤1 is not compatible with the convexity of c. 
 
How should our person behave?  Consider linear incentives, which are also 
known as piece rates.  With piece rates, the employee gets a payment pi for each 
unit of xi produced.  The person then chooses x to maximize 
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Here • is the dot product, which is the sum of the products of the components. 
 
The agent chooses x to maximize u, resulting in n first order conditions 
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where ci is the partial derivative of c with respect to the ith argument xi.  This first 
order condition can be expressed more compactly as 
 
)(0 xp c ′−=  
 
where )(xc′  is the vector of partial derivatives of c.  Convexity of c insures that 
any solution to this problem is a global utility maximum, since the function u is 
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concave, and strict convexity insures that there is at most one solution to the first 
order conditions.101 
 
One very useful implication of homogeneity is that incentives scale.  
Homogeneity has the effect of turning a very complicated optimization problem 
into a problem that is readily solved, thanks to this very scaling. 
 
Claim: If all incentives rise by a scalar factor α, then x rises by 1
1
−rα . 
 
Proof of Claim: Note that differentiating )()( xx cc rλλ =  with respect to xi 
yields )()( xx i
r
i cc λλλ = , and thus )()( 1 xx cc r ′=′ −λλ .  That is, if c is 
homogeneous of degree r, c ′  is homogeneous of degree r – 1.  
Consequently, if )(0 xp c ′−= , )(0 1
1
xp −′−= rc αα .  Thus, if the 
incentives are scaled up by α, the efforts rise by the scalar factor 1
1
−rα . 
 
Now consider an employer with an agent engaging in n activities.  The employer 
values the ith activity at vi, and thus wishes to maximize 
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This equation embodies a standard trick in agency theory.  Think of the principal 
(employer) not as choosing the incentives p, but instead as choosing the effort 
levels x, with the incentives as a constraint.  That is, the principal can be thought 
of choosing x and then choosing the p that implements this x.  The principal’s 
expected profit is readily differentiated with respect to each xj, yielding 
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However, since cj(x) is homogeneous of degree r – 1,  
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101 This description is slightly inadequate, because we haven’t considered boundary conditions.  
Often a requirement like xi≥0 is also needed.  In this case, the first order conditions may not hold 
with equality for those choices where xi=0 is optimal. 
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and thus )())()(0
1
xxx jj
n
i
iijjj rcvxccv −=−−= ∑
=
. 
 
This expression proves the main result of this section.  Under the maintained 
hypotheses (convexity and homogeneity), an employer of a multi-tasking agent 
uses incentives which are a constant proportion of value, that is, 
 
r
v
p jj = ,  
 
where r is the degree of homogeneity of the agent’s costs.  Recalling that r>1, the 
principal uses a sharing rule, sharing a fixed proportion of value with the agent. 
 
When agents have a homogeneous cost function, the principal has a very simple 
optimal incentive scheme, requiring quite limited knowledge of the agent’s cost 
function (just the degree of homogeneity).  Moreover, the incentive scheme 
works through a somewhat surprising mechanism.  Note that if the value of one 
activity, say activity 1, rises, p1 rises and all the other payment rates stay 
constant.  The agent responds by increasing x1, but the other activities may rise 
or fall depending on how complementary they are to activity 1.  Overall, the 
agent’s substitution across activities given the new incentive level on activity 1 
implements the desired effort levels on other activities.  The remarkable 
implication of homogeneity is that, although the principal desires different effort 
levels for all activities, only the incentive on activity 1 must change! 
7.5.5 Multi-tasking without Homogeneity 
For example, if the agent has quadratic costs, the principal pays the agent half 
the value of each activity.  Moreover, the more rapidly costs rise in scale, the 
lower the payments to the agent. 
 
This remarkable theorem has several limitations.  The requirement of 
homogeneity is itself an important limitation, although this assumption is 
reasonable in some settings.  More serious is the assumption that all of the 
incentives are set optimally for the employer.  Suppose, instead, that one of the 
incentives is set “too high,” at least from the employer’s perspective.  This might 
arise if, for example, the agent acquired all the benefits of one of the activities.  
An increase in the power of one incentive will then tend to “spill over” to the other 
actions, increasing for complements and decreasing for substitutes.  When the 
efforts are substitutes, an increase in the power of one incentive will cause others 
to optimally rise, to compensate for the reduced supply of efforts of that type.102 
 
                                            
102 Multi-tasking, and agency theory more generally, is a rich theory with many implications not 
discussed here.  For a challenging and important analysis, see Bengt Holmstrom and Paul 
Milgrom, "The Firm as an Incentive System,” American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4  (Sep., 
1994), pp. 972-991. 
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We can illustrate the effects of cost functions that aren’t homogeneous in a 
relatively straightforward way.  Suppose the cost depends on the sum of the 
squared activity levels: 
 
)()(
1
2 xxx •=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∑
=
gxgc
n
i
i . 
 
This is a situation where vector notation (dot-products) dramatically simplifies the 
expressions.  You may find it useful to work through the notation on a separate 
sheet, or in the margin, using summation notation to verify each step.  At the 
moment, we won’t be concerned with the exact specification of g, but instead use 
the first order conditions to characterize the solution. 
 
The agent maximizes 
 
)( xxxp •−•= gu . 
 
This gives a first order condition 
 
xxxp )(20 •′−= g  
 
It turns out that a sufficient condition for this equation to characterize the agent’s 
utility maximization is that g is both increasing and convex (increasing second 
derivative). 
 
This is a particularly simple expression, because the vector of efforts, x, points in 
the same direction as the incentive payments p.  The scalar that gives the overall 
effort levels, however, is not necessarily a constant, as occurs with 
homogeneous cost functions.  Indeed, we can readily see that x•x is the solution 
to 
 
)())(2( 2 xxxxpp ••′=• g . 
 
Because x•x is a number, it is worth introducing notation for it: S = x•x.  Then S 
is the solution to  
 
2))((4 SgS ′=•pp . 
 
The principal or employer chooses p to maximize 
 
))((2 xxxxxvxpxv ••′−•=•−•= gπ . 
 
This gives the first order condition 
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( )xxxxxxxv0 )()()(4 •′′•+•′−= gg . 
 
Thus, the principal’s choice of p is such that x is proportional to v, with constant 
of proportionality )()( xxxxxx •′′•+•′ gg .  Using the same trick (dotting each 
side of the first order condition ( )xxxxxxxv )()(4 •′′•+•′= gg  with itself),  
 
( ) **)(**)(16 2SSgSSg ′′+′=• vv  
 
is the level of x•x=S* induced by the principal.  Given S*, p is given by 
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Note that this expression gives the right answer when costs are homogeneous.  
In this case, g(S) must be in the form Sr/2, and the formula gives  
 
rr
vvp =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+= 11
1
2
1  
 
as we already established.   
 
The natural assumption to impose on the function g is that ( ) SSgSSg 2)()( ′′+′  is 
an increasing function of S.  This assumption implies that as the value of effort 
rises, the total effort also rises.   
 
Suppose 
)(
)(
Sg
SgS
′
′′
 is increasing in S.  Then an increase in vi increases S, 
decreasing pj for j≠i.  That is, when one item becomes more valuable, the 
incentives on the others are reduced.  Moreover, since 2))((4 SgS ′=•pp , an 
increase in S only occurs if p•p increases. 
 
These equations together imply that an increase in any one vi increases the total 
effort (as measured by S* = x•x), increases the total incentives as measured by 
p•p, and decreases the incentives on all activities other than activity i.  In 
contrast, if 
)(
)(
Sg
SgS
′
′′
 is a decreasing function of S, then an increase in any one vi 
causes all the incentives to rise.  Intuitively, the increase in vi directly causes pi to 
rise, since xi is more valuable.  This causes the agent to substitute toward activity 
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i.  This causes the relative cost of total activity to fall (since 
)(
)(
Sg
SgS
′
′′
 decreases), 
which induces a desire to increase the other activity levels, which is 
accomplished by increase in the incentives on the other activities. 
 
This conclusion generalizes in a major way.  Suppose that c(x) = g(h(x)), where h 
is homogeneous of degree r and g is increasing.  In the case just considered, 
h(x)=x•x.  Then the same conclusion, that the sign of 
j
i
dv
dp  is determined by the 
derivative of 
)(
)(
Sg
SgS
′
′′
, holds.  In the generalization, S now stands for h(x). 
7.6 Auctions 
When we think of auctions, we tend to think of movies where 
people scratch their ear and accidentally purchase a Faberge 
egg, like the one pictured at left.103  However, stock exchanges, 
bond markets and commodities markets are organized as 
auctions, too, and because of such exchanges, auctions are the 
most common means of establishing prices.  Auctions are one of 
the oldest transactions means recorded in human history, and 
were used by the Babylonians.  The word auction comes from the 
Latin auctio, meaning to increase. 
 
Auctions have been used to sell a large variety of things.  Internet 
auction house eBay is most famous for weird items that have been auctioned 
(e.g. one person’s attempt to sell their soul), but in addition, many of the 
purchases of the U.S. government are made by auction.  The U.S. purchases 
everything from fighter aircraft to French fries by auction, and the U.S. 
government is the world’s largest purchaser of French fries.  In addition, 
corporations are occasionally sold by auction. 
 
Items that are usually sold by auction include prize bulls, tobacco, used cars, 
race horses, coins, stamps, antiques, and fine art. 
 
Information plays a significant role in bidding in auctions.  The two major 
extremes in information, which lead to distinct theories, are private values, which 
means bidders know their own value, and common values, in which bidders don’t 
know their own value, but have some indication or signal about the value.  In the 
private values situation, a bidder may be outbid by another bidder, but doesn’t 
learn anything from another bidder’s willingness to pay.  The case of private 
values arises when the good being sold has a quality apparent to all bidders, no 
hidden attributes, and no possibility of resale.  In contrast, the case of common 
                                            
103 Photo courtesy of Paris Jewelers, 107 East Ridgewood Ave. Ridgewood, New Jersey 07450. 
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values arises when bidders don’t know the value of the item for sale, but that 
value is common to all.  The quintessential example is an off-shore oil lease.  No 
one knows for sure how much oil can be extracted from an off-shore lease, and 
companies have estimates of the amount of oil.  The estimates are closely 
guarded because rivals could learn from them.  Similarly, when antiques dealers 
bid on an antique, the value they place on it is primarily the resale value.  
Knowing rivals’ estimates of the resale value would influence the value each 
bidder placed on the item. 
 
The private values environment is unrealistic in most settings, because items for 
sale usually have some element of common value.  However, some situations 
approximate the private values environment and these are the most readily 
understood. 
7.6.1 English Auction 
An English auction is the common auction form used for selling antiques, art, 
used cars and cattle.  The auctioneer starts low, and calls out prices until no 
bidder is willing to bid higher than the current high price.  The most common 
procedure is for a low price to be called out, and a bidder accept it.  A higher 
prices is called out, and a different bidder accepts it.  When several accept 
simultaneously, the auctioneer accepts the first one spotted.  This process 
continues until a price is called out that no one accepts.  At that point the auction 
ends, and the highest bidder wins. 
 
In a private values setting, a very simple bidding strategy is optimal for bidders: a 
bidder should keep bidding until the price exceeds the value a bidder places on 
it, at which point the bidder should stop.  That is, bidders should drop out of the 
bidding when the price exceeds their value, because at that point, winning entails 
a loss.  Every bidder should be willing to continue to bid and not let the item sell 
to someone else if the price is less than their value.  If you have a value v and 
another bidder is about to win at a price pa < v, you might as well accept a price 
pb between the two, pa < pb < v, since a purchase at this price would provide 
profits.  This strategy is a dominant strategy for each private values bidder, 
because no matter what strategy other bidders adopt, bidding up to value is the 
strategy that maximizes the profits of a bidder. 
 
The presence of a dominant strategy makes it straightforward to bid in the private 
values environment.  In addition, it makes an analysis of the outcome of the 
English auction relatively simple. 
 
Most auctioneers use a somewhat flexible system of bid increments.  A bid 
increment is the difference between successive price requests.  The theory is 
simplest when the bid increment, which we will denote as ∆, is very small.  In this 
case, the bidder with the highest value will win, and the price will be no more 
than the second-highest value, but at least the second-highest value minus ∆, 
since if the price was less than this level, the bidder with the second-highest 
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value would submit another bid.  If we denote the second-highest value with the 
somewhat obscure (but standard) notation v(2), the final price p satisfies 
 
 )2()2( vpv ≤≤∆− . 
 
As the bid increment gets small, this nails down the price.  The conclusion is that, 
when bid increments are small and bidders have private values, the bidder with 
the highest value wins the bidding at a price equal to the second-highest value.  
The notation for the highest value is v(1), and thus the seller obtains v(2), and the 
winning bidder obtains profits of v(1) – v(2). 
7.6.2 Sealed-bid Auction 
In a sealed-bid auction, each bidder submits a bid in an envelope.  These are 
opened simultaneously, and the highest bidder wins the item and pays his or her 
bid.  Sealed-bid auctions are used to sell off-shore oil leases, and used by 
governments to purchase a wide variety of items.  In a purchase situation, known 
often as a tender, the lowest bidder wins and is paid the bid. 
 
The analysis of the sealed-bid auction is more challenging because the bidders 
don’t have a dominant strategy.  Indeed, the best bid depends on what the other 
bidders are bidding.  The bidder with the highest value would like to bid a penny 
more than the next highest bidder’s bid, whatever that might be. 
 
To pursue an analysis of the sealed-bid auction, we are going to make a variety 
of simplifying assumptions.  These assumptions aren’t necessary to the analysis 
but are made to simplify the mathematical presentation. 
 
We suppose there are n bidders, and label the bidders 1,…,n.  Bidder i has a 
private value vi which is a draw from the uniform distribution on the interval [0,1].  
That is, if 10 ≤≤≤ ba , the probability that bidder i’s value is in the interval [a, 
b] is b – a.  An important attribute of this assumption is symmetry – the bidders 
all have the same distribution.  In addition, the formulation has assumed 
independence – the value one bidder places on the object for sale is statistically 
independent from the value placed by others.  In addition, each bidder knows 
their own value, but doesn’t know the other bidders’ values.  Each bidder is 
assumed to bid in such a way as to maximize expected profit, and we will look for 
a Nash equilibrium of the bidding game.  Bidders are permitted to submit any bid 
not less than zero. 
 
To find an equilibrium, it is helpful to restrict attention to linear rules, in which a 
bidder bids a proportion of their value.  Thus, we suppose each bidder bids λv 
when their value is v, and examine under what conditions this is in fact Nash 
equilibrium behavior.  We have an equilibrium if, when all other bidders bid λv 
when their value is v, the remaining bidder will, too. 
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So fix a bidder and suppose that bidder’s value is vi.  What bid should the bidder 
choose?  A bid of b wins the bidding if all other bidders bid less than b.  Since the 
other bidders, by hypothesis, bid λv when their value is v, our bidder wins when 
jvb λ≥  for each other bidder j.  This occurs when jvb ≥λ  for each other 
bidder j, and this in turn occurs with probability λb .104  Thus, our bidder with 
value vi who bids b wins with probability ( ) 1−nbλ , since the bidder must beat all 
n-1 other bidders.  That creates expected profits for the bidder of 
 
 ( ) 1)( −−= ni bbv λπ . 
 
The bidder chooses b to maximize expected profits. The first order condition 
requires 
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The first order condition solves for  
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But this is a linear rule!  Thus, if 
n
n 1−=λ , we have a Nash equilibrium. 
 
The nature of this equilibrium is that each bidder bids a fraction 
n
n 1−=λ  of 
their value, and the highest value bidder wins at a price equal to that fraction of 
their value. 
 
In some cases, the sealed-bid auction produces regret.  Regret means that a 
bidder wishes she had bid differently.  Recall our notation for values: v(1) is the 
highest value and v(2) is the second-highest value.  Since the price in a sealed-
bid auction is )1(
1
v
n
n − , the second-highest bidder will regret her bid when 
)1()2(
1
v
n
n
v
−> .  In this case, the bidder with the second-highest value could 
have bid higher and won, if the bidder had known the winning bidder’s bid.  In 
                                            
104 If λ>b , then in fact the probability is one.  You can show that no bidder would ever bid 
more than λ. 
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contrast, the English auction is regret-free, in that the price rises to the point that 
the bidder with the second-highest value won’t pay. 
 
How do the two auctions compare in prices?  It turns out that statistical 
independence of private values implies revenue equivalence, which means the 
two auctions produce the same prices on average.  Given the highest value v(1), 
the second-highest value has distribution 
1
)1(
)2(
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ n
v
v
, since this is the probability 
that all n-1 other bidders have values less than v(2).  But this gives an expected 
value of v(2) of 
 
)1()2(
0
1
)1(
2
)2(
)2()2(
1
)1(
)1(
v
n
n
dv
v
v
nvEv
v
n
n −=−= ∫ −
−
. 
 
Thus, the average price paid in the sealed-bid auction is the same as the 
average price in the English auction. 
7.6.3 Dutch Auction 
The Dutch auction is like an English auction, except that prices start high and are 
successively dropped until a bidder accepts the going price, at which point the 
auction ends.  The Dutch auction is so named because it is used to sell cut 
flowers in Holland, in the enormous flower auctions. 
 
A strategy in a Dutch auction is a price at which the bidder bids.  Each bidder 
watches the price decline, until such a point that either the bidder bids, or a rival 
bids, and the auction ends.  Note that a bidder could revise their bid in the course 
of the auction, but there isn’t any point.  For example, suppose the price starts at 
$1,000, and a bidder decides to bid when the price reaches $400.  Once the 
price gets to $450, the bidder could decide to revise and wait until $350.  
However, no new information has become available and there is no reason to 
revise.  In order for the price to reach the original planned bid of $400, it had to 
reach $450, meaning that no one bid prior to a price of $450.  In order for a bid of 
$400 to wins, the price had to reach $450; if the price reaching $450 means that 
a bid of $350 is optimal, than the original bid of $400 wasn’t optimal.105 
 
What is interesting about the Dutch auction is that it has exactly the same 
possible strategies and outcomes as the sealed-bid auction.  In both cases, a 
strategy for a bidder is a bid, no bidder sees the others’ bids until after their own 
bid is formulated, and the winning bidder is the one with the highest bid.  This is 
                                            
105 Of course, a bidder who thinks losing is likely may wait for a lower price to formulate the bid, a 
consideration ignored here.  In addition, because the Dutch auction unfolds over time, bidders 
who discount the future will bid slightly higher in a Dutch auction as a way of speeding it along, 
another small effect that is ignored for simplicity. 
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called strategic equivalence.  Both games – the Dutch auction and the sealed-bid 
auction – offer identical strategies to the bidders, and given the strategies chosen 
by all bidders, produce the same payoff.  Such games should produce the same 
outcomes. 
 
The strategic equivalence of the Dutch auction and the sealed-bid auction is a 
very general result, which doesn’t depend on the nature of the values of the 
bidders (private versus common) or the distribution of information (independent 
versus correlated).  Indeed, the prediction that the two games should produce the 
same outcome doesn’t even depend on risk aversion, although that is more 
challenging to demonstrate. 
7.6.4 Vickrey Auction 
The strategic equivalence of the Dutch and sealed-bid auction suggests another 
fact: there may be more than one way of implementing a given kind of auction.  
Such logic led Nobel laureate William Vickrey (1914-1996) to design what has 
become known as the Vickrey auction, which is a “second-price sealed-bid” 
auction.  This auction is most familiar because it is the foundation of eBay’s 
auction design.  The Vickrey auction is a sealed-bid auction, but with a twist: the 
high bidder wins, but pays the second-highest bid.  This is why the Vickrey 
auction is called a second-price auction: the price is not the highest bid, but the 
second-highest bid. 
 
The Vickrey auction underlies the eBay outcome because when a bidder submits 
a bid in the eBay auction, the current “going” price is not the highest bid, but the 
second-highest bid, plus a bid increment.  Thus, up to the granularity of the bid 
increment, the basic eBay auction is a Vickrey auction run over time. 
 
As in the English auction, bidders with private values in a Vickrey auction have a 
dominant strategy.  Fix a bidder, with value v, and let p be the highest bid of the 
other bidders.  If the bidder bids b, the bidder earns profits of 
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It is profitable for the bidder to win if v > p, and lose if v < p.  To win when v > p, 
and lose if v < p, can be assured by bidding v.  Essentially, there is no gain to 
bidding less than your value, because your bid doesn’t affect the price, only the 
likelihood of winning.  Bidding less than value causes the bidder to lose when the 
highest rival bid falls between the bid and the value, which is a circumstance that 
the bidder would like to win.  Similarly, bidding more than value only creates a 
chance of winning when the price is higher than the bidder’s value, in which case 
the bidder would prefer to lose. 
 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 7-324
Thus, bidders in a Vickrey auction have a dominant strategy to bid their value.  
This produces the same outcome as the English auction, however, because the 
payment made is the second-highest value, which was the price in the English 
auction.  Thus, the Vickrey auction is a sealed-bid implementation of the English 
auction when bidders have private values, producing the same outcome, which is 
that the highest value bidder wins, but pays the second-highest value. 
 
Because the Vickrey auction induces bidders to bid their value, it is said to be 
demand revealing.  Unlike the English auction, in which the bidding stops when 
the price reaches the second-highest value and thus doesn’t reveal the highest 
value, the Vickrey auction reveals the highest value.  In a controlled, laboratory 
setting, demand revelation is useful, especially when the goal is to identify buyer 
values.  Despite its theoretical niceties, the Vickrey auction can be politically 
disastrous.  Indeed, New Zealand sold radio spectrum with the Vickrey auction 
on the basis of advice by a naïve economist, and the Vickrey auction created a 
political nightmare when a nationwide cellular license received a high bid of $110 
million, and a second-highest bid of $11 million.  The political problem was that 
the demand revelation showed that the government received only about 10% of 
the value of the license, making the public quite irate and dominating news 
coverage at the time.106  Some smaller licenses sold for tenths of a percent of the 
highest bid. 
 
In a private values setting, the Vickrey auction, or the English auction, are much 
easier on bidders than a regular sealed-bid auction, because of the dominant 
strategy.  The sealed-bid auction requires bidders to forecast their rivals’ likely 
bids, and produces the risks of either bidding more than necessary, or losing the 
bidding.  Thus, the regular sealed-bid auction has undesirable properties.  
Moreover, bidders in the sealed-bid auction have an incentive to bribe the 
auctioneer to reveal the best bid by rivals, because that is useful information in 
formulating a bid.  Such (illegal) bribery occurs from time to time in government 
contracting. 
 
On the other hand, the regular sealed-bid auction has an advantage over the 
other two that it makes price-fixing more difficult.  A bidder can cheat on a 
conspiracy and not be detected until after the current auction is complete. 
 
Another disadvantage of the sealed-bid auction is that it is easier to make certain 
kinds of bidding errors.  In the U.S. PCS auctions, in which rights to use the radio 
spectrum for cellular phones was sold for around $20 billion, one bidder, 
intending to bid $200,000, inadvertently bid $200,000,000.  Such an error isn’t 
possible in an English auction, because prices rise at a measured pace.  Such 
                                            
106 The Vickrey auction generally produces higher prices than regular sealed-bid auctions if 
bidders are symmetric (share the same distribution of values), but is a poor choice of auction 
format when bidders are not symmetric.  Since the incumbent telephone company was expected 
to have a higher value than others, the Vickrey auction was a poor choice for that reason as well. 
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errors have little consequence in a Vickrey auction, since getting the price wrong 
by an order of magnitude requires two bidders to make such errors. 
7.6.5 Winner’s Curse 
"I paid too much for it, but it's worth it." 
 -Sam Goldwyn 
 
The analysis so far has been conducted under the restrictive assumption of 
private values.  In most contexts, bidders are not sure of the actual value of the 
item being sold, and information held by others is relevant to the valuation of the 
item.  If I estimate an antique to be worth $5,000, but no one else is willing to bid 
more than $1,000, I might revise my estimate of the value down.  This revision 
leads bidders to learn from the auction itself what the item is worth. 
 
The early bidders in the sale of oil lease rights in the Gulf of Mexico (the outer 
continental shelf) were often observed to pay more than the rights were worth.  
This phenomenon came to be known as the winner’s curse.  The winner's curse 
is the fact that the bidder who most overestimates the value of the object wins 
the bidding.  Naïve bidders, who don’t adjust for the winner’s curse, will tend to 
lose money because they only win the bidding when they’ve bid too high.   
 
 
Figure  7-9: Normally Distributed Estimates 
  
Auctions, by their nature, select optimistic bidders.  Consider the case of an oil 
lease (right to drill for and pump oil) that has an unknown value v.  Different 
bidders will obtain different estimates the value, and we may view these 
estimates as draws from a normal distribution illustrated in Figure  7-9.  The 
estimates are correct on average, which is represented by the fact that the 
distribution is centered on the true value v.  Thus a randomly chosen bidder will 
have an estimate that is too high as often as it is too low, and the average 
estimate of a randomly selected bidder will be correct.  However, the winner of 
-4 -2 2 4
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
v v+2σ v+4σv – 2σ v – 4σ 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 7-326
an auction will tend to be bidder with the highest estimate, not a randomly 
chosen bidder.  The highest of five bidders will have an estimate that is too large 
97% of the time.  The only way the highest estimate is not too large is if all the 
estimates are below the true value.  With ten bidders, the highest estimate is 
larger than the true value with probability 99.9%, because the odds that all the 
estimates are less than the true value is (½)10 = 0.1%.  This phenomenon – that 
auctions tend to select the bidder with the highest estimate, and the highest 
estimate is larger than the true value most of the time – is characteristic of the 
winner’s curse. 
 
A savvy bidder corrects for the winner’s curse.   Such a correction is actually 
quite straightforward when a few facts are available, and here a simplified 
presentation is given.  Suppose there are n bidders for a common value good, 
and the bidders receive normally distributed estimates that are correct on 
average.  Let σ be the standard deviation of the estimates.107  Finally, suppose 
that no prior information is given about the likely value of the good.   
 
In this case, it is a straightforward matter to compute a correction for the winner’s 
curse.  Because the winning bidder will generally be the bidder with the highest 
estimate of value, the winner’s curse correction should be the expected amount 
by which the highest value exceeds the average value. This can be looked up in 
a table for the normal distribution.  The values are given for selected numbers n 
in Table  7-30.  This shows, as a function of the number of bidders, how much 
each bidder should reduce their estimate of value to correct for the fact that 
auctions select optimistic bidders.  The units are standard deviations. 
 
Table  7-30: Winner's Curse Correction 
n 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 
WCC (σ) 0 .56 .85 1.03 1.16 1.54 1.74 
n 20 25 50 100 500 1000 10,000
WCC (σ) 1.87 1.97 2.25 2.51 3.04 3.24 3.85 
 
For example, with one bidder, there is no correction, since it was supposed that 
the estimates are right on average.  With two bidders, the winner’s curse 
correction is the amount that the higher of two will be above the mean, which 
turns out to be 0.56σ, a little more than half a standard deviation.  This is the 
amount which should be subtracted from the estimate to insure that, when the 
bidder wins, the estimated value is on average correct.  With four bidders, the 
highest is a bit over a whole standard deviation.  As is apparent from the table, 
the winner’s curse correction increases relatively slowly after ten or fifteen 
bidders.  With a million bidders, it is 4.86σ. 
                                            
107 The standard deviation is a measure of the dispersion of the distribution, and is the square 
root of the average of the square of the difference of the random value and its mean.  The 
estimates are also assumed to be independently distributed around the true value.  Note that 
estimating the mean adds an additional layer of complexity. 
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The standard deviation σ measures how much randomness or noise there is in 
the estimates.  It is a measure of the average difference between the true value 
and the estimated value, and thus the average level of error.  Oil companies 
know from their history of estimation how much error arises in the company 
estimates.  Thus, they can correct their estimates to account for the winner’s 
curse using their historical inaccuracies. 
 
Bidders who are imperfectly informed about the value of an item for sale are 
subject to losses arising from the way auctions select the winning bidder.  The 
winning bidder is usually the bidder with the highest estimate, and that estimate 
is too high on average.  The difference between the highest estimate and the 
average estimate is known as the winner’s curse correction.  The size of the 
winner’s curse correction is larger the more bidders there are but tends to grow 
slowly beyond a dozen or so bidders. 
 
If the bidders have the same information on a common value item, they will 
generally not earn profits on it.  Indeed, there is a general principle that it is the 
privacy of information, rather than the accuracy of information, that leads to 
profits.  Bidders earn profits on the information that they hold that is not available 
to others.  Information held by others will be built into the bid price and therefore 
not lead to profits. 
7.6.6 Linkage 
The U.S. Department of the Interior, when selling off-shore oil leases, not only 
takes an upfront payment (the winning bid) but also takes 1/6 of the oil that is 
eventually pumped.  Such a royalty scheme links the payment made to the 
outcome, and in a way, shares risk, since the payment is higher when there is 
more oil.  Similarly, a book contract provides an author with an upfront payment 
and a royalty.  Many U.S. Department of Defense purchases of major weapons 
systems involve cost-sharing, where the payments made pick up a portion of the 
cost.  Purchases of ships, for example, generally involve 50% to 70% cost 
sharing, which means the DOD pays a portion of cost overruns.  The contract for 
U.S. television broadcast rights for the summer Olympics in Seoul, South Korea, 
involved payments that depended on the size of the U.S. audience. 
 
Royalties, cost-sharing and contingent payments generally link the actual 
payment to the actual value, which is unknown at the time of the auction.  
Linkage shares risk, which is a topic already considered in Section  7.5.  But 
linkage does something else, too.  Linkage reduces the importance of estimates 
in the auction, replacing the estimates with actual values.  That is, the price a 
bidder pays for an object, when fully linked to the true value, is just the true 
value.  Thus, linkage reduces the importance of estimation in the auction by 
taking the price out of the bidder’s hands, at least partially. 
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The linkage principle108 states that, in auctions where bidders are buyers, the 
expected price rises the more the price is linked to the actual value.  (In a parallel 
fashion, the expected price in an auction where bidders are selling falls.)  Thus, 
linking price to value generally improves the performance of auctions.  While this 
is a mathematically deep result, an extreme case is straightforward to 
understand.  Suppose the government is purchasing by auction a contract for 
delivery of 10,000 gallons of gasoline each week for the next year.  Suppliers 
face risk in the form of gasoline prices; if the government buys at a fixed price, 
the suppliers’ bids will build in a cushion to compensate for the risk, and for the 
winner’s curse.  In addition, because their estimates of future oil prices will 
generally vary, they will earn profits based on their private information about the 
value.  In contrast, if the government buys only delivery and then pays for the 
cost of the gasoline, whatever it might be, any profits that the bidders earned 
based on their ability to estimate gasoline prices evaporates.  The overall profit 
level of bidders falls, and the overall cost of the gasoline supply can fall.  Of 
course, paying the cost of the gasoline reduces the incentive of the supplier to 
shop around for the best price, and that agency incentive effect must be 
balanced against the reduction in bidder profits from the auction to select a 
supplier. 
7.6.7 Auction Design 
We saw above that the English auction tends to reduce regret relative to sealed-
bid auctions, and that the linkage principle suggests tying payments to value 
where possible.  These are examples of auction design, in which auctions are 
designed to satisfy objectives of the auction designer.  Proper auction design 
should match the rules of the auction to the circumstances of the bidders and the 
goal of the seller.  Some of the principles of auction design include: 
 
• Impose an appropriate reserve price or minimum bid 
• Use ascending price (English) auctions rather than sealed-bid 
• Reveal information about the value of the item 
• Conceal information about the extent of competition 
• Handicap bidders with a known advantage 
 
However, many of these precepts change if the seller is facing a cartel.  For 
example, it is easier for bidders to collude in a sealed-bid auction than in an 
English auction; and reserve prices should be made relatively high. 
 
Reserve prices (minimum bid) have several effects.  They tend to force marginal 
bidders to bid a bit higher, which increases bids of all bidders, reducing bidder 
profits.  However, reserve prices also lead to a failure to sell on occasion, and the 
optimal reserve trades off this failure to sell against the higher prices.  In addition, 
reserve prices may reduce the incentive of bidders to investigate the sale, 
                                            
108 The linkage principle, and much of modern auction theory, was developed by Paul Milgrom 
(1948 – ). 
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reducing participation, which is an additional negative consideration for a high 
reserve price. 
 
Ascending price auctions like the English auction have several advantages.  
Such auctions reduce the complexity of the bidder’s problem, because bidder’s 
can stretch their calculations out over time, and because bidders can react to the 
behavior of others and not plan for every contingency in advance.  In addition, 
because bidders in an English auction can see the behavior of others, there is a 
linkage created – the price paid by the winning bidder is influenced not just by 
that bidder’s information but also by the information held by others, tending to 
drive up the price, which is an advantage for the seller. 
 
One caveat to the selection of the English auction is that risk aversion doesn’t 
affect the outcome in the private values case.  In contrast, in a sealed-bid 
auction, risk aversion works to the advantage of the seller, because bidders bid a 
little bit higher than they would have otherwise, to reduce the risk of losing.  
Thus, in the private values case, risk averse bidders will bid higher in the sealed-
bid auction than in the English auction. 
 
When considering the revelation of information, there is always an issue of lying 
and misleading.  In the long run, lying and misleading is found out, and thus the 
standard approach is to ignore the possibility of lying.  Making misleading 
statements is, in the long run, the same thing as silence, since those who 
repeatedly lie or mislead are eventually discovered, and then not believed.  Thus, 
in the long run, a repeat seller has a choice of being truthful or silent.  Because of 
the linkage principle, the policy of revealing truthful information about the value of 
the good for sale dominates the policy of concealing information, because the 
revelation of information links the payment to the actual outcome. 
 
In contrast, revealing information about the extent of competition may not 
increase the prices.   Consider the case where occasionally there are three 
bidders, and sometimes only one.  If the extent of competition is concealed, 
bidders will bid without knowing the extent of competition.  If the bidders are risk 
neutral, it turns out that the revelation doesn’t matter and the outcomes are the 
same on average.  If, in contrast, bidders are risk averse, the concealment of 
information tends to increase the bid prices, because the risk created by the 
uncertainty about the extent of competition works to the advantage of the seller.  
Of course, it may be difficult to conceal the extent of competition in the English 
auction, suggesting a sealed-bid auction instead. 
 
Bidders with a large, known advantage have several deleterious effects.  For 
example, incumbent telephone companies generally are willing to pay more for 
spectrum in their areas than outsiders are.  Advantaged bidders discourage 
participation of others, since the others are likely to lose.  This can result in a 
bidder with an advantage facing no competition and picking up the good cheaply.  
Second, rivals don’t present much competition to the advantaged bidder, even if 
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the rivals do participate.  Consequently, when a bidder has a large advantage 
over rivals, it is advantageous to handicap the advantaged bidder, favoring the 
rivals.  This handicapping encourages participation and levels the playing field, 
forcing the advantaged bidder to bid more competitively to win. 
 
A common means of favoring disadvantaged bidders is by the use of bidder 
credits.  For example, with a 20% bidder credit for disadvantaged bidders, a 
disadvantaged bidder only has to pay 80% of the face amount of the bid.  This 
lets such a bidder bid 25% more (since a $100 payment corresponds to a $125 
bid) than they would have otherwise, which makes the bidder a more formidable 
competitor.  Generally, the ideal bidder credit is less than the actual advantage of 
the advantaged bidder. 
 
Auction design is an exciting development in applied industrial organization, in 
which economic theory and experience is used to improve the performance of 
markets.  The U.S. Federal Communications Commissions auctions of spectrum, 
were the first major instance of auction design in an important practical setting, 
and the auction design was credited with increasing the revenue raised by the 
government substantially.  
7.7 Antitrust 
In somewhat archaic language, a trust was a group of firms acting in concert, 
which is now known as a cartel.  The antitrust laws made such trusts illegal, and 
were intended to protect competition.  In the United States, these laws are 
enforced by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, and by the Federal 
Trade Commission.  The United States began passing laws during a time when 
some European nations were actually passing laws forcing firms to join industry 
cartels.  By and large, however, the rest of the world has since copied the U.S. 
antitrust laws in one version or another. 
7.7.1 Sherman Act 
The Sherman Act, passed in 1890, is the first significant piece of antitrust 
legislation.  It has two main requirements: 
 
Section 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
 
Section 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, 
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and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three 
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.109 
 
The phrase “in restraint of trade” is challenging to interpret.  Early enforcement of 
the Sherman Act followed the “Peckham Rule,” named for noted Justice Rufus 
Peckham, which interpreted the Sherman Act to prohibit contracts that reduced 
output or raised prices, while permitting contracts that would increase output or 
lower prices. 
 
In one of the most famous antitrust cases ever, the United States sued Standard 
Oil, which had monopolized the transportation of oil from Pennsylvania to the 
east coast cities of the United States, in 1911. 
 
The exact meaning of the Sherman Act had not been settled at the time of the 
Standard Oil case.  Indeed, Supreme Court Justice Edward White suggested 
that, because contracts by their nature set the terms of trade and thus restrain 
trade to those terms and Section 1 makes contracts restraining trade illegal, one 
could read the Sherman Act to imply all contracts were illegal.  Chief Justice 
White concluded that, since Congress couldn’t have intended to make all 
contracts illegal, the intent must have been to make unreasonable contracts 
illegal, and therefore concluded that judicial discretion is necessary in applying 
the antitrust laws.  In addition, Chief Justice White noted that the act makes 
monopolizing illegal, but doesn’t make having a monopoly illegal.  Thus, Chief 
Justice White interpreted the act to prohibit certain acts leading to monopoly, but 
not monopoly itself. 
 
The legality of monopoly was further clarified through a series of cases, starting 
with the 1945 Alcoa case, in which the United States sued to break up the 
aluminum monopoly Alcoa. The modern approach involves a two-part test.  First, 
does the firm have monopoly power in a market?  If not, no monopolization has 
occurred and there is no issue for the court.  Second, if so, did the firm use illegal 
tactics to extend or maintain that monopoly power?  In the language of a later 
decision, did the firm engage in “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of 
superior product, business acumen or historic accident?”  (U.S. v. Grinnell, 
1966.) 
 
There are several important points that are widely misunderstood and even 
misreported in the press.  First, the Sherman Act does not making having a 
monopoly illegal.  Indeed, three legal ways of obtaining a monopoly – a better 
product, running a better business, or luck – are spelled out in one decision.  It is 
illegal to leverage that existing monopoly into new products or services, or to 
                                            
109 The current fines were instituted in 1974; the original fines were $5,000, with a maximum 
imprisonment of one year.  The Sherman Act is 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
McAfee: Introduction to Economic Analysis, http://www.introecon.com, November 27, 2005 7-332
engage in anticompetitive tactics to maintain the monopoly.  Moreover, you must 
have monopoly power currently to be found guilty of illegal tactics. 
 
When the Department of Justice sued Microsoft over the incorporation of the 
browser into the operating system and other acts (including contracts with 
manufacturers prohibiting the installation of Netscape), the allegation was not 
that Windows was an illegal monopoly.  The DOJ alleged Microsoft was trying to 
use its Windows monopoly to monopolize another market, the internet browser 
market.  Microsoft’s defense was two-fold.  First, it claimed not to be a monopoly, 
citing the 5% share of Apple.  (Linux had a negligible share at the time.)  Second, 
it alleged a browser was not a separate market but an integrated product 
necessary for the functioning of the operating system.  This defense follows the 
standard “two-part test.” 
 
Microsoft’s defense brings up the question of “what is a monopoly?”  The simple 
answer to this question depends on whether there are good substitutes in the 
minds of consumers – will they substitute to an alternate product in the even of 
some bad behavior by the seller?  By this test, Microsoft had an operating 
system monopoly in spite of the fact that there was a rival, because for most 
consumers, Microsoft could increase the price, tie the browser and MP3 player to 
the operating system, or even disable Word Perfect, and the consumers would 
not switch to the competing operating system.  However, Microsoft’s second 
defense, that the browser wasn’t a separate market, is a much more challenging 
defense to assess. 
 
The Sherman Act provides criminal penalties, which are commonly applied in 
price-fixing cases, that is, when groups of firms join together and collude to raise 
prices.  Seven executives of General Electric and Westinghouse, who colluded in 
the late 1950s to set the prices of electrical turbines, spent several years in jail 
each, and there was over $100 million in fines.  In addition, Archer Daniels 
Midland executives went to jail after their 1996 conviction for fixing the price of 
lysine, which approximately doubled the price of this common additive to animal 
feed.  When highway contractors are convicted of bid-rigging, generally the 
conviction is under the Sherman Act, for monopolizing their market. 
7.7.2 Clayton Act 
Critics of the Sherman Act, including famous “trust-buster” and President Teddy 
Roosevelt, felt the ambiguity of the Sherman Act was an impediment to its use 
and that the United States needed a more detailed law setting out a list of illegal 
activities.  The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, was passed in 1914 and it adds 
detail to the Sherman Act.  The same year, the FTC Act was passed, creating the 
Federal Trade Commission, which has authority to enforce the Clayton Act, as 
well as engage in other consumer protection activities. 
 
The Clayton Act does not have criminal penalties, but does allow for monetary 
penalties that are three times as large as the damage created by the illegal 
behavior.  Consequently, a firm, motivated by the possibility of obtaining a large 
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damage award, may sue another firm for infringement of the Clayton Act.  A 
plaintiff must be directly harmed to bring such a suit.  Thus, customers who paid 
higher prices, or firms driven out of business by exclusionary practices are 
permitted to sue under the Clayton Act.  When Archer Daniels Midland raised the 
price of lysine, pork producers who bought lysine would have standing to sue, 
while final pork consumers who paid higher prices for pork, but who didn’t directly 
buy lysine, would not. 
 
Highlights of the Clayton Act include: 
 
• Section 2, which prohibits price discrimination that would lessen 
competition, 
• Section 3, which prohibits exclusionary practices that lessen 
competition, such as tying, exclusive dealing and predatory pricing, 
• Section 7, which prohibits share acquisition or merger that would 
lessen competition or create a monopoly 
 
The language “lessen competition” is generally understood to mean that a 
significant price increase becomes possible – that is, competition has been 
harmed if the firms in the industry can successfully increase prices. 
 
Section 2 is also known as ‘Robinson-Patman’ because of a 1936 amendment by 
that name.  It prohibits price discrimination that lessens competition.  Thus, price 
discrimination to final consumers is legal under the Clayton Act; the only way 
price discrimination can lessen competition is if one charges different prices to 
different businesses.  The logic of the law was articulated in the 1948 Morton Salt 
decision, which concluded that lower prices to large chain stores gave an 
advantage to those stores, thus injuring competition in the grocery market.  The 
discounts in that case were not cost-based, and it is permissible to charge 
different prices based on costs. 
 
Section 3 rules out practices that lessen competition.  A manufacturer who also 
offers service for the goods it sells may be prohibited from favoring its own 
service organization.  Generally manufacturers may not require the use of the 
manufacturer’s own service.  Moreover, an automobile manufacturer can’t 
require the use of replacement parts made by the manufacturer, and many car 
manufacturers have lost lawsuits on this basis.  In an entertaining example, 
Mercedes prohibited Mercedes dealers from buying Bosch parts directly from 
Bosch, even though Mercedes itself was selling Bosch parts to the dealers.  This 
practice was ruled illegal because the quality of the parts was the same as 
Mercedes (indeed, identical), so Mercedes’ action lessened  competition. 
 
Predatory pricing involves pricing below cost in order to drive a rival out of 
business.  It is relatively difficult for a firm to engage in predation, simply because 
it only makes sense if, once the rival is eliminated, the predatory firm can then 
increase its prices and recoup the losses incurred.  The problem is that once the 
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prices go up, entry becomes attractive; what keeps other potential entrants 
away?  One answer is reputation: a reputation for a willingness to lose money in 
order to dominate market could deter potential entrants.  Like various rare 
diseases that happen more often on TV than in the real world (e.g. Tourette’s 
syndrome), predatory pricing probably happens more often in textbooks than in 
the real world.110 
 
The Federal Trade Commission also has authority to regulate mergers that would 
lessen competition.  As a practical matter, the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission divide responsibility for evaluating mergers.  In 
addition, other agencies may also have jurisdiction over mergers and business 
tactics.  The Department of Defense has oversight of defense contractors, using 
a threat of “we’re your only customer.”  The Federal Communications 
Commission has statutory authority over telephone and television companies.  
The Federal Reserve Bank has authority over national and most other banks. 
 
Most states have antitrust laws as well, and can challenge mergers that would 
affect commerce in the state.  In addition, attorneys general of many states may 
join the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission is suing to block 
a merger or in other antitrust actions, or sue independently.  For example, many 
states joined the Department of Justice in its lawsuit against Microsoft.  Forty-two 
states jointly sued the major record companies over their “minimum advertised 
prices” policies, which the states argued resulted in higher compact disc prices.  
The “MAP” case settlement resulted in a modest payment to compact disc 
purchasers.  The Federal Trade Commission had earlier extracted an agreement 
to stop the practice. 
7.7.3 Price-Fixing 
Price-fixing, which is called bid-rigging in a bidding context, involves a group of 
firms agreeing to increase the prices they charge and restrict competition against 
each other.  The most famous example of price-fixing is probably the “Great 
Electrical Conspiracy” in which GE and Westinghouse (and a smaller firm, Allis-
Chalmers and many others) fixed the prices of turbines used for electricity 
generation.  Generally these turbines were the subject of competitive (or in this 
case not-so-competitive) bidding, and one way that the companies set the prices 
was to have a designated winner for each bidding situation, and using a price 
book to provide identical bids by all companies.  An amusing element of the 
price-fixing scheme was the means by which the companies identified the winner 
in any given competition: it used the phase of the moon.  The phase of the moon 
determined the winner and each company knew what to bid based on the phase 
of the moon.  Executives from the companies met often to discuss terms of the 
price-fixing arrangement, and the Department of Justice acquired a great deal of 
physical evidence in the process of preparing its 1960 case.  Seven executives 
went to jail and hundreds of millions of dollars in fines were paid. 
                                            
110 Economists have argued that American Tobacco, Standard Oil and A.T. & T. each engaged in 
predation in their respective industries. 
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Most convicted price-fixers are from small firms.  The turbine conspiracy and the 
Archer Daniels Midland lysine conspiracy are unusual.  (There is evidence that 
large vitamins manufacturers conspired in fixing the price of vitamins in many 
nations of the world.)  Far more common conspiracies involve highway and street 
construction firms, electricians, water and sewer construction companies or other 
“owner operated” businesses.  Price-fixing seems most common when owners 
are also managers and there are a small number of competitors in a given 
region. 
 
As a theoretical matter, it should be difficult for a large firm to motivate a 
manager to engage in price-fixing.  The problem is that the firm can’t write a 
contract promising the manager extraordinary returns for successfully fixing 
prices because such a contract itself would be evidence and moreover implicate 
higher management.  Indeed, Archer Daniels Midland executives paid personal 
fines of $350,000 as well as each serving two years in jail.  Thus, it is difficult to 
offer a substantial portion of the rewards of price-fixing to managers, in exchange 
for the personal risks the managers would face from engaging in price-fixing.  
Most of the gains of price-fixing accrue to shareholders of large companies, while 
large risks and costs fall on executives.  In contrast, for smaller businesses in 
which the owner is the manager, the risks and rewards are borne by the same 
person, and thus the personal risk more likely to be justified by the personal 
return. 
 
We developed earlier a simple theory of cooperation, in which the grim trigger 
strategy was used to induce cooperation.  Let us apply that theory to price-fixing.  
Suppose that there are n firms, and that they share the monopoly profits πm 
equally if they collude.  If one firm cheats, that firm can obtain the entire 
monopoly profits until the others react.  This is clearly the most the firm could get 
from cheating.  Once the others react, the collusion breaks down and the firms 
earn zero profits (the competitive level) from then on.  The cartel is feasible if 1/n 
of the monopoly profits forever is better than the whole monopoly profits for a 
short period of time.  Thus, cooperation is sustainable if: 
 
m
mm
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The left hand side gives the profits from cooperating – the present value of the 
1/n share of the monopoly profits.  In contrast, if a firm chooses to cheat, it can 
take at most the monopoly profits, but only temporarily.  How many firms will this 
sustain?  The inequality simplifies to δ−≤ 1
1n .  Suppose the annual interest rate 
is 5% and the reaction time is 1 week – that is, a firm that cheats on the 
cooperative agreement sustains profits for a week, after which time prices fall to 
the competitive level.  In this case, 1-δ is a week’s worth of interest (δ is the value 
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of money received in a week) and therefore 999014.95.0 52
1 ==δ .  According 
to standard theory, the industry with a week-long reaction time should be able to 
support cooperation with up to a thousand firms! 
 
There are a large variety of reasons why this theory fails to work very well 
empirically, including that some people are actually honest and don’t break the 
law, but we will focus on one game-theoretic reason here.  The cooperative 
equilibrium is not the only equilibrium, and there are good reasons to think that 
full cooperation is unlikely to persist.  The problem is the prisoner’s dilemma 
itself: generally the first participant to turn in the conspiracy can avoid jail.  Thus, 
if one member of a cartel is uncertain whether the other members of a price-
fixing conspiracy are contacting the Department of Justice, that member may 
race to the DOJ – the threat of one confession may cause them all to confess in 
a hurry.  A majority of the conspiracies that are prosecuted arise because 
someone – a member who feels guilty, a disgruntled ex-spouse of a member, or 
perhaps a member who thinks another member is suffering pangs of conscience 
– turns them in.  Lack of confidence in the other members creates a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  Moreover, cartel members should lack confidence in the other cartel 
members who are, after all, criminals. 
 
On average, prosecuted conspiracies were about seven years old when they 
were caught.  Thus, there is about a 15% chance annually of a breakdown of a 
conspiracy, at least among those that are eventually caught. 
7.7.4 Mergers 
The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission share 
responsibility for evaluating mergers.  Firms with more than $50 million in assets 
are required under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to file an intention to merge with the 
government.  The government then has a limited amount of time to either 
approve the merger or request more information (called a second request).  
Once the firms have complied with the second request, the government again 
has a limited amount of time before it either approves the merger or sues to block 
it.  The agencies themselves don’t stop the merger, but instead sue to block the 
merger, asking a federal judge to prevent the merger as a violation of one of the 
antitrust laws.  Mergers are distinct from other violations, because they have not 
yet occurred at the time the lawsuit is brought, so there is no threat of damages 
or criminal penalties; the only potential penalty imposed on the merging parties is 
that the proposed merger may be blocked. 
 
Many proposed mergers result in settlements.  As part of the settlement 
associated with GE’s purchase of RCA in 1986, a small appliance division was 
sold to Black & Decker, thereby maintaining competition in the small kitchen 
appliance market.  In the 1999 merger of oil companies Exxon and Mobil, a 
California refinery, shares in oil pipelines connecting the gulf with the northeast, 
and thousands of gas stations were sold to other companies.  The 1996 merger 
of Kimberley-Clark and Scott Paper would have resulted in a single company 
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with over 50% of the facial tissue and baby wipes markets, and in both cases 
divestitures of production capacity and the “Scotties” brand name preserved 
competition in the markets.  Large bank mergers, oil company mergers and other 
large companies usually present some competitive concerns, and the majority of 
these cases are solved by divestiture of business units to preserve competition. 
 
A horizontal merger is a merger of competitors, such as Exxon and Mobil or two 
banks located in the same city.  In contrast, a vertical merger is a merger 
between an input supplier and input buyer.  The attempt by book retailer Barnes 
and Noble to purchase the intermediary Ingram, a company that buys books from 
publishers and sells to retailers but didn’t directly sell to the public, would have 
resulted in a vertical merger.  Similarly, Disney is a company that sells programs 
to television stations (among other activities), so its purchase of TV network ABC 
was a vertical merger.  The AOL--Time Warner merger involved several vertical 
relationships.  For example, Time Warner is a large cable company, and cable 
represents a way for AOL to offer broadband services.  In addition, Time Warner 
is a content provider, and AOL delivers content to internet subscribers. 
 
Vertical mergers raise two related problems: foreclosure and raising rivals’ costs.  
Foreclosure refers to denying access to necessary inputs.  Thus, the AOL--Time 
Warner merger threatened rivals to AOL internet service (like EarthLink) with an 
inability to offer broadband services to consumers with Time Warner cable.  This 
potentially injures competition in the internet service market, forcing Time Warner 
customers to use AOL.  In addition, by bundling Time Warner content and AOL 
internet service, users could be forced to purchase AOL internet service in order 
to have access to Time Warner content.  Both of these threaten foreclosure of 
rivals, and both were resolved to the government’s satisfaction by promises that 
the merged firm would offer equal access to rivals. 
 
Raising rivals’ costs is a softer version of foreclosure.  Rather than deny access 
to content, AOL--Time Warner could instead make the content available under 
disadvantageous terms.  For example, American Airlines developed the Sabre 
computerized reservation system, which was used by about 40% of travel 
agents.  This system charged airlines, rather than travel agents, for bookings.  
Consequently, American Airlines had a mechanism for increasing the costs of its 
rivals, by increasing the price of bookings on the Sabre system.  The advantage 
to American was not just increased revenue of the Sabre system but also the 
hobbling of airline rivals.  Similarly, banks offer free use of their own automated 
teller machines (ATMs), but charge the customers of other banks.  Such charges 
raise the costs of customers of other banks, thus making other banks less 
attractive, and hence providing an advantage in the competition for bank 
customers. 
 
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission periodically issue 
horizontal merger guidelines, which set out how mergers will be evaluated.  This 
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is a three step procedure for each product that the merging companies have in 
common. 
 
The procedure starts by identifying product markets.  To identify a product 
market, start with a product or products produced by both companies.  Then ask 
if the merged parties can profitably raise price by a small but significant and non-
transitory increase in price, also known as a “SSNIP,” pronounced ‘snip.’  A 
SSNIP is often taken to be a 5% price increase, which must prevail for several 
years.  If the companies can profitably increase price by a SSNIP, then they are 
judged to have monopoly power and consumers will be directly harmed by the 
merger.  (This is known as a unilateral effect, because the merging parties can 
increase price unilaterally after the merger is consummated.)  If they can’t 
increase prices, then an additional product has to be added to the group; 
generally the best substitute is added.  Ask whether a hypothetical monopoly 
seller of these three products can profitably raise price.  If so, an antitrust market 
has been identified; if not, yet another substitute product must be added.  The 
process stops adding products when enough substitutes have been identified 
which, if controlled by a hypothetical monopoly, would have their prices 
significantly increased. 
 
The logic of product market definition is that, if a monopoly wouldn’t increase 
price in a meaningful way, than there is no threat to consumers – any price 
increase won’t be large or won’t last.  The market is defined by the smallest set 
of products for which consumers can be harmed.  The test is also known as the 
hypothetical monopoly test. 
 
The second step is to identify a geographic market.  The process starts with an 
area in which both companies sell, and asks if the merged company has an 
incentive to increase price by a SSNIP.  If so, that geographic area is a 
geographic market.  If not, it is because of buyers substituting outside the area to 
buy cheaply, and the area must be expanded.  For example, owning all the gas 
stations on a corner doesn’t let one increase price profitably because an increase 
in price leads to substitution to stations a few blocks away.  If one company 
owned all the stations in a half mile radius, would it be profitable to increase 
price?  Probably not, as there would still be significant substitution to more 
distant stations.  Suppose, instead, that one owned all the stations for a 15 mile 
radius.  Then an increase in price in the center of the area is not going to be 
thwarted by too much substitution outside the area, and the likely outcome is that 
prices would be increased by such a hypothetical monopoly.  In this case, a 
geographic market has been identified.  Again, parallel to the product market 
definition, a geographic market is the smallest area in which competitive 
concerns would be raised by a hypothetical monopoly.  In any smaller area, 
attempts to increase price are defeated by substitution to sellers outside the 
area. 
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The product and geographic markets together are known as a relevant antitrust 
market, relevant for the purposes of analyzing the merger. 
 
The third and last step of the procedure is to identify the level of concentration in 
each relevant antitrust market.  The Hirschman-Herfindahl index, or HHI, is used 
for this purpose.  The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of the firms in 
the relevant antitrust market, and is justified because it measures the price – cost 
margin in the Cournot model.  Generally in practice the shares in percent are 
used, which makes the scale range from 0 to 10,000.  For example, if one firm 
has 40%, one 30%, one 20% and the remaining firm 10%, the HHI is 
 
 402 + 302 + 202 + 102 = 3,000. 
 
Usually, anything over 1800 is considered “very concentrated,” and anything over 
1000 is “concentrated.” 
 
Suppose firms with shares x and y merge, and nothing in the industry changes 
besides the combining of those shares.   Then the HHI goes up by (x + y)2 – x2 – 
y2 = 2xy.  This is referred to as the change in the HHI.  The merger guidelines 
suggest the government will likely challenge mergers with (i) a change of 100 
and a concentrated post-merger HHI, or (ii) a change of 50 and a very 
concentrated post-merger HHI.  It is more accurate to understand the merger 
guidelines to say that the government likely won’t challenge unless either (i) or (ii) 
is met.  Even if the post-merger HHI suggests a very concentrated industry, the 
government is unlikely to challenge is the change in the HHI is less than 50. 
 
Several additional factors affect the government’s decision.  First, if the firms are 
already engaging in price discrimination, the government may define quite small 
geographic markets, and possibly as small as a single customer.  Second, if one 
firm is very small (less than a percent) and the other not too large (less than 
35%) the merger may escape scrutiny because the effect on competition is likely 
small.  Third, if one firm is going out of business, the merger may be allowed as a 
means of keeping the assets in the industry.  Such was the case with 
Greyhound’s takeover of Trailways, a merger to monopoly of the only intercity 
bus companies in the United States. 
 
Antitrust originated in the United States and the United States remains the most 
vigorous enforcer of antitrust laws.  However, the European Union has recently 
taken a more aggressive antitrust stance and in fact blocked mergers that 
obtained tentative U.S. approval, such as General Electric and Honeywell. 
 
Antitrust is, in some sense, the applied arm of oligopoly theory.  Because real 
situations are so complex, the application of oligopoly theory to antitrust analysis 
is often challenging, and we have only scratched the surface of many of the more 
subtle issues of law and economics in this text.  For example, intellectual 
property, patents and standards all have their own distinct antitrust issues. 
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